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I. INTRODUCTION
This article discusses Supreme Court of Florida decisions in the area of
substantive criminal law handed down between January 1, 1999 and May 1,
2000.1 Cases discussing substantive criminal procedure issues, e.g., search
and seizure, are not the subject of this survey, although they obviously are
important to the criminal law practitioner. As with past criminal law survey
articles, cases discussing the death penalty and sentencing guidelines are
omitted, as these are specialized areas beyond the scope of what actions (or
inactions) may constitute a crime. Cases from Florida's district courts of
appeal are mentioned in footnotes to the extent that their inclusion
* Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University.
J.D., Indiana University, 1978; A.B., Indiana University, 1975.
** Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern .University, Shepard Broad Law Center.
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1. The authors have chosen as their beginning and ending points decisions reported in
volumes 723 through 760 of the Southern Second Reporter.
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supplements the textual discussion. Otherwise, Florida district court
decisions are not the subject of this article.
Even after cases involving the death penalty and sentencing are
eliminated, this survey does not discuss every Supreme Court of Florida
substantive criminal law decision. Those cases that merely address the
application of standard fact situations to a well-settled rule of law have also
been eliminated. Thus, this survey focuses on decisions which "broke
ground" in some way and thus contributed significantly to the dynamic
growth of Florida's substantive criminal law.
This survey is divided into two main parts. The first part discusses
Supreme Court of Florida cases concerning major or novel questions of
substantive criminal law that do not involve constitutional questions. The
second part discusses Supreme Court of Florida cases concerning
constitutional challenges to some of Florida's substantive criminal law
statutes.
II. BURGLARY
At common law, burglary was the breaking and entering of the dwelling
house of another during the nighttime in order to commit a felony therein.
Like other states' statutes, Florida's definition of burglary has significantly
broadened this definition.3 Section 810.02 of the Florida Statutes defines
"burglary" as "entering or remaining in a dwelling, a structure, or a
conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises
are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to
enter or remain.' 4 This definition expands the common law definition of
burglary to protect structures and conveyances as well as dwellings5 and
2. See, e.g., State v. Hicks, 421 So. 2d 510, 511 (Fla. 1982).
3. See id. at 512.
4. FLA. STAT. § 810.02(1) (2000).
5. The burglary statute's definitions of "structure" (subsection 810.011(1)) and
"dwelling" (subsection 810.011(2)) also include the "curtilage" of these two places. See
§ 810.011(1)-(2). Both subsections specifically contain the language "together with the curtilage
thereof' in their definitions. Id. The term "curtilage" itself is not defined in the Florida Statutes.
Hamilton defined the term "curtilage" to require an enclosed area, not just any area connected
with a dwelling or structure. State v. Hamilton, 660 So. 2d 1038, 1044 (Fla. 1995). For a
detailed discussion of Hamilton, see Mark M. Dobson, Criminal Law: 1996 Survey of Florida
Law, 21 NOVA L. REv. 101, 117-22 (1996). The enclosure requirement also applies to Florida's
trespass statute. See FLA. STAT. § 810.08 (2000); L.K.B. v. State, 677 So. 2d 925, 926 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
For a recent case discussing the meaning of "curtilage," see Mejias, where the court found
that a common parking area of an industrial park where several businesses were located within
two separate buildings could not be considered within the curtilage of one of the businesses even
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eliminates the requirement of a "breaking."' 6 The intruder also does not have
to intend to commit a felony; the intent to commit any offense inside the
protected area will do.7 Finally, the unlawful entry with criminal intent can
occur anytime, not just at night.8
The language in the second part of the definition of burglary in section
810.02 of the Florida Statutes has been labeled the "consent clause." 9 The
courts have construed the language "unless the premises are at the time open
to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain" as
constituting an affirmative defense to a burglary charge rather than an
element of the offense which the State must allege and subsequently
though the entire industrial park was enclosed. Mejias v. State, 731 So. 2d 728, 729 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1999). Additionally, in Freeman, the court explained that an unenclosed area in
front of an abandoned apartment building was not within the "curtilage" for purposes of the
trespass in a structure statute. Freeman v. State, 743 So. 2d 603, 603 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App.
1999).
For a recent case discussing what is a "structure" within the definition of section
810.011(1) of the Florida Statutes, see Bean, where the court found that an attached garage
within a wing of a house that shared a common roof and three walls with the rest of the building
was a structure under the burglary statute, even though it did not have a door. Bean v. State, 728
So. 2d 781, 782 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1999).
If the structure that is burglarized or trespassed upon is "occupied," then a higher degree of
burglary or trespass is committed. Section 810.02(2)(c) of the Florida Statutes makes burglary of
an occupied structure a first-degree felony, and section 810.08(2)(b) makes trespass in an
occupied structure a first-degree misdemeanor. FLA. STAT. § 810.02(2)(c), .08(2)(b) (2000). In
D.E., the court recently found that when the only other persons in the place involved are the
defendant's confederates, that place is not occupied for purposes of the trespass statute. D.E. v.
State, 725 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 4th DisL CL App. 1999). As chapter 810 does not define when a
place should be considered "occupied" and does not make a distinction between burglary and
trespass for purposes of this term, the same result should occur if the charge involved is a
burglary.
6. See State v. Hicks, 421 So. 2d 510,511 (Fla. 1982).
7. Although intent to commit a felony is no longer required for a burglary offense, the
specific intent to commit a crime within the protected area is an essential element of burglary. Id.
at 512. Thus, ajury instruction that omits the requirement that the jury find an accused intended
to commit a crime after the unlawful entry constitutes reversible error even without an objection
at trial, as failure to adequately instruct the jury on an element of an offense is fundamental error.
Davis v. State, 736 So. 2d 27, 28 (Fla. 4th DisL CL App. 1999). However, it is not necessary to
instruct the jury on any specific crime that the accused purportedly intended to commit. Puskac
v. State, 735 So. 2d 522, 523 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1999). The requirement that a jury be
instructed that it must find the defendant intended to commit an offense within a protected area
cannot be satisfied by instructing the jury that it must find the defendant intended to commit
"burglary." Viveros v. State, 699 So. 2d 822, 824-25 (Fla. 4th DisL CL App. 1997); Puskac, 735
So. 2d at 523.
8. Hicks, 421 So. 2d at 511.
9. Id.
2000]
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disprove. °  In actuality, this clause contains two separate affirmative
defenses. An accused can either claim that the entry into or remaining in
even a private protected area was with the legal occupant's explicit consent,
or allege that the entry was impliedly consensual by virtue of the premises
being open to all members of the public.
As to the first of these affirmative defenses, explicit consent to enter or
remain, the defense has the burden of offering evidence to raise this
argument." Once this occurs, the State has the burden to disprove the
presence of explicit consent beyond a reasonable doubt. 12 As to the second
of these two affirmative defenses, the Supreme Court of Florida recently
clarified the respective burdens in the "open to the public" affirmative
defense in Miller v. State.1
3
In Miller, the State charged Miller with multiple offenses stemming
from the holdup of a grocery store, committed with the aid of his juvenile
10. Id.
11. Jones v. State, 745 So. 2d 403, 404 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999). As consent is an
affirmative defense, an accused who pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a burglary charge waives
this defense. Id.
12. For a recent case discussing this in detail, see D.R., where a trailer owner had given
the defendant permission to stay in the trailer several nights before the owner locked the trailer up
and moved his family elsewhere. D.R. v. State, 734 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
The defendant admitted going inside the trailer while the owner was away but claimed he
believed he had the owner's permission to do so. Id. at 458. At trial, the owner testified that it
was his understanding that D.R. could not go inside until the owner returned. Id. at 457-58.
However, this testimony was insufficient to prove revocation of consent to enter, as it only went
to the owner's state of mind, not the accused's knowledge of the consent's revocation. Id. at 460.
As "[n]othing in the record suggests that consent to enter, once given to D.R., was ever
withdrawn expressly or by implication and communicated to him," the State failed to meet its
burden. Id.
For another recent case on this point, see Medina, where the court found that after
permission to enter is given, the mere fact that the accused subsequently commits a crime inside a
protected place does not automatically require a finding that consent to remain was revoked.
Medina v. State, 743 So. 2d 116, 117 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1999).
Any alleged consent to enter that has been obtained by trick or fraud will not be considered
valid or lawful consent for purposes of avoiding a conviction. For a recent case on this issue, see
Gordon, where initial entry was gained through a ruse in which the defendant pretended to have a
toothache. Gordon v. State, 745 So. 2d 1016, 1018 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
However, the lawful occupant does not have to explicitly tell an accused to leave. Ray v.
State, 522 So. 2d 963, 966 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a defendant who entered
another's apartment with consent had unlawfully remained there for purposes of a burglary when
the occupant fought with the defendant when he tried to sexually assault her). Consent to remain
after a lawful entry can be revoked implicitly. Id.
13. 733 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1998).
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nephew.14 The two entered the store in the late afternoon armed with a
rifle.15 They disarmed the store's security guard, shot both the guard and the
store's operator, took money from the cash register, and fled. The operator
recovered, but the guard died from injuries caused by his wounds.17 Miller
was subsequently arrested and found guilty on all the charges against
him: first-degree murder; attempted first-degree murder with use of a
firearm; armed robbery with a firearm; robbery with a firearm; and
burglary. 8 The judge followed the jury's unanimous recommendation and
sentenced Miller to death.19
On appeal, Miller raised no issue regarding thezguilt phase of his trial,
but raised six issues regarding the penalty phase. However, upon an
independent review of the record, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed his
burglary conviction and remanded the case to the trial court for a new
penalty phase hearing.21 The court believed that there had been some
confusion regarding the "open to the public" affirmative defense, as opposed
to the licensee or invitee affirmative defense in the "consent clause" of
section 810.02(1) of the Florida Statutes.22 The court subsequently held that
"if a defendant can establish that the premises were open to the public, then
this is a complete defense." 23  Thus, even if an accused enters an area
publicly open, and the lawful occupants subsequently withdraw consent, this
will still not make the accused guilty of burglary.2 A finding otherwise was
considered not only to be in direct conflict with explicit language in the
14. Id. at 955. The nephew was a prosecution witness against Miller at trial. Id. at 956.
The opinion does not indicate what charges were brought against the nephew or what ultimately
happened to him. See id.
15. Id.
16. Miller, 733 So. 2d at 956. Three other people were also inside the store at the time,
including two children. Id. The nephew, who shot the store's operator, claimed that the shooting
was accidental. Id. The opinion contains no facts as to why the guard was shot after being
disarmed or why the two did not shoot any of the other four occupants. See id. at 955.
17. Id. at 956.
18. Miller, 733 So. 2d at 955.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 956.
21. Id. at 957. The court found a new sentencing hearing was needed, as its decision
invalidated the "committed during the course of a burglary" aggravating factor in Miller's case.
Id. The court declined to find that use of this improper factor was harmless error. Miller, 733 So.
2d at 957.
22. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 810.01(1) (2000).
23. Miller, 733 So. 2d at 957.
24. See, e.g., Franklin v. State, 750 So. 2d 63, 65 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(rejecting the argument that once an accused entered a 24-hour convenience store and demanded
money, consent for him to be there was implicitly revoked as the employees knew he was only
there to commit a crime).
200]
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consent clause of section 810.02(1),25 but also would produce absurd results.
For example, a thief would automatically be guilty of burglary whenever
entering a store to secretly steal an item, no matter how open to the public
the premises would be.26 As the State conceded that the store Miller robbed
was open to the public, his burglary conviction was reversed.27
Several subsequent cases show that the principle established in Miller
could be extended too far. Business areas may have a dual nature or
character; that is, part of them may, by virtue of the business engaged in, be
open to the public, and part of them may be closed to the public. When
defendants go beyond the publicly open areas with the intent to commit a
crime, they may easily find themselves being charged and convicted of
burglary. Thus, a defendant who gained access through deception to a hotel
manager's private office even though his entry into the hotel's lobby had
been to a public area,2 a defendant who dove head first through a
restaurant's drive-up window to take cash,29 and a defendant who entered a
locked, gated employee area of a cellular telephone store,30 all were found
guilty of burglary.
m0. POSSESSION OF BURGLARY TOOLS
The Supreme Court of Florida also recently decided an important case
concerning possession of burglary tools. Section 810.06 of the Florida
Statutes states that "[w]hoever has in his or her possession any tool,
machine, or implement with intent to use the same, or allow the same to be
used, to commit any burglary or trespass" commits a crime.31 In Calliar v.
State,32 a teacher saw Calliar on school property trying to break a bicycle's
chain with wire cutters and a screwdriver. Calliar had entered the property
through an open gate in a fence and was trying to get the bicycle unchained
from a rack in the school's fenced area. Calliar was subsequently
25. Miller, 733 So. 2d at 957.
26. Ray v. State, 522 So. 2d. 963, 967 n.6 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (citing a similar
factual situation it deemed ridiculous in State v. Shult, 380 N.W.2d 352 (S.D. 1985), where a
pizza thief was convicted of burglary for entering a store with intent to shoplift).
27. Miller, 733 So. 2d at 957.
28. Thomas v. State, 742 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
29. Fine v. State, 758 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
30. Millian v. State, 758 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
31. FLA. STAT. § 810.06(2000). This section makes the crime a third-degree felony. Id.
32. 760 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 1999).
33. Id. at 885.
34. Id.
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convicted of possession of burglary tools, burglary of an occupied structure,
and resisting an officer without violence.
35
Calliar appealed his conviction for possession of burglary tools,
claiming that section 810.06 only criminalizes possession of tools with intent
to use them to commit burglary or trespass, not theft.36 The First District
Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction 37 and rejected the contrary
reasoning of the Third District in Hierro v. State.38 The First District
criticized the Hierro court as having "ignored... that the intent to commit
the theft at the time of the illegal entry is an element of the crime of
burglary. The two charges should not be treated as separate incidents, but
rather as one criminal episode with a unified intent.
39
The Supreme Court of Florida, in a short, well-reasoned opinion,
quashed the district court's opinion.4 The court cited with approval,
Hierro's reasoning that the explicit statutory language of section 810.06
required 'not merely that the accused intended to commit a burglary or
trespass while those tools were in his possession, but that the accused
actually intended to use those tools to perpetrate the crime."' 41 The court
thus held that "the crime of possession of burglary tools is just what it
appears to be: possession of tools used or intended to be used to unlawfully
enter the premises of another. '42  Several reasons supported this
interpretation. First, under the plain meaning rule, a court must give words
in a statute their plain meaning.3 Here, that meant "burglary tools" should
only be considered as those tools actually used or intended for use in a
burglary or trespass, and not merely tools that were intended to commit
another crime once the trespass or burglary was accomplished. 44 Under
section 810.02(1), all Calliar needed to commit a burglary was an unlawful
entry of a statutorily protected place "with the intent to commit an additional
offense."4S Second, the court found that a contrary construction would lead
to absurd results, since as long as an accused possessed something that was
intended to commit any other crime after an illegal entry, the accused would
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Calliarv. State, 714 So. 2d 1134, 1134 (Fla. 1stDist. Ct. App. 1998).
38. 608 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1992).
39. Calliar, 714 So. 2d at 1135.
40. Calliar v. State, 760 So. 2d 885, 887-88 (Fa. 1999).
41. Id. at 886 (quoting Thomas v. State, 531 So. 2d 708, 709 (Fla. 1988)) (emphasis
omitted).
42. Id. at 887.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Calliar, 760 So. 2d at 887 (discussing FLA. STAT. § 810.02(1) (1995)). For a more
detailed discussion of burglary see supra notes 2-30 and accompanying text.
20001
10
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
be guilty of possession of burglary tools.46 Instead, the court found that the
tools possessed must be used to commit a burglary or trespass for section
810.06 to be violated.47 In this case, since there was no evidence that the
wirecutters or screwdriver had been used to help Calliar burglarize or
trespass on school grounds, his burglary conviction was reversed.48
IV. POSSESSION OF CONCEALED WEAPONS OR FIREARMS
Florida's substantive criminal law makes the possession of a weapon or
firearm a crime in a variety of circumstances. The possession may be
criminal depending on the status of the possessor,49 the nature of the weapon
46. Callier, 760 So. 2d at 887.
47. Id. The court could have possibly cited to a third rationale to support its decision.
Assuming the court found ambiguity in the statutory language of section 810.06, the court could
have then relied on the rule of leniency, which requires a court to strictly construe criminal
statutes in favor of the accused.
48. Id.
49. FLA. STAT. § 790.23(1) (2000) (making possession of a firearm, electric weapon, or
concealed weapon illegal if the possessor is a convicted felon or has been found delinquent of an
offense that would have been a felony for an adult, and the possessor is under 24 years of age).
Until 1999, if the possessor had been adjudicated delinquent, but the juvenile court's jurisdiction
over him or her had expired or been relinquished, then the accused would not have been a
delinquent in possession. § 790.23(2). The 1999 Legislature amended section 790.23 to extend
the applicable age of former delinquents from 18, when juvenile court jurisdiction over them
expires, until 24. Ch. 99-284, § 39, 1999 Fla. Laws 3133, 3133 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 790.23(1) (2000)).
For a recent case involving offenses under this subsection, see Adkins, where the court
found that the felon defendant could not be convicted of possession of a firear where the
firearm was found in the trunk of his girlfriend's car that he happened to be driving, and there
was no proof he knew of its presence. Adkins v. State, 738 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1999). Further, in Bullis, the court found that the accused could be convicted of a felony charge
for possession of firearm based upon the testimony of a deputy sheriff placing the accused inside
a motor home where weapons were found scattered about in the open. Bullis v. State, 734 So. 2d
463 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
For an important recent decision holding that voluntary intoxication is not an available
defense to violations of section 790.23 of the Florida Statutes, as these are general, rather than
specific, intent crimes, see Goodwin v. State, 734 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Section 790.235(1) of the Florida Statutes makes it a crime for a violent career criminal to
"own[] or ha[ve] in his or her care, custody, possession, or control any firearm or electric
weapon... or carr[y] a concealed weapon." In Jackson, the court recently rejected due process,
equal protection, and ex post facto attacks on the statutory predecessor to section 790.235.
Jackson v. State, 729 So. 2d 947, 949-50 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
For another recent case involving this subsection, see Jacobs, where the court found that
the accused was properly convicted of being a violent career criminal in possession of a firearm
[Vol. 25:1
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or firearm possessed,5° how the weapon or firearm is possessed,5' or the
geographical area where the weapon or firearm is possessed.52 Recently, the
Supreme Court of Florida decided an important case clarifying the test to be
used and factors to be considered in determining whether a weapon or
firearm was possessed in a "concealed" fashion.
5 3
In Dorelus v. State, the defendant and a co-defendant, Presume, were
in a car stopped for a traffic violation.55 The defendant was the driver, and
the co-defendant was a passenger.5 6  While standing outside the car, the
officer who stopped them claimed, according to his probable cause affidavit,
that he saw "'the shiny silver butt of a handgun... located underneath the
when a handgun was found partially hidden under the driver's seat of the car he was seen driving,
and the car's owner testified it was not hers. Jacobs v. State, 742 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1999).
50. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 790.221 (2000) (making it a crime to possess a short-barreled
rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or a machine gun); § 790.225 (making possession of self-propelled
knives illegal).
51. Sections 790.01(1) and (2) of the Florida Statutes make it a crime to possess
concealed or electric weapons or concealed firearms. § 790.01(1), (2). However, a person may
be licensed to carry a concealed weapon or firearm pursuant to section 790.06, or lawfully carry
such concealed weapons even without a license if the weapon or firearm is in a "private
conveyance... [and] is securely encased or is otherwise not readily accessible for immediate
use" pursuant to section 790.25(5). § 790.25(5). Section 790.053 makes it a crime to openly
carry a firearm or device. § 790.053.
52. See, e.g., § 790.115(1)-(2) (making it a crime to possess firearms or weapons on
school property or at school-sponsored events). But see RLLS. v. State, 732 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 2d
Dist. CL App. 1999) (finding that the accused could not be convicted of possessing a weapon on
school property when the knife he had was so short-bladed that it fell within the "common
pocketknife" exception to the definition of a weapon under section 790.001(13)).
For another recent case discussing this exception, see Walls, where the court found that a
knife approximately nine inches long and carried with the blade locked open could be considered
a weapon for purposes of a conviction. Walls v. State, 730 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App.
1999).
For detailed discussion of the "common pocketknife" exception, see LB. v. State, 700 So.
2d 370 (Fla. 1997).
53. Dorelus v. State, 747 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1999). The case only involved a charge of
carrying a concealed firearm. Id. at 370. However, the supreme court noted that since the critical
statutory language concerning what constitutes concealment was the same for both concealed
firearms and concealed weapons, its decision should be applicable to both offenses. Id.
54. 747 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1999).
55. Id. at 369.
56. These facts come from the district court's opinion in the co-defendant's case. State
v. Presume, 710 So. 2d 604, 604 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1998). The opinions in both the
defendant's and the co-defendant's cases are silent as to where the co-defendant, Presume, was
sitting when the car was stopped; however, the facts imply that he was in the front seaL See id. at
605.
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radio."'57 The officer arrested both men for carrying a concealed weapon.
Before trial, both Presume and Dorelus separately filed sworn motions to
dismiss. 59 The State filed a traverse to Presume's motion, denying its
material allegations.60 At the hearing on the motion, the State argued
unsuccessfully that it needed to present the arresting officer's testimony to
show how the gun was concealed.61 The prosecution additionally argued
that the question of concealment was a matter of fact for the jury and thus
not the proper subject of a motion to dismiss.62 However, after examining
the officer's probable cause affidavit, the trial court rejected these arguments
and granted Presume's motion. 63 Dorelus' motion was filed after his co-
defendant's successful hearing.64 Dorelus' motion asked the court to
judicially notice the order granting his co-defendant's motion to dismiss. 65
The State did not traverse this time but instead relied on its arguments in the
previous case.6 Once again, the motion to dismiss was granted.6__68
The State appealed both orders dismissing the charges.68 In both cases,
the district court of appeal reversed.69 Both opinions found that the trial
court had erred by granting the motions based on the appellate court's
findings that whether a weapon is concealed is a question for the trier of fact
and never a question of law,70 relying on the supreme court's decision in
Ensor v. State.71 Dorelus subsequently appealed the decision in his case to
the supreme court.72
57. Dorelus, 747 So. 2d at 370. The Fourth District's opinion in Presume noted that the
affidavit also alleged the gun was "'easily accessible to both the defendant & co-defendant."'
Presume, 710 So. 2d at 604.
58. Dorelus, 747 So. 2d at 370.
59. Id. Both motions were filed pursuant to FIA. R. CUM. P. 3.190(c)(4).
60. Presume, 710 So. 2d at 604-05.
61. Id. at 605.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Dorelus, 747 So. 2d at 370.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.; Presume, 710 So. 2d at 604.
69. Dorelus, 720 So. 2d at 543; Presume, 710 So. 2d at 606.
70. Dorelus, 720 So. 2d at 543; Presume, 710 So. 2d at 606. The Presume opinion also
found that the State's traverse, along with the statements in the arresting officer's probable cause
affidavit, created an issue of material fact for a jury. Id. at 605.
71. 403 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1981). The court in Ensor held that a firearm may be within a
police officer's sight for purposes of invoking the "plain view" doctrine to support a warrantless
seizure under the Fourth Amendment and still be found to be a "concealed firearm" under section
790.001(2). Id. at 351.
72. Dorelus, 747 So. 2d at 370.
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In an important, well-organized opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida
quashed the appellate court's decision.73  The court noted that section
790.001(2) of .the Florida Statutes defined a concealed firearm as one
"carried on or about a person in such a manner as to conceal the firearm
from the ordinary sight of another person. ' 74 It agreed with the Fourth
District's characterization of Ensor as the seminal case discussing when a
weapon or firearm is considered "concealed" under section 790.001.75 The
court in Ensor found that a firearm does not have to be totally out of sight to
be considered concealed.7 6 Rather, the test for concealment was whether the
firearm was "hidden from the ordinary sight of another person.' 7 7 "Ordinary
sight of another person" was in turn defined as "the casual and ordinary
observation of another in the normal associations of life."78 The court
declared that this would depend "on whether an individual, standing near a
person with a firearm or beside a vehicle in which a person with a firearm is
seated, may by ordinary observation know the questioned object to be a
firearm." 79 According to Ensor, this question "must rest upon the trier of
fact under the circumstances of each case."go
The supreme court in Dorelus noted that Ensor has been interpreted as
standing for the proposition that concealment is always a question of fact
and never a question of law which could be decided on a motion to dismiss.
8 1
Dorelus rejected this broad interpretation of Ensor and clarified that what
the court in that case meant to say was that "the issue of concealment is
ordinarily an issue for the trier of fact., 82 The court also noted that Ensor
may have been misleading in another respect, viz., the extent to which its
83discussion focused on the observer's viewpoint. Instead, to be consistent
with the statutory definition of "concealed firearm," the Dorelus court
declared that the emphasis should be on "the manner," that is, how someone
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 790.001(2) (1995)). This language is the same as that
currently found in that section. See FLA. STAT § 790.001(2) (2000). The same language is also
found in the statutory definition of a "concealed weapon." § 790.001(3)(a).
75. Dorelus, 747 So. 2d at 370.
76. Ensor, 403 So. 2d at 354.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 355.
80. Id.
81. Dorelus, 747 So. 2d at 371.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 372.
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carries the firearm.84 This manner of carrying would again focus on whether
the firearm involved was out of "the ordinary sight of another person."8 5
The supreme court's opinion, besides clarifying earlier statements in
Ensor, is especially helpful because the court also discussed in some detail
what factors are and are not relevant in determining if the manner in which
86the firearm is carried means it should be considered concealed. Factors
which Dorelus deemed relevant to whether the manner of carrying the
firearm made it concealed included where it was inside a vehicle, how
much or how little it was covered by another object,88 whether an accused
used his/her body to conceal what would otherwise be ordinarily visible,
8 9
and "the nature and type of weapon involved." 90 Finally, as to relevant
factors, the court said that the police officers' observations are important. 9'
Thus, a statement that the officer could "immediately recognize" an object as
a weapon may conclusively show it was not concealed. However, just
because an officer cannot or did not immediately make such a recognition
would not automatically mean a jury could find that an object was
concealed.93 This contrary result is rational, since a weapon may be
immediately visible in the open if viewed from one position but not from
another one. Likewise, someone may not see a firearm or weapon that is in
the open just because the person does not happen to be looking in that
direction or may be just careless in his or her observation. An observer's
viewpoint or lack of attention should not determine if how an object is
carried makes it concealed, as this would make the issue depend on factors
totally beyond the control of the person accused of carrying it in a concealed
fashion.9' -
84. Id.
85. Id. at 371.
86. Dorelus, 747 So. 2d at 370-72.
87. Id. at 371. Places specifically mentioned in this regard included "the floorboard, the
seat, a seat pocket, or an open console." Id.
88. Id. The objects mentioned as examples were "a sheet or a towel." Id.
89. Dorelus, 747 So. 2d at 371-72. The court gave as an example a Second District case
where a driver leaned over a weapon located between the seats and tried to put one arm over the
weapon's butt to prevent a police officer from seeing it. Id. (discussing State v. Hankerson, 430
So. 2d 517 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
90. Id. at 372. The court noted that rifles are more difficult to conceal than handguns,
and that obviously smaller firearms can be concealed more easily than larger ones. Id.
91. Id.
92. Dorelus, 747 So. 2d at 372.
93. Id. at 371.
94. Id. at 372. The court rejected the First District's reasoning which found that a
firearm caried in a stopped car could be concealed even though the officer looking through a
passenger side window could readily see it but the officer looking through the driver's side
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The court rejected the State's argument that other factors extraneous to
how the weapon involved was carried may be relevant to whether it was
concealed or not.95 Thus, time of day and whether a vehicle's window is
open or closed should not be considered in making this determination. The
court felt that using such factors would create the risk that the concealed
weapons and firearm law would be unconstitutionally vague.9
Looking at the actual facts in Dorelus and applying the appropriate
factors as to how the firearm was carried, the supreme court agreed with the
trial court's determination that, as a matter of law, it was not concealed.
97
There was no dispute it was in an open console with the butt of the handgun
sticking out. The handgun was not covered, and the defendant made no
attempt at all to use his body to shield the gun from the officer's view.
99
Finally, the officer had no difficulty recognizing it as a firearm.l°°
When the court's reasoning is examined in light of some of criminal
law's basic principles, the correctness of this decision becomes even more
evident. One of the basic principles of criminal law in a free, democratic
society is that citizens should be able to govern their conduct to avoid the
potentially coercive effects that criminal law can impose on them through
charging, conviction, and ultimately punishment. Before citizens can govern
their conduct so as to avoid the possibility of conviction and punishment,
they must know what conduct will violate the law. A second basic principle
is that citizens should only be punished for factors, usually action or
inaction, within their own control, not someone else's. The court furthered
both of these principles by elaborating on those factors that may make a
weapon or firearm concealed. First, it provided better notice to citizens, as
well as to the courts, regarding what conduct to avoid so as not to run the
risk of being charged and convicted of carrying a concealed item. Second,
the conduct to avoid is limited to factors that citizens who might be charged
with carrying a concealed weapon can avoid, because it is their own conduct,
window could not. Id. (discussing McGraw v. State, 404 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App.
1981)). As the Dorelus court said, "[w]hether a crime has occurred should not depend on
whether the officer's initial vantage point is the driver's rather than the passenger's side of the
automobile." Id.
95. Dorelus, 747 So. 2d at 373. One extraneous factor the court did not mention is the
weather. This, too, should be considered irrelevant, as it is outside the accused possessor's
control. Why should a weapon resting uncovered on the back seat of a car be considered
concealed because it cannot be readily seen through a rain-fogged window but would be readily
seen in the exact same spot on a clear, sunny day?
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Dorelus, 747 So. 2d at 373.
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and not someone else's, on which a charge would be brought. Citizens may
not always be able to control how observant an officer is, but they can
control how secluded a weapon is by where it is placed, what covers it, and
what actions are taken or not taken to try or not try to hide it with the body.
At the conclusion of its opinion, the supreme court suggested that the
legislature should consider amending the law "to set forth the exact
parameters for carrying a weapon [or firearm] in a vehicle in this state."101
The court cited three groups that would benefit from such a statutory
clarification.10 2 First, police would benefit because they would better know
when to arrest for a concealed weapon violation. 13 Second, citizens would
benefit because, as mentioned above, they would better know how to
transport certain items legally.104 Finally, courts would benefit because it is
they who must decide whether a weapon has been carried in a prohibited
manner.1
05
At least through the 1999 session, the Florida legislature has not acted
on the court's suggestion. However, the Dorelus opinion will still be useful
to all three groups, especially the trial courts. When called upon to make the
initial judgment as to whether a person has unlawfully carried a concealed
firearm or weapon, trial judges should look to Dorelus for guidance.
Furthermore, unless and until the legislature acts upon the supreme court's
suggestion, trial judges may wish to consider instructing juries on those
factors Dorelus has explicitly declared relevant and irrelevant when a jury
trial is involved. Finally, strong consideration should be given to amending
the Florida Standard Jury Instructions in criminal cases to incorporate these
factors for charges related to carrying concealed weapons or firearms.'0
6
V. MANSLAUGHTER: OMISSIONS, CAUSATION,
AND CULPABLE NEGLIGENCE
Substantive criminal law sometimes, but not always, requires that there
be a harmful result for there to be a crime. When such a harmful result
101. Id. at 374.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Dorelus, 747 So. 2d at 374.
106. For another recent case involving carrying concealed firearms, see Walker. Walker
v. State, 733 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999). In Walker, there was no question that
firearms carried in a car Walker drove and shared with a passenger were concealed. See id. at
564. However, there was no direct or even circumstantial evidence, such as Walker's fingerprints
on any of the guns, to show he knew of their presence. Id. at 564-65. Thus, Walker could not
even be convicted on a theory of constructive possession with ajoint occupant. Id. at 564.
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occurs, criminal law further requires that it be the result of an accused's act.
This second requirement is the requirement of causation. Usually, when a
harmful result occurs, causation is self-evident. However, occasionally
cases arise where the issue of causation raises serious problems. These
issues almost always arise in the context of homicide prosecutions. A
homicide prosecution requires proof of a harmful result, the killing of a
human being, as well as proof of causation, by another human being. Where
the killing stems solely from a voluntary act of the accused, both elements
are easily satisfied. For instance, if one person pulls a gun and shoots
another person, killing the second person instantly, both the killing and the
causation through human agency are obvious. However, when the killing
occurs through the alleged omission, rather than commission, of another,
then serious questions of causation can arise. The Supreme Court of Florida
recently addressed the issues of causation and omissions in Eversley v.
State."" This case also gave the court an opportunity to discuss culpable
negligence and Florida's felony child abuse statute.108
Eversley was charged with manslaughter and felony child abuse
stemming from the death of her infant son, Isaiah.1°9 When Isaiah was born,
the defendant contracted with another woman to keep and to care for him as
Eversley felt she could not do so because of her work.110 Two months later,
Eversley decided to care for Isaiah herself, showed up at the woman's home,
and took him with her."' The next day, Isaiah began to act as if he were
sick.11 2 Eversley took him to a clinic where medical staff, including a
doctor, repeatedly told her that he might have pneumonia and that she
needed to take him to a hospital for immediate testing.1 3 Eversley took the
baby to a hospital emergency room but left without having him examined
because she became impatient while waiting for doctors to see several
people ahead of her.114 That evening, Isaiah continued to show signs of
11516labored breathing. Eversley went to sleep with him lying next to her.16When she woke up in the early morning hours the next day, she noticed he
107. 748 So. 2d 963 (Fa. 1999).
108. Id. at968-70.
109. Id.at964.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 964.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 965.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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was not breathing. 1 7 Paramedics were summoned and found that Isaiah had
been dead for some time.118
At trial, cause of death was a major issue.119 Eversley claimed the baby
was sick when she first picked him up at the other woman's home.
However, both the woman and Eversley's aunt, who had also seen Isaiah that
day, said he was not sick when Eversley picked him up. 12 1 Nurses and the
doctor at the clinic testified about the repeated admonitions they had given
Eversley concerning the need for the baby to receive testing at a hospital.
122
Eversley herself admitted that she knew if she had told the hospital
emergency room staff she had been sent there by a doctor, Isaiah would have
been seen ahead of the people who were there before her.123 She claimed she
believed the baby only had a cold, but this testimony was countered by the
clinic staff who testified they specifically told her he might have
pneumonia.'2 At trial, medical experts for both sides differed in their
estimates of Isaiah's chances for survival had he been given prompt medical
care. 125 The defense's expert estimated that the mortality rate for the type of
pneumonia the baby had was twenty-five percent, thus giving him only a
seventy-five percent chance of survival even with adequate care.'2 The
State's expert put the mortality rate at only one percent, assuming adequate
medical care.
The jury convicted Eversley of manslaughter and felony child abuse,
but the trial court, in ruling on the defense's post trial motion for judgment
of acquittal, overturned the manslaughter conviction and reduced the child
abuse conviction to a misdemeanor. The trial court based its ruling on the
supreme court's early decision in Bradley v. State,129 which it read as finding
that a parent's failure to provide medical care for a sick child can never be
considered the legal cause of the child's death.130 The State appealed and
the district court reinstated both the manslaughter and felony child abuse
117. Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 965.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 964.
121. Id.
122. Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 964.
123. State v. Eversley, 706 So. 2d 1363, 1365-66 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
124. Id. at 1366.
125. See Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 967.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 964.
129. 84 So. 677 (Fla. 1920).
130. Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 965.
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convictions.13 The defense subsequently appealed this decision to thesupreme court hbpe
As both the district court and the supreme court's opinions discussed
Bradley, an examination of that decision is helpful. In Bradley, the
defendant's epileptic daughter fell into a fire during a seizure and was
severely burned.' This occurred on April 26." From then until May 30,
the defendant repeatedly refused to have her seen by a doctor, although
relatives and even a justice of the peace urged him to do so. 135 Bradley
apparently could have paid for the medical attention and turned down offers
from others to pay for a doctor to examine his daughter. 136 The father told
anyone who urged him to seek medical treatment for his daughter that he
was relying on the will of God, and that "the greatest physician was God
himself. ' 137 Finally, the daughter was taken to a state hospital where she
died on June 22. Bradley was charged with manslaughter by culpable
negligence. 139 At trial, the doctors who treated his daughter testified she
would have recovered from the burns if-prompt medical care had been given,
and that the burns were the cause of her death. 140
On appeal, the supreme court reversed. 141 The statute under which the
State charged Bradley defined manslaughter as "[tihe killing of a human
being by the act, procurement or culpable negligence of another, in cases
where such killing shall not be justifiable or excusable homicide nor
murder."1 42 Justice Whitfield, in his majority opinion, first invoked as the
basis for reversal the principle of legali, that is, that no act can be a crime
unless the legislature has made it so. According to Justice Whitfield,
"statutes creating and defining crimes cannot be extended by intendment,
and that no act, however wron.ul, can be punished under such a statute
unless clearly within its terms." Justice Whitfield found that there was no
state law "specifically making the failure or refusal of a father to provide
medical attention for his child a felony, and [that] the general [statutory]
131. Id.
132. See id.at 964.
133. Bradley, 84 So. at 679 (West, J., dissenting).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 679-80.
136. Id. at 680.
137. Id. at 681.
138. Bradley, 84 So. at 680.
139. Id. at 681.
140. Id. at 680.
141. Id. at 679.
142. Id. at 678 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 3209 (1906)).
143. See Bradley, 84 So. at 678-79.
144. Id. at 679.
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definition of 'manslaughter'... does not appear to cover a case of this
nature.' 45 Looking at both the indictment's allegations and the evidence at
trial, the justice then found no proof the girl had been killed "by the
[defendant's] act, procurement or culpable negligence."'9 46 Justice Whitfield
concluded by asserting that even if the girl would have recovered, the cause
of her death was accidentally being burned, not her father's failure to get
prompt care.147 Thus, "even if the failure or refusal of the father to provide
medical attention was 'culpable negligence' within the intent of the statute,"
this culpable negligence would not have caused the daughter's death.14
In a brief concurring opinion, Chief Justice Browne agreed that the
conviction should be reversed. 149  Although his concurrence purports to
address a number of different questions, all of them seem to be directed to
the issue of causation. 50 Browne believed that whatever the State's claims
factually and legally, it had not met its burden of proof as to causation.'
5
'
Thus, he claimed that "it was not proven, and was not capable of being
proven that if the child had had medical attention it would have
recovered.'
52
Justice West wrote an extensive dissent.153 He began by asserting that
"[a]ll the essential elements of the offense charged in the
indictment.., were proved." ' 4 That being so, he found only two questions
that needed to be addressed: did the facts proven "make a case of
manslaughter within the terms of the statute," and, if so, did the defendant's
religious beliefs provide a "sufficient justification or excuse for his failure to
secure any medical treatment for his daughter?"' 55  The first question
addressed Justice Whitfield's principle of legality argument.,5 6 Justice West
noted that a father owes a legal duty to his minor children to provide the
necessities of life, if possible?.57 Thus, a father must provide his children
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Bradley, 84 So. at 679.
149. Id. (Browne, J., concurring).
150. See id.
151. Id.
152. Id. Justice Browne believed that the State could never factually prove causation in a
case like this "until the practice of medicine becomes an exact science so that it can be established
beyond the peradventure of a doubt that death would not have ensued if a physician had been in
attendance." Bradley, 84 So. at 679.
153. Id. at 679-83 (West, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 680.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Bradley,84So.at681.
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with food, clothing, shelter, and medical care if he can.158 Failure to do so
could be culpable negligence in West's oinion, thus coming within the
prohibition of the manslaughter statute. Having answered the first
question affirmatively, the dissent cited a number of cases from other
jurisdictions all concluding that defendants' personal religious beliefs will
not exonerate them when their actions otherwise break the law.16 Thus,
Justice West found Bradley's religious belief in leaving the matter of his
daughter's recovery solely in God's hands neither a justification nor an
excuse for failing to get her prompt medical care.
61
The Bradley majority opinion is a confusing combination of legal and
factual justifications for reversal. The first basis, the principle of legality,
would mean that the accused could never be convicted of manslaughter
under the law at the time, as his omissions did not fall within the statute's
prohibition. This could be so either because Justice Whitfield believed that
an omission could never give rise to criminal liability unless there was a
statute specifically declaring that such liability existed, or because even if
omissions could sometimes give rise to criminal liability under the
manslaughter statute, the father's omissions did not do so here as a matter of
law. Justice Whitfield's comments regarding "no proof' provided at least
two additional bases for reversal. 162 First, the Justice may have believed that
the State had not presented sufficient medical testimony to prove causation.
Second, even if the State had proved causation, it had not offered enough
evidence to prove the accused was culpably negligent here. Unfortunately,
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 681-83.
161. Id. at 683. Neither the majority nor concurring opinions directly discuss whether
Bradley's beliefs could have been a reason to exonerate him. Reading both of these opinions,
one cannot help but feel that possibly the justices silently felt that maybe Bradley was a good man
who had "suffered enough," but the justices were at the same time hesitant to endorse the notion
that a person's religious beliefs can be a reason not to hold someone criminally responsible.
Justice Whitfield's opinion refers to "[whatever motive may have prompted the father" and notes
that the father was not charged with willfully depriving the daughter of medical attention.
Bradley, 84 So. at 679. To an extent, this is a true statement, as Bradley was not charged with
violating an existing statute making it a crime to "willfully deprive his child of necessary medical
attention." Id. at 678 (citing RLA. STAT. § 3238 (1906)). Certainly, though, as the word
"willfully" is commonly understood, Bradley's inaction was willful; his child needed medical
help, and he made the decision not to provide it promptly because of his religious beliefs.
Chief Justice Browne asked whether a father "who belongs to that exemplary band of
Christians who have no faith in the efficacy of medicine as a curative agency," should be
convicted when he does not provide necessary medical care to a child who dies. Id. at 679.
Of course, there is no way of knowing whether these two justices did indeed silently cast
their votes to overturn the conviction on this basis.
162. Id.
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Justice Whitfield's opinion never clarifies which one or ones of these three
grounds he relies upon in reversing the conviction.
1 63
In Eversley, the district court of appeal reversed the trial court's order
overturning the manslaughter conviction and reducing the child abuse
conviction to a misdemeanor.1" The district court noted that the trial court
had read Bradley to mean that a parent's failure to provide needed medical
care could never be the legal cause of death. 65 The district court believed
that continued reliance on Bradley for this proposition was inconsistent with
the development of Florida's laws regarding the protection of children.
16
Unlike the state of the law in 1906, Florida law in effect when Eversley was
decided provided extensive protection for children and explicitly made
parental failure to obtain medical care for a sick child a serious crime.
67
Thus, parents who willfully failed to provide medical care to their child
could be prosecuted for manslaughter provided three elements were
proven.1 68 The defendant had to: 1) cause the child's death; 2) do so by
culpable negligence; and 3) have no lawful justification for doing so.
Culpable negligence would exist "when a defendant recklessly or wantonly
disregards the safety of another." 170  As for causation, the district court
believed that this concept had been significantly liberalized in modem
manslaughter cases. 171 No longer did the State have to prove that "but for"
an accused's acts or omissions, the death would not have occurred.
1 72
Instead, causation would lie "when a defendant's action is a material
contributing factor in the victim's death.'1
3
Applying these two standards, the district court first concluded that a
jury could find Eversley culpably negligent. 74 Her actions in leaving the
163. Id. at 678-79. Unfortunately, Justice Whitfield also mentions all three grounds in
the same paragraph, thus adding to the difficulty of determining his grounds for reversal. Bradley,
84 So. at 678.
164. State v. Eversley, 706 So. 2d 1363, 1364 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
165. Id. at 1365.
166. Id.
167. FLA. STAT. § 827.04(1) (1995). This section was subsequently changed and
incorporated into section 827.03 of the Florida Statutes. For a brief discussion of the changes,
see infra notes 226-29 and accompanying text.
Florida criminal law when Bradley was decided in 1906 made depriving a child of needed
medical care a crime; however, it was only a misdemeanor. FLA. STAT. § 3238 (1906).
168. Eversley, 706 So. 2d at 1365.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Eversley, 706 So. 2d at 1365.
174. Id. at 1366.
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hospital emergency room without having her child treated or even examined,
after having been advised by doctors of the baby's potentially serious
medical situation, "epitomize[d] willful and wanton recklessness." 75 As to
causation, the medical testimony established that "[t]here was a significant
chance that, given medical aid, Isaiah could have survived his bout of
pneumonia." '  Since the defendant's failure to get him that aid deprived the
baby of that chance for life, there was enough evidence for a reasonable jury
to conclude the mother's actions and omissions contributed to his death.
177
Finally, the district court reinstated the felony child abuse conviction. 17
The 1995 statute under which Eversley was charged with criminal child
abuse made it a third-degree felony to "willfully or by culpable negligence,
depriv[e] a child of... necessary... medical treatment... and in so doing
caus[e] great bodily harm ... to such child., 179 The district court's opinion
does not even discuss culpable negligence as far as a conviction under this
law. 180  Instead, "Eversley's capricious decision to leave the emergency
room, despite her knowledge that she could obtain immediate assistance,
evidence[d] a specific and willful intent to deny Isaiah medical services."''
The Supreme Court of Florida, in an extensive discussion of causation
and culpable negligence, reversed the district court's finding that Eversley
could be convicted of manslaughter, but upheld the court's finding that she
was guilty of felony child abuse.182 The supreme court first noted that thelanguage of the two manslaughter statutes under which Bradley 83 and
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. Once again, the district court found that Bradley presented an antiquated view
which should no longer be followed. Eversley, 706 So. 2d at 1365. The court rejected Justice
Browne's reasoning in his concurring opinion that causation was factually incapable of being
proved in these types of cases. Id. at 1366. "Medical science has progressed significantly since
the days when 'it was not capable of being proven that if the child had had medical attention it
would have recovered."' Id. (quoting Bradley v. State, 84 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1920)).
178. Id.
179. FLA. STAT. § 827.04(1) (1995).
180. See Eversley, 706 So. 2d at 1363-66.
181. Id. at 1366. The district court's opinion does not discuss whether culpable
negligence for purposes of a manslaughter conviction is the same as for a child abuse conviction.
Presumably the definitions would be the same, as the same term is used in both statutes and thus
should be given the same meaning unless an explicit legislative intent to do otherwise is shown.
As the district court found Eversley guilty of willful child abuse, one can assume it also would
alternatively have found her guilty of child abuse by culpable negligence.
182. Eversley v. State, 748 So. 2d 963, 970 (Fla. 1999).
183. FLA. STAT. § 3209 (1906). See supra note 142 and accompanying text for the*
language of this statute.
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Eversley' 4 were prosecuted is substantially the same. 85 The supreme court
agreed with the district court as to the three elements needed to prove
manslaughter under these statutes.186 However, the supreme court disagreed
with the district court's opinion in its analysis of causation and culpable
negligence. 187
Eversley examined the majority's opinion in Bradley and found it
"rather ambiguous," especially on the issue of causation. 8  The supreme
court disagreed with the district court's finding that the "but for" test for
cause-in-fact causation need no longer be satisfied, and that instead cause-in-
fact causation could be established by using a "material contributing factor"
test. 89 As Eversley correctly recognized, causation in criminal law consists
of two parts.19° First, "but for" causation must be found before an accused
can be potentially criminally liable.'91 However, this alone is not enough for
criminal responsibility to be imposed. 92 There must be a second category of
causation, usually called legal causation. 193  Only when both types of
causation exist can criminal responsibility be found.' 94 As to "but for"
causation, in Eversley the supreme court noted that "the State usually must
demonstrate that 'but for' the defendant's conduct, the harm would not have
occurred.', 195 If a harm would have occurred anyway despite the accused's
conduct, then "but for" causation is not satisfied, and there should be no
criminal responsibility for the harm.116 When "but for" causation has been
184. FLA. STAT. § 782.07 (1995) (defining manslaughter in part as "[t]he killing of a
human being by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, without lawful
justification... and in cases in which such killing shall not be excusable homicide or
murder...").
185. Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 965-66.
186. Id. at 966.
187. Id. at 966-70.
188. Id. at 966. The Eversley court found that the concurring and dissenting opinions in
Bradley only contributed to this ambiguity. Id. Chief Justice Browne's concurrence was
described as only begging the question posed in the majority opinion, "[W']as the majority
holding that the State failed to prove causation in this case or that the State could never prove
causation in this case or any other case with similar facts?" Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 966 n.3.
189. Id. at 966.
190. Id. at 966-67.
191. Id. at 967. "But for" causation is also sometimes called "factual" or "actual"
causation. All three terms stand for the same concept.
192. Id.
193. Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 966-67. This type of causation can also go by other names
such as "proximate cause." Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 967.
196. For example, assume baby Isaiah had a rare, untreatable disease that would have
killed him before or by the time he eventually died, then "but for" causation would not have been
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established, then legal causation becomes an issue.197 The Supreme Court of
Florida declared that two questions must be answered positively before this
type of causation exists. 19" The first question is "whether the prohibited
result of the defendant's conduct is beyond the scoNe of any fair assessment
of the danger created by the defendant's conduct. 99 The second question
is, "whether it would be otherwise unjust, based on fairness and policy
considerations, to hold the defendant criminally responsible for the
prohibited result." 20°
The court noted that the issue in Eversley involved "but for" causation
and not legal causation.2o1 That being so, the district court erred by using the
"substantial factor" or "material contributing factor" test.202 These types of
tests may be appropriate for the issue of legal causation but not for factual
causation. However, the supreme court in Eversley agreed with the
district court's conclusion that the evidence at trial was sufficient to prove
causation here and rejected Chief Justice Browne's statements in Brad l
that "medical testimony cannot be the basis for establishing causation."
Advancements in medicine since Bradley were such that "it is common to
uphold convictions on the basis of medical testimony advancing reasonable
theories of causation when such testimony has been supplemented by other
proven. His mother may still have been culpably negligent for not getting him prompt
examination or treatment, but her negligence would not have been the factual cause of his death.
197. Id.
198. Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 967.
199. Id.
200. Id. Neither of these two questions can be answered with precision. Instead, in any
case where the fact finder must explicitly address the question of legal causation, the fact finder is
really being asked to make a policy decision that, given the circumstances of the case, criminal
responsibility should or should not be imposed on the accused. Only where the imposition of
criminal responsibility seems beyond the bounds of all fairness is an appellate court likely to
reverse a conviction for lack of legal causation.
As stated by one writer, '"he decision to attach causal responsibility for social harm to one
rather than to another actual cause is one made [by the fact finder] by use of common sense and
moral intuitions." JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERMrANDiNG CRmINAL LAw 163 (1987). Dressier
clearly believes that unlike "but for" causation which can be reduced to answering precise, fact
based inquiries, legal causation is incapable of being found through using a formulaic process.
Instead, he suggests that courts can only consider a number of factors in making the intuitive
judgment they must make on legal causation. His discussion of both "but for" causation and legal
causation is among the best on these subjects and is highly recommended for readers desiring
more about these topics.
201. Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 967.
202. Id. at 966.
203. See id. at 967.
204. Id.
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evidence supporting the causal relation at issue. 20 5 This medical testimony
"does not have to be expressed in terms of a reasonable medical certainty"
but instead could be stated as probabilities.2G6 Thus, the State's expert
testimony that there was a ninety-nine percent chance of survival had the
accused obtained prompt medical care for the child was sufficient to show
"but for" causation.2 7 The court recognized that Eversley had offered
contrary medical testimony but found that it was up to the jury to resolve the
differences between the two, as juries must with all questions of fact. 8
After rejecting both Bradley's and the district court's treatment of "but
for" causation, the Supreme Court of Florida turned its attention to the issue
of culpable negligence. 209 Here the Eversley court found that the Bradley
opinion resolved the issue.210 Eversley used the principle of legality to
resolve the question of whether the defendant could be convicted under the
manslaughter statute she was charged with violating.211 The court focused
on Justice Whitfield's language from the majority in Bradley that "the
general definition of 'manslaughter' contained in the statute does not
appear to cover a case of this nature.212 As the manslaughter statute in that
case was virtually the same as in Eversley, Bradley's reasoning was still
213
controlling. Thus, Eversley held "that under the statute in effect at the
time of the crime ... the failure to provide medical care does not satisfy the
culpable negligence element of manslaughter," so the mother's conviction
for this had to be overtumed.
214
The State fared better on the argument that Eversley had committed
215felony child abuse. The felony child abuse statute in effect when Isaiah
died specifically provided that "[w]hoever, willfully or by culpable
negligence, deprives a child of... necessary... medical treatment... and
in so doing causes great bodily harm" was guilty of a third-degree felony.
6
Unlike the manslaughter statute, "culpable negligence" for purposes of a
child abuse conviction had been interpreted several times to include
205. Id. at 968.
206. Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 968 (quoting Delap v. State, 440 So. 2d 1242, 1253 (Fla.
1983)) (emphasis added).
207. Id. at 967.
208. Id. at 968.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 968-70.
212. Id. at 968 (quoting Bradley v. State, 84 So. 677,679 (FIa. 1920)) (emphasis added).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 970.
216. Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 970.
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purposeful omissions which caused harm.2 17 The supreme court noted that
the trial court's reduction of Eversley's child abuse conviction rested on its
erroneous finding that there was insufficient evidence to believe she caused
the baby "great bodily harm." 218 As the only difference between felony and
misdemeanor child abuse was causing great bodily harm versus "the
infliction of physical or mental injury," 9 and the supreme court had found
the causation element met, it reinstated the Eversley jury's felony child
abuse verdict.220 Thus, the supreme court did not have to address the district
court's finding that the defendant's actions had amounted to willfulness
under the statute.
There is certainly an ironic bent to the supreme court's rulings in
Eversley. The mother was statutorily unable as a matter of law to commit
"culpable negligence" for purposes of a manslaughter charge but was not
only able, but explicitly found guilty of committing "culpable negligence"
for purposes of felony child abuse. 2 Unless one believes that the supreme
court intended "culpable negligence" to mean factually one thing for one
offense and something completely different for the other offense, there
initially seems to be an unresolvable conflict between the two rulings in the
same opinion. However, when the court's reasoning is examined closely, no
such inconsistency exists. Indeed, the Eversley holding is completely
consistent with basic notions of stare decisis, statutory construction, and
even constitutional law.
The bedrock for Eversley's different rulings on culpable negligence is
the principle of legality. Justice Whitfield in Bradley's majority had relied
on one aspect of this principle to find Bradley not guilty of manslaughter. 2
This aspect of the principle requires that before an act can be criminal, the
legislature must make it such by law.?2 Thus, Whitfield's opinion rested on
his statement that "[tbhere is no statute in this state specifically making the
failure or refusal of a father to provide medical attention for his child a
felony," and therefore Whitfield found that the general definition of
manslaughter did not extend to such inaction.224 Another aspect of the
principle of legality is that a legislature cannot judicially amend a statute to
make criminal, acts or omissions that were not previously considered to be
217. See, e.g., Nicholson v. State, 600 So. 2d 1101, 1104 (Fla. 1992) (finding that "a
willful 'omission ... whereby unnecessary or unjustifiable pain or suffering is caused' constitutes
aggravated child abuse under section 827.03(Y).
218. Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 970.
219. FA. STAT. § 827.04(2) (1995).
220. Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 970.
221. See id.
222. Bradley v. State, 84 So. 677, 678 (Fla. 1920).
223. Id. at 678-79.
224. Id. at 679 (emphasis added).
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prohibited by the statute. Thus, even though failure to provide a child
necessary medical aid had been made legislatively a felony when Isaiah died,
the legislature had not amended the general definition of manslaughter
beyond that in Bradley. As a result, the principles of legality and of stare
decisis forced the supreme court in Eversley to follow the Bradley holding,
whether the justices personally wanted to or not. If the court had not done
so, it would not only have violated the principle of legality and the concept
of stare decisis, but would also have possibly raised constitutional issues.
Judicial amendment of the manslaughter statute would have violated the due
process principle that people are entitled to fair notice of what constitutes a
crime. It would also have violated the prohibition against ex post facto
laws225 by retroactively making criminal what was previously not considered
criminal, that is, Eversley's failure to get care for her child. When examined
in light of these considerations, one certainly may not like the result that
Eversley could not be convicted of manslaughter but still must respect the
supreme court's ruling for sticking to higher principles of law.
Fortunately, Eversley's ruling on manslaughter has become an
aberration and should not occur again. As the court itself noted, shortly after
Isaiah's death, the Florida Legislature amended section 782.07 of the
Florida Statutes to add a third subsection explicitly stating that "[a] person
who causes the death of any person under the age of 18 by culpable
negligence under [section] 827.03(3) commits aggravated manslaughter of a
child," a first-degree felony."26 The 1996 Legislature also amended section
827.03 to include two new subsections explicitly defining what constitutes
"aggravated child abuse" 227 and "neglect of a child. ''"e Thus, "it is clear that
the Legislature now intends to include the failure to provide medical care
within the definition of manslaughter." 229 This legislative amendment also
225. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
226. Ch. 96-322, § 12, 1996 Fla. Laws 1761, 1774 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 782.07(3)
(2000)).
227. Id. § 8, 1996 Fla. Laws 1761, 1770 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 827.03(2)(a)-(c)
(2000)).
228. Id.
229. Eversley v. State, 748 So. 2d 963, 969 (Fla. 1999). The court also explicitly declared
that "[h]ad the amended statutes been in effect at the time of the alleged crime in this case,
Eversley's conduct would have been punishable as manslaughter." Id.
Eversley noted in its discussion that at least one previous Florida decision had concluded
that the failure to provide medical care when one would be considered to have a legal duty to do
so could not result in a manslaughter conviction. Id. at 965 (citing Neveils v. State, 145 So. 2d
883 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1962)) (finding that a husband's failure to provide medical care for
his wife who died could not constitute manslaughter). Failure to provide necessary medical aid to
a child for whom one had assumed the duty of care had also been declared a proper basis for a
manslaughter conviction in other jurisdictions. See Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307 (D.C.
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demonstrates an additional argument that Eversley was correct in
overturning the manslaughter conviction. Legislatures, when enacting or
amending statutes, are presumed to not engage in useless acts.m Thus, if the
previous definition of manslaughter had been meant to include those acts or
omissions included in the new amendments, these would have been mere
redundancies. Since statutes should not be construed in a way that makes
them totally or even partially redundant, the previous manslaughter statute
could not have included culpable negligence through failure to furnish
needed medical care to a child.
VI. SELF-DEFENSE, DUTY TO RETREAT, AND THE "CASTLE DOCTRINE"
Florida statutory law recognizes that one may use force to defend
oneself from an attack 231 This use of force may even extend to the use of
deadly force when one "reasonably believes that such [deadly] force is
necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself. ' z 2
However, the person threatened cannot use deadly force without first doing
everything possible to avoid doing so, including retreating, even though the
other person is the wrongful aggressor.233 Common law has recognized one
exception to this duty to retreat whenever possible, known as the "castle
doctrine.' 2"2 Under this doctrine, Florida courts have recognized that
persons attacked at home do not have to retreat or try to retreat from their
home before using deadly force in self-defense, so long as the deadly force is
necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm.235 Unfortunately, Florida
case law has also crafted exceptions to this exception, leaving the state of the
law in this area confusing and irrational . 6
Cir. 1962). Thus, the Florida Legislature's amendment of section 782.07 is not surprising; what
is surprising is how long it took for this to be done after Bradey.
230. Beachv. GreatW. Bank, 692 So. 2d 146, 152 (Fla. 1997).
231. FLA. STAT. § 776.012 (2000).
232. Id. The remainder of this section justifies deadly force if one reasonably believes it
necessary to prevent the same bodily harm to "another or to prevent the imminent commission of
a forcible felony." Id.
Use of deadly force to defend another or prevent the commission of a forcible felony is
beyond the scope of this article's discussion. For the statutory definition of what constitutes a
"forcible felony," see § 776.08.
233. See State v. Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d 724, 725 (Fla. 1982) (quoting the trial court's
jury instructions on the legal duty to retreat).
234. Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1049 (Fla. 1999).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1049-51.
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In Weiand v. State,'3' the Supreme Court of Florida recently eliminated
these irrational exceptions and helped bring clarity to the "castle doctrine's"
application. In Weiand, the defendant was charged with the first-degree
murder of her husband.238  During a violent argument, Weiand shot her
husband in the apartment where they lived with their newborn child.239 She
claimed the killing was in self-defense and presented exert testimony about
battered woman's syndrome to support her argument. Weiand herself
claimed her husband had choked, beaten, and threatened her with more
violence if she ever tried to leave him.2 1 Two experts testified that she
suffered from battered woman's syndrome.2 2 One of these experts, based
on her examination of Weiand and the expert's own studies, concluded that
"when Weiand shot her husband she believed that he was going to seriously
hurt or kill her.''243 This expert also explained that Weiand did not leave her
home during the fatal argument for several reasons despite her apparent
opportunities to do so." The defense requested that the trial court give the
standard jury instruction on the "castle doctrine. '" 5 However, the court
refused and instead gave the instruction regarding the general duty to retreat
in a case of self-defense.246 The jurors were told that "[t]he fact that the
defendant was wrongfully attacked cannot justify her use of force likely to
cause death or great bodily harm if by retreating she could have avoided the
237. 732 So. 2d 1044, 1044 (Fla. 1999).
238. Id. at 1048.
239. Id.
240. Id. In Hickson, the court held that expert testimony about the battered spouse
syndrome should be admissible to support a self-defense claim, provided that the expert witness
is properly qualified to testify on this subject. State v. Hickson, 630 So. 2d 172, 176 (Fla. 1993).
The syndrome itself is not a defense but only a way of explaining to the fact finder why a battered
spouse would have acted the way the spouse did in certain circumstances.
241. Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1048.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. The expert believed that Weiand did not flee, because she felt unable to do so as
she had recently given birth, she was paralyzed with fear, she had been choked unconscious
(although when this occurred in relation to the killing is not clear), and past experience had
shown her that threatening to leave only increased her husband's violence. Id.
245. Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1048. This instruction would have told the jurors that:
If the defendant was attacked in [his][her] own home or on [his][her] own
premises, [he][she] had no duty to retreat and had the lawful right to stand
[his][her] ground and meet force with force, even to the extent of using force
likely to cause death or great bodily harm if it was necessary to prevent either
death or great bodily harm.
Id.
246. Id.
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need to use that force. '' 47 In the prosecutor's closing argument, the State
stressed that in order for her actions to be considered justifiable self-defense,
Weiand must have used all _possible means to avoid the killing, including
leaving the couple's home. Weiand was convicted of second-degree
murder and sentenced to eighteen years in prison.2 9 The Second District
Court of Appeal initially affirmed Weiand's conviction.m On rehearing, the
appellate court certified the question of the jury instruction concerning the
duty of retreat to the Supreme Court of Florida as one of great public
importance.51 The supreme court accepted and rephrased the certified
question to address the correctness of the jury instructions on retreat and
self-defense in a case like this.
z2
According to the supreme court, the trial court's instruction was
technically correct as the instruction followed the supreme court's opinion in
State v. Bobbitt.253 Prior to Bobbitt, the supreme court held that a lawful
resident had the privilege of nonretreat from her home when the resident was
attacked by her lover who was lawfully in the home as an invitee at the time
of the killing.z 4 Bobbitt examined whether the privilege should apply when
the person killed is not only lawfully present but is also a co-occupant of the
home. 25 Bobbitt and her husband were living together when she killed him
during his unprovoked attack on her.Y The Bobbitt trial court failed to
instruct the jury that as the attack was unlawful and happened in her home,
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Wejand, 732 So. 2d at 1049.
250. Weiand v. State, 701 So. 2d 562, 563 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997). This opinion
concerned issues not pertinent to the "castle doctrine" and the duty to retreat.
251. The original question certified by the Second District was:
SHOULD THE RULE OF STATE V. BOBBITT, 415 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1982),
BE CHANGED TO ALLOW THE CASTLE DOCTRINE INSTRUCTION IN
CASES WHERE THE DEFENDANT RELIES ON BATTERED-SPOUSE
SYNDROME EVIDENCE (AS NOW AUTHORIZED BY STATE V.
HICKSON, 630 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1994D] TO SUPPORT A CLAIM OF SELF-
DEFENSE AGAINST AN AGGRESSOR WHO WAS A COHABITANT OF
THE RESIDENCE WHERE THE INCIDENT OCCURRED?
We n 732 So. 2d at 1046-47.
252. Id. at 1047.
253. 415 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1982), recededfrom by Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044 (Fla.
1999).
254. Hedges v. State, 172 So. 2d 824, 827 (Fla. 1965). The court rejected the argument
that the "castle doctrine" only applied when the person killed was a trespasser as was the case in
Pell v. State. Id. (discussing Pell v. State, 122 So. 110 (Fla. 1929)).
255. Bobbit, 415 So. 2d at 724.
256. Id. at 725.
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the defendant had no duty to retreat to the maximum extent possible.
Instead, the jury was instructed about the defendant's general duty to retreat
when attacked before a killing could be considered self-defense.2 8 The
supreme court approved this instruction and also Aproved the failure to
further instruct the jurors on the "castle doctrine." The court noted its
earlier decision finding that the doctrine applied when one is attacked at
home by an invitee who is lawfully present but not living in the home as
well.260 However, the court felt the Bobbitt situation was distinguishable. 261
Thus, the Bobbitt court held that:
[T]he privilege not to retreat, premised on the maxim that every
man's home is his castle which he is entitled to protect from
invasion, does not apply here where both Bobbitt and her husband
had equal rights to be in the "castle" and neither had the legal right
to eject the other.262
Implicit in this decision was the distinction between trespassers,
invitees, and co-occupants. Trespassers have no legal right to be in an
occupant's home while invitees do, by virtue of the lawful occupant's
invitation. However, the supreme court evidently considered this invitation
implicitly revoked because of the invitee's unprovoked attack, thus reducing
the invitee's status to that of a trespasser. The same could not be said of co-
occupants who had equal legal rights to be on the premises when the attack
began. Ironically, one result of Bobbitt was that it functionally changed this
equality of the right to remain. The attacker was considered legally on the
premises, but the attacked victim's right to remain was reduced by the
257. Id. The trial court declined to give the requested jury instruction which was:
One unlawfully attacked in his own home or on his own premises has no duty
to retreat and may lawfully stand his ground and meet force with force,
including deadly force, if necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily
harm to himself or another, or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.
Id.
258. Id.
259. Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d at 726.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. In so doing, the court approved language from Conner that a mother attacked in
her home by a son living there also had the general duty to retreat and could not claim the benefit
of the "castle doctrine." Id. at 726 (reviewing Connor v. State, 361 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1978)). The Conner court claimed this did not make the mother defenseless as she could
still use deadly force if retreating from the home would increase her chances of death or great
bodily harm. Connor v. State, 361 So. 2d 774, 776 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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victim's obligation to retreat fully if, by doing so, the victim could avoid
using deadly force without endangering the victim.
Justice Overton dissented from the majority's opinion in Bobbitt. 3 His
dissent criticized the artificial distinctions made based solely upon the status
of the attacker.? One result of Bobbitt that he correctly pointed out was
that it "places the wife in the same position as if the altercation had occurred
in a public place." 20 He criticized the different applications of the duty to
retreat between an attack by one family member on another member when
both live in the home and when only one member lives in the home.
266
Justice Overton claimed that "the majority's rule is in fact a minority
position which does not recognize the realities of life."267 Instead of the
State or defense's positions, Justice Overton argued for the establishment of
a limited duty to retreat rule when the victim is attacked by one legally in the
home regardless of the attacker's status.2" This rule would place upon the
victim attacked a duty to retreat within the home, if possible, but not require
the victim to actually leave the home.. 9 Victims could meet force with
equal force, even deadly force, if such force were needed to prevent their
death or great bodily harm.270
In Weiand, the supreme court receded from its position in Bobbitt and
adopted Justice Overton's suggestion to adopt a limited duty to retreat when
both the person attacked and the attacker are lawfully in the home.27 1 The
court did so for two reasons. First, Bobbitt was found to rely on
considerations of "property law and possessory rights" that are inconsistent
with the "castle doctrine. That doctrine is grounded, not in a notion of
263. Bobbin, 415 So. 2d at 726 (Overton, ., dissenting).
264. Id. at 729.
265. d. at 727.
266. Id. at 728.
267. Id
268. Bobbin, 415 So. 2d at 728. This limited rule would apply "when the assailant in
one's home is an invitee, a cotenant, or a family member." Id. Thus, by implication it would not
change the "castle doctrine" when the attacker is a trespasser.
269. See id.
270. Id. Justice Overton proposed the following instruction on this limited duty:
If the defendant was attacked in [his/her] own home, or on [his/her] own
premises, by a cotenant, family member, or invitee, [he/she] has a duty to
retreat to the extent reasonably possible but is not required to flee [his/her]
home and has the lawful right to stand [his/her] ground and meet force with
force even to the extent of using force likely to cause death or great bodily
harm if it was necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to
[himself/herself] or another.
Id.
271. Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1051 (Fla. 1999).
272. ki
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superior property rights of one against another, but in the realistic, "time-
honored principle that the home is the ultimate sanctuary. ' '273  Second,
increased awareness and understanding of domestic violence showed that
there were sound policy reasons to recede from Bobbitt.274 The court noted
that studies showed that "[d]omestic violence is the single major cause of
injury to women. ' 275  Other studies showed that attempted retreat by a
battered spouse can actually increase the chances of the spouse being killed
or seriously harmed, as the retreat often served to further provoke the
attacker. 276 The court also believed that an instruction requiring the battered
spouse to leave the home (as opposed to retreating in it, if possible)
perpetuated the "common myth that the victims of domestic violence are free
to leave the battering relationship any time they wish to do so.
'277
Weiand recognized the argument that eliminating a duty to retreat from
the home when the parties involved are co-occupants could ultimately
increase the number of violent encounters, as more violence in the home is
likely to occur between co-occcupants than between occupants and
trespassers or invitees.278 However, the court found that this argument was
not supported by any empirical studies.279 Instead, the court determined that
forcing complete retreat, when possible, could actually increase the number
of domestic violence incidents. Furthermore, the court noted that even
when an attacked co-occupant does not have to completely retreat from the
home, that occupant is not absolutely privileged to use deadly force.2 1 The
general rule that defensive force must be proportionate to the offensive force
still exists under the limited duty rule.u Thus, attacked occupants cannot
kill unless they reasonably use all means to avoid doing so. The limited duty
to retreat rule merely recognizes that one of the means the law of self-
defense cannot reasonably expect people to use is to leave their homes when
attacked. Weiand thus approved of Justice Overton's suggested jury
instruction, with some minor changes in language.
283
273. Id. at 1052.
274. Id. at 1051.
275. Id. at 1053.
276. Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1054.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1056.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1056.
282. See id.
283. Id. The exact instruction approved in Weiand is as follows:
If the defendant was attacked in [his/her] own home, or on [his/her] own
premises, by a co-occupant [or any other person lawfully on the premises]
[he/she] had a duty to retreat to the extent reasonably possible without
[Vol. 25:1
35
: Nova Law Review 35, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2000
Adams IDobson
Weiand brings Florida in line with the majority of courts that have
considered this question.2 Moreover, it eliminates irrational outcomes
based on minor distinctions in how an attacker is lawfully in the home.
While the court's decision spends much time discussing domestic violence
against women, its rule is equally applicable when the husband/male lover is
the one attacked.20 Additionally, at least one commentator has argued that
even though Florida recognized the battered spouse syndrome as part of the
law of self-defense "as a matter of law, self-defense was still nearly
impossible for a battered spouse to prove because of the [Bobbitt] duty to
retreat." m After Weiand, this should certainly be a different case.
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A. Separation of Powers
During the past year, the Supreme Court of Florida addressed a problem
that has drawn frequent public attention and criticism: the efficiency and
fairness of Florida's death penalty appellate process. During a special
legislative session, the Florida Legislature attempted to expedite the process
through the Death Penalty Reform Act of 2000 ("DPRA").' 7 The DRPA
attempted to significantly alter the state's post conviction process in capital
cases with several specific revisions, particularly with its creation of a "dual-
track" process in which post conviction claims could be filed almost
contemporaneously with a direct appeal.28
While expressing sympathy with the legislature's desire to improve the
efficiency and speed of the process, the Supreme Court of Florida asserted
its prerogative under the Florida Constitution to exclusively control the
power to adopt judicial rules of practice and procedure in Allen v.
increasing [his/her] own danger of death or great bodily harm. However, the
defendant was not required to flee [his/her] home and had the lawful right to
stand [his/her] ground and meet force with force even to the extent of using
force likely to cause death or great bodily harm if it was necessary to prevent
death or great bodily harm to [himself/herself].
Id. at 1057.
284. Id. at 1051.
285. The rule would presumably also be applicable in same-sex domestic relationships.
286. Douglas A. Orr, Weiand v. State and Battered Spouse Syndrome: The Toothless
Tigress Can Now Roar, 74 FLA. B.L 14, 16 (2000). This article provides a good, concise
discussion of the battered spouse syndrome and the duty to retreat in Florida before and after
Weland.
287. Ch. 2000-3, §§ 1-22,2000 Fla. Laws 4,4-23.
288. Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So. 2d 52,55 (Fla. 2000).
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Butterworth,289 where it found that most sections of the DPRA violated the
provisions of the Florida Constitution that guarantee separation of powers of
the branches of state government.290 Using its mandamus authority,291 the
court held that the statute interfered with its power to "adopt rules for the
practice and procedure in all courts," including the time for seeking appellate
review.2g The court rejected the State's contention that the law's deadlines
for filing post conviction motions were statutes of limitations that would
293have fallen within the legislature's substantive lawmaking powers. While
recognizing that habeas corpus petitions are technically civil in nature, the
court declared that they were actually quasi-criminal because they are heard
and disposed of in criminal courts. 9,C The fact that the writ of habeas corpus
is explicitly provided for in the text of the Florida Constitution2o was also
deemed significant by the court.296 The court also distinguished an Eleventh
Circuit decision that permitted Congress to impose a deadline on filing
habeas corpus actions in federal courts.297 The court noted that unlike the
federal Constitution, which provides that the United States Supreme Court
.298derives its appellate jurisdiction from congressional authority, the
authority for original and appellate jurisdiction in Florida courts is entirely
derived from Article V of the Florida Constitution. 299 Despite the DPRA's
severability provision, the court also found most of the sections so
"inextricably intertwined" as to preclude severance.
300
Nevertheless, the court's shared concern for efficiency prompted it to
propose amendments to Rules 3.851 and 3.852 of the Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure.30 1 The court noted that the amendments were meant to
balance the need to carry out a sentence of death "in a manner that is fair,
just, and humane and that conforms to constitutional requirements" with the
289. 756 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 2000).
290. Id. at 52; see FLA. CONST. art. 11, § 3. The court did not strike sections 11, 14, 15,
and 16 of the DPRA. Allen, 756 So. 2d at 65. Although the court also found that some
provisions violated equal protection and due process doctrines, its holding was based on its
separation of powers analysis. Id. at 58.
291. Id. at 54 (relying on FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(8)).
292. Id. (citing FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a)).
293. Id. at 62.
294. Allen, 756 So. 2d at 61.
295. FIA. CONST. art. I, § 13.
296. Allen, 756 So. 2d at 61.
297. Weekley v. Moore, 204 F.3d 1083 (1lth Cir. 2000).
298. U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2.
299. Allen, 756 So. 2d at 63.
300. Id. at 65.
301. Id.; see also Amendments to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, 3.852, 3.993, 25 Fla. L Weekly
S285 (Fla. Apr. 14,2000).
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need for promptness and efficiency in administering justice.3 °2 Arguably,
the timing of these amendments may also reflect an attempt by the court to
circumvent more attempts by the state legislature to interfere with the court's
powers.
The court also informed the legislature in its opinion that Florida's
public records laws 30 3 had to be amended in order for the dual-track system
to work. 3° Because Florida statutes currently exempt criminal intelligence
and investigation information from disclosure during appeals, defendants
could not pursue all potential remedies until such exemptions end. The court
noted that the dual-track system could not work until these exemptions are
removed by the legislature.
Finally, in this clash between the judicial and legislative branches, the
court also seized the opportunity to plead for more funding. 6  In its
conclusion the court noted that a reliable justice system requires funding at
all levels.36 The court argued that funding was needed for the attorneys
litigating death penalty cases as well as for the courts.30 8 This case probably
correctly reflects the appropriate roles for the legislative and judicial
branches to undertake in this politically sensitive area. With new public
attention focused on cases in other states where wrongly accused defendants
have proven their innocence through DNA evidence, the need to proceed
cautiously in reviewing cases where the death penalty has been imposed
seems even more critical. In addition, the court's decision underlines the
importance of maintaining an independent judiciary that retains control over
its practice and procedures. In an area where the state decides to end
someone's life, it is arguably important that the process be deliberate and
cautious. Nevertheless, if the court's proposed procedural reforms do not
actually reduce delays in the process, one can expect further attempts from
the other two branches to continue to change the process. This case seems to
indicate, however, that the court will be diligent in protecting its authority
from encroachment by the other branches.
B. Due Process
The Supreme Court of Florida also had the opportunity to consider due
process challenges to a pair of criminal statutes during the past year. In State
302. Allen, 756 So. 2d at 65.
303. FLA. STAT. § 119 (1999).
304. Allen, 756 So. 2d at 65.
305. Id. at 65-66 (discussing FL4. STAT. § 119.07(3)(b), (3)(1), .011(3)(d)(2) (2000)).
306. Id. at 67.
307. Id.
308. Id.
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v. O.C.,309 a juvenile defendant challenged the constitutionality of section
874.04 of the Florida Statutes, a provision that enhanced criminal penalties
for members of criminal street gangs. O.C., a juvenile was found guilty
of attempted aggravated battery and misdemeanor battery.31l The State then
moved for a penalty enhancement pursuant to the aforementioned statutory
section. 312 On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal concluded that the
law was unconstitutional because it enhanced punishment for "mere
association. '31 3 The problematic language of the challenged section
permitted enhancement for belonging to a criminal street gang. 314  The
Supreme Court of Florida first noted that both the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article I, section 9 of the Florida
Constitution provide that citizens have the right to be protected from
deprivations of their legally protected interests without due process of law.315
The clauses permit legitimate interference with one's legal rights, but only if
the means chosen "shall have a reasonable and substantial relation to the
object sought to be attained and shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious. '' 316  The court reviewed previous decisions 317 that overturned
statutes criminalizing otherwise innocent activities without a showing of
criminal intent or behavior.318 Because this statute made simple association
with others who may not even be criminals a ground for penalty
enhancement, without also requiring a showing that there was a nexus
between the criminal act committed by the defendant and his membership in
the organization, it seems that the court was correct. To permit a penalty
enhancement for merely belonging to an organization, the definition of
which is relatively broad in the statute, raises a number of constitutional
309. 748 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 1999).
310. Id. at 945.
311. Id. at 946.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 947.
314. Section 874.04 of the Florida Statutes states as follows:
Upon a finding by the court at sentencing that the defendant is a member of a
criminal street gang, the penalty for any felony or misdemeanor, or any
delinquent act or violation of law which would be a felony or misdemeanor if
committed by an adult, may be enhanced if the offender was a member of a
criminal street gang at the time of the commission of such offense.
FLA. STAT. § 874.04 (2000).
315. O.C., 748So. 2dat948.
316. Id. (emphasis omitted).
317. Wyche v. State, 619 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1993); State v. Walker, 461 So. 2d 108 (Fla.
1984).
318. O.C., 748So. 2dat949.
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questions. 319 The court distinguished a decision by the Supreme Court of
California2  that rejected a challenge to a criminal gang statute permitting
enhancement where the defendant committed the crime, "for the benefit of,
at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang, with the
specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang
members." 32  This decision seems correct in striking a statute that was too
broad in its sweep at addressing a perceived societal harm.
The court also considered a due process challeng to the criminal
statute that punishes neglect of the elderly and disabled in Sieniarecki v.
State.323 Patricia Sieniarecki lived in an apartment with her boyfriend and
mother.324 Although in her fifties, the elder Sieniarecki became despondent
and disoriented after the combination of her husband's death and a surgery
on her hip.32 Mrs. Sieniarecki was found dead on a mattress soiled with
319. Section 874.03(2)(a)-(h) of the Florida Statutes lists eight criteria for classifying a
person as being a member of a "Criminal Street Gang" as follows:
(2) "Criminal street gang member" is a person who is a member of a criminal
street gang as defined in subsection (1) and who meets two or more of the
following criteria:
(a) Admits to criminal street gang membership.
(b) Is identified as a criminal street gang member by a parent or guardian.
(c) Is identified as a criminal street gang member by a documented reliable
informant.
(d) Resides in or frequents a particular criminal street gang's area and adopts
their style of dress, their use of hand signs, or their tattoos, and associates with
known criminal street gang members.
(e) Is identified as a criminal street gang member by an informant of
previously untested reliability and such identification is corroborated by
independent information.
(f) Has been arrested more than once in the company of identified criminal
street gang members for offenses which are consistent with usual criminal
street gang activity.
(g) Is identified as a criminal street gang member by physical evidence such as
photographs or other documentation.
(h) Has been stopped in the company of known criminal street gang members
four or more times.
§ 874.03(2)(a)-(h).
320. People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1996).
321. O.C., 748 So. 2d at 950 (quoting Gardeley, 927 P.2d at 720). The court did not
reach the First Amendment challenge to the statute. Id.
322. FLA. STAT. § 825.102(3) (1997).
323. 756 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2000).
324. Id. at 70.
325. Id.
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urine and feces wearing only a polo shirt and one tennis shoe.32  She
weighed only sixty-eight pounds. 27 The cause of death was septicemia
caused by decubitus ulcers as well as bladder and vaginal infections.
3
Dehydration and malnutrition also contributed to the cause of death.329
Found guilty of neglect, the defendant argued on appeal that the statute
violated her due process rights by imposing an affirmative duty upon her
while penalizing a failure to comply, and that the statute was
unconstitutionally vague and interfered with her mother's right to privacy.
330
The due process challenge included an argument that the statute failed
to contain a specific intent requirement.33 1 The court compared this
challenge to similar ones previously decided by the court in regard to the
state's child protection statutes.332  Although the court had struck child
neglect statutes that penalized persons for mere negligence, it had also
upheld a statutory provision in the child neglect area that required
willfulness or culpable negligence.333 Similarly, because section 825.102(3)
of the Florida Statutes also requires willfulness or culpable neligence by
the caregiver, it was therefore found to pass constitutional muster.
In response to the vagueness challenge, the court noted that the test for
vagueness in Florida is "whether the statute gives a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct. 335 The court
held that pursuant to the facts of this case, the victim was sufficiently
336impaired to be considered disabled under the statute. It also felt that the
326. Id. at 71.
327. Id. at 70.
328. Sieniarecki, 756 So. 2d at 71.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 72.
331. Id. at 73.
332. Id. at 73-74 (citing State v. Mincey, 672 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1996) and invalidating
FLA. STAT. § 827.05 (1991) because the amended statute continued to criminalize simple
negligence); State v. Winters, 346 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1977) (overturning FLA. STAT. § 827.05
(1975) for vagueness and overbreadth). For a discussion of the Mincey decision, see Dobson,
supra note 5, at 127-31.
333. Sieniarecki, 756 So. 2d at 74 (citing State v. Joyce, 361 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1978)).
334. Id.
335. Id. (citing Brown v. State, 629 So. 2d 841,842-43 (Fla. 1994)).
336. Id. at 75. Section 825.101(4) of the Florida Statutes defines "Disabled Adult" as:
[A] person 18 years of age or older who suffers from a condition of physical
or mental incapacitation due to a developmental disability, organic brain
damage, or mental illness, or who has one or more physical or mental
limitations that restrict the person's ability to perform the normal activities of
daily living.
FLA. STAT. § 825.101(4) (2000).
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facts were sufficient so that the defendant had adequate notice of the fact
that she could be deemed a caregiver as defined by the statute.
3 3 7
The court also found that the defendant lacked standing to raise a facial
vagueness challenge or the victim's alleged privacy rights.3 8 This decision
clearly seems consistent with the court's prior decisions on the child neglect
statute.339 In addition, the facts of this case did make it very difficult for this
defendant to plausibly argue that she did not understand that her mother's
physical and mental state fit within the definition of disabilitym or that the
defendant's conduct satisfied the definition of caregiver.34 1 In addition, the
state of the victim indicated that the care provided fell below that of mere
inattentiveness. 34  It is not difficult to find a culpable state of mind by the
defendant in this case. Whether the statute is sufficiently clear could be
tested in other cases where the neglect is less egregious. Arguably, the
heightened mens rea imposed by the court may save the statute in those
cases as well.
C. Federalism
The Supreme Court of Florida also rejected a variety of federalism
challenges to criminal charges brought against a defendant for acts that
occurred on a cruise ship in waters beyond the state's territorial boundaries
in State v. Stepansky.343 Matthew Stepansky was charged in Brevard County
with burglary and attempted sexual battery of a thirteen-year-old on a cruise
ship.3 " Although both the victim and defendant were United States citizens,
337. Sierniarecki, 756 So. 2d at 75.
338. Id. at 76.
339. Some other states have even upheld constitutional attacks against statutes that
provided criminal penalties for "mere" negligence. Dobson, supra note 5, at n.141.
340. Sierniarecki, 756 So. 2d at 70-71. The evidence indicated that the victim would not
walk, required adult diapers, and generally refused to eat. Id. In addition, the defendant's
boyfriend told the apartment manager, who inquired about the victim's ability to reach the
upstairs apartment into which the family was moving, that the victim "would not ever be coming
back down the stairs anymore." Id. at 70. The boyfriend carried the victim into the apartment
when the family moved in. Id. at 70-71.
341. Id. at 70. The evidence indicated that when the children of the victim discussed with
which child the mother would live, the family agreed she would live with the defendant because
she did not work and would be able to take care of her mother unlike her two brothers who
worked long hours and would not have as much time to spend with her. Sieniarecki, 756 So. 2d
at 70.
342. Id. at 75.
343. 761 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 2000).
344. Id. at 1029.
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neither was a Florida resident at the time of the alleged attack.345 No other
jurisdiction had attempted to prosecute the crime. The special maritime
criminal jurisdiction statute that was challenged in this case extended the
state's jurisdiction to acts committed on ships outside the state's territorial
waters, if the "act or omission occurs during a voyage on which over half of
the revenue passengers on board the ship originally embarked and plan to
finally disembark" in Florida.347 Stepansky moved to dismiss the action on
the basis that Florida lacked jurisdiction.3 Upon denial of the motion, he
sought a writ of prohibition from the Fifth District Court of Appeal, which
issued the writ.
34W
A number of issues were raised by this case. First, the state's
jurisdiction over criminal acts generally extends to those committed wholly
or partly within its geogrgahical boundaries. Florida's boundary extends
three miles from its coast.35 From an international law perspective, a vessel
on the high seas is generally regarded as part of the territory of the nation of
its owners. 351 In this case, the alleged acts occurred 100 nautical miles from
the Atlantic coastline of Florida. The ship was registered in Liberia and
belonged to a cruise line from the British West Indies. 3  In addition,
although the states are generally responsible for defining and prosecuting
crimes, they are precluded in some circumstances from asserting authority
where the federal government has primary authority and has preempted that
area of law.354 The Supreme Court of Florida first considered Article I,
section 8, clause 10 of the United States Constitution, which grants Congress
the right to define piracies and felonies on the high seas. The court held
that this provision did not preclude the state from criminalizing the same
act.
356
Next, the court considered whether the prosecution violated the "flag
state rule" of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, and therefore
interfered with the national government's treaty powers. 7 The "flag state
rule" states that a ship shall sail under the flag of one state and that state
345. Id.
346. Id. at 1030.
347. F.A. STAT. § 910.006(3)(d) (1995).
348. Stepansky, 761 So. 2d at 1030.
349. Id.
350. FLA. CONST. art. H, § 1(a).
351. 21 AM. JUR. 2D CriminalLaw § 491 (1998).
352. Stepansky, 761 So. 2d at 1029.
353. Id. at 1030.
354. Id. at 1030-31.
355. Id. at 1031.
356. Id.
357. Stepansky, 761 So. 2d at 1032.
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shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the ship8 absent exceptional cases
expressly provided for in international treaties.35 The defendant conceded
that he "lack[ed] standing to raise a violation of an international treaty that is
not self-executing." 359 The court held that the treaty was not self-executing
and did not limit the jurisdiction asserted by the United States over foreign
vessels.36
The defendant also conceded that the United States could prosecute him
for his conduct. 61 In 1994, the federal government, by statute, did assert
maritime jurisdiction over offenses committed on the high seas by or against
United States nationals on board foreign vessels scheduled to depart from or
arrive in the United States."2 The court held that this federal statute did not
preclude the state from exercising concurrent jurisdiction over the activity.363
Having held that the statute did not interfere with the aforementioned
provisions of the United States Constitution or federal statutes, the court
next considered whether the State could exercise jurisdiction over an act
committed outside its territory. 64 The court cited the "effects" doctrine that
permits jurisdiction over acts "intended to produce and producing
detrimental effects" within the state. 6  The court accepted the State's
argument that its tourism industry would suffer a significant adverse effect if
it could not prosecute crimes on cruise ships where neither the federal or
366foreign governments prosecute. Justice Wells filed a dissenting opinion
arguing that the legislature lacked authority to extend jurisdiction conducted
outside the territorial boundaries of the state over the acts of nonresidents.
367
He argued that jurisdiction over this act could only be roperly asserted by
the United States or other relevant foreign governments.
Arguably the dissent and the Fifth District Court of Appeal have more
correctly analyzed the issues in this case. Even if the 1994 legislation did
not preempt the field of maritime law, it does not therefore follow that the
State of Florida retains the authority to extend its criminal jurisdiction over
acts occurring in a location that a valid treaty entered into by the national
358. Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. VI, 13 U.S.T. 2313,2315,
450 U.N.T.S. 82, 86.
359. Stepansky, 761 So. 2d at 1032.
360. Id. at 1037.
361. Id. at 1033.
362. 18 U.S.C. § 7(8) (1994).
363. Stepansky, 761 So. 2d at 1033-34.
364. Id. at 1035.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 1036.
367. Id. at 1037 (Wells, J., dissenting).
368. Stepansky, 761 So. 2d at 1037.
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government has deemed to be under the jurisdiction of a foreign
government. As stated by the district court of appeal:
Although there is authority for the United States to assert
extraterritorial jurisdiction over its nationals, there simply is no
basis for such an extension by a political subdivision of the United
States in regard to the territory of a foreign country-and the
flagship of another country is just that. The State of Florida is
constitutionally prohibited from entering into a treat with Liberia
in respect to jurisdiction of crimes on the high seas.36
The Supreme Court of Florida's broad interpretation of its "effects"
doctrine causes one to ponder how far it would be willing to extend its
jurisdiction to acts occurring outside of its boundaries. As noted by the
concurring opinion of Judge Harris of the Fifth District Court of Appeal, the
statute would seemingly permit the State to prosecute a person who commits
a criminal act against another even if both persons are nationals of the ship's
flag State and have physically entered Florida soil so long as the ship
stopped at a Florida port and picked up over half of its revenue passengers
there with an intent to return them to Florida.37° Contrary to the conclusions
of the majority opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida, this statutory
scheme does not appear to be narrowly drawn or consistent with the federal
Constitution, which specifically grants the power to make treaties to the
President and the Senate.371 In addition, the Constitution makes proerly
executed treaties the supreme law of the land, binding upon the states. The
power of the national government in this area has been considered to be so
unquestioned as to raise debate about whether a treaty was even subject to
constitutional limitations.373 The United States Supreme Court has rejected
attempts by the states to impose Tenth Amendment limits upon the national
government's treaty power.374 This assertion of jurisdiction by Florida
seems to contravene the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, and therefore
constitutional limitations as well.
369. Stepansky v. State, 707 So. 2d 877, 879 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1995), rev'd, 761
So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 2000).
370. Id. at 880.
371. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
372. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
373. See discussion in NowAK& RorTuNDA, CONSTTumoNALLAW §6.6 (5thed. 1995).
374. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483
(1879).
[Vol. 25:1
45
: Nova Law Review 35, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2000
A Survey of Florida's Recent District Court of Appeal and
Administrative Decisions Involving Bid Protests:
Challenging the Government's Conduct Regarding a Public
Procurement
Joseph M. Goldstein and Vanessa L. Prieto
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 44
II. STANDING TO COMMENCE A BID PROTEST ................................ 45
A. Generally Only Bidders or Prospective Bidders
Have Standing .................................................................... 46
B. Under Extraordinary Circumstances a Nonbidder
May Commence a Bid Protest ............................................ 46
C. A Bidder Must Also be Likely to Obtain Award if Protest
is Granted ........................................................................... 47
III. TIMELINESS ISSUES ................................................................... 50
A. Submission of Bids ............................................................ 50
B. Timeliness of Bid Protests Challenging the Specifications ..... 51
C. Timeliness of Bid Protests Challenging the Award ............ 52
D. Equitable Tolling Doctrine ................................................. 54
IV. AUTOMATIC STAY OF CONTRACT AWARD ............................... 55
A. Under Chapter 120 of the Florida Statutes, a Bid
Protest Stays the Procurement ........................................... 55
B. Injunctions .......................................................................... 57
V. HEARING PROCEDURES ............................................................. 59
VI. CHALLENGES TO THE EVALUATION PROPOSALS ........................ 60
* Joseph M. Goldstein, a Partner at Shutts & Bowen LLP in Fort Lauderdale,
Florida, received his J.D. from Nova Southeastern University, magna cum laude, in 1989
where he served as an Editor for the Nova Law Review. He received an LL.M. in Tax from
Georgetown University Law Center, with distinction (the highest available honors), in 1994.
Mr. Goldstein handles transactional and litigation matters regarding federal, state, and local
government contracting and procurement, and other complex commercial litigation.
** Vanessa L. Prieto, an Associate at Shutts & Bowen LLP in Fort Lauderdale,
Florida, received her J.D. from Nova Southeastern University in 1997, and served as an Editor
for the Nova Law Review. Mrs. Prieto is a civil and commercial litigator and is developing a
concentration in governmental relations, including local government contracting and
procurement.
46
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss1/1
44 Nova Law Review [Vol. 25:43
A. Responsiveness .................................................................... 60
B. Exceptions to the Specifications ........................................ 66
C. No Material Deviation in Bids ............................................. 68
D . Best Value .......................................................................... 70
E. Evaluation Methodology .................................................... 72
F. Qualifications or Bias of Evaluators ................................. 73
G. Price Evaluation ................................................................. 74
VII. REJECTION OF ALL BIDS ............................................................ 75
Vin. WOMAN-OWNED AND DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE ISSUES ................................................................... 78
IX. RESPONSIBILITY ........................................................................ 81
X. SUNSHINE LAW .......................................................................... 82
X I. REMEDIES ................................................................................... 84
XII. HEARING OFFICER'S DECISION ................................................. 85
A. Rejection of Hearing Officer's Legal Conclusion ................... 85
B. Administrative Law Judge's Decision is Binding
in a Chapter 120 Challenge if Supported by Substantial
and Competent Evidence .................................................... 87
C. Nonchapter 120 Procurements .......................................... 88
XIII. CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 89
I. INTRODUCTION
This article is a survey of recent Florida decisions of the district courts
of appeal and the Division of Administrative Hearings1 involving
government bid protests. Because there have been few, if any, recent articles
on this topic, this article briefly discusses or cites to older, leading cases that
are necessary to place certain issues in context.2
1. Many of the citations to decisions of the Division of Administrative Hearings
("DOAtH") are to Recommended Orders, rather than Final Orders, and are thus not published
in any reporter. These decisions, however, are available at the DOAH'S website,
www.doah.state.fl.us/intemet.
2. For an excellent historical discussion of bid protests and public contracting in
Florida in general, see J. Rex Farrior, Jr. & John H. Rains, III, Public Sector Competitive
Bidding in Florida, 11 STTON L. REv. 428 (1982) and John H. Rains, IlI, An Update on
Public Sector Competitive Bidding in Florida, 14 SMrsoN L. REv. 771 (1990). See also F.
Alan Cummings & Mary M. Piccard, Section 10: Bid Dispute Resolution in Florida
Administrative Practice (Florida Bar Continuing Legal Education) (5th ed. March 1997); John
W. Bakas, Jr., Section 7: Bids, Bid Disputes, and Competitive Negotiations Involving Public
Entities in Florida Construction Law and Practice (Florida Bar Continuing Legal Education
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A bid protest is a legal challenge to an action of a public entity relating
to the procurement of goods or services. All state agencies4 and most local
agencies must select contractors to provide goods or services through a
competitive process.5 If a potential contractor objects to the process that a
public entity uses to select the contractor or objects to the result of the
process, then it may file a lawsuit challenging the public entity's action.
With regard to state agencies, there is a comprehensive administrative
process that must be followed.6 Local entities may elect either an
administrative process, or an aggrieved potential contractor can file suit in
circuit court.
I. STANDING TO COMMENCE A BiD PROTEST
Like traditional lawsuits, to commence a bid protest the contractor must
have standing.7 Under Florida statutory law, and most local government
entity procurement codes, a contractor may commence a bid protest only if
the contractor's "significant interests" have been affected by the public
entity's conduct.8 This section of the survey reviews the circumstances
under which a contractor's "significant interests" are affected, enabling it to
have standing to file a bid protest.
(3d ed. May 1997); Larry R. Leiby, Florida Construction Law Manual, Section 5: Bids (4th
ed. 1999).
3. See Farrior & Rains, supra note 2, at 443.
4. "Agency" means any of the various state officers, departments, boards,
commissions, divisions, bureaus, councils, and any other unit of organization, however
designated, of the executive branch of state government. "Agency" does not include the
Board of Regents or the State University System. FLA. STAT. § 287.012(1) (2000).
5. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 255.20 (2000) (requiring competitive awarding of con-
struction contracts by counties, municipalities, and other political subdivisions of the state);
§ 255.29 (requiring procedures for competitively awarding state construction contracts);
§ 287.057 (requiring the use of competitive sealed bidding for the purchase of all goods and
services in excess of $25,000); § 287.055 (discussing competitive selection, of contractors for
the acquisition of professional architectural, engineering, landscape architectural, or surveying
and mapping services, including design-build contractors); BROWARD COUNTY PRoCUREMENT
CODE § 21.6, .29; MIAMI DADE COUNTY CODE § 2-8.1.
6. See FLA. STAT. § 120.57(3) (2000).
7. Id.
8. See § 120.57(3)(b) (restricting standing to persons "adversely affected by the
agency decision or intended decision"); see also BRoWARD COUNTY PROCUmENT CODE
§ 21.118 (restricting standing to "[a]ny actual or prospective bidder or offeror who has a
substantial interest in and is aggrieved in connection with the solicitation or proposed award
of a contract").
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A. Generally Only Bidders or Prospective Bidders Have Standing
Generally, only bidders or prospective bidders challenging the
specifications or other procurement documents have standing to commence a
bid protest. Accordingly, it has long been established that a bidder who fails
to submit a proposal lacks standing to pursue a protest.9 Likewise, in Fort
Howard Co. v. Department of Management Services, 0 the appellate court
confirmed that subcontractors and suppliers lack standing to commence a
protest in which they are not bidders. Even a joint venturer who lacks the
consent of the other joint venturers to bring a bid protest lacks standing to
commence a bid protest.1 2 This nonbidder rule was recently followed in
More Financial Services, Inc. v. Broward County School Board,13 where the
administrative law judge granted the agency's motion to dismiss the bid
protest where the protester lacked standing because it was a subcontractor,
rather than a bidder. 14
B. Under Extraordinary Circumstances a Nonbidder May Commence a
Bid Protest
Despite the general rule that only bidders or prospective bidders have
standing to commence a bid protest, one case created an exception, holding
that in "extraordinary circumstances" other parties may have standing.15 In
Fairbanks, Inc. v. Department of Transportation,16 a supplier that
manufactured truck-weighing scales was permitted to maintain a bid protest
even though it was not a bidder or prospective bidder.' 7  The intended
9. E.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Jacksonville Transp. Auth., 491 So. 2d 1238,
1240-41 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming denial of bid protest and finding that
Westinghouse lacked standing because it did not submit a price proposal).
10. 624 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
11. Id. at 785 (affirming finding that a manufacturer of paper towels who was a
supplier to potential bidders, but not a bidder itself, lacked standing).
12. See Brasfield & Gorrie Gen. Contractor, Inc. v. Ajax Const. Co. of Tallahassee,
627 So. 2d 1200, 1203 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
13. No. 00-2311BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs June 26,2000).
14. Id. at 4 (relying on Sys., Controls & Servs., Inc. v. St. Johns Water River Mgmt.
Dist., No. 92-3385BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs June 15, 1992)).
15. Advocacy Ctr. for Persons with Disabilities, Inc. v. Dep't of Children & Family
Servs., 721 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998); see also Fairbanks, Inc. v. Dep't of
Transp., 635 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
16. 635 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
17. Id. at 61.
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awardee of the public contract proposed using the scales manufactured by
Fairbanks.1s The appellate court concluded that the supplier established
standing by alleging the Department of Transportation ("DOT") intended to
construct numerous weigh stations in Florida in the future using the same
specifications, and it was impeding the competitive procurement of scales
for weigh stations by permitting only one manufacturer's model.' 9
The appellate court distinguished Fort Howard because in that case the
issue was decided upon whether the protester could file a bid protest.20 In
Fairbanks, the court focused on whether the protester was entitled to a
formal hearing.2 1 The appellate court also found that the bidders in Fort
Howard had no interest in rebidding the procurement.2 These distinctions,
along with allegations that the government intended to use the same
challenged specifications in future procurements, sufficiently established
such exceptional circumstances, although the court commented that
generally most nonbidders would not have standing.23
Despite the appellate court's creation of this exception, no other
decisions have ever found similar exceptional circumstances justifying
standing for a nonbidder. For instance, the court in Advocacy Center for
Persons With Disabilities, Inc. v. Department of Children & Family
Services,24 involving a privatized state psychiatric hospital, held that neither
two involuntarily confined patients nor a nonprofit advocacy organization
for the disabled had standing to challenge the public agency's request for
proposals.2 The appellate court reasoned that in order to have standing to
commence a bidprotest, one must have some potential stake in the contract
to be awarded. The court also noted that such standing is limited to
potential bidders and perhaps suppliers to those bidders.27
C. A Bidder Must Also be Likely to Obtain Award if Protest is Granted
The mere fact that someone is a bidder, however, is not enough to have
standing to commence a bid protest. In order to have standing, a bidder must
18. Id. at 59.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 61.
21. Fairbanks, 635 So. 2d at 61.
22. Id.
23. See Id.
24. 721 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1998).
25. Id. at 755-56.
26. Id. at 755.
27. Id.
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also have a reasonable likelihood of obtaining the contract if its bid protest is
successful. 28 Generally, this means the bidder must be either the highest
ranked offeror, the lowest priced bidder, or the next bidder in line for an
award.2 9 For instance, previous cases have found that a fourth ranked bidder
had standing to file a protest,30 but have questioned whether the seventh
ranked bidder had such standing.3 3
In contrast, in Rovel Construction, Inc. v. Department of Health,32 the
Division applied an analysis that permits any bidder to file a bid protest.
33
The fourth ranked bidder challenged the agency's $1.6 million intended
award for the procurement of the rehabilitation of the Gato Cigar Factory, an
existing historic structure in Key West, and construction of internal office
and clinic space for the Department of Health. 4 The protester in Rovel
Construction, Inc. did not challenge the second and third bidders.
35
Nonetheless, the administrative law judge rejected the argument of the
agency and the intervenor/awardee that the protester lacked standing as the
fourth ranked bidder.36 The administrative law judge found standing
decisions before the 1996 amendments to chapter 120 of the Florida Statutes
were not applicable because, among other things, the amendments added37
language that a bid protest proceeding was de novo. Thus, the judge
reasoned that because the second and third ranked bidders did not participate
28. Id.
29. E.g., Mid-Am. Waste Sys. of Fla., Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 596 So. 2d 1187,
1189 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (reversing dismissal of bid protest lawsuit and holding that
second most responsible bidder had standing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief against
awarding contract to sister corporation of waste hauler that had been convicted of price
fixing); Preston Carroll Co. v. Fla. Keys Aqueduct Auth., 400 So. 2d 524, 525 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the third lowest bidder lacked standing).
30. E.g., Capeletti Bros., Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Gen. Servs., 432 So. 2d 1359, 1362
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (affirming denial of protest by the fourth ranked bidder).
31. See Brasfield & Gorrie Gen. Contractor, Inc. v. Ajax Const. Co. of Tallahassee,
627 So. 2d 1200, 1203 n.1 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (questioning whether seventh ranked
bidder would have standing).
32. No. 99-0596BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Apr. 27, 1999) (denying protest of
fourth ranked proposal, and although finding standing, determining proposal nonresponsive
and rejecting challenge to evaluation of awardee).
33. See id. 18.
34. Id. 9 1-13.
35. Id.
36. Id. 123.
37. Rovel Constr., No. 99-596BID U 9-10.
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in the protest, the only possible outcome was that either the protester or the
intervenor/awardee would receive the award.
38
Because the standing analysis in Rovel Construction, Inc. is not
persuasive, a potential protester should pause before relying on the decision
to determine whether it has standing. Instead, a bidder, other than one who
is next in line, should contend one or all of the following: 1) that all bidders
in line for award are not eligible; 2) that the agency should reject all bids for
some reason; or 3) that some reason prevents the procuring agency from
selecting the higher ranked proposals. For instance, in Enpower, Inc. v.
Tampa Bay Water,39 the fourth ranked bidder challenged the evaluation of
the two highest ranked proposals, but not that of the third.40 However, the
administrative law judge found the protester had standing because it
contended that the agency should not be able to select the third ranked
proposal without retaining an independent consultant, one not affiliated with
the agency, to select between its proposal and the third ranked proposal.4 1
Not only must a bidder be in line for an award to have standing, but as
noted in Intercontinental Properties, Inc. v. Department of Health &
Rehabilitative Services,42 its bid or proposal must be responsive to the
procurement requirements to challenge an award to another contractor.43 In
Intercontinental Properties, Inc., the appellate court held that the
responsiveness of the protestor's bid was an issue that could be determined
by the administrative law judge." However, the issue of responsiveness
regarded the same procurement requirement for both the protester and the
intended awardee. At least one agency has attempted to restrict the
decision in Intercontinental Properties, Inc. to its specific facts."6 In
38. Id. 123.
39. No. 99-3398BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Oct. 25, 1999).
40. See id. i1 177-78 (denying protest challenging evaluation of intended awardee
and others).
41. Id. (H 178-84.
42. 606 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming rejection of bid as
nonresponsive).
43. Id. at 385.
44. Id. at 384.
45. ld. at 381.
46. In a recent case in which this author is counsel to the protester, the Broward
County School Board argued that it was premature for the intervenor to challenge the
responsiveness of the protester, and the administrative law judge agreed. Padula &
Wadsworth Constr., Inc. v. Broward County Sch. Bd., No. 00-2408BID (Fla. Div. Admin.
Hr'gs Aug. 21, 2000) (deferring issue challenging standing of protester until resolution of
issue in underlying protest).
200o1
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Wharton Investment Group, Ltd. v. Department of Juvenile Justice,47
however, the administrative law judge reviewed the protester's
responsiveness as to its failure to submit a Public Entity Crime Addendum,
which was not the basis for nonresponsiveness raised by the protester against
the intended awardee.4 Thus, it is likely that future courts will permit
intervenors and agencies to challenge the responsiveness of protesters for
their failure to comply with any procurement requirement.
Ill. TIMELINESS ISSUES
A. Submission of Bids
Bidders must be very careful to ensure their bids are timely received by
the procuring entity. Untimely delivery, even if caused by third persons,
such as a delivery service, is an appropriate basis for the procuring entity to
reject the bid. For instance, in Nationwide Credit, Inc. v. Department of
Education,49 the administrative law judge denied the protest of a bidder who
challenged the agency's refusal to consider its late-filed proposal.' ° The
bidder, who had been the incumbent contractor for the previous nine years,
provided its proposal to Federal Express on January 19, 2000, at 1:20 p.m.,
with instructions to deliver it to the agency by 10:00 a.m. on January 20,
2000.51 The Request for Proposal ("RFP") informed offerors that proposals
were due by January 20, 1999, at 3:00 p.m., and that the agency could reject
untimely proposals.52 Due to an error in the Federal Express distribution
system, however, the agency did not receive the proposal until January 21,
1999.53 At that time, the agency had not completed any evaluations, but it
refused to consider the proposal.4 The agency also refused to consider
another proposal that had been received thirty minutes late.55  The
administrative law judge held that, despite an agency's discretion to accept
and review an untimely proposal, it was not improper to reject a proposal
where the rejection was consistent with the agency's policy.)6 However, as
47. No. 98-4063BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Dec. 7, 1998).
48. Id. 9M 12-16 (relying on Intercontinental Props., Inc., 606 So. 2d at 380).
49. No. 99-1192BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs June 14, 1999).
50. Id. 126.
51. Id. H 9-10.
52. Id. 4.
53. Id. 10.
54. Nationwide Credit, Inc., No. 99-1192BID 17.
55. Id. 16.
56. Id. 9[ 26.
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the judge held, an exception would be made where the delay was caused by
an act of God.57
B. Timeliness of Bid Protests Challenging the Specifications
In addition to planning ahead regarding the delivery of a bid or
proposal, prospective bidders must decide if they intend to challenge the
terms of an invitation to bid ("ITB") 58 or an RFP.59 In a procurement subject
to chapter 120 of the Florida Statutes, bidders must make any such
challenges within seventy-two hours of publication of the RFP.60 Thus, a
protest challenging the assignment of evaluation points regarding race-based
classifications as unconstitutional was untimely when the bidder failed to
61file the protest until after the evaluation of proposals.
57. Id.
58. In general, the term "invitation to bid" means a written solicitation for competitive
sealed bids. FLA. STAT. § 287.012(11) (2000). "The invitation to bid is used when the agency
is capable of specifically defining the scope of work for which a contractual service is required
or when the agency is capable of establishing precise specifications defining the actual
commodity or group of commodities required." Id.
59. In general, the term "request for proposals" means a written solicitation for
competitive sealed proposals. § 287.012(15).
The request for proposals is used when the agency is incapable of specifically
defining the scope of work for which the commodity, group of commodities, or
contractual service is required and when the agency is requesting that a qualified
offeror propose a commodity, group of commodities, or contractual service to
meet the specifications of the solicitation document. A request for proposals
includes, but is not limited to, general information, applicable laws and rules,
functional or general specifications, statement of work, proposal instructions, and
evaluation criteria. Requests for proposals shall state the relative importance of
price and any other evaluation criteria.
Id.
60. Section 120.57(3)(b) of the Florida Statutes provides:
With respect to a protest of the specifications contained in an invitation to bid or
in a request for proposals, the notice of protest shall be filed in writing within 72
hours after the receipt of notice of the project plans and specifications or
intended project plans and specifications in an invitation to bid or request for
proposals, and the formal written protest shall be filed within 10 days after the
date the notice of protest is filed.
§ 120.57(3)(b).
61. Optiplan, Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of Broward County, 710 So. 2d 569, 572-73 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Capeletti Bros. v. Dep't of Transp., 499 So. 2d 855, 857 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1986)) (affirming administrative law judge's holding that challenge to rejection
of bid based on failure to comply with woman-owned business enterprise goal was untimely
because it was a challenge to the specifications).
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On the other hand, in E.L Cole Photography v. Department of Highway
Safety & Motor Vehicles,62 the court stated a protest filed after the opening
of bids contending that the agency should have purchased the goods from the
protester's preexisting contract rather than solicit bids was timely, since it
was not a challenge to the bid specifications, and the protester participated in
the procurement "under protest." In E.L Cole Photography, the petitioner
claimed that the award of the contract would breach its current contract
because the photographic rolls were included in its already existing contract
as "representative products." 64 The administrative law judge held that the
protest did not challenge the specifications because it did not seek to clarify,CO~l" r65
correct, or refine them. Instead, the protest sought to enjoin or cancel the
bid solicitation and award altogether.
66
C. Timeliness of Bid Protests Challenging the Award
In procurements subject to chapter 120 of the Florida Statutes, protests
must be filed "within 72 hours after the posting of the bid tabulation."
67
Often, because of this short time frame, a protester's failure to file its protest
within seventy-two hours is excused if the delay was due to the agency's
failure to comply with the statutory and regulatory requirements regarding
notice of its decisions. 68 For instance, in Bell Atlantic Business Systems
Services, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Employment Security,69 the
appellate court reversed the Department's order finding the protest was
untimely, since the protest was filed within sevent-two hours of Bell
Atlantic's actual receipt of the posting by facsimile. 0 The Bell Atlantic
62. No. 98-3471BID (Fla. Div. Admin. -r'gs Oct. 2, 1998) (affirming denial of bid
protest).
63. Id. U 18-20.
64. Id. 2.
65. Id. 118.
66. Id. 9a9-12.
67. Section 120.57(3)(b) of the Florida Statutes provides:
Any person who is adversely affected by the agency decision or intended
decision shall file with the agency a notice of protest in writing within 72 hours
after the posting of the bid tabulation or after receipt of the notice of the agency
decision or intended decision and shall file a formal written protest within 10
days after filing the notice of protest.
FLA. STAT. § 120.57(3)(b) (2000).
68. See id.
69. 677 So. 2d 989 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
70. Id. at 992.
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court reasoned that the statute emphasizes actual receipt of the intended
decision.71 Also, in Bell Atlantic, the RFP was contradictory as to when
results would be posted, and the last information that the Department
provided to prospective offerors was that it would fax a copy of the decision
to the offerors at the time of posting.72 Thus, because the protester filed
within seventy-two hours of actual receipt of notice, the appellate court
found that the protest was timely filed.73  Similarly, otherwise untimely
protests have been permitted when agencies have failed to properly notify
bidders of the results of the procurement or of their administrative protest
rights.74
Notwithstanding that an untimely protest will be permitted where an
agency has failed in its notice requirement, potential protesters may not rely
on oral statements from agency personnel that a protest need not be filed by
a certain time.75 For instance, in Xerox Corp. v. Florida Department of
Professional Regulation,76 the protester timely filed a notice of protest, but
then failed to file a formal protest within ten days as required by chapter 120
of the Florida Statutes.77 The protester attempted to excuse its untimeliness
by stating that it relied on statements by the agency indicating that it was
going to resolve the protest.78 The Xerox court held that the protester was
not permitted to rely on such oral communications and that the protest was
untimely.
79
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.; see also SWS P'ship v. Dep't of Corrs., 567 So. 2d 1048, 1050 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1990) (reversing Department's order finding protest untimely even though it was
filed more than 72 hours after posting because it was disputed whether the bidders knew that
the results.would be posted).
74. E.g., Northrop & Northrop Bldg. P'ship v. Fla. Dep't of Corrs., 528 So. 2d 1249,
1250 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (reversing Department's order finding protest untimely
because Department had failed to properly inform bidders of its intended award); Capital
Copy, Inc. v. Univ. of Fla., 526 So. 2d 988, 988-89 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (reversing
agency's order finding protest untimely because posting did not include statutorily required
notice informing bidders of the protest time requirements).
75. See Xerox Corp. v. Ha. Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, 489 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
76. 489 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
77. Id. at 1231.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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D. Equitable Tolling Doctrine
While it is not clear whether the doctrine of equitable tolling should
apply within the context of an administrative bid protest,80 one recent case
used the doctrine to reject an agency's argument that a technically untimely
protest should be rejected. In Gibbons & Co. v. Florida Board of Regents,s1
the Board contended that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the protest because the
protester sent the protest to the correct address, but to the wrong person,
arguably rendering the protest untimely.82 The administrative law judge,
however, held that:
The time requirements for filing notices of protests and formal
written protests prescribed by Section 120.57(3)(b), Florida
Statutes... are "not jurisdictional in the sense that failure to
comply is an absolute bar to [the agency's consideration of a
protest] but [are] more analogous to statute[s] of limitations which
are subject to equitable considerations such as tolling."83
The administrative law judge noted that in Machules v. Department of
Administration," the court stated the following regarding the doctrine of
equitable tolling:
Equitable tolling is a type of equitable modification which "focuses
on the plaintiffs excusable ignorance of the limitations period and
on [the] lack of prejudice to the defendant."... Generally, the
tolling doctrine has been applied when the plaintiff has been misled
or lulled into inaction, has in some extraordinary way been
80. See Ross Stafford Burnaman, Equitable Tolling in Florida Administrative
Proceedings, 74 FLA. B.J. 60, 62-63 (Feb. 2000) (noting that 1996 amendments to the
Administrative Procedure Act appear to make timeliness a jurisdictional requirement that
would preclude equitable tolling, but appellate decisions continue to apply the doctrine); see
Robert E. Korroch, 1999 Year in Review: Analysis of Significant Federal Circuit Government
Contracts Decisions, 29 PuB. CONT. L.J. 351, 354-60 (2000) (discussing whether equitable
tolling applies under the Contract Disputes Act).
81. No. 99-0697BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Sept. 17, 1999) (holding that the protest
was timely, but without merit).
82. Id. 270.
83. Id. [ 268 (citing Machules v. Dep't of Admin., 523 So. 2d 1132, 1133 n.2 (Fla.
1988)).
84. 523 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1988).
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prevented from asserting his rights, or has timely asserted his rights
mistakenly in the wrong forum.
85
The administrative law judge reasoned that sending the protest to the right
address, but to the wrong person, was essentially similar to sending it to the
wrong forum and should be considered timely.
86
IV. AUTOMATIC STAY OF CONTRACT AWARD
A. Under Chapter 120 of the Florida Statutes, a Bid Protest Stays the
Procurement
In order to ensure a successful bidder an effective remedy, under
chapter 120 of the Florida Statutes, consistent with federal law87 and nearly
all other jurisdictions, 88 an agency is required to stop the procurement
process or contract award until the protest is resolved by final agency
action.89 Some reasons for the necessity of the automatic stay are: 1) the
prevention of a wrongful award; 2) the preservation of rights of the protester;
3) the resolution of the dispute before performance commences on an
improper award; 4) the preservation of the public treasury by ensuring that a
contract is awarded to the lowest, responsible bidder; and 5) the orderly
resolution of bid and contract protests.90 Thus, compelling circumstances
must exist to override the automatic stay.
9
'
85. Id. at 1134.
86. Gibbons & Co., No. 99-0697BID [ 267-271.
87. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3553(c), (d)(3)(A)(ii) (1998) (providing for stay of award and
cessation of performance); see also FED. AcQUIsmoN REGuiATION § 33.103(t) (providing for
stay of award or performance pending the resolution of agency-level protests).
88. E.g., The Model Procurement Code § 9-101(6)-101.05 (providing for stay). But
see Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 1, § 1404 (1999) (California has enacted a pilot project eliminating
the automatic stay). Compare Cal. Pub. Cont. Code §§ 10306, 10343, with 12102(h) (Deering
1999) (existing California statutes that provided for automatic stay in bid protests). This
aspect, among others of the California pilot project, has been strongly criticised. E.g., Brett E.
Bacon, The California Alternative Protest Pilot Project: Eviscerating the Protestant's Due
Process Rights and Remedies to Improve Administrative Efficiency and Reduce Costs, 29 PuB.
CONT. LJ. 511, 527-30 (2000).
89. "Upon receipt of the formal written protest which has been timely filed, the
agency shall stop the bid solicitation process or the contract award process until the subject of
the protest is resolved by final agency action...." FLA. STAT. § 120.57(3)(c) (2000).
90. Cianbro Corp. v. Jacksonville Transp. Auth., 473 So. 2d 209, 212 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1985).
91. Id.
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The automatic stay, however, is not absolute. An agency may override
the stay "to avoid an immediate and serious danger to the public health,
safety, or welfare." 92 Because of this high standard, agency overrides are
rare and subject to appellate review. Only one such override has been
sustained by an appellate court. 93  In Global Water Conditionin v.
Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services, Division of Forestry, the
Department of Agriculture rejected all bids on a procurement for the
installation and exchange of ethylene dibromide water filters.95 These filters
reduce exposure to a toxin that causes cancer.96 A bidder challenged the
rejection of all bids and appealed an order of the Commissioner of
Agriculture declaring that there existed a state of emergency requiring
immediate re-advertising for filters and the award of a temporary contract for
a partial award of the filters.97 The court sustained the agency's
determination that immediate and serious danger to public health was
sufficient to override the automatic stay, accepting affidavits of the agency
establishing that these filters were necessary to reduce human exposure to
this harmful toxin.9'
The court in NEC Business Communication Systems (East), Inc. v.
Seminole County School Board,99 held that convenience and efficiency are
not sufficient reasons to override the automatic stay, unlike the prevention of
serious health risks. 1°° In NEC, an unsuccessful bidder sought judicial
review of the county school board's decision to proceed with the contract
award pending its protest.' 0 ' The basis for the override was that the school
board needed an operating phone system, which was the item being
purchased, so that it could transfer its personnel into a recently completed
school building. The appellate court found that this rationale failed to
92. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(3)(c) (2000) (providing in full for an override if "the agency
head sets forth in writing particular facts and circumstances which require the continuance of
the bid solicitation process or the contract award process without delay in order to avoid an
immediate and serious danger to the public health, safety, or welfare").
93. Global Water Conditioning v. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., Div. of
Forestry, 521 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
94. Id. at 126.
95. Id. at 127-28.
96. Id. at 130.
97. Id. at 129-30.
98. Global Water Conditioning, 521 So. 2d at 130.
99. 668 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
100. Id. at 339.
101. Id. at 338-39.
102. Id. at 339-40.
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establish that the stay of the contract award process presented a serious and
immediate danger to the public welfare, and therefore, ordered the stay.10 3
Even if an agency has violated the automatic stay, however, relief may not
be appropriate where an agency has not awarded a contract and where the
protester continued to contract with the agency as the incumbent vendor.1 4
B. Injunctions
In a nonchapter 120 bid protest where there is no automatic stay, or
once an agency has denied a protest through final agency action, a party
must seek a temporary injunction to stop the contract process.105
Traditionally, a bid protestor's remedy of choice was to seek injunctive
relief.106 However, even before seeking such injunctive relief, a protester
must first apply to the agency for stay of its order before it may request the
same relief from an appellate court.'°7 Additionally, the last, or fourth
element of a preliminary injunction, substantial likelihood of success on the
merits, is difficult to meet, since courts have been opposed to granting an
injunction in instances where an agency has acted in good faith and has not
violated a statute or ordinance.10 8 Due to such procedural obstacles and the
high standard to obtain injunctive relief, as demonstrated by the cases below,
the benefit of the automatic stay is apparent.
One limitation on the injunctive relief against a public agency is the
doctrine of "exhaustion of administrative remedies."'1 9 For instance, since it
103. Id.; see also Cianbro Corp. v. Jacksonville Transp. Auth., 473 So. 2d 209, 212-14
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (reversing override of stay because agency's reasons for alleged
immediate danger to the public health were insufficient, especially where potential emergency
caused in large part by agency's delay in starting procurement, which was not explained and
emergency could be averted by requesting extension).
104. See Humana Med. Plan, Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of Broward County, No. 98-5086BID
(Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs June 9, 1999) (rejecting Humana's protest and awarding the contract
to intervenors, Foundation Health and HIP Health Plan of Fla., Inc.).
105. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(1)-(2)(a) (2000). A party who is adversely affected by final
agency action is entitled to judicial review in the appellate district where the agency maintains
its headquarters or where a party resides or as otherwise provided by law. Id.
106. Farrior & Rains, supra note 2, at 445.
107. MSQ Props. v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 626 So. 2d 292, 293 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (denying stay where a landlord sought a stay of a final order of the
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services from awarding a lease contract to its
competitor where the landlord had not first sought such a stay from the agency under section
120.68 of the Florida Statutes).
108. Farrior & Rains, supra note 2, at 446.
109. Id.
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is required that administrative remedies be exhausted prior to going to the
circuit court, in Department of Transportation v. Anderson Columbia Co., 10
the DOT petitioned for writs of prohibition challenging jurisdiction of the
circuit court to enter orders enjoining the DOT from awarding road
construction contracts to the lowest bidder.' The DOT's challenge came
during the pendency of administrative proceedings initiated to protest
bidding procedures on the basis that the lowest bidder was not the lowest
responsible bidder.' 2 The DOT also filed interlocutory appeals from the
injunctive orders. 113 The district court of appeal held that the corporation
had adequate administrative remedies available to it, and thus, the circuit
court lacked jurisdiction to enter injunctive relief. 114
In Miami-Dade County v. Church & Tower, Inc.,'15 the appellate court
affirmed the denial of a temporary injunction holding that the protester did
not have a substantial likelihood to prevail on the merits. 16 In light of the
deference given agency decisions, this is a common basis to deny such
requests for temporary injunctions. 17  Church & Tower, Inc. was a
procurement involving the Dade County Procurement Code, rather than the
automatic stay provision of chapter 120 of the Florida Statutes, where the
appellate court determined that it was not likely that the protester would
prevail on its challenge to the county's decision, since the court found that
the contractor was not responsible based on its performance on other
contracts."1 ' Although it denied the injunction, the court noted, contrary to
110. 651 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (reversing temporary injunction in
favor of protester).
111. Id. at 1267.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 715 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
116. Id. at l090.
117. E.g., Cent. Fla. Equip. Rentals of Dade County, Inc. v. Lowell Dunn Co., 586 So.
2d 1171, 1172 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (reversing entry of temporary injunction for
failure to show a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits). In this case, the
unsuccessful bidder on a landfill construction project sued to enjoin the county from awarding
a contract to the next lowest bidder. Id. The trial court entered a preliminary injunction, and
the defendants appealed. Id. The appellate court held that an unsuccessful bidder on a landfill
construction project, whose bid had been rejected as materially irregular because of its failure
to designate a single manufacturer and installer of landfill liner, was not entitled to a
preliminary injunction to prevent the county from awarding a contract to the next lowest
bidder because it was not substantially likely to prevail due to the wide discretion given to the
county's award decision. Id. at 1172-73.
118. Church & Tower, Inc., 715 So. 2d at 1090.
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other decisions, u 9 that the protesting bidder ordinarily has no adequate
remedy at law.
12
V. HEARING PROCEDURES
Little precedent exists as to prehearing procedures or the conduct of a
bid protest hearing, but two cases confirm a protester's entitlement to amend
its pleadings and to request a continuance of the hearing. In a significant
decision, the Fourth District recently held that an administrative law judge
abused his discretion, and thus committed reversible error, when he failed to
permit a protester to amend its protest at the outset of the hearing based on
information obtained during discovery, and where amendment would not
prejudice the other party.121
In a case regarding a request for a continuance, the appellate court
reversed an administrative law judge's dismissal of a protest where counsel
for the protester failed to appear at the final hearing but had asked agency
counsel for a continuance of the hearing.122 Counsel for the protester sought
the continuance from the agency's counsel due to a previously scheduled
pretrial conference.12 At the hearing however, counsel for the agency told
the administrative law judge that he did not know why counsel for the
protester could not attend, allowing the judge to dismiss the protest.lU The
appellate court reversed the ruling based on the agency's counsel's failure to
inform the administrative law judge of counsel's request for a
continuance. 12
119. Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Cont'l Car Servs., Inc., 650 So. 2d 173, 175
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (reversing temporary injunction because if protester should have
been awarded contract there were sufficient records to determine the monetary loss that
protester would suffer, thus, protester had an adequate remedy at law).
120. Church & Tower, Inc., 715 So. 2d at 1086 n.2; see also S. Fla. Limousines, Inc. v.
Broward County Aviation Dep't, 512 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987). In South
Florida Litousines, Inc., the appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of a temporary
injunction, finding that no irreparable harm existed. Id. at 1060. The appellate court,
however, should have based its decision on the delay of the protester to seek injunctive relief
or the unlikelihood that the protester would prevail on the merits.
121. Optiplan, Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of Broward County, 710 So. 2d 569, 571-72 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (reversing denial of amendment to protest in procurement for group
vision care).
122. Id. at 571.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 572; see also Ross v. Fla. Dep't of Corrs., 669 So. 2d 1060, 1062 (Fla. 5th
Dist. CL App. 1996) (reversing dismissal ofprotest).
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VI. CHALLENGES TO THE EVALUATION PROPOSALS
A. Responsiveness
One of the most common and successful type of protest is one
challenging the responsiveness of the awardee's proposal to the requirements
of the solicitation. The seminal responsiveness case is Harry Pepper &
Associates, Inc. v. City of Cape Coral,126 which reversed the trial court's
denial of bid protest, challenging the responsiveness of the low bidder. 127
In Harry Pepper, the city required bidders to specify the manufacturer
of the pumps they proposed to supply under the bid for construction of a
water treatment plant.1 2 The low bidder had identified pumps that were
unacceptable to the city.'29 Rather than finding the low bidder nonrespon-
sive, the city requested that the low bidder submit a letter stating that it
would comply with the bid specifications as to the pumps. After
submitting the letter, the city awarded the contract to the low bidder. 31 The
next lowest bidder filed a lawsuit, and on appeal the court held that the
award to the low bidder was improper, concluding that the city exceeded its
authority by allowing the lowest bidder to bring its bid into conformity with
the specifications after bid opening.132
Under statute, in a competitive-procurement protest, an agency may not
consider "submissions made after the bid or proposal opening amending or
supplementing the bid or proposal ....,,33  Despite this prohibition, in
Nippon Carbide Industries v. Department of Transportation,134 the courtheld that an agency may reasonably seek clarification of an offeror's
126. 352 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
127. Id. at 1193.
128. Id. at 1192.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Harry Pepper & Assocs., 352 So. 2d at 1192.
132. Id.; see also Harris/3M v. Office Sys. Consultants, 533 So. 2d 833, 836 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (affirming denial of protest finding bidder not responsive where
competent and substantial evidence showed that required microfilm readers/printers were not
available at time of bid); E.M. Watkins & Co. v. Bd. of Regents, 414 So. 2d 583, 589 (Fla.
Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (affirming rejection of protester's bid for failing to identify
subcontractors).
133. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(3)(f) (2000).
134. No. 98-3594BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs. Nov. 19, 1998) (denying protest of low
bidder found nonresponsive and awarding bid to the intervenor, the second lowest bidder).
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proposal. 135 In Nippon Carbide, the agency believed that the low bidder,
Nippon Carbide Industries ("NCI"), was nonresponsive because the process
inks used in its reflective sheeting for roadway signs did not meet the
technical specifications.136 The DOT postponed the bid award date so that it
could resolve whether NCI's process inks could be utilized.3 7  After a
telephone conversation with NCI's director, where the mixing instructions
were provided by NC!, the DOT confirmed that the NCI bid did not conform
to the bid specifications. 13 The administrative law judge held that the DOT
acted reasonably in seeking clarification, and such actions were not an "open
door for NCI to change or amend the bid it submitted.' 3
9
An example of a post-bid submission that was an "open door to change
or amend a bid" is found in Miami Elevator Co. v. Manatee County School
Board,'40 where the intended awardee had supplemented its bid with a post-
submission letter stating it had an office within the county, which was not
disclosed in its bid.141 In Miami Elevator Co., the school board issued a
Request for Quotation for elevator and wheelchair lift maintenance
services. 42 The school board proposed to award the contract to General
Elevator Company ("General"), and Miami Elevator protested, claiming that
General was nonresponsive for failing to maintain a physical office in
Manatee County, as required under the specifications. 143
In response, General stated that it had a Bradenton office in Manatee
County.'" The evaluation committee determined that General's bid met the
requirements based on an unscientific survey to test the response time of
General, which had technicians and some minimal office equipment present
in the office. 145  The administrative law judge found General's bid
nonresponsive, reasoning that the school board should not have considered
the letter referencing the Bradenton office because it was sent after the
deadline for submission of proposals.'" Furthermore, the Bradenton office
135. Id. (20.
136. Id.96.
137. Id. 8.
138. Id. 4.
139. Nippon Carbide Indus., No. 98-3594BID 20.
140. No. 98-4474BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Nov. 23, 1998) (awarding the contract
to the protestor, the second lowest bidder).
141. Id. 12.
142. Id. 11.
143. Id. 111.
144. Id. 9[12.
145. Miami Elevator Co., No. 98-4474BID T1 15-16.
146. Id. 9[ 20.
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was not a physical office within the county because no business was
conducted there.147 The administrative law judge reasoned that, "[tlo ignore
the requirement.. . operates to disadvantage vendors who met the
requirement and any potential vendors who did not submit proposals because
they did not have a 'physical office' located within the county.'
148
In protests alleging an offeror is nonresponsive, the issue is usually
whether a bid requirement is mandatory, rather than permissive, and whether
the challenged proposal complies with the requirement.' 49 For example, in
National Computer Systems, Inc. v. Department of Education ("NCSI"), 'm
the administrative law judge granted a protest challenging the evaluation of
the intended awardee, but recommended rejection of all bids.15' This protest
involved a procurement for the administration of the Florida Comprehensive
Assessment Test ("FCAT").5 2 The Department of Education received two
proposals. 3 One of the evaluation criteria was corporate qualification.15 4
The RFP established a minimum set of requirements for this criterion by
stating that bidders "must demonstrate" that they have the "minimum
threshold of experience.' 55 The requirements included that the bidders must
have administered "'a minimum of two assessment programs using imaged-
based scoring that involved 'at least 200,000 students annually.'15
The administrative law judge reasoned that these minimums were
material requirements of the RFP, because they gave the Department some
level of assurance that the awardee would be able to successfully perform a
contract of such large magnitude.15 7 The intended awardee did not have
sufficient image-based testing experience, and the administrative law judge
147. Id. 122.
148. Id. 126.
149. See Lockheed Martin Info. Sys. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., No. 98-
2570BID 77 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Mar. 30, 1999) (finding conditional language in bid
waivable as a minor irregularity because it was boilerplate language, commonly used to
provide an edge on future negotiations).
150. No. 99-1226BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs May 25, 1999).
151. Id. 64.
152. id. at Statement of Issues.
153. Id. (H 45, 52.
154. Id. 715-15.
155. Nat'l Computer Servs., Inc., No. 99-1226BID I 11.
156. Id. 121.
157. Id. 122.
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found that the intended awardee should have been disqualified from further
evaluation because it was a mandatory requirement.
158
In NCSI, the administrative law judge also held that the Department
should have found the protester nonresponsive. 159 The administrative law
judge noted that the Department improperly waived the protester's failure to
have experience in a statewide procurement as a minor technicality.' 60
Without this waiver, the protester also failed to meet the minimum
requirement of having two statewide procurements. 161  Thus, the
administrative law judge recommended that the Department rebid because
only 2.06 evaluation points out of 150 separated the proposals, and if other
bidders knew that the Department was going to ignore these stated minimum
requirements and evaluate the proposals "holistically," the Department could
have received more than two proposals. 162
It is well-settled that an agency may not accept a bid or proposal that is• 163
materially at variance with the specifications set forth in an RFP. Thus,
offerors who failed to submit required audited financial statements and
bidding and insurance costs were properly found to be nonresponsive.16 A
bidder will also be considered nonresponsive if it, or its designated
subcontractors, fails to possess the licenses required by the solicitation. 65
Additionally, an offeror who fails to include a completed public entity crime
certification is nonresponsive since such failure is considered a material
deviation. 166 However, it has been held that offerors' identification of key
158. Id. 62 (citing Jacobs Assoc., Inc. v. Dep't of Corrs., No. 96-5831BID (Fla. Div.
Admin. I-r'gs Mar. 4, 1997)).
159. Id.163.
160. Nat'l Computer Servs., Inc., No. 99-1226BID I52-54.
161. Id. 154.
162. Id. 63 (citing Marpan Supply Co. v. Dep't of Mgmt. Servs., No. 96-2777BID
(Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Sept. 26, 1996) (citing Courtenay v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs.,
581 So. 2d 621,623 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1991)).
163. Air Support Servs. Int'l, Inc. v. Metro. Dade County, 614 So. 2d 583, 584 (Fla. 3d
Dist. CL App. 1993).
164. Rattler Constr. Contractors, Inc. v. Dep't of Cons., No. 98-5623BID UI 35-36
(Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Mar. 4, 1999) (granting protest, but rejecting all bids rather than
selecting protester since all bids were found nonresponsive).
165. Rovel Constr., Inc. v. Dep't of Health, No. 99-0596BID 9a 14-18 (Fla. Div.
Admin. Hr'gs Apr. 27, 1999) (finding standing but denying fourth ranked protestor's proposal
as nonresponsive because it proposed the use of subcontractors without required speciality
licenses and rejecting challenge to evaluation of awardee).
166. See Wharton Inv. Group, Ltd. v. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, No. 98-4063BID U 9,
15-16 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Dec. 7, 1998); Cook v. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, No. 98-
1641BID [ 24-25, 28 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Jun. 24, 1998); Ctr. for Indep. Living v. Dep't
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personnel who were not current employees (all offerors submitted the same
people) where they had agreed to work with whomever became the actual
awardee complied with the RFP's requirement to include the names of
qualified personnel to perform the work.
Offerors face a difficult obstacle establishing that a procuring agency's
determination that it was nonresponsive was arbitrary or capricious, due to
the extreme deference normally given to an agency's interpretations of the
terms of the procurement.16 8 In Bobick v. Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority,
one of the most extreme examples of deference to agency discretion,
Aqueduct Authority rejected a bid that contained three references, but not
three letters supporting the bidder from those references. 169 The district
court of appeal held that Aqueduct Authority's interpretation of the bid
requirement for "references from three vendors" to mean that the bidder
must include three "letters" of reference, not a list including three references,
was not improper.1 70 The court noted that although Aqueduct Authority had
the power to waive the irregularity, it was not obliged to do so.171 This
decision is an example of the tenet in bid protests that the agency is likely to
prevail regardless of its decision. Here, if the agency had accepted the three
references, rather than requiring three letters of reference, or had waived this
failure as a minor irregularity, a challenge to this decision by the other
bidder would likely have failed.
Similarly, in Center Printing, Inc. v. University of North Florida,172
appearing to give too much deference to an agency's determination than
should have been due, an administrative law judge upheld an agency's
of Health & Rehab. Servs., No. 94-5627BID T 23-25, 31 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Jan. 17,
1995); Jones Floor Covering, Inc. v. Dep't of Gen. Servs., No. 90-5032BID 19-20 (Fla.
Div. Admin. Hr'gs Oct. 11, 1990). But see Padula & Wadsworth Constr., Inc. v. Broward
County Sch. Bd., No. 00-2408BID [ 5-6 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs. Sept. 26, 2000); J.D.
Pirrotta, Co. v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Valencia Cmty. Coil., No. 90-7967BID H 21-28 (Fla. Div.
Admin. Hr'gs Feb. 25, 1991) (addressing minor deviation that is waivable).
167. Old Tampa Bay Enter., Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., No. 99-0120BID 11 26, 44 (Fla.
Div. Admin. Hr'gs June 22, 1999) (denying protest challenging evaluation of awardee in a
procurement for bridge tending, maintenance, and repair services).
168. Id.
169. Bobick v. Fla. Keys Aqueduct Auth., 648 So. 2d 1263, 1263 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) (affirming rejection of bid).
170. Id.
171. Id. (citing Liberty County v. Baxter's Asphalt & Concrete, Inc., 421 So. 2d 505
(Fla. 1982)). But see Advocacy Ctr. for Pers. with Disabilities, Inc. v. Dep't of Children &
Family Servs., 721 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
172. No. 99-2278BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Aug. 27, 1999).
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determination that a bidder was nonresponsive because it did not
demonstrate its ability to be able to perform the contract. 173 In Center
Printing, Inc., which involved a procurement for printing services, the
invitation to bidders required that the bidders have a manufacturing plant
capable of doing the work at the time of the bid opening. 174 The protester
was a new company founded by the former owner of the incumbent
contractor and the intended awardee. 75 The protester appeared to have
underbid the contract, and the agency was concerned it would be unable to
perform. 176  The agency conducted an inspection of the plants and
determined that the protester did not have an adequate inventory system,
storage space, and produced no samples; thus, the protester was found to be
nonresponsive, and the contract was awarded to another bidder.1" The
administrative law judge held that the finding of nonresponsiveness was not
clearly erroneous. 178 In view of the bid requirements, it appears that the
administrative law judge gave too much deference to the agency (even
though under the facts the protester did not deserve the award), because the
ITB did not appear to actually require the bidder's ability to establish that it
could perform as required. It appears that the agency did a responsibility
determination without calling it as such. This decision demonstrates the
difficulty that a new business can face in obtaining a government contract.
In Humana Medical Plan, Inc. v. School Board,179 the issue was
whether the school board's decision to reject the proposal of Humana and to
award it to HIP Health Plan of Florida, Inc. ("HIP") and Foundation Health,
was contrary to the school board's governing statutes and rules, policies, or
the proposal specifications. 180 The RFP related to health coverage for school
board employees.1 The school board announced its intent to award
contracts to Foundation Health and HIP, and Humana protested'! 2 Humana
responded to the RFP stating that it would "strive" to meet the
requirements.18 3 Humana testified that the statement meant that it would
173. Id. 9 54 (denying protest challenging protester's nonresponsiveness).
174. Id. 4.
175. Id. R 16, 21.
176. Id. 34.
177. Ctr. Printing, Inc., No. 99-2278BID [ 34.
178. Id. 54.
179. No. 98-5086BED (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Apr. 29, 1999).
180. Id. at Statement of Issues.
181. Id. at Prelim. Statement.
182. Id.
183. Id. 19.
200]
68
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
"make a strong effort" to comply.1 The administrative law judge held that
this language was insufficient to indicate compliance with the requirements
of the RFP that Humana could not correct this error by submission of a post-
bid letter stating it would comply.
B. Exceptions to the Specifications
Any bidder whose proposal takes exception to the specifications or
places conditions on its proposal is at high risk of being rejected by the
agency. Thus, a protest by an offeror challenging the award of another
185
offeror who took exception to the specifications is likely to be successful,
while a challenge to the agency's rejection of a proposal that took exception
to the specifications is likely to fail."86
In Ryan Inc. Eastern v. Peace River/Manasota Regional Water Supply
Authority,187 involving a procurement for six miles of water pipeline that
required forty-two inch pipe to specified standards, the low bidder included a
letter from its pipe supplier with its bid indicating that it could not supply the
required pipes. The agency allowed the low bidder and its pipe supplier
eight days after the bid opening to decide whether to withdraw the
conditions and exceptions to the specifications, which rendered its bid
nonresponsive.189 Instead of withdrawing, the bidder stated that it could
supply the required pipes.190
The administrative law judge granted the protest, reasoning that the
agency's award of the contract to the low bidder was manifestly unfair to the
other bidders and undermined the integrity of the bidding process. 91 The
administrative law judge noted that in the eight days following the bid
opening, the bidder enjoyed the unfair advantage, not shared by other
bidders, of analyzing the job and its bid, knowing that the absence of an
enforceable contract would allow it to walk away from the job with
184. Humana Med. Plan, Inc., No. 98-5086BID 23.
185. Ryan Inc. E. v. Peace River/Manasota Reg'l Water Supply Auth., No. 00-
0555B1D (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Mar. 30, 2000) (granting protest). But see Lockheed
Martin Info. Sys. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., No. 98-2570 (Fla. Div. Admin. -r'gs
Dec. 21, 1998) (adopted in part or modified).
186. Bellsouth Communication Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of the Lottery, No. 99-3956BID
(Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Dec. 13, 1999) (denying protest of offeror found nonresponsive).
187. No. 00-0555BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Mar. 30, 2000).
188. Id. 21.
189. Id. 29-32.
190. Id. 134.
191. Id.[40.
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impunity.192 The fact that the bidder did not walk away from the job meant
only that its post-bidding analysis disclosed that the job would be
profitable.193  Thus, the administrative law judge found the bidder
nonresponsive even though the solicitation contained a provision requiring
the contractor to comply with the specifications without exception.
194
On the other hand, in Bellsouth Communication Systems, Inc. v.
Department of the Lottery,195 a procurement for the maintenance of
telecommunications equipment and software, the agency received four
proposals, but found only one responsive.196 In its proposal, Bellsouth, who
had held the incumbent contract for twelve years, had suggested several
clarifications and modifications to the specifications, relating to its price,
agency approval of subcontractors, agency ability to demand documentation,
indemnification, and warranty. 197 Bellsouth believed that these clarifications
and modifications were permissible due to the language of the RFP, but the
Department of the Lottery found them to be "material deviations" from the
specifications and eliminated Bellsouth as nonresponsive. 198 The administra-
tive law judge agreed with the agency's determination, noting that in the
absence of anything in the proposal to indicate that Bellsouth intended to put
forward these clarifications and modifications simply as negotiating points,
the Department could reasonably interpret Bellsouth's responses as convey-
ing its refusal to accept the mandatory requirements of the RFP.' 99 Further,
the administrative law judge reasoned that it was of no legal significance in
determining the materiality of the deviations that the clarifications and
192. Ryan Inc. E., No. 00-0555BID 40.
193. Id.
194. Id. 141.
195. No. 99-3956BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Dec. 13, 1999) (denying protest of
offeror found nonresponsive).
196. Id. 41. The administrative law judge also held that sections 287.057(3) and
287.012(5) of the Florida Statutes, when read together, meant that for a procurement in excess
of $25,000, an agency must receive at least two responsive proposals to go forward with the
award. Id. 9 46, 51, 58. If not, then the agency must document the reasons that awarding the
contract is in the best interest of the state rather than resoliciting. Id. 59. The administrative
law judge found such reasons present here because the agency had tried twice to obtain the
services and the current contract, which was to expire within 30 days, had already been
extended. Id.; see also E.L. Cole Photography, Inc. v. Dep't of Law Enforcement, No. 99-
3401BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Oct. 2, 1998) (denying protest challenging evaluation of
awardee). Although not addressed specifically, failure of all bidders, except one, to identify
duplicates, was not a basis to resolicit when not a material deviation. See id.
197. Bellsouth Communication Sys., Inc., No. 99-3956BID I 15-19.
198. Id. 37.
199. Id. U 56-57.
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modifications were commercially reasonable and necessary to remedy
ambiguities and potentially unenforceable terms in the RFP.0
C. No Material Deviation in Bids
Even when a bidder is nonresponsive, an agency may still accept a
proposal if the bidder's deviation from the solicitation is not material. In
Tropabest Foods, Inc. v. Department of General Services,2° ' the court noted
that "a minor irregularity [is] a variation [from the bid specifications that]
'does not affect the price of the bid, or give the bidder an advantage or
benefit not enjoyed by other bidders or does not adversely impact the
interests of the agency. ' '2°2 In Tropabest Foods, Inc., a case involving a
procurement for specialty food, the solicitation sought, among other items,
two items for beverage mixes, calling for "'1 lb. yields approximately 1
gal[lon] .... ,,20 The solicitation sought other similar items, but generally
included the specified yield "or more."0 4 As to the two items at issue, the
awardee's product yielded more than one gallon (it yielded 3.5 gallons). 5 A
bidder protested, claiming that the awardee's bid was nonresponsive because
it did not yield approximately one gallon.2 6 The administrative law judge
agreed that the awardee's bid was at variance with the specifications, but
held that such deviation was a minor irregularity that could be waived by the
agency because the variance did not give the awardee a substantial
advantage or restrict competition.2
7
In Robinson Electrical Co. v. Dade County,2°s the appellate court held
that the low bidder's submission of a cashier's check instead of a bid bond,
as required by the solicitation, did not constitute a material variance from the
county's invitation for bids, and thus, the low bidder should have been
awarded the contract.209  While this decision appears to support the
proposition that the agency must waive a minor deviation if it would enable
200. Id. 156.
201. 493 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming denial of protest
challenging responsiveness of awardee).
202. Id. at 52.
203. Id. at 50.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 51.
206. Tropabest Foods, Inc., 493 So. 2d at 51.
207. Id. at 52.
208. 417 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
209. Id. at 1034.
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it to select the otherwise lowest bid or best value,21° other cases conclude
that an agency may waive, but such is not required."'
Other examples of minor deviations include a bidder's failure to bid on
212 213
alternative items, untimely and/or misdelivery of forms, failure to
provide an unemployment form,214 and failure to price an item that was not
to be used in price evaluation but was to be negotiated after the award.215
210. See J. Ruiz Sch. Bus Serv's., Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade County, No. 99-
4021BID (Fla. Div. Admin. -r'gs Mar. 24, 2000); A. Oliveros Transp., Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of
Miami-Dade County, No. 99-4022BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Mar. 24,2000) (joint decision
granting protests that challenged agency's determination of their bids as nonresponsive).
211. Bobick v. Fla. Keys Aqueduct Auth., 648 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1995) (finding that although the Authority had the power to waive the irregularity, it was not
obliged to do so and citing Liberty County v. Baxter's Asphalt & Concrete, Inc., 421 So. 2d
505 (Fla. 1982)); see also Padula & Wadsworth Constr., Inc. v. Broward County Sch. Bd.,
No. 00-2408BID 7 n.2 (Fia. Div. Admin. Hr'gs., Sept. 26, 2000) (suggesting that failure to
waive nonsubmission of Public Entity Crime Statement would be arbitrary and capricious
because it served no useful purpose).
212. Liberty County v. Baxter's Asphalt & Concrete, Inc., 421 So. 2d 505, 506-07
(Fla. 1982) (holding that failure to bid on an alternative item for procurement to resurface
roads was a minor irregularity); E.L. Cole Photography, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Law
Enforcement, No. 99-3401BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Oct. 28, 1998) (petitioner failed to
prove that the awardee's bid which offered a price for a discontinued item, contrary to
instructions, was a minor irregularity); Rovel Constr., Inc. v. Dep't of Health, No. 99-
0596BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Apr. 27, 1999) (denying protest, holding that offering
different amount for bids on similar items was not material and properly waived as a minor
irregularity even though it affects price, and finding it did not give awardee an advantage,
since several other bidders made similar mistake, and price submitted reflected actual cost to
perform).
213. Hewitt Contracting Co., Inc. v. Melbourne Reg'l Airport Auth., 528 So. 2d 122
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (affirming denial of bid protest challenging award to bidder
whose bid was 10 minutes late); Gibbons & Co. v. Bd. of Regents, No. 99-0697BID (Fla. Div.
Admin. Hr'gs Sept. 17, 1999) (accepting protest delivered to right address, but wrong person);
D.A.B. Constructors, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., No. 99-726BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Apr.
21, 1999) (excusing "untimely" filing of DBE form).
214. J. Ruiz Sch. Bus Servs., Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade County, No. 99-4021BD
(Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Mar. 24,2000); A. Oliveros Transp., Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade
County, No. 99-4022BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Mar. 24, 2000) (granting protests that
challenged agency's determination of their bids as nonresponsive for failing to include the
required UCT-6 Form, which is the Florida Division of Unemployment Quarterly Report,
showing current employees and payroll amount, where other bidders committed similar
errors).
215. Con-Air Indus., Inc. v. Seminole County Sch. Bd., No. 98-4714BID (Fla. Div.
Admin. Hr'gs Dec. 11, 1998) (adopting in toto, a finding that the contract was properly
awarded to the intervenor, and denying protest). The school board issued a call for bids for air
filter maintenance, service, and replacement to Filter Service and Installation Corporation
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D. Best Value
One common type of bid protest is a challenge to the agency's
evaluation of either the protester's proposal or the intended awardee's
proposal, contending that if the agency had properly performed the
evaluation, then the protester would have received the award. This type of
challenge often arises within the context of a procurement where the agency
is not necessarily selecting the lowest-priced, responsive offeror, but instead
is selecting the best value to the agency, considering price and other
factors. 2
16
If a procuring agency awards a contract to an offeror on the basis that
the proposal is of better value to the agency because of its technical
superiority, for instance, the award will be improper if there is no reasonable
basis supporting the superiority.217  In Eagle Tire & Service Center v.
Escambia County Utilities Authority,218 involving a procurement for new
truck tires and retread services, the bidders' prices were essentially the
same.219 At the meeting to select the awardee, one of the commissioners
spoke very highly of one contractor, who was a local company, and
presented a letter of recommendation from another local agency praising the
contractor.m In addition, at the commission meeting, persons stated
("Filter"). Id. at Prelim. Statement. The second low bidder, Con-Air, protested, claiming that
the school board staff did not follow its own policy in determining the low bid, that Filter's
reference list was for a different company and unresponsive, and that Filter's bid was
incomplete because it failed to list prices for certain filter frames at Item E on the bid proposal
form. Id. The school board reserved the right to negotiate the unit price of the filter frames at
Item E. Id. 28. Filter failed to attach a price sheet to its proposal and, instead, stated at Line
F: "Per Price Sheet." Id. 16. Filter's failure to state a numeric price for filter frames
afforded Filter a benefit or advantage not enjoyed by Con-Air. Con-Air Indus., Inc., No. 98-
4714BID 28. The instructions to bidders indicated that a bidder was not to include the cost
as stated in lines E & F in the total. Id. 11. The total cost, Line D, determined the low
bidder. Id. 1 14. The effect of the reservation of the right to negotiate prices was that the
school board would determine what it would pay for the items despite the price submitted. Id.
129.
216. See Carl J. Peckinpaugh & Joseph M. Goldstein, Best Value Source Selection, 22
PuB. CONT. L J. 275, 317 (1993).
217. Eagle Tire & Serv. Ctr. v. Escambia County Utils. Auth., No. 00-0661BID (Fla.
Div. Admin. Hr'gs June 14, 2000) (granting protest).
218. No. 00-0661BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs June 14, 2000).
219. Id. 4.
220. Id. ( 8, 14.
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generally that the local contractor's retread services were superior to those of
the low bidder.221
The administrative law judge noted "a public agency has no obligation
to accept the 'lowest dollars and cents bid as being the 'lowest responsible
bid' in every case, to the exclusion of all other pertinent facts which may
well support a reasonable decision to award the contract to a contractor
filing a higher bid."= In Eagle Tire, however, there was no reasonable
basis to determine that the local contractor was a better value than the lower
priced bid. Despite a recommendation from the staff to award the contract to
the low (non-local) bidder, the commissioners split the award and gave the
retread portion to the local contractor.m At the administrative hearing, it
was clear that the local contractor's product and services were not superior,
but essentially equal to the low bidder's, and thus the decision to award to
the local contractor based on its purported superiority was found arbitrary
and capricious.224
Even if the protester establishes that the agency improperly evaluated
proposals, not all such errors are significant enough to merit granting the
protest.2s For instance, in Youthtrack, Inc. v. Department of Juvenile
Justice.226 the administrative law judge denied a protest challenging the
evaluation of the protester where correcting the evaluation error would not
have changed the award.22 7 After conducting a detailed review of the
evaluations, the administrative law judge found that the evaluators made
some errors, but that even if the errors were corrected, the protester would
not garner enough points to exceed the points awarded to the intended
awardee.2 The administrative law judge rejected the argument that the
221. Id. 8.
222. Id. 36 (citing Culpepper v. Moore, 40 So. 2d 366, 370 (Fla. 1949)).
223. Eagle Tire & Serv. Cr., No. 00-0661BID at Recomm.
224. Id. 1 38. The administrative law judge noted that in a nonsection 120.57(3),
referral by contract, where statute or code does not provide a standard, public agencies have
the obligation to engage in contracting procedures in a manner that is not arbitrary and
capricious. Id. 35. Also, where the local agency has adopted rules that mandate awarding
contracts by competitive bids, the agency may not act arbitrarily to ignore those rules or select
someone other than the lowest and best bidder. Id. 36.
225. Youthtrack, Inc. v. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, No. 99-4403BID (Fla. Div. Admin.
Hr'gs Jan. 14,2000).
226. No. 99-4403BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Jan 14,2000).
227. Id. I[f 47-51.
228. See also Non-Secure Det. Home, Inc. v. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, No. 99-
2620BID (Fla. Div. Admin. -r'gs Sept. 14, 1999) (finding the DJJ should have given both
proposals zero points for their failure to include a financial statement or audit, but denying
protest where such failure benefited the protester more than the awardee).
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protester was harmed because two of three evaluators had failed to prepare a
written narrative documenting their point scores, especially because the
229protester had an opportunity to depose the evaluators, but did not do so. 9
E. Evaluation Methodology
Challenges to the evaluation methodology are rarely successful. In
Non-Secure Detention Home, Inc. v. Department of Juvenile Justice,230 the
administrative law judge denied a protest challengingI the Department of
Juvenile Justice's ("DJJ") scoring of past performance.23 The RFP provided
that where an offeror did not have past performance, it would receive the
average score of the competing 3proposals for past performanceY 2 Only two
offerors submitted proposals. Rather than giving the intended awardee,
which had no past performance, the same score as the protester, the DJJ gave
the protester the average of the individual evaluator's score for the protester,
234
which was one-third of the total score.
A different result was reached in Moore v. Department of Health &
235Rehabilitative Services, where the evaluation was contrary to the agency's
guidelinesY 6 The agency's manual required each committee member to
evaluate the proposals independently. 2 7  Nevertheless, three members
provided their evaluations to the fourth evaluator, who then conducted an
evaluation. 8 The bidder recommended by the fourth evaluator, but not the
other three, received the award.239  The appellate court held that the
administrative law judge properly decided that the agency had acted
arbitrarily by not following its own evaluation process, suesting that a
rebid or a proper reevaluation would be a permissible remedy.
229. Youthtrack, Inc., No. 99-4403BID 48.
230. No. 99-2620BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Aug. 27, 1999).
231. Id. U 23-28.
232. Id. 8.
233. Id. 12.
234. Id.
235. 596 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (reversing hearing officer's and
agency's award of the contract).
236. Id. at 760.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 761.
240. Moore, 596 So. 2d at 761.
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In GTECH Corp. v. Department of the Lottery,24 ' an unsuccessful
bidder appealed a decision by the Department of the Lottery awarding a
contract to provide computerized gaming systems and related services for the
state lottery.7 2 The district court of appeal held that the Department did not
violate the applicable procurement procedures or due process by referring
the proposals back to the evaluation committee, some of whom testified at
the bid protest hearing for the correction of its errors.243
F. Qualifications or Bias of Evaluators
An award based on evaluations performed by unqualified persons is
considered arbitrary and capricious if it affects the outcome of the
procurement. 2" In Knaus Systems, Inc. of Florida v. Department of
Children & Family Services, a point-scored procurement for a three-year
maintenance service contract for computer equipment worth between three
and three-and-a-half million dollars, one of the areas evaluated was the
financial capability of the offerors.U6 However, the evaluators had a limited
financial background, and all testified that they did not have enough
knowledge to properly evaluate the financial requirements of the RFP.
Their inexperience was demonstrated by their evaluation of the intended
awardee as having above average financial capability although its financial
statements showed that it had suffered sizable losses. Thus, the
administrative law judge held that lack of qualifications of the evaluators
coupled with grave deficiencies in results of scoring of the financial aspects
of one of the four criteria, which had a material impact on the outcome of the
relative scoring (though not explained in the decision) rendered the
evaluation process clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, and
241. 737 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (affirming agency's acceptance of
hearing officer's decision to have proposals reevaluated).
242. Id. at 616.
243. Id. at 622.
244. Knaus Sys., Inc. of Florida v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., No. 99-
1230BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs. Sept. 3, 1999) (granting protest of third ranked offeror and
recommending rejection of all bids).
245. No. 99-1230BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs. Sept. 3, 1999).
246. Id. 11.
247. Id.(120.
248. Id. cR 21-24.
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capricious. 249  Based on this error, the administrative law judge
recommended the rejection of all bids.250
Another frequent type of challenge alleges that the evaluators were
biased in favor of the intended awardee. Again, success in such challenges
is rare. In Non-Secure Detention Home, Inc., the administrative law judge
denied a protest claiming that the evaluators were unfairly biased because
two of the three evaluators knew a former employee of the awardee, who
was now an employee of the DJJ.251 The judge reasoned that the bias
challenge was without merit because the evaluators did not know that the
former employee had an interest in the property that was to be used for the
contract and because she had no involvement with the procurement. 5 2
G. Price Evaluation
Another area that protesters often challenge is the agency's price
analysis of the bids or proposals. One recent administrative decision denied
a protest challenging a bid that contained "unbalanced" items because the
internal imbalance did not affect the order of bids.2. 3 In Anderson Columbia
Co. v. Department of Transportation, 4 a procurement for road resurfacing,
the intended awardee's bid price was $2,271,354.81 and the protester's was
$2,278,263.07.255  The administrative law judge held that the agency
properly determined that the awardee's bid was not materially unbalanced,
noting that "[a] bid is... mathematically unbalanced if the prices quoted are
significantly different from the approximate cost of the item to the
contractor." 256 The administrative law judge reasoned that a bid is materially
249. Knaus Sys., Inc. of Fla., No. 99-1230BID 61.
250. Id. at Recomin
251. Non-Secure Det. Home, Inc. v. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, No. 99-2620BID (Fla.
Div. Admin. Hr'gs Aug. 27, 1999).
252. See also Rattler Constr. Contractors, Inc. v. Dep't of Corrs., No. 98-5623BID
(Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Mar. 4, 1999) (rejecting claim of bias where the son of the protester's
consulting engineer had previously made a complaint against one of the selection committee
members reasoning that the engineer's evaluation scores were in line with other evaluators,
and even if his scores were not used, ranldng would not have changed).
253. Anderson Columbia Co. v. Dep't of Transp., No. 99-0740BID (Fla. Div. Admin.
Hr'gs May 7, 1999) (final order May 24, 1999) (denying protest challenging intended
awardee's price proposal as unbalanced); see also Dep't of Transp. v. Anderson Columbia
Co., 651 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
254. No. 99-0740BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs May 7, 1999).
255. Id. 2.
256. Id. [6.
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unbalanced if there is reasonable doubt as to whether the bid will ultimately
result in the lowest cost.257 Here, the intended awardee's front-loading of the
mobilization item would result in a potential advantage of only $434.84.28
This potential advantage did not materially unbalance the bid by changing
the ranking, did not have a detrimental effect upon the competitive process,
and would not cause contract administration problems. 9  Thus, the
administrative law judge denied the protest. 2
In another decision, a protester challenged an agency's decision to
award the contract to an offeror whose proposal exceeded the agency's
estimated budgetary ceiling amount set forth in the RFP." In Old Tampa
Bay Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Transportation,62 the agency
contended that it interpreted the ceiling as an estimate and not a maximum
cap and could accept the awardee's price proposal even though it exceeded
the ceiling.26 3  The administrative law judge agreed, holding that the
"agency's interpretation need not be the sole possible interpretation or even
the most desirable one; it need only be within the range of possible
interpretations.
' '2"
VII. REJECTION OF ALL BIDS
Rather than announce that it intends to award a procurement to one
offeror, an agency sometimes decides to reject all of the bids and start over
or cancel the procurement altogether. Because this type of agency action
treats all bidders equally, the agency's decision to reject all bids is subject to
less scrutiny than when an agency treats certain bidders differently, such as
the rejection of a bidder as nonresponsive. Thus, an agency's decision to
257. Id. 7.
258. Id. 9[18.
259. Anderson Columbia Co., No. 99-0740BID 20.
260. Id. 125.
261. Old Tampa Bay Enters., Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., No. 99-120BID (Fla. Div.
Admin. Hr'gs May 27, 1999) (denying protest challenging evaluation of awardee in a
procurement for bridge tending, maintenance, and repair services).
262. No. 99-120BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs May 27, 1999).
263. Id. 9[ 10.
264. Id. 1 51 (quoting Orange Park Kennel Club, Inc. v. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l
Regulation, 644 So. 2d 574, 576 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
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reject all bids will only be overturned if it is arbitrary, 265 illegal, dishonest, or
fraudulent.266
In Department of Transportation v. Groves-Watkins Constructors,267 an
early decision foreshadowing the lower statutory standard of review for
decisions rejecting all bids, the appellate court quashed the administrative
law judge's recommended decision granting a protest. 268- The appellate court
held that, at most, the administrative law judge found the DOT had made an
honest mistake in its prebid estimate of the cost of the procurement, which
does not establish that the DOT acted fraudulently, arbitrarily, illegally, or
dishonestly.269 Thus, the court found that the DOT lawfully rejected all bids
submitted on a highway construction project as too high and properly
directed that the project be rebid where the protester's low bid was still
twenty-nine percent higher than estimated. 270
Examples abound of decisions rejecting challenges to an agency's deci-
sion to reject all bids. For instance, protests have been unsuccessful when an
agency rejected all bids due to potentially restrictive specifications,271
265. A decision is arbitrary if it is not supported by facts or logic, or is despotic. E.g.,
Agrico Chem. Co. v. Dep't of Envtl. Regulation, 365 So. 2d 759, 763 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1978).
266. "In any bid-protest proceeding contesting an intended agency action to reject all
bids, the standard of review by an administrative law judge shall be whether the agency's
intended action is illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent." FLA. STAT. § 120.57(3)(f)
(2000). On the other hand, in other bid protests:
[Tihe administrative law judge shall conduct a de novo proceeding to determine
whether the agency's proposed action is contrary to the agency's governing
statutes, the agency's rules or policies, or the bid or proposal specifications. The
standard of proof for such proceedings shall be whether the proposed agency
action was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Id. Because of the use of "arbitrary" in both types of actions, the different standards are
questionable to some extent.
267. 530 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1988).
268. Id. at 913.
269. Id. at 914.
270. Id. at915.
271. Neel Mech. Contractors, Inc. v. Fla. Agric. & Mech. Univ., No. 99-3424BID (Fla.
Div. Admin. Hr'gs Nov. 12, 1999) (reasoning that rebid was appropriate where the agency
either intended to restrict the specifications to one product without complying with the
requirements for a sole-source procurement or intended to permit more than one product, but
such intent was frustrated by the specification); see also Caber Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Gen.
Servs., 530 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (affirming the denial of a bid protest
when, based on information learned during a protest, the agency decided to reject all bids
because the ITB was ambiguous and flawed due, in part, because it was based on unwritten
specifications not known by some bidders).
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unclear instructions to bidders,272 receipt of only a few responses to the
solicitation,273 the existence of only one responsive bidder,274 or a change in
the agency's needs after the issuance of the solicitation.275 An agency's
decisions not to reject all bids, however, will not be overturned where the
agency received more than two bids, but only one responsive bid.276
Not all uncertainty in the specifications, however, demands a rebid. In
Capeletti Bros. v. Department of General Services,2" which involved a
procurement for site preparation and grading for a Dade County prison, the
specifications showed a public road bordering the site, which was only an
access road.278 Capeletti, however, actualy privately owned the road.279
Capeletti brought the issue to the attention of the Department, but received
no response, and no other bidders complained. The Department
announced its intent to award another bidder, and Capeletti protested.2 1
Initially, the Department decided to reject all of the bids, but after the
272. Contemporary Constr. Southeast, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., No. 98-5018BID (Fla.
Div. Admin. Hr'gs Mar. 1, 1999) (affirming decision to reject all bids, despite the fact that
petitioner submitted a responsive bid, where there were inconsistencies regarding the due date
for a particular form and the agency failed to provide an addendum to all the bidders); Felker
v. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l. Regulation, No. 98-1985BID 15 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Aug. 11,
1998) (holding that it was proper to reject all bids and readvertise because the RFP was
unclear as to certain restroom requirements and it provided the current landlord with an unfair
advantage).
273. Ad. Inv. of Broward v. Dep't of Transp., No. 00-224BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs
Apr. 14, 2000) (denying protest where an agency only received one quotation regarding the
leasing of real property).
274. Cook v. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, No. 98-1641BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs June
24, 1998) (affirming dismissal of protest where there was only one responsive bidder);
M.H.M.S. Corp. v. Dep't of Mgmt. Servs., No. 98-4952BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Feb. 12,
1999) (denying protest and rejecting all bids).
275. Gulf Real Props., Inc. v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 687 So. 2d 1336, 1338
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (affirming denial of protest where the agency rejected all bids
because space became available that was owned by a local government).
276. Satellite Television Eng'g, Inc. v. Dep't of Gen. Servs., 522 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (affirming denial of protest where the Department refused to reject all
bids and negotiated contract with the sole responsive bidder for purchase of satellite television
network).
277. 432 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1983).
278. Id. at 1361.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
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hearing it changed its mind.282 The court reasoned that the uncertainty in the
specifications was not sufficiently material to require a rebid . 3
The blurred line between the standard of review in the rejection of all
bids and in a protest challenging one bidder's evaluation is demonstrated in
Knaus Systems, Inc. which granted the protest of the third ranked offeror, but
recommended rejection of all bids. In Knaus Systems, Inc., the
administrative law judge found that lack of qualifications of evaluators,
along with grave deficiencies in results of scoring of one of the evaluation
criteria, and the material impact on the outcome of the relative scoring,
rendered the evaluation process clearly erroneous, contrary to competition,
arbitrary, and capricious. 285 While the administrative law judge referred to
the standard of proof for protests other than the rejection of all bids, the
judge recommended the rejection of all bids, rather than award the contract
to the protestor or the revaluation of all bids.286
VIII. WOMAN-OWNED AND DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE ISSUES
Some procurements are set aside or contain goals for companies owned
by women, minorities, or other "disadvantaged" businesses. The latest
appellate decision regarding compliance with the Disadvantaged Business
Enterprise ("DBE") rules held that a bidder has to only facially comply with
such requirements in its bid or proposal and actual compliance is a contract
administration issue.287  In State Contracting & Engineering Corp. v.
Department of Transportation,288 involving a procurement for the
replacement of tollbooths on a state road, the protester contended that the
low bidder was nonresponsive because its proposed DBE subcontractors did
not actually cualify as DBE's because they had to purchase materials from
non-DBE's.2 The DOT contended that the low bidder was responsive
because it properly completed its DBE form, and its ability to actually
282. Capeletti Bros., 432 So. 2d at 1361.
283. Id. at 1362.
284. Knaus Sys., Inc. of Fla. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., No. 99-1230BED
(Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Sept. 3, 1999). For additional discussion of Knaus Systems, Inc. see
supra Part VI.F.
285. Id.1 61.
286. Id.
287. State Contracting & Eng'g Corp. v. Dep't of Transp., 709 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct App. 1998) (affirming agency's rejection of hearing officer's decision granting
protest).
288. 709 So. 2d 607 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct App. 1998).
289. Id. at 608.
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comply was a performance issue, not a responsiveness issue.29  The hearing
officer disagreed, and the DOT rejected the decision.291 The protester
appealed, but the appellate court affirmed the DOT's final order.292
Despite the decision in State Contracting, one administrative law judge
still continued to conduct a broad analysis of a bidder's actual ability to
comply with the established DBE goals for the procurement.293 The DOT,
however, rejected the administrative law judge's analysis based on State
Contracting.294 In this procurement for the rehabilitation of the Jewfish
Creek Bridge in Monroe County, the protester submitted the lowest priced
bid of five bidders. 295 The lTB established two DBE goals: eight percent for
non-minority female DBE's and four percent for African-American
DBE's.296 The DOT, however, rejected the protester's bid because it failed
to meet the DBE goals.29
The protester challenged the agency's rejection of its bid and the ability
of the intended awardee to meet DBE goals.298 The administrative law judge
found that the intended award was improper because the intended awardee
could not actually meet DBE goals, although it submitted all materials
required by the ITB to determine such compliance.299 The administrative
law judge reasoned that the DBE subcontractors proposed by the awardee
did not comply with the DBE requirements because it was not clear that they
could perform the work.3°° Moreover, the administrative law judge found
that the DOT improperly evaluated the protester's good faith effort to
comply with applicable DBE goals.
30 1
The DOT, however, rejected the administrative law judge's decision in
part.? The DOT stated that its regulations only require bidders to identify
their DBE's, the description of work to be performed, the dollar amount of
290. Id.
291. Id. at 609.
292. Id. at 610.
293. Quinn Constr., Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., No. 99-2277BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs
Aug. 3, 1999) (granting protest challenging DBE good faith effort evaluation, but rejecting in
large part hearing officer's recommended decision).
294. Id.
295. Id. [ 4.
296. ld. 15.
297. Id. 20.
298. Quinn Constr., Inc., No. 99-2277BID [43.
299. Id. 27.
300. Id. 167.
301. Id. 168.
302. Id. (H 70-71.
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such work, any other documentation required by contract or bidding
documents, the signature of the proposed DBEs, and evidence that the goal
has been met.3 3 The DOT argued all other materials are performance issues,
not responsiveness issues, relying on State Contracting, which the DOT
determined that the hearing officer ignored and failed to distinguish.: 4
Nonetheless, although the evidence presented at the hearing regarding the
protester's good faith compliance with the DBE requirements was not
included with its bid, the DOT would consider the material now because the
protester already had one DBE, and the DOT should have known about the
severe limitation on certified painters, which rendered it meaningless to
contact more.305  Thus, the DOT accepted the hearing officer's
recommendation regarding the protester's good faith efforts to comply with
the DBE goals, and that the protester should receive the contract.
In Overstreet Paving Co. v. Department of Transportation, 30 an agency
had to waive a bidder's failure to include its DBE form where evidence in
the record demonstrated that it had been included with its bid, but that the
agency lost it.307  The DOT found the low bid nonresponsive due to
Overstreet's failure to include its DBE utilization form with its bid.30 The
DOT dismissed the protest, and the low bidder appealed. 30 9 The appellate
court held that the bid should not have been declared nonresponsive for a
technical omission that was not material to the bid, that did not result in
competitive advantage, and that was a matter the DOT had discretion to
overlook, in view of the hearing officer's findings establishing an unrefuted,
prima facie case that the low bidder included the document in question in its
sealed bid.310 The decision in Overstreet Paving Co. should not be taken as
firm precedent that an agency must waive an offeror's failure to include its
303. Quinn Constr., Inc., No. 99-2277BID [ 67.
304. See also Old Tampa Bay Enters., Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., No. 99-0120BID (Fla.
Div. Admin. Hr'gs May 27, 1999) (denying protest challenging evaluation of awardee in a
procurement for bridge tending, maintenance, and repair services where protester failed to
prove that proposed DBE could not perform the work and the work of the DBE was a matter
of contract performance, not responsiveness).
305. Quinn Constr., Inc., No. 99-2277BID 58.
306. 608 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (reversing final order finding
contractor nonresponsive).
307. Id. at 852.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 853.
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DBE firm because of the finding that the agency had lost the documentation.
The Division of Administrative Hearings has accepted this distinction.311
In City of Wildwood v. Gibbs & Register, Inc.,3 2 the court held a
contractor cannot use its failure to comply with a solicitation's DBE
requirements to withdraw a bid.3" In Gibbs & Register, Inc., the city
brought an action against the low bidder for a wastewater system reuse
storage pond construction contract, seeking damages stemming from a
314bidder's withdrawal of its bid in an ITB. The bidder claimed that it could
not meet the DBE participation requirements. 315 The bidder and its surety
that had issued the bid bond counterclaimed for damages resulting from the
316city's refusal to return the bid bond. All the parties moved for summary
judgment, and the trial court granted the bidder's motion and denied the
317
city's motion. The city appealed, and the appellate court held that the
bidder breached the agreements in its bid by refusing to provide post-award
information necessary to comply with the DBE participation goal
requirements as required for a contract, thus triggering forfeiture of the
bidder's bid bond to the city.
318
IX. RESPONSIBILITY
It is very difficult for a bidder to successfully challenge the agency's
determination that the bidder is not responsible. A responsible bidder is one
who "has the capability in all respects to perform fully the contract
requirements and has the integrity and reliability which will assure good
faith performance." '319 In one recent decision, a city manager found a bidder
not responsible based on his performance during a previous contract in
311. See Hubbard Constr. Co. v. Dep't of Transp., No. 98-0749BID (Fla. Div. Admin.
Hr'gs May 1, 1998) (denying protest challenging agency's determination that proposals were
nonresponsive where one offeror failed to include its DBE form and another did not meet
DBE goals when the proposed DBE was not certified).
312. 694 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1997).
313. Id. at 766 (reversing summary judgment for contractor who attempted to withdraw
bid).
314. Id. at 764.
315. Id. at765.
316. Id.
317. Gibbs & Register, Inc., 694 So. 2d at 765.
318. Id. at 766.
319. FLA. STAT. § 287.012(13) (2000); see also BROWARD Co. PROCUREMENT CODE
§ 21.8 (b)(60).
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which the bidder billed the city for work that it had not performed.32  A
hearing officer disagreed with the city manager's conclusion, reasoning that
the city manager did not know all of the pertinent facts. 32' The city
commission, however, rejected the decision of the hearing officer, and still
rejected the bid.32 In an order affirming the denial of a temporary injunction
sought by the purported nonresponsible bidder, the appellate court held that
the bidder was not likely to succeed on the merits because, based on the
bidder's performance under previous contract, it did not appear to be
arbitrary to find the bidder nonresponsible.32
X. SUNSHINE LAW
Florida has a statutory requirement granting a broad right of access to
public records and meetings of public boards and commissions.24 This law,
known as the Sunshine Law, is a potentially powerful weapon that may be
unleashed by a disappointed bidder to upset a procurement. Several recent
decisions have considered the application of the Sunshine Law within a
government procurement.
In Silver Express Co. v. District Board of Lower Tribunal Trustees of
Miami-Dade Community College,325 a contractor that had submitted an
unsuccessful proposal to the college to provide flight training services
brought an action in circuit court seeking to enjoin the college from
awarding a two-year contract to another contractor, alleging a violation of
the Sunshine Law.32 The circuit court denied the motion for a temporary
injunction, and the contractor appealed.327 On appeal, the appellate court
held that the committee appointed by the college's purchasing director to
consider proposals was subject to the Sunshine Law. The court further held
320. Miami-Dade County v. Church & Tower, Inc., 715 So. 2d 1084, 1086 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
321. Id. at 1085.
322. Id. at 1086.
323. Id. at 1091 (affirming denial of a temporary injunction because no substantial
likelihood to prevail on the merits existed); see also Culpepper v. Moore, 40 So. 2d 366, 370
(Fla. 1949) (affirming the agency's decision that the low bidder was not responsible in part
because of mistakes in the bid).
324. FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (2000). For an extensive analysis of the law, see Office of
the Attorney General, Florida's Government-In-The-Sunshine Manual and Public Records
Law Manual (2000 ed.).
325. 691 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
326. Id. at 1100-01.
327. Id. at 1100.
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that the committee's violation of the law caused irreparable public injury,
warranting a temporary injunction prohibiting the college from entering into
the contract based on the ranking established by the committee.3' 2 The
appellate court also held that the plaintiff did not waive its Sunshine Law
claim by failing to raise it in the chapter 120 bid protest.329
Other decisions, while confirming that procurements are subject to the
Sunshine Law, did not provide similar relief to disappointed bidders. For
instance, in Leach-Wells v. City of Bradenton,33 the appellate court held that
the city violated the Sunshine Law when an ad hoc committee failed to hold
a meeting regarding the short-listing of bidders for a construction contract
for a municipal complex. 33' The city had appointed a selection committee
comprised of the city clerk, a local engineer, the public works director, and a
city councilman to review the six proposals submitted in response to the
RFP. 332 These committee members were then required to rank the proposals,
with the top three being permitted to make presentations to the city council,
and then select one.33 Because all of the committee members had found the
same three bidders to be the highest rated, the city did not hold a meeting to
discuss who the top three should be. 34 The appellate court reasoned that the
ranking, which in essence eliminated three bidders from the process, was a
"formal action" that was required to be done at a public meeting.335 Although
a violation had occurred, the city had not been enjoined (the plaintiff had not
appealed the denial of the temporary injunction), therefore the action was
moot.
336
The Sunshine Law does not prohibit all private discussions within the
context of a procurement. In Humana Medical Plan, Inc. v. School Board of
328. Id. at 1101.
329. Id.
330. 734 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
331. Id. at 1169.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Leach-Wells, 734 So. 2d at 1171.
336. Id.; see also Capeletti Bros. v. Dep't of Transp., 499 So. 2d 855, 857 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1986). In Capeletti Bros., the court held that the bid review committee was not
subject to the Sunshine Law because section 337.168 of the Florida Statutes, the DOT statute,
exempted DOT cost estimates, identities of potential bidders, and bid analysis under the
Public Records Law, located in section 119.07(1) of the Florida Statutes. Id. The result of
this case would be different now that a 1991 amendment to the Public Records Law states that
exemptions from it do not provide an exemption from the Sunshine Law unless it is
specifically provided. See FLA. STAT. § 119.07(2)(a) (2000).
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Broward County, Humana claimed that three meetings violated the
Sunshine Law.3 8  The administrative law judge ruled, however, that the
individual committee members were free to meet with a consultant retained
to assist with the procurement. 339 Further, while two other meetings were
violations of the Sunshine Law, the administrative law judge found that
those violations were cured by holding a subsequent full and open public
hearing on the same issues.340
XI. REMEDIES
Although Florida courts have awarded attorneys' fees and bid
preparation costs to successful protestors, lost profits have not been held to
be recoverable. In City of Cape Coral v. Water Services of America, Inc.,
("WSA"),34 ' the city informed bidders that they did not have to be licensed
as a general contractor under chapter 489 of the Florida Statutes in order to
bid on the water treatment facility.342 A bidder complained that it should
receive the contract award because the other bidders were not licensed as
general contractors. 4 3  The city agreed, and WSA protested, seeking an
injunction and damages.344 The request for an injunction was denied in
another decision, but the trial court awarded lost profits, bid preparation
costs, prejudgment interest, and attorneys' fees3 45 Thereafter, the appellate
court reversed as to lost profits only346
337. No. 98-5086BID (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Apr. 29, 1999) (rejecting Humana's
protest and awarding the contract to Foundation and HIP).
338. Id. 121.
339. Id. (citing Sch. Bd. of Duval County v. Fla. Publ'g Co., 670 So. 2d 99, 101 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996)) (holding that the Sunshine Law does not prevent private meetings
between individual committee members and staff members or consultants). But see Blackford
v. Sch. Bd. of Orange County, 375 So. 2d 578, 581 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (finding that
meetings between one subject to the Sunshine Law and one not subject to the Sunshine Law
would be subject to Sunshine Law if the other person was acting as a liaison between persons
subject to the Sunshine Law). See also Office of the Attorney General, supra note 324, at 18-
19.
340. Humana Med Plan, Inc., No. 98-5086BID U 122-23; see Monroe County v.
Pigeon Key Historical Park, Inc., 647 So. 2d 857, 860 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
341. 567 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
342. Id. at 511.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 512.
345. Id.
346. City of Cape Coral, 567 So. 2d at 514.
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In contrast, in City of Tallahassee v. Blankenship & Lee,347 a
disappointed bidder on a natural gas line project sued the city for
disqualification from bidding, in which the trial court had found that the
city's decision had come too late.m The circuit court ordered the city to pay
bid preparation costs, including attorneys' fees, incurred in pursuing the bid
protest, but the district court of appeal held that attorneys' fees were not
recoverable.349 Although there is a limited exception that attorneys' fees are
available where the wrongful act involved a party in litigation against others,
it was found to be inapplicable.3 °
In Procacci Commercial Realty, Inc. v. Department of Health &
Rehabilitative Services,351 the agency was awarded sanctions against the
protester and attorneys' fees and costs for having to defend a frivolous
appeal regarding a bid protest.
352
XII. HEARING OFFICER'S DECISION
A. Rejection of Hearing Officer's Legal Conclusion
Decisions of the administrative law judges are only recommended
decisions and the agencies may reject the decisions, subject to judicial
review, though such rejections are rare. In LB. Bryan & Co. v. School
Board of Broward County, 35' the appellate court held that the school board,
in a procurement for insurance, properly rejected the administrative law
judge's conclusions of law that the board had acted illegally by awarding the
contract to the intended awardee 5 4 The protester claimed that the school
board could not award the contract to the intended awardee because it was in
violation of the surplus lines insurance statute. 5  The administrative law
judge agreed in its conclusions of law. 6 The school board rejected these
347. 736 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (reversing the trial court's decision
and holding fees not recoverable).
348. Id. at 29.
349. Id. at 30.
350. Id.
351. 690 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
352. Id. at 609; see FLA. STAT. §120. 595(5) (2000).
353. 746So.2d1194 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1999) (affirming rejection of
administrative law judge's conclusions of law, but noting statute has now been changed
effective June 18, 1999).
354. Id. at 1197.
355. Id. at 1196.
356. Id.
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two conclusions of law, and on appeal, the protester challenged the school
board's authority to reject the judge's legal conclusions, contending that the
school board could not reject such findings because it did not have
"substantive jurisdiction" over the surplus lines statute. 57
At the time, an agency could "reject or modify the conclusions of law
and interpretation of administrative rules over which it has substantive
jurisdiction. 358 The First District held that the phrase "over which it has
substantive jurisdiction" only applied to "administrative rules," not to
"conclusions of law." 359 The appellate court reasoned that it has been the
longstanding rule in Florida that an agency could reject any conclusion of
law, but as to administrative rules, only those over which the agency has
substantive jurisdiction. 36° However, the district court noted that the recent
amendment to section 120.57(1)0) of the Florida Statutes has departed from
long standing law, and now agencies may only reject or modify conclusions
of law and administrative rules over which they have substantive
jurisdiction.361
In State Contracting & Engineering Corp. v. Department of
Transportation,362 a contractor challenged a final order of the DOT
approving the acceptance of a competitive bid for construction work on a
state road project.363 The district court of appeal held that the competing
contractor's bid for replacement of tollbooths on a state road was only
required to facially comply with the rule's requirements for subcontract
work by disadvantaged businesses.364 The protester contended that the low
bidder was nonresponsive because its DBE subcontractors intended to
purchase goods from non-DBEs 65 The DOT contended that the low
bidder's completed DBE form and actual compliance was a performance
357. Id.
358. LB. Bryan & Co., 746 So. 2d at 1197 (citing FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)0) (Supp.
1996)).
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id. In pertinent part, the section states as follows: "[tihe agency in its final order
may reject or modify the conclusions of law over which it has substantive jurisdiction and
interpretation of administrative rules over which it has substantive jurisdiction." FLA. STAT.
§ 120.57(1)(1) (2000).
362. 709 So. 2d 607 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (affirming agency's rejection of
hearing officer's decision granting protest).
363. Id. at 608.
364. Id. at 610.
365. Id. at 608.
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issue, not a responsiveness issue.366 The hearing officer disagreed, but the
agency rejected this argument.367 The appellate court affirmed and held that
the burden is on the party protesting the award of the bid to establish the
368ground(s) for invalidating the award. Moreover, the appellate court held
that an agency may reject a hearing officer's findings of fact only if not
supported by competent and substantial evidence, but can reject or modify
conclusions of law and interpretations of administrative rules over which the
369agency has substantive jurisdiction. Here, the court's review of the
agency's decision is limited to whether it is correct as a matter of law, which
is certainly not clearly erroneous.37°
B. Administrative Law Judge's Decision is Binding in a Chapter 120
Challenge if Supported by Substantial and Competent Evidence
In Hubbard Construction Co. v. Department of Transportation,37' the
appellant/bidder challenged a final order in which the DOT rejected certain
findings of fact and conclusions of law of the hearing officer that the
bidder's discrepancy was a minor irregularity (no discussion of issue) and,
thereby, denied the appellant's bid protest.372 Because the hearing officer's
recommended order was supported by competent substantial evidence and
did not involve a misapplication of law, the appellate court reversed.373
In Asphalt Pavers, Inc. v. Department of Transportation,374 a chapter
120 case, a final order of the DOT dismissed a contractor's protest to the
disqualification of its bid and the intended award of the project to the next
lowest bidder.375  The contractor appealed.376  The contractor's bid was
missing the disadvantaged business form, which was required to be
366. Id.
367. State Contracting & Eng'g, 709 So. 2d at 608.
368. Id. at 609.
369. Id. at 610.
370. See id.
371. 642 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (reversing DOT's rejection of
hearing officer's granting of protest).
372. Id. at 1192.
373. Id. (stating no beneficial facts, but providing just another example of reversal of
agency rejection of hearing officer's determination).
374. 602 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1992) (reversing agency's rejection of
hearing officer's decision upholding protest that bidder was responsive).
375. Id. at 558.
376. Id. at 559.
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responsive.377 The hearing officer found that the bidder included the form in
its bid, but the DOT lost it.378 Thus, the protest was upheld.379 The DOT
rejected the hearing officer's decision.380 The district court of appeal held
that the hearing officer's findings of fact after an evidentiary hearing were
supported by competent, substantial evidence, and the DOT's decision to
reject the lowest bid was clearly arbitrary.381
C. Nonchapter 120 Procurements
In Miami-Dade County v. Church & Tower, Inc., ("C & T"),382 a case
applying Dade County Procurement Code 2-8.4, the court held that the
county commission is not bound by the hearing examiner's recommendation,
but still must not exercise its discretion arbitrarily or capriciously. 38 3 The
city manager found C & T nonresponsible based upon findings of previous
contracts where C & T billed for work not performed. 384 However, the
hearing officer disagreed because the city manager did not know all the
pertinent facts (although there were no findings that any allegations were
false) and recommended the award go to C & T.385 The city commission
rejected the decision and the bid.386 The appellate court held that the trial
court improperly entered a temporary injunction because C & T failed to
establish the likelihood of success on the merits and was therefore not
entitled to an injunction.387  The Dade County Code permitted the
commission to reject the hearing officer's decision (by a two-thirds
requirement if it is the same as the manager), as long as the decision was not
arbitrary or capricious. 388 Here, based upon the facts under the previous
contract, it was not found to be arbitrary.
38P
377. Id.
378. Id. at 560.
379. Asphalt Pavers, Inc., 602 So. 2d at 560.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 562; see also Overstreet Paving Co. v. Dep't of Transp., 608 So. 2d 851
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
382. 715 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (affirming denial of a temporary
injunction because protestor did not show a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits).
383. Id. at 1089-90.
384. Id. at 1086.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Church & Tower, Inc., 715 So. 2d at 1089.
388. Id. at 1088.
389. Id. at 1091.
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XIV. CONCLUSION
The rules governing contracting with the government are intended to
ensure the fair and equitable treatment of all persons who seek such
contracts. While often these rules make it more difficult to obtain
government contracts, as compared to private contracts, such rules provide
all potential contractors with an equal opportunity. Despite this level
playing field among contractors, the government is given a firm advantage.
Governmental entities are provided with broad discretion as to the decisions
they make regarding the evaluation of bids and proposals and the award of
contracts for goods and services. Thus, potential government contractors,
and their counsel, need to pay special attention to the unique rules governing
the process, as discussed in this article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Both the Florida courts and the state legislature spent a busy year
dealing with juvenile justice and child welfare issues. The Supreme Court of
Florida ruled on two significant matters. The first involved the reach of the
Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure in criminal cases, and the second the
application of due process hearing rights to mental health residential
treatment placements of children who have been committed to the custody of
the Department of Children and Family Services as dependents.
The lower appellate courts continued more than a decade long process
of holding the trial courts strictly accountable for compliance with basic
constitutional principles of the right to counsel and statutory compliance in
juvenile delinquency settings. In addition, the intermediate appellate courts
faced an eclectic body of issues involving both the dependency and
termination of parental rights settings including, among other things,
questions of the rules for returning children to their natural parents.
* Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida. J.D., Boston College, 1970; B.A., Colgate University, 1967. The author
thanks Mark Earles and Garrett Franzen for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
This article covers cases decided through June 30, 2000.
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The legislature was also particularly active in the child welfare field. It
passed legislation putting in place a dramatic reformulation of the child
welfare system. Seeking a new approach, the legislature placed
responsibility for child welfare services on private for-profit entities that
would contract with the Department of Children and Family Services.
I. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
A. Adjudicatory Issues
In juvenile law survey articles dating back a decade, this author has
discussed the trial court's failure to comply with the United States Supreme
Court's 1967 ruling in In re Gault, providing that juveniles have a right to
counsel in delinquency cases and if indigent, are entitled to an attorney paid
for by the state.2
The Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure and an extensive body of case
law articulate the right to counsel and state the test for waiver of counsel.
3
Yet, as recorded case law demonstrates, the trial courts continue to misapply
the test for waiver of counsel. Thus, in A.G. v. State,4 a child waived counsel
at a dispositional hearing in which the appellate court found that there was
no determination that the child's waiver was knowing and voluntary as
provided by the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure.5 Under Florida law, a
juvenile has a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel at all critical
stages of a delinquency proceeding.6 If there is a waiver, the court must
determine if it was freely and intelligently made.7 In the case at bar, the
court failed to advise the child of the nature of the rights he was waiving,
1. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. See id. at 36-42; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1998 Survey of Florida Law, 24
NOVA L. REV. 179, 185-86 (1999) [hereinafter 1998 Survey]; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law:
1997 Survey of Florida Law, 22 NOVA L. REv. 179, 188 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 Survey];
Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1995 Survey of Florida Law, 20 NOVA L. REv. 191, 194-95
(1995) [hereinafter 1995 Survey]; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1992 Survey of Florida
Law, 17 NOVA L. REV. 335, 342-45 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 Survey]; Michael J. Dale,
Juvenile Law: 1990 Survey of Florida Law, 15 NovA L. REv. 1169, 1179-80 (1991)
[hereinafter 1990 Survey]; Michael J. Dale, 1989 Survey of Florida Law: Juvenile Law, 14
NOVA L. REV. 859, 861-64 (1990) [hereinafter 1989 Survey].
3. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.185; see 1998 Survey, supra note 2, at 185 (discussing related
Florida cases); 1997 Survey, supra note 2, at 188 (addressing precisely the same topic).
4. 737 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
5. Id. at 1247; see FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.185.
6. See A.G., 737 So. 2d at 1247.
7. Id.
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that he understood the consequences of waiving legal representation, and
that the waiver was knowingly and intelligently made.
Similarly in A.P. v. State,9 in a short opinion, the appellate court
reversed a trial court decision for failure to properly advise the child as to
the right to counsel.10 In that case, not only was there no written waiver of
counsel as required by the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure," but the
court found there was no thorough inquiry into the child's comprehension of
the offer of counsel, nor a finding of the child's capacity to make the choice
to waive counsel intelligently and understandingly as required under the
Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure.12 This constituted fundamental error.13
Sometimes, the trial court personnel cannot even seem to get the
document signing procedure correct. In M.A.F. v. State,14 the waiver of
counsel was signed by the child but the place designated for the parent was
left blank.15  In that case as well, there was a "failure to perform the
necessary colloquy" about the right to counsel and a question as to whether
the waiver of counsel was freely and intelligently made.1 6 The appellate
court thus reversed.
1 7
In testing whether the waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent, the
courts include in the analysis an evaluation of the child's prior exposure to
the juvenile justice system and whether it would aid in the child's
comprehension of his or her rights. In T.S.D. v. State,8 the appellate court
held that the State did not meet its burden of demonstrating that the waiver
of counsel was knowing and intelligent and specifically found that there was
no demonstration that the juvenile's prior exposure to the juvenile court
system would help in the comprehension of the right to counsel.' 9
In the author's experience, the process of advising juveniles of their
right to counsel in delinquency cases often takes place in a group setting
where a number of children are before the court waiting for their cases to be
8. Id. at 1246. The plea colloquy was as follows: The judge asked, "'Okay. [A.G.],
the Department of Juvenile Justice has recommended a Level 6 commitment program for you.
Would you like to have a lawyer now?' A. G. responded, 'No, ma'am.' Id.
9. 740 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
10. Id. at 1241.
11. See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.165(a).
12. A.P., 740 So. 2d at 1241; see FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.165(b)(2).
13. A.P., 740 So. 2d at 1241.
14. 742 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
15. Id. at 535.
16.. Id.
17. Id.
18. 741 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 3d Dist Ct. App. 1999).
19. Id. at 1143.
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heard. The issue of whether this is acceptable arose in B.F. v. State.20 The
child appeared with his parents at an initial detention hearing, held as part of
a group hearing.21 Some of the juveniles were present for arraignment
hearings, while others were present for detention hearings, and the judge
spoke to the entire group of youngsters explaining the nature of the hearing
and informing them of various rights including the right to counsel.
Subsequently, the child was called before the court and asked whether he
heard the speech given when he first came in.23 On appeal from a plea, the
child claimed the court failed to adequately explain the right to counsel and
to determine the child knowingly and intelligently waived the right.2
The appellate court reversed, finding that while the arraignment
colloquy minimally informed the child that he had the right to counsel, the
trial court failed to make an individualized inquiry into the child's
comprehension of the right to counsel and the capacity to make a decision to
waive counsel in an intelligent and understanding fashion 25 Recognizing
that the generalized speech to a group of youngsters might not be enough,
the appellate court ruled that testing the knowing and intelligent waiver of
counsel requires several steps including informing the juvenile of the
benefits that he would relinquish and the danger and disadvantages of
representing himself, determining whether the youngster's choice was
voluntarily and intelligently made, and determining whether there were any
unusual circumstances which might preclude the youngster from exercising
the right to represent himself.26
Florida, like other states, provides for both waiver of a juvenile to adult
court and certification as an adult.27 This subject has been discussed on a
number of occasions in prior editions of this survey.' In State v. Brown,'
the circuit court certified a minor as an adult, despite his being seventeen
years of age at the time of the alleged offense.30 He had previously been
adjudicated delinquent for possession of cocaine, which would have been a
20. 747 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
21. Id. at 1062.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1063-64.
24. Id. at 1064.
25. B.F., 747 So. 2d at 1065-66 (citing J.R.V. v. State, 715 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1998) and D.L. v. State, 719 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
26. Id. at 1065.
27. See FLA. STAT. § 985.226 (2000).
28. 1998 Survey, supra note 2, at 185, 194-95; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law Issues
in Florida in 1998, 23 NOvA L. REv. 819, 835-36 (1998) [hereinafter Juvenile Law Issues].
29. 745 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
30. Id. at 1006.
[Vol. 25:91
96
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss1/1
2000]
felony if committed as an adult.31 The appellate court held that certification
as an adult did not end the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the
youngster's previous delinquent act.32  The adult criminal law statute
provided certain exceptions to criminal court jurisdiction, those being: a
person convicted of a felony whose civil rights and final authority had been
restored, and a person who had committed a delinquent act but where the
jurisdiction over the delinquent act had expired.3 However, in the case at
bar, the child was a delinquent under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for
his prior delinquent act at the time he was charged with possession of a
firearm.4 Thus, the appellate court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the
State's information.3
Another issue involving the interplay of juvenile and adult criminal
36
court jurisdiction arose in Williams v. State. In that case, a juvenile was
charged as an adult for agravated battery, an offense which qualified for
direct filing in adult court. He was also charged with other offenses which
could have been heard in adult court together with the battery.3 8  The
question before the district court was whether, once the State entered a nolle
prosequi39 as to the battery offense, those other charges over which the adult
court did not have any independent jurisdiction could still be heard in adult
court.4° The appellate court answered in the negative.4' Commenting that
the issue was not, in its technical sense, one of subject matter jurisdiction
(because both juvenile and adult criminal courts are divisions of the circuit
court in Florida) the appellate court explained that the Supreme Court of
Florida, nonetheless, recognizes the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile
court in the absence of a statutory exception.42
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1007.
33. FLA. STAT. § 790.23(2) (2000); see Brown, 745 So. 2d at 1007.
34. Brown, 745 So. 2d at 1007.
35. Id.
36. 737 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
37. Id. at 1142.
38. Id.
39. "A formal entry upon the record, by the plaintiff in a civil suit, or, more
commonly, by the prosecuting attorney in a criminal action, by which he declares that he 'will
no further prosecute' the case, either as to some of the defendants, or altogether." BLACK's
LAW DICTIONARY 1048 (6th ed. 1990).
40. Williams, 737 So. 2d at 1141.
41. Id. at 1142.
42. Id. at 1141.
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The Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure contain a ninety-day speedy
trial rule.43 In juvenile cases, the time begins to run on the earlier of the date
the child is taken into custody or the date a delinquency petition is filed.
44
Should the hearing not commence within the ninety-day period the child can
move to dismiss based upon violation of the speedy trial rule.45 The
Supreme Court of Florida has held that the State may not refile charges
against a juvenile after the speedy trial rule has expired.46 In D.A.J. v.
State,47 the State filed the initial petition 103 days after the child's arrest and
thirteen days after the speedy trial period had run.48 Thus, the court should
have granted the motion to dismiss.49 Furthermore, although the child failed
to file a written motion for discharge, the court held that Rule 8.090 of the
Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, which requires written motions dealing
with the fifteen-day window of recapture, was irrelevant in this case because
the State failed to file the initial petition within the speedy trial period.50
Therefore, the appeal could be heard and the reversal ensued.
51
A final case involved the issue of the application of the Florida Rules of
Juvenile Procedure to a child who has been filed against in adult court. The
question in State v. Olivo5 2 was whether the adult speedy trial rule or the
juvenile speedy trial rule Aoverns when the State directly files against a
juvenile in the adult court. The supreme court held that the adult speedy
trial rule governs. "4
B. Dispositional Issues
Probation, known until recently as "community control" in Florida, is
one of the dispositional alternatives in chapter 985 of the Florida Statutes
which has been recently described by one court as a "moderately complex
statute [that] allows for many different dispositions. '55 It has been the
43. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.090(a).
44. 8.090(a)(1)-(2).
45. 8.090(d).
46. P.S. v. State, 658 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1995).
47. 754 So. 2d. 817 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
48 Id. at 819.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 759 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 2000).
53. Id. at649.
54. Id. at 650.
55. T.J. v. State, 743 So. 2d 1158, 1159 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
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subject of substantial discussion in earlier surveys.5 6 In T.J. v. State,57 the
issue was whether the trial court was obligated to actually enter an order
citing the statutory requirement that community control end upon the child's
eighteenth birthday.58 The appellate court held that it was receding from
prior decisions which either held or suggested that the order must require a
statement that the community control end at age nineteen.5 9 The court held
that both the juvenile and the State are on legal notice of the content of
chapter 39 regarding termination of community control at the child's
nineteenth birthday and further that the form disposition order aproved by
the supreme court in 1987 did not contain the statutory language.
In an interesting opinion involving the agplication of the Miami Dade
County ordinance relating to spray painting, the Third District Court of
Appeal in State v. D.S., recently held that sentencing a juvenile to time
served in the detention center based upon a nolo contendere plea to
possessing spray paint cans complied with the ordinance provision for
punishment by a term in jail.63 Significantly, the court did not reach the
issue of the validity of the requirement that the juvenile disposition conform
to a plan for punishment contained in the ordinance as provided for in
section 806.13(7) of the Florida Statutes." Raised, but not properly before
the appellate court, was the constitutional validity of a statute that placed
dispositional authority in the ordinance.6 In dicta, Chief Judge Schwartz
commented that it might be inappropriate to suggest that the court resist a
view of the law that interferes with the right and duty of the juvenile court to
render appropriate dispositions concerning a particular child and situation
before the court.6
56. See 1998 Survey, supra note 2, at 183-85; Juvenile Law Issues, supra note 28, at
833-34, 841-44; 1997 Survey, supra note 2, at 195-97.
57. 743 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1999).
58. Id. at 1159.
59. Id. at 1160 (citing C.D.D. v. State, 684 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1996);
C.P. v. State, 674 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996); M.T.H. v. State, 676 So. 2d 77
(Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1996); M.V. v. State, 507 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1987)
and F.R. v. State, 473 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1985)).
60. T.J., 743 So. 2d at 1160.
61. The Third District Court of Appeal previously upheld the constitutionality of the
ordinance in D.P. D.P. v. State, 705 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997); see Juvenile
Law Issues, supra note 28, at 819, 838-39.
62. 760 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
63. Id. at958.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 959.
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I1. DEPENDENCY
In recent years, the subject of grandparent visitation and custody rights
has been before the United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of
Florida, and Florida's intermediate appellate courts. As the discussion in
this section of the article shows, parent and grandparent visitation issues
arise within dependency proceedings. Therefore, an analysis of the recent
appellate visitation decisions is germane to understanding their effect upon
dependency proceedings.
In the Spring of 2000, in a plurality opinion, the United States Supreme
Court decided Troxel v. Granville, a case involving the State of
Washington's grandparent visitation statute.68 The Supreme Court held that
it need not reach the constitutional question of whether the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires all nonparental visitation
statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a
condition precedent to granting visitation.69  Because of the sweeping
breadth and application of unlimited power under the Washington statute,
the Supreme Court did not have to decide the narrower constitutional issue
of whether harm need be proven to order grandparent visitation.70 It found
that the expansive Washington visitation statute was an unconstitutional
infringement on the parental right to make decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of children.71 Specifically, the Court held that under
Washington law the burden of disproving the visitation was on the parents,
and the Washington court gave no weight to the parents' assent to visitation
before the filing of a petition.7  Concluding that what happened in
Washington was a simple disagreement between the court and the parents
concerning the child's best interest, such a decision constituted an
unconstitutional infringement on the parents' basic decisionmaking rights."
In a series of cases beginning with Beagle v. Beagle,74 and presaging the
United States Supreme Court opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida
effectively rejected the entire Florida grandparent visitation statute on
grounds that it violated the parents' right to privacy under Article I, section
67. 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
68. Id. at 2057.
69. Id. at 2064.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2065.
72. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2062.
73. Id. at 2061.
74. 678 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1996) (holding that section 752.01(1)(a) of the Florida
Statutes governing visitation in context of families was unconstitutional).
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23 of the Florida Constitution.75 The court decided on the basis of the
Florida Constitution what the United States Supreme Court did not reach
under the United States Constitution, namely that family privacy precludes
court ordered grandparent visitation unless~a showing is made that somehow
lack of visitation will harm the child. 76
Despite these decisions, grandparent visitation and custody continue to
be issues in Florida's dependency and termination of parental fights cases.
Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes provides for grandparent visitation after a
child has been adjudicated dependent, and terminates visitation after the
child is returned to the physical custody of the other parent.77 In L.B. v.
C.A., 78 the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court's dismissal
of the grandparents' petition for visitation in a dependency proceeding
because there were no allegations of harm and the child had been reunited
with his mother.
7 9
In a second case, Powell v. Department of Children & Families,80 the
appellate court affirmed a trial court's denial of the grandparents'
application for unsupervised visitation with their dependent grandchildren.8'
The trial court found a compelling reason not to allow the visitation in the
home of the grandparents because the children's father, who had been
arrested for kidnapping and domestic battery, had free access to the
grandparents' home, and thus the grandparents could not assure the safety of
the children.82
Finally, grandparent intervention also arises in the context of adoption.
Section 63.0425 of the Florida Statutes requires that a grandparent be
75. Saul v. Brunetti, 753 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 2000) (finding the grandparent visitation
statute was unconstitutional in the context of deceased parent); Von Eiffv. Azicri, 720 So. 2d
510 (Fla. 1998) (ruling the grandparent visitation statute was unconstitutional in the context of
out-of-wedlock child); see also Lonon v. Ferrell, 739 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that in face of mother's objection, biological father's parents have no right to
visitation with child after biological father and mother divorce, mother remarries, and
biological father consents to child's adoption by stepfather).
76. Von Eiff, 720 So. 2d at 515. In the 2000 Legislative Session Senator Campbell
unsuccessfully sought to amend the grandparent visitation statute, section 752.01 of the
Florida Statutes, to require a showing of present or threatened significant mental or physical
harm as a result of the refusal to permit visitation. See Fla. S. Res. 288 (Fla. 2000).
77. FLA. STAT. § 39.509 (2000).
78. 738 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
79. Id. at 427. In LB., the court discussed section 39.4105 of the Florida Statutes.
Id. This section has since been renumbered § 39.509. See FLA. STAT. § 39.509 (2000).
80. 764 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
81. Id. at 632.
82. Id.
Dale
101
: Nova Law Review 35, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2000
Nova Law Review
provided with notice when the grandchild is placed for adoption if the child
83lived with the grandparent for at least six months.
Previous juvenile law surveys have discussed the issue of parents using
a variety of procedures, including dependency proceedings, as tactical
devices to oust spouses, former spouses, and putative parents from
involvement with the child.84 In LJ.R. v. T.T., 5 a natural father appealed a
final judgment granting a petition for adoption filed by the child's natural
mother. The judgment of adoption had terminated the father's parental
rights.87 He was imprisoned at the time in Massachusetts.88 The court
recognized that a proceeding to terminate parental rights, while generally
brought by the Department of Children and Family Services, might be
brought pursuant to Florida law by any person with knowledge of the facts,
which would include a parent.89 However, the court concluded that the
parent could not go straight to the adoption process without complying with
the termination of parental rights provisions of Florida law.9° Further, the
natural mother could not circumvent the statutory restrictions on terminating
the father's parental rights while retaining her own by petitioning for
adoption as a single birth parent.
91
A significant issue of parents' custodial rights arose recently in the case
of Department of Children & Families v. Benway.92 The Department of
Children and Families appealed an order requirin it to send a dependent
child to live with his natural father in Vermont.9 Vermont officials had
disapproved of the placement, having been contacted by Florida state
officials it would appear, pursuant to the Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children ("ICPC").94 Because Vermont disapproved of the
placement, the Department of Children and Families appealed from the court
order which held that the child should be placed with the father irrespective
83. FA. STAT. § 63.0425(1) (2000); see In re X.Z.C., 747 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the "lived with" provision is unambiguous and only requires that
the child live with the grandparent for at least six months and not that the child resides solely
with the grandparents).
84. See 1995 Survey, supra note 2, at 208-09; 1992 Survey, supra note 2, at 369.
85. 739 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
86. Id. at 1284.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1285 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.461(1) (1997)).
90. LJ.R., 739 So. 2d at 1287.
91. Id.
92. 745 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
93. Id. at 438.
94. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 409.401, Art. IH (2000).
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of Vermont's disapproval.95 The appellate court held that the ICPC is
applicable to an out-of-state placement of a dependent-child with a natural
parent, even though the statute makes no reference to a placement by a state
agency back with a natural parent.96 The statute does refer to the transfer of
a child "for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible
adoption." 97 The Florida court held, nonetheless, that the statute ought to be
liberally construed.98 The Fifth District also relied upon other state court
decisions and a law review article that suggest that the statute ought to be
interpreted to include placement of a child with natural parents.99 The
District Court of Appeal concluded that "[o]nce a court has legal custody of
a child, it would be negligent to relinquish that child to an out-of-state parent
without some indication that the parent is able to care for the child
appropriately."1°°
Left undecided, indeed not even discussed in the Benway case, are the
questions of family privacy and parental rights constitutionally protected
under the United States Supreme Court decision in Stanley v. Illinois,101 and
the series of Florida cases dealing with parental privacy beginning with
Beagle v. Beagle.1°2 In a dependency proceeding, in the absence of a
showing of harm, and it may well be that harm could have been shown in the
Benway case, there is no constitutional basis for keeping a child from a
natural parent.1 3 To do otherwise is to deny the liberty and privacy based
constitutional rights of natural parents recognized in these cases. 1
4
A second case, raising similar issues, is V.P. v. Department of Children
& Families.105 In V.P., a non-custodial parent residing in Illinois sought to
have the child, who was the subject of a dependency petition alleging abuse
and neglect by the child's mother and stepfather, temporarily placed with
hinm. 06 Instead, the trial court placed the child with a non-relative.10 7 The
95. Benway, 745 So. 2d at 438.
96. Id.
97. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 409.401, Art. 11(a) (1997)).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 439 (citing Kimberly M. Butler, CHILD WELFARE-Outside the Interstate
Compact on the Placement of Children-Placement of a Child with a Natural Parent, 37
VML. L. REV. 896 (1991)).
100. Benway, 745 So. 2d at 439.
101. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
102. 678 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1996).
103. See id. at 1277.
104. See id. at 1275.
105. 746 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
106. Id. at 590.
107. Id.
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district court held that the trial court did not comply with chapter 39
provisions regarding temporary custody, noting that absent evidence and
findings that the temporary custody would endanger the safety, well-being,
and physical, mental, or emotional health of the child, the court should order
temporary placement of the child with the natural parent. 10
A third issue of parental custody arose in J.R. v. Department of
Children & Families.109 In J.R., a mother and stepfather were charged with
abusing their children." 0 At the detention hearing the natural father
requested custody of the minor children."' The court made no finding of
facts pursuant to chapter 39, but simply placed the children in shelter care.1
2
Section 39.508(8) of the Florida Statutes requires that when a child is
removed from the custody of a parent, the court must determine whether
there is a parent with whom the child is not residing who desires to assume
custody of the child and that the child shall be placed with that parent
"unless it finds that such placement would endanger the safety, well-being,
or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child."'1 3 In the J.R. case, the
district court held that the lower court should at least have conducted a
hearing to determine the father's suitability under the statute."
4
These three cases demonstrate by their reference to the Florida Statutes
that the failure to allow the parent to have custody of the child must be
premised upon a showing of endangering the safety of the child. Although
the appellate courts made no such reference, the statute and their holdings
closely follow the Supreme Court decision in Stanley v. Illinois."
5
Concern for conditions in a Department of Children and Family
assessment center by a trial judge in Broward County generated an appellate
decision on the scope of the authority of the dependency court in
Department of Children & Family Services v. L C. 11 The issue arose from a
statutory court review of a dependency case in which the trial court learned
that the juvenile before the court, as well as others with disabilities who had
been rejected from various placements, were being brought to a particular
assessment center facility where they stayed until late at night without what
appeared to be appropriate placement supervision.117 The trial court ordered
108. Id.
109. 745 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
110. Id. at 1059.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id; FLA. STAT. § 39.508(8) (2000).
114. J.R., 745 So. 2d at 1059.
115. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
116. 742 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
117. Id. at 402.
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the agency to terminate the practice, as well as to produce the relevant
records of all the children who had recently been placed at the center.118 The
issue before the appellate court was one of division of responsibility between
the executive branch and the courts, and the degree to which the juvenile
court can act to protect children within its jurisdiction.1 9 The appellate
court affirmed in part requiring the agency to produce the names of the
children at the assessment center, but reversed the production of more
extensive records and the entry of an injunction against the agency
preventing children with disabilities in the judge's division from being held
in the center.12
Finally, and most significantly, in dicta the appellate court recognized
the severity of the problem of "the horrendous number of abused and
abandoned children, and the difficult caseloads of both the case workers and
the courts in juvenile proceedings. ' 2 The court then added:
What would help considerably is if each child could have a
guardian ad litem or attorney ad litem who could be in contact with
the child on a more regular basis and serve as the child's advocate.
Parents are represented in these proceedings, but the child, the
alleged object of everyone's concern, has no voice and no capacity
to reach the court in many cases. We commend the bar volunteer
projects such as Lawyers for the Children of America, for their
representation of dependent children.
122
Further discussion of the Florida legislature's very limited effort to fund a
model program for the representation of children in dependency cases is
discussed later in this article.
In making determinations of dependency, Florida appellate courts
continue to apply and interpret the Supreme Court of Florida's 1991 decision
in Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services,123 in which
the court held that the prior termination of a parent's rights as to one child
supports the severing of the parent's rights as to another child.124 In M.F. v.
118. Id.
119. Id. at404.
120. Id. at 404-05.
121. I.M., 742 So. 2d at 406.
122. Id.
123. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
124. Id. at 571; see generally Juvenile Law Issues, supra note 28, at 825; Michael J.
Dale, Juvenile Law: 1991 Survey of Florida Law, 16 NOVA L. REv. 333, 368-73 (1991)
[hereinafter 1991 Survey].
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Department of Children & Families,12 a father appealed from an order
adjudicating two minor children dependent following his conviction for
attempted sexual battery on a stepdaughter. 126  The appellate court
recognized that the abuse of one child can provide a cause for termination of
parental rights or adjudication of dependency as to a sibling if there is a
substantial likelihood of future abuse and neglect of the sibling if that child
were returned to the parent.127 The issue in M.F. was whether the copy of
the father's conviction for sexual abuse of a stepchild, as the only evidence
presented to support an adjudication of dependency of the two siblings, was
adequate.'2 The court held it wa's. 129 The appellate court relied upon
professional literature showing that the act of sexual abuse itself provides
evidence of likelihood of sexual abuse of other children.'3 In so doing,
however, the court distanced itself from the Fifth District Court of Appeal
that required additional evidence of the likelihood that the parent would
similarly abuse other children.'
31
Services to children who have been removed from their homes as a
result of a petition for dependency in Florida have been the subject of
significant recent litigation. Two class action lawsuits challenging
conditions in the Florida foster care system are currently pending in the
federal courts. Ward v. Kearny 132 is a challenge to conditions in foster care
in Broward County.133  That case was filed on October 20, 1998 and
conditionally certified as a class on March 17, 1999, with a settlement
agreement signed by the parties on January 26, 2000.134 The federal court
held a Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure fairness hearing on
125. 742 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
126. Id. at 491.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. M.F., 742 So. 2d at 491.
131. Id. (citing Eddy v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 704 So. 2d 734, 736 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Denson v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 661 So. 2d 934, 936
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); and Palmer v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 547 So. 2d
981, 984 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989)); see also Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1996 Survey
of Florida Law, 21 NOVA L. REv. 190, 216-17 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 Survey].
132. Compl. at 1, Ward v. Feaver, (S.D. Fla., filed Oct. 20, 1998) (No. 98-7137-Civ.)
(subsequently Kathleen Kearney, in her official capacity as Secretary of State, was substituted
as the named defendant in this case pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
133. Compl. at 1, Ward (No. 98-7137-Civ.).
134. Settlement Agreement, Ward v. Kearney (S.D. Fla., filed Feb. 17, 2000) (No. 98-
7137-Civ.).
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May 31, 2000, and approved the settlement agreement.135 A second case,
Thirty-One Foster Children v. Bush,1 36 filed on June 13, 2000, is also
presently pending in the federal district court for the Southern District of
Florida. 37" That case challenges foster care throughout the state and makes
multiple constitutional and statutory claims.1
38
Another significant issue of out-of-home care in the dependency system
came before the Supreme Court of Florida this past year in M. W. v. Davis.139
The issue in that case was whether, when a court orders a child to be placed
in a residential facility for mental health treatment after the child has been
committed to the local custody of the Department of Children and Families
in a dependency proceeding, the child must have an evidentiary hearing prior
to the court ordering the temporary placement in the residential mental
health facility.1
4
The supreme court analyzed whether the reuirements of Florida's civil
commitment statute, known as the Baker Act,14 are incorporated into the
laws regulating dependency proceedings. 142 The court held that neither the
requirements of chapter 39 nor the Florida Constitution mandates an
evidentiary hearing that complies with the substantive and procedural
requirements of the Baker Act prior to a dependent child being ordered by
the court into a residential mental health facility.' 43  In making its
constitutional ruling, the Supreme Court of Florida relied on Parham v.
JR.,'" the 1979 opinion in which the United States Supreme Court set out
the constitutional due process procedural standards necessary when a child is
committed by a parent voluntarily, or by a state agency when the child is in
the custody of the state, into a state mental hospital. The Parham court,
according to the Supreme Court of Florida, set three minimum due process
standards to be met when a child is committed including an inquiry by a
neutral fact finder, albeit not in a form of a judicial inquiry, an inquiry to
probe the child's background using available resources, and a periodic
135. Order Approving Settlement Agreement, Ward v. Kearney (S.D. Fla. May 31,
2000) (No. 98-7137-Civ.).
136. Amended Compl., Thirty-One Foster Children v. Bush, (S.D. Fla., filed Aug. 28,
2000) (No. 00-2116-Civ.).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2-3.
139. 756 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2000).
140. Id. at 92.
141. FLA. STAT. § 394.467 (2000).
142. M.W., 756 So. 2d at 92.
143. Id.
144. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
145. Id.; see M.W., 756 So. 2d at 99.
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review by a neutral fact finder.' 46 Thus, the Supreme Court of Florida held
implicitly that a prior due process evidentiary hearing was not
constitutionally required. 47 The child argued alternatively that the Florida
Statutes provided more rights than the minimum federal constitutional
procedures. After detailed review of chapter 39, the court concluded that
the legislature did not intend the Baker Act to apply to children who had
been adjudicated dependent and placed in the temporary legal custody of the
Department of Children and Family Services.149
Finally, the court looked at the question of what procedures should
apply before the court orders a dependent child to be placed in a residential
psychiatric facility against the child's wishes. 150 Initially, the court
recognized that chapter 39 provides that there shall be judicial and other
procedures to assure due process for children in the form of fair hearings that
recogmze, protect, and enforce children's constitutional and other legal
rights. The court then expressed concern that while the procedures in the
statute might be construed to require a precommitment hearing, the statute
does not adequately address a number of significant issues including whether
there ought to be an appointment of an attorney for the child before
commitment, the type of hearing required, the standard of proof to apply,
and whether the child should have the right to put on evidence before
placement in the psychiatric facility.152 The decision to place a child in a
psychiatric facility must be included in the case plan developed in the course
of the dependency proceeding. 153 However, the court also concluded that an
order that approves the placement of a dependent child in a locked
residential facility against that child's wishes deprives a child of liberty and
thus makes obligatory clear cut procedures to be followed by the dependency
judge. 154 Such procedures, the court opined, do not appear to exist in the
Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure.55
Then, in forceful language, the court pointed to its concern that while
the various parties and actors in the proceeding would be acting in the
child's best interest, nonetheless, the child might not perceive that anyone
had his or her best interest at heart when the child was placed in a locked
146. M. W., 756 So. 2d at 99.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 100.
149. Id. at 105.
150. Id.
151. M.W., 756 So. 2d at 106 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.001(1)() (2000)).
152. Id. at 106-07.
153. Id. at 107.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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psychiatric facility against his or her wishes without an opportunity to be
heard.156 The court stated, "Indeed, the issue presented by this case extends
beyond the legal question of what process is due; rather, this case also
presents the question of whether a child believes that he or she is being
listened to and that his or her opinion is respected and counts."5 The court
rejected the ill-conceived argument of the Guardian Ad Litem Program of
the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, which argued that the court ought not find that
the Baker Act procedures should be incorporated into the statutes, because
the dependency courts are so busy and lack time and resources to accomplish
the procedures that were already statutorily required. 55 The court explained
that although dependency courts are busy this does not mean that the court
could reject procedural rights of a child about to be placed in a residential
treatment facility against his or her wishes simply because there are other
hearings under chapter 39 and that additional hearings might somehow
burden the court.
159
The court concluded that while the Baker Act did not apply, in the
future there ought to be clear procedures prior to placement in a residential
treatment facility, which should include a hearing in which the child has a
meaningful opportunity to be heard.' 60 The court directed the Juvenile Court
Rules Committee to submit to the court proposed rules that set forth
procedures to be followed in a residential mental health situation.
1 61
Although children have no right to counsel in dependency proceedings
in Florida, several years ago the Florida legislature made absolute the right
to counsel to parents in dependency proceedings providing that, if indigent,
parents are entitled to appointed counsel unless the indigent parent waives
that right.162 The Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure follow the statute and
make explicit the procedure by which the court shall advise parents of the
right to counsel and determine whether there is a waiver of counsel.163 In
D.M. v. Department of Children & Family Services,164 the trial court
blatantly failed to comply with these provisions and the appellate court
reversed.165 Among the trial court's failings were advising the parent at the
arraignment that she could either admit or deny the allegations in the petition
156. M.W., 756 So. 2d at 107-08.
157. ld. at 108.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 109.
161. M.W., 756 So. 2d at 109.
162. See FLA. STAT. § 39.013(9)(a) (2000).
163. See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.320.
164. 750 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
165. id. at 130.
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and if she chose to deny them she would have the right to a lawyer.166 At the
arraignment hearing, while determining that the mother was on medication,
the trial court only briefly mentioned the right to counsel which failed to
fulfill the duty to advise of the right to counsel and what the right entails.
167
The trial court also failed to determine whether the mother's waiver was
made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.'6 At the shelter and
dispositional hearings, the problem was the court's failure to advise the
mother of a right to counsel at all.169 The appellate court reversed. 170
Chapter 39 provides for termination of jurisdiction in a dependency
case based upon the recommendation of the Department of Children and
Family Services or the guardian ad litem or based upon any other relevant
factors, once six months have passed since returning the child to the
parents. 171 In W.R. v. Department of Children & Families,172 despite the
recommendations of the guardian ad litem and the Department, the court
continued jurisdiction after six months had passed since the return of the
child to her parents. 173 In the W.R. case, nothing appeared on the record to
justify continued jurisdiction. 74 The appellate court recognized that it was
difficult to let go when one takes responsibility for a child's welfare.' 75
However, as the court put it, "our present legal system provides that under
normal circumstances (as have come to pass in this case), parents have both
the joy and the burden of raising their children without interference from the
courts.',
17 6
Finally, in an important case of first impression, the Third District
Court of Appeal in M.C. v. Department of Children & Families,177 ruled that
the Americans With Disabilities Act is inapplicable when used as a
defense by the parent in proceedings under chapter 39 related to
166. Id. at 129.
167. See id.
168. Id. at 130.
169. M.C., 750 So. 2d at 130.
170. Id.
171. FLA. STAT. § 39.806 (2000).
172. 757 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
173. Id. at 606.
174. Id. at 606-07.
175. id. at 607.
176. Id.
177. 750 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
178. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000).
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dependency. 179 In so doing, the court followed several other state courts
which had rejected the argument.180
IV. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
The current provision of chapter 39 governing termination of parental
rights contains nine separate grounds for termination including: 1) the
voluntary execution of a written surrender; 2) abandonment of the child and
the identity and location of parent is unknown despite a sixty-day diligent
search; 3) the existence of conduct toward the child demonstrating
continuing parental relationship threatens life, safety, well-being, or
physical, mental, or emotional health of the child despite services being
rendered; 4) the incarceration in a state or federal institution for a substantial
period of time before the child will reach the age of eighteen or the parent is
determined to be a violent career criminal; 5) the filing of a plan and the
child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned wherein the failure to
comply is for a period of twelve months or more after filing for dependency;
6) the parents are engaged in egregious conduct toward the child; 7) the
parents have subjected the child to aggravated sexual abuse; 8) the parents
have committed murder or voluntary manslaughter of another child or a
felonious assault involving serious bodily injury to the child; or 9) the
parental rights of the parent to a sibling have been terminated
involuntarily. 81 The law is clear that the court must address the statutory
factors listed in section 39.806 of the Florida Statutes."2
Furthermore, the court at the termination hearing shall consider what
the statute describes as the "manifest best interests of the child," and in
doing so shall consider eleven different factors.18 3 The court will then enter
a written order with the findings of facts and conclusions of law.184 In A.C.
v. Department of Children & Families,85 the appellate court was compelled
179. M.C., 750 So. 2d at 706 (discussing 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132 (West 1999)).
180. See Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550 (6th Cir. 2000); In re Antony B., 735 A.2d
8930 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999); A.P. v. State, 728 A.2d 375 (Pa. Super. CL 1999); In re B.K.F.,
704 So. 2d 314 (La. CL App. 1997); In re B.S., 693 A.2d 716 (Vt. CL App. 1997); Stone v.
Daviess County Div. of Children & Family Servs., 656 N.E.2d. 824 (Ind. CL App. 1995).
181. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(a)(I) (2000).
182. See id.
183. § 39.810.
184. § 39.809(5).
185. 751 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
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to reverse because the final judgment failed to address the statutory factors
listed in the manifest best interests of the child section of the statute.18
6
Also in A.C., the court commented on a rather basic evidentiary
proposition. The court held that in conducting an adjudicatory hearing in a
termination case the trial court is required to abide by the rules of evidence
in civil cases and thus must receive admissible evidence prior to entry of a
final judgment terminating parental rights.18 7 The court is not permitted to
consider inadmissible evidence in determining whether it shall terminate
parental rights.1
88
Termination of parental rights may not occur where a prior dependency
adjudication is deficient because a parent is not properly served with notice
of an arraignment hearing at which a default adjudication of dependency was
entered against the parent.189 In T.R.F. v. Department of Children &
Families,1 the problem was whether the failure to make a diligent search as
a predicate to determining that the parents' failure to appear at the
arraignment hearing may result in a default determination of dependency and
subsequent termination of parental rights.191 Chapter 39 provides that an
affidavit of diligent search shall be filed where the parent's identity or
residence is unknown. 192 The court in T.R.F. explained that a diligent search
involves checking with the offices of the Department of Children and Family
Services that might have information about the parent, other state and federal
agencies that might have information, utility and postal providers, or
appropriate law enforcement agencies. 193
The same problem arose in S.N.S. v. Department of Children &
Families.194 An order terminating parental rights was reversed because the
record contained no evidence that the mother was served with notice of the
arraignment hearing at which a default adjudication of dependency was
entered. 195  In S.N.S., the trial court took into account the father's
representations regarding the mother's knowledge of the hearing and the
father's specific statement that the mother was aware of the hearing but was
186. Id. at 669 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.467(3) (1997)).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See T.R.F. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 741 So. 2d 1184, 1186 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1999).
190. 741 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
191. Id. at 1186.
192. FLA. STAT. § 39.502(8)-(9) (2000).
193. T.R.F., 741 So. 2d at 1186.
194. 750 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
195. Id. at 62.
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too embarrassed to attend.196 Such oral notice, if it existed at all, was
insufficient to satisfy the Florida statute.197
V. STATUTORY CHANGES
A. Dependency and Termination of Parental Rights
The Florida legislature has changed the name and purpose of the
Department of Children and Family Services on a number of occasions over
the past twenty years. 198 This year is no different. The legislature has
changed the philosophical approach of the Department by moving to
privatization of the child welfare system through the use of profit making
entities to carry out many of the responsibilities of the Department.! The
key component of the new approach involves authorizing the Department of
Children and Family Services to contract for services with a lead agency in
each county. ° The obligations of the lead agency shall include: directing
and coordinating programs and services, including the provision of core
services involving intake and eligibility, assessment, service planning, and
case management; developing a service provider network that can develop
services contained in client service plans; managing and monitoring provider
contracts; developing and implementing effective bill payment mechanisms;
providing or arranging for the provision of administrative services to support
the service delivery scheme; employing department approved training and
meeting department defined credentials and standards; providing for
performance measurements in accordance with the department's quality
assurance program; developing and maintaining interagency collaboration;
insuring that all federal and state reporting requirements are met; operating
the consumer complaint and grievance process; and insuring that services are
coordinated. 2" The theory for the change in approach is one of free
enterprise competition described as a competitive procurement approach to
services.2
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See 1998 Survey, supra note 2, at 193-94; Juvenile Law Issues, supra note 28, at
828-30; 1997 Survey, supra note 2, at 205-06; 1995 Survey, supra note 2, at 217-19.
199. See Ch. 2000-139, § 2, 2000 Fla. Laws 306, 310 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 20.19
(2000)).
200. Id. at 315 (codified at RA. STAT. § 20.19 (2000)).
201. Id.
202. See id. § 7,2000 Fla. Laws at 320-24 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 402.73 (2000)).
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The second significant change has been the transfer of responsibility to
perform child protective investigations to the sheriffs of Pasco, Manatee, and
now Broward County.
203
In an effort to clarify court jurisdiction when dependency proceedings
and custody and/or divorce proceedings are pending at the same time, the
legislature amended section 39.013 of the Florida Statutes to include a
provision that when there are dissolution or other proceedings involving
custody or visitation of a child pending at the same time as a dependency
proceeding, the dependency proceeding shall take precedence. W
4
The legislature passed a narrowly focused bill aimed at providing
attorneys ad litem to children in dependency cases in Orange County on a
test basis. 0 5 The legislature determined that in light of the declaration of
goals for dependent children contained in the statute, a pilot program for
attorneys ad litem for dependent children who are in out-of-home care by
court order was to be put in place so the children received competent
representation.20' It set up the program in the Ninth Judicial Circuit, which
encompasses Orlando.207 Under the provisions of the statute, the circuit
court contracts with a private or public entity to establish the private
program which would represent the rights of children taken into custody by
the Department.2 s The Office of State Courts sets measurable outcomes for
the program and the court designates an attorney to conduct administrative
oversight of the program.20 9
The statute, while quite limited in scope geographically as well as in
purpose, is significant because Florida does not provide for counsel to
children in dependency cases.210 Furthermore, while Florida receives funds
pursuant to federal legislation for child welfare purposes,21 the state of
Florida does not provide guardians ad litem for children in all cases as
212
required by the federal statute. Indeed, Florida has not reported to the
203. Id. § 3, 2000 Fla. Laws at 316-18 (codified at FA. STAT. § 39.3065 (2000)).
204. Ch. 2000-139, § 16, 2000 Fla. Laws 306, 336 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.013
(2000)).
205. Id. § 88, 2000 Fla. Laws at 389 (codified at FlA. STAT. § 39.4086 (2000)).
206. Id. (codified at § 39.4086(1) (2000)).
207. Id. at 390 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.4086(2)(a) (2000)).
208. Id. (codified at F.A. STAT. § 39.4086(2)(b) (2000)).
209. Ch. 2000-139, § 88, 2000 Fla. Laws 306, 390 (codified at EtA. STAT.
§ 39.4086(2)(b) (2000)).
210. See D.B. v. State, 385 So. 2d 83, 91 (Fla. 1980); Brevard County v. Dep't of
Health & Rehab. Servs., 589 So. 2d 398,400 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
211. See Childhood Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974 ("CAPTA"), 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 5101-5119 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000).
212. See infra notes 214 and 215.
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federal government on compliance213 and contact with the Guardian Ad
Litem Program in Broward County demonstrates that children are provided
with guardians ad litem in less than fifty percent of the cases.
214
Furthermore, there is a body of case law in the State of Florida holding that
children do not receive counsel in all cases and, despite the federal
legislation, that they are not entitled to guardians ad litem.
215 "
B. Juvenile Delinquency
The legislature made several changes in the juvenile delinquency field
including a well-deserved change in terminology from the term "community
control" to "probation," thus bringing Florida in line with most other
states.2 6 The legislature also expanded the use of pretrial detention for
juveniles again.21 It amended chapter 985 to provide for a period of up to
seventy-two hours of prehearing detention for a child who is detained for
failure to appear and who has previously willfully failed to appear after
proper notice of the adjudicatory hearinE on the same case regardless of the
result of the risk assessment instrument. 8 The legislature also provided for
detention for up to seventy-two hours for willful failure to appear at two or
more court hearings of any nature with seventy-two hour detention
resulting.2, 9
In addition, the legislature extended the time for pretrial extension for
good cause shown to an additional nine days when the child is charged with
an offense which, if committed as an adult, would be a capital felony, life
213. See Summary Data Component Survey 1998, Department of Children and Family
Services.
214. Telephone Conversation with Jeanette Wagner and Melissa Solomon, Esq.,
Broward County Guardian Ad Litem Program. On November 9, 2000, the circuit court in
Broward County had assigned 1341 cases to the local office of the guardian ad litem. Of that
number, the office was able to assign 831 guardians or 62%.
215. See Fisher v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 674 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1996); E.F. v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 639 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1994); 1998 Survey, supra note 2, at 190-91; Juvenile Law Issues, supra note 28, at 824-25;
1997 Survey, supra note 2, at 209.
216. See Ch. 2000-135, § 18, 2000 Fla. Laws 209, 232 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 985.03(43)).
217. See generally 1998 Survey, supra note 2, at 180; Juvenile Law Issues, supra note
28, at 831-34; 1997 Survey, supra note 2, at 180-84; 1992 Survey, supra note 2, at 348-53;
1991 Survey, supra note 124, at 339-43.
218. See Ch. 2000-134, § 9, 2000 Fla. Laws 197, 204 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 985.215(2)(i) (2000)).
219. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 985.215(2)j) (2000)).
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felony, felony of the first degree, or felony of the second degree involving
violence.
220
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Florida heard just a few cases involving
children's issues, but rendered a major opinion establishing certain
procedural due process rights for children who are in the child welfare
system as dependents and who are to be placed in mental health residential
facilities. Lower appellate courts ruled on diverse issues in both the
delinquency and the child welfare fields upholding constitutional rights of
children and strictly enforcing statutory protections for both children and
their families.
The legislature put into effect a dramatic change in the focus of the
child welfare system in Florida by authorizing the Department of Children
and Family Services to contract with profit making entities to take over
responsibility for major portions of the child welfare system.
220. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 985.215(5)(f) (2000)).
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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey covers Florida judicial decisions and legislation that
appeared between July 1, 1999 and June 30, 2000. As in past years, the
volume is huge. So many cases and statutes can have an impact on real
estate that we had to limit our coverage to what we thought would be of
particular interest to the real estate community.' Our goal is to inform our
readers of what has happened and, on occasion when we thought it was
needed, to voice agreement, disagreement, or suggestions for the future. As
always, we urge you to read the original cases and acts. As readers will
discover, real estate law continues to develop in interesting ways.
Il. ATTORNEYS' FEES
A. In General
2Munao v. Homeowners Ass'n of La Buona Vita Mobile Home Park.
Owners of mobile homes who rented spaces in a mobile home park
challenged the rent as unreasonable because the landlord had reduced the
3amenities. The trial court ruled in their favor and ordered a rent reduction,
retroactively and prospectively until repairs were made.4 The court also
ordered the payment of attorneys' fees. The fees were challenged on the
ground that the plaintiff tenants had not proved all the defects they had
alleged in their complaint.6 The district court pointed out that "the test is
whether the party 'succeed[ed] on any significant issue in litigation which
I. Some areas, such as land use planning, are excluded because they are to be
covered by separate survey articles. Other areas, like regulation of the construction industry,
are too specialized to be of interest to our readers.
2. 740 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
3. Id. at 75. The landlord and tenant issues of this case are discussed in the Landlord
and Tenant section of this article. See discussion infra Part XIII.
4. Munao, 740 So. 2d at 75.
5. Id.
6. Id. at78.
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achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit."' 7 The
plaintiff had won a rent reduction and the restoration of amenities, which
was enough to make it a prevailing party.s
The landlord also challenged the use of a multiplier in the calculation of
attorneys' fees because the plaintiffs' attorneys' fee agreement was only
partly based on a contingency fee.9 The district court found the use of the
multiplier to be proper because the trial court had carefully explained the
factors used to conclude that a contingency risk multiplier was warranted
and justified the use of those factors based upon the expert witness
testimony, Rule 4-1.5 of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct, section
57.104 of the Florida Statutes, and relevant Florida case law.1°
Tri-County Development Group, Inc. v. C.P.T. of South Florida, Inc."
The tenant was a corporation owned by Barrett Hess.12 The landlord sued
the tenant for a breach of the lease.1 3 Included as defendants were Mr. Hess,
C.P.T., and Profitable Investment Corporation, another company that Hess
owned.1 4 The defendants' answer denied the landlord's claims and also
stated, "[tihe claims against DEFENDANTS, HESS AND CPT, are wholly
without factual and/or legal merit and the DEFENDANTS should be
awarded attorney's fees pursuant to F.S. 57.105. "15 The trial court awarded
$75,000 in attorneys' fees and costs to tenant Profitable Investment
Corporation based upon the attorneys' fees provision in the lease. 16 The
landlords appealed claiming that the tenant had failed to properly plead its
claim for attorneys' fees and, therefore, waived its attorneys' fees claim.
17
The unsuccessful appeal was based on two theories.
18
First, the answer did not specify whether attorneys' fees were sought
based upon the contract or upon a statute.19 To the extent that section 57.105
of the Florida Statutes was mentioned, the answer did not specify under
7. Id. (quoting Moritz v. Hoyt Enters., Inc., 604 So. 2d 807, 809-10 (Fla. 1992)).
8. Id. at 79.
9. Munao, 740 So. 2d at 78-79.
10. Id. at 79-80.
11. 740 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
12. Id. at 573.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 573-74.
15. Id. at 574.
16. Tr-County Dev. Group, Inc., 740 So. 2d at 574.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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which subsection attorney's' fees were being sought.2 The district court
found this unpersuasive. Waiver benefited the tenant rather than the
22landlord . The court stated:
[W]here a party has notice that an opponent claims entitlement to
attorney's fees, and by its conduct recognizes or acquiesces to that
claim or otherwise fails to object to the failure to plead the
entitlement, that party waives any objection to the failure to plead a
claim for attorney's fees.23
Any challenges to or questions about that claim could have and should have
been raised by a responsive pleading.2 Failure to do so resulted in waiver of
the objections.2 5 Moreover, section 57.105(1) of the Florida Statutes
provided for attorneys' fees based on bringing a frivolous claim or action,
and subsection two of the same statute provided for attorneys' fees under a
contract where the contract would have allowed the other party to recover
attorneys' fees for prevailing.26 Thus, claiming attorneys' fees under section
57.105 of the Florida Statutes effectively gives notice that a claim is being
made for either or both statutory or contractual attorneys' fees.27
The next theory was that the answer only mentioned the claims against
Hess and C.P.T. as being without merit and, therefore, Profitable Investment
Corporation had not made any claim for attorneys' fees.2 However, the
answer said that "the DEFENDANTS should be awarded attorney's fees."
29
The tenant was one of the defendants.30 In fact, the tenant was the only
defendant who was a party to the lease that was the subject of the suit and
which contained the attorneys' fees provision to which subsection two of the
statute would apply.31 Thus, the claim was sufficient to give the landlord
notice that all three defendants were seeking attorneys' fees.
32
20. Id.
21. Tri-County Dev. Group, Inc., 740 So. 2d at 575.
22. Id. at 574.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 575.
25. Id.
26. Tri-County Dev. Group, Inc., 740 So. 2d at 575.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 574.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Tri-County Dev. Group, Inc., 740 So. 2d at 575.
32. Id.
120
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss1/1
Brown / Grohman
B. Eminent Domain
Reese v. Department of Transportation.33  The Department of
Transportation ("DOT") began proceedings to take the entire property.
3 4
Reese challenged the taking, but the DOT prevailed after an evidentiary
hearing. 35 The tenant appealed. 36 The parties reached an agreement that the
appeal would be dismissed in exchange for the DOT allowing the tenants to
remain two additional months.37 During that period, the tenant realized a
profit of $58,098." The tenant then claimed attorneys' fees equal to thirty-
three percent of that profit.39 The trial court rejected the attorneys' fees
claim and the district court affirmed.4°
Under section 73.092(1) of the Florida Statutes, attorneys' fees in an
eminent domain proceeding are to be based on the benefit the attorney
achieved for the client.4 That benefit could be monetary or nonmonetary,
but in this case the court could find neither, characterizing the profit
achieved during the extended period of possession as betterment that the
tenant had achieved for itself by its own efforts.42
The district court also rejected the argument that the statute produced
an unconstitutional result in this case.43 The argument was raised for the
first time on appeal."4 Failure to raise the issue in the trial court would
constitute waiver unless the trial court had made a fundamental error.45 In
the lease, the tenant assigned any condemnation settlement or award, except
business damages.4 However, the Florida Constitution does not require the
payment of business damages or attorneys' fees incurred in recovering
thern 7  Business damages are a benefit provided by the legislature and
33. 743 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
34. Id. at 1228.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Reese, 743 So. 2d at 1228.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1229; see FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1) (2000).
42. Reese, 743 So. 2d at 1229.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1228.
47. Reese, 743 So. 2d at 1228.
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failure of the court to award them without being asked would not be
fundamental error.4
Department of Transportation v. Lakepointe Associates.49 As noted,
section 73.092(1) of the Florida Statutes provides that attorneys' fees should
be calculated based "solely on the benefits achieved for the client."50 It goes
on to provide that "benefits means the difference... between the final
judgment or settlement and the last written offer made by the condemning
authority.",51 In this case, the landowner had received a letter purporting to
be a "summary of the Department's offer" for the property.52 The letter had
a line for the signature of the District Right of Way Administrator, but that
person had not signed it because such letters were routinely sent out without
signatures.5 3 The landowner's attorneys claimed that this was not a valid
offer and that the attorneys' fees should therefore be based on the final
judgment, i.e., calculate the benefit as if the offer had been zero."4 The trial
court agreed that there had not been a valid offer.55 The statute did not
specify what to do in such a case, so the trial court decided to calculate fees
based on the difference between the final judgment and the figure testified to
by the DOT's expert.
56
The district court disagreed, concluding there had been a valid offer.57
Focusing on the purpose of the statute and reading it in pari materia with
section 119.07(3)(n) of the Florida Statutes, the court concluded that the
letter was an offer within the meaning of this attorneys' fees statute.58 The
statute did not require an offer that could, by mere acceptance, ripen into a
contract.59 In fact, what was anticipated was that a formal contract would be
executed if the landowner agreed to the terms of the offer. 6° "Moreover, it is
48. Id. at 1229.
49. 745 So. 2d 364 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
50. FRA. STAT. § 73.092(1) (2000).
51. § 73.092(1)(a).
52. Lakepointe Assocs., 745 So. 2d at 365.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 366.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 367.
57. Lakepointe Assocs., 745 So. 2d at 367.
58. Id. at 368. Section 119.07 of the Florida Statutes provides that a contract to
purchase property acquired by eminent domain shall not be formalized for 30 days by the
condemning agency in order to give the public time to review the transaction. FLA. STAT
§ 119.07(3)(n) (2000).
59. Lakepointe Assocs., 745 So. 2d at 367-68.
60. Id. at 368.
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clear from the circumstances that the letter was intended as a binding offer,
despite the absence of a signature. ' 61 Thus, the court managed to avoid
dealing with the difficult problem of how to calculate attorneys' fees if the
condemnor makes no offer.62
C. Homeowner Associations
Southpointe Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Segarra.63 The issue here was
whether the trial court properly concluded and did not abuse its discretion
when it awarded $785 for attorneys' fees and $133 for costs, due to the fact
that the homeowner had attempted to settle the matter and that the
association had been quick to file suit.
64
The dispute arose over a $294 arrearage for maintenance and dues that
the homeowner owed the association.65 The homeowner testified that she
had made efforts to determine the exact amount she owed so that she could
pay it but had difficulty in obtaining this information from the association's
law firm.66 The association sought $4646 in attorneys' fees and $689 in
costs.67 The trial court observed that the association had been quick to file
suit and that the amount of fees claimed over $294 was outrageous.68 The
law firm sought fees for 29.4 hours.69 The court awarded three hours for the
lawyer's time and two hours for paralegal time.
70
The court held that the trial court properly concluded the case and that
it did not abuse its discretion when it found the homeowner was sincere in
her efforts to settle and the association was too quick to file suit.71 It based
this on the fact that the trial court is able, based on its familiarity with the
type of litigation involved, to determine that some work was unnecessary.
72
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. 763 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
64. Id. at 1186.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Segarra, 763 So. 2d at 1186.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1187.
72. Id; see Wiederhold v. Wiederhold, 696 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 4th Dis. Ct. App. 1997).
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Ill. CONDOMINIUMS
Gulf Island Resort, LP. v. Gulf Island Beach & Tennis Club
Condominium Ass'n I, Inc." The issue was whether the trial court properly
held that the association could file a complaint seeking alternate remedies of
lien foreclosure or money judgment, and could elect different remedies on
different delinquent units in the same action.74
The association brought suit against Gulf for delinquency in mainten-• 75
ance assessments on forty-one units that Gulf owned. The association
sought alternate remedies of lien foreclosure or a money judgment on
different units based on the amount of equity in the units.76 The trial court
entered two partial final judgments of foreclosure on twenty-two units and a
monetary judgment of $53,593.49 against Gulf which was the delinquent
amount owed on the other units.77 Gulf appealed this judgment, arguing that
the final decision must either be foreclosure on all units or a monetary
judgment.78
The appellate court held that the trial court was correct and that the
association was entitled to seek alternate remedies and elect the judgment of
foreclosure on some units and a monetary judgment for remaining
assessments in the same action. 79 The court based its opinion on section
718.116(6)(a) of the Condominium Act.?'
Wellington Property Management v. Parc Corniche Condominium
Ass'n.81 The issue here was whether a bare majority of condominium
owners could amend the declaration pursuant to a provision in the
declaration by "add[ing] a new provision which permits the common
elements to be amended or altered and, by applying this new provision
retroactively, defeat the vested rights of the pre-amendment purchasers.
82
In this case, the condominium association made an amendment to the
declaration that would allow the association to alter the common elements by
73. 740 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
74. Id. at 64.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Gulflsland Resort, LP., 740 So. 2d at 65.
79. Id.
80. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 718.116(6)(a) (1997)); see Mellor v. Goldberg, 658 So.
2d 1162 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct App. 1995); Gottschamer v. August, Thompson, Sherr, Clark &
Shafer, P.C., 438 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1983).
81. 755 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
82. Id. at 825.
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a fifty-one percent vote of the board of directors.8 3 The court held that due
to the importance placed on the common elements, when interpreting a
general power to amend in the declaration, the court must "consider the
statutory law and other provisions of the declaration and by-laws applicable
when the condominium was purchased in order to determine existing
rights." The court found that a purchaser should be able to rely on the
provisions of the declaration at the time of purchase, so the purchaser may
determine its ability to afford the unit.85 In its interpretation of section
718.110(4) of the Florida Statutes, which provides for the alteration of the
declaration as provided by the declaration, the court found the legislature
was talking about a provision existing in the declaration at the time of
purchase.8 The court reversed and remanded this case.8
7
Legislation affecting condominiums includes the addition of a new
section for multicondominium associations and statutory authority for
transferring limited common elements.88 Also, there is a definition of a
"successor or assignee" of a first mortgagee who takes title to a
condominium by foreclosure and receives limited liability for outstanding
association assessments.89 For that protection one must be a successorholder of the first mortgage.90
IV. CONSTRUCTION
Sunshine-Jr. Stores, Inc. v. Autopump Services Co.91  Sunshine
operated convenience stores with self-service gasoline stations. 9- It had
contracted for the removal of its old filling station equipment and the
installation of new tanks, pumps, and a protective canopy at one of its
stores.93 After a subcontractor put in the tanks and pumps, the contractor
83. Id.
84. Id. at 826.
85. Id.
86. Wellington Prop. Mgmt., 755 So. 2d at 826-27.
87. Id. at 828.
88. Ch. 2000-302, § 55, 2000 Fa. Laws 3129, 3147 (codified at FIA. STAT.
§ 718.115 (2000)).
89. Id. § 56,2000 Fla. Laws at 3149 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 718.116(2000)).
90. Ch. 2000-201, § 1, 2000 Fla. Laws 2040, 2040 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 718.116
(2000)).
91. 240 B.R. 788 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999).
92. Id. at 790.
93. Id.
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began work on the protective canopy, which was the source of the dispute.94
Sunshine became concerned about the quality and quantity of the bracing.
95
After an unsuccessful conference with the contractor, it hired a structural
engineer who found the design questionable and the construction
substandard.96 The contractor claimed the construction was completed, or at
least ninety percent completed, and refused to remedy the problems or
remove the canopy. 97 Sunshine terminated the contract.9s It then hired a
structural engineer to make new drawings for the canopy and remove and
replace the old one.99
The court decided that Florida law applied and the first step should be
to determine if the case was controlled by Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code ("U.C.C.").1°°  Construction contracts are typically
dominated by the services element rather than by the provision of goods for
the construction.' 01 Consequently, the court applied contract law and not the
U.C.C. to the damages and breach issues. 02
Under Florida law, Sunshine would have been entitled to terminate the
contract if the contractor had materially breached.' °3 It found that the
primary purpose of the canopy was to have a safe and operational -self-
service station.1' The canopy was intended to provide protection for the
customers and the gas tanks.105 A dangerous canopy would defeat the
purpose of the contract.1 6 The contractor did not produce a safe canopy
and, in fact, showed no concern about doing so.1°7 It treated the drawings
and the code requirements as mere formalities to be circumvented.1
8
Moreover, the contractor was given ample opportunities to remedy the
94. Id. at 791.
95. Id. at 792.
96. Sunshine-Jr. Stores, Inc., 240 B.R. at 793.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 794.
100. Id.
101. Sunshine-Jr. Stores, Inc., 240 B.R. at 794.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 795.
105. Id.
106. Sunshine-Jr. Stores, Inc., 240 B.R. at 795.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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deficiencies and refused. 0 9 The contractor was in breach and the termina-
tion of the contract was justified.'1
Under the circumstances, Sunshine was entitled to be put in the position
it expected to be in under the contract."1 So long as it did not constitute
unreasonable economic waste, Sunshine could recover what it cost to get the
construction it had bargained for.1 2 Here, Sunshine had expected to get the
work done for $67,500 and it had already paid $25,000 to the contractor 13
To get the job completed properly, it had to pay the structural engineer
$62,608.12.1 4 Consequently, Sunshine was entitled to recover $20,108 so
that its total cost would not exceed the original price.'15
Sunshine also sought lost profits.11 6 To recover lost profits it would
have to prove that the contractor's breach had caused that loss and there had
to be a standard for calculating the amount of damages.' 17 The evidence was
insufficient to meet the test.1" Even if the pumps had been operational on
schedule, the inside of the store was still being remodeled during the period
when lost profits were sought. 9 So the amount of profits which might have
been attributable to the inoperable pumps could not be determined.17
V. CONVERSION AND MERGER OF BUSINESS ENTTIES
Legislation now provides that there is no need to record a deed for title
to transfer by merger or conversion of business entities.
12
'
VI. COVENANTS AND RESTRICTIONS
Boyce v. Simpson.1' - The issue here was whether the trial court
properly denied Boyce's request for a permanent injunction against the
109. Id. at 796.
110. Id.
111. Sunshine-Jr. Stores, Inc., 240 B.R. at 796.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Sunshine-Jr. Stores, Inc., 240 B.R. at 797.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Ch. 2000-298, § 7, 2000 Fla. Laws 2940, 2942 (creating FLA. STAT. § 694.16
(2000)).
122. 746 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
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Simpsons' proposed use of their dwelling as an Adult Congregate Living
Facility ("ACLF'). 12
The Simpsons purchased their single family dwelling to both live in and
to operate as an ACLF for up to six non-family members as allowed by
sections 419.01 and 400.401 of the Florida Statutes.12 The Boyces objected
to the use of the home as an ACLF and sought to enforce the applicable
restrictive covenant within their residential neighborhood.125 The covenant
provided:
USE RESTRICTIONS. Lots may be used for dwelling units and
pertinent uses and for no other purposes. No business buildings
may be erected in the subdivision and no business may be
conducted on any part thereof, nor shall any dwelling unit or any
portion thereof be used or maintained as a professional office.1
The dispute centered around "whether the phrase 'on any part there-
of applies to the term 'business building' or the word 'subdivision.'"1 27 The
trial court denied the request for the permanent injunction ruling that any
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the homeowner.'2
The appellate court held that the trial court was correct in denying the
request for the permanent injunction. 129 This was based on the fact that
restrictive covenants are to be strictly construed in favor of the
homeowners.
1 30
Loren v. Sasser.131 The issue here was whether to grant an amended
motion for a preliminary injunction on Loren's First Amendment claim to be
allowed to place a "for sale" sign on her property without violating the
community's judicially enforceable deed restriction ban on all homeowner
signs.
132
The court had previously recognized that judicial enforcement in
Florida of rules and restrictions banning or restricting free speech constitutes
123. Id. at 508.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. (emphasis supplied).
127. Boyce, 746 So. 2d at 508.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.; see Palma v. Townhouses of Oriole Ass'n, 610 So. 2d 112, 113 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1992); James v. Smith, 537 So. 2d 1074, 1076 (Ha. 5th Dist. CL App. 1989).
131. 13 Ha. L. Weekly Fed. D241 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 11, 2000).
132. Id. at D241.
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state action. 33 Therefore, the constitutional validity of the speech ban or
restriction is properly subject to federal scrutiny under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments in an action under section 1983 of Title 42 of the
United States Code.
134
The court denied the amended motion for preliminary injunction. 35 It
reasoned that Loren had not met the burden of showing it would suffer
irreparable harm absent the Association's being enjoined from interfering
with her First Amendment rights to place a "for sale" sign on her property.
VII. DEEDS
Griem v. Zabala.137 The question was whether the trial court erred
when it denied a quiet title petition involving two condominium units, when
the sellers of one unit did not sign the deed and had not met or been in the
presence of the notary who notarized the deed, and for the second unit, the
grantees did not introduce the deed into evidence or adequately explain why
it was missing.
138
In 1978, Griem purchased condominium unit numbers 106 and 110, the
units at issue.139 After his wife's death, Griem quitclaimed these units to
himself and his two daughters. 40 Afterwards, Griem entered into an
agreement with a real estate agent to manage, maintain, and rent the units.
14 1
From 1980 to 1989, Griem visited Miami annually to check on the properties
and receive statements from the real estate agent as to the properties'
status.' 42 These reports stopped in 1989.143 From 1989 to 1996, Griem did
not visit Miami due to health and business problems.1M  Additionally, Griem
owned six other condominium units located in Pointe South which were also
133. See Gerber v. Longboat Harbour N. Condo, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 884, 887 (M.D.
Fla. 1989).
134. Id.
135. Loren, 13 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. at D241.
136. Id.; see Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v.
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
137. 744 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1999).
138. Id. at 1140.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Griem, 744 So. 2d at 1140.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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managed by the real estate agent' 45 These units were severely damaged by
Hurricane Andrew and "[t]here were no reserve funds nor incoming rents to
pay the mortgage and maintenance assessments" on these units.146 Allegedly,
the real estate agent sold units 106 and 110 to avoid foreclosure on the other
units. 147 In 1996, Griem came to Miami and discovered the units in question
had been transferred to the Zabalas and to the Moraleses without his consent
or knowledge.14 Further, he stated that he did not sign any deeds or powers
of attorney. 149 Griem filed suit to quiet title, to eject the Zabalas and the
Moraleses, and to obtain declaratory relief against them.15 The trial court
entered final judgment for the Zabalas and the Moraleses. 15 1
The appellate court held that the trial court erred in holding that the
Zabalas and Moraleses had valid deeds to units 106 and 110.5 2 For there to
be a transfer of a property interest, "a deed must be in writing and signed by
the person conveying such interest.'1 53 Further, section 117.05(6)(a) of the
Florida Statutes prohibits a notary to notarize a signature if the person is not
in his or her presence at the time the signature is notarized.154 The notary in
this case testified that she did not know Griem and he was not in her
presence when she notarized the deed. 55 Therefore, the Zabalas did not
have a valid deed for unit 106.156 Section 90.952 of the Florida Statutes
requires the offering of an original writing or a sufficient explanation for its
unavailability 5 7 The Moraleses failed to introduce their deed into evidence
or adequately explain its absence.' 58 Therefore, there was no evidence to
support a finding that the Moraleses owned unit 110.159
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Griem, 744 So. 2d at 1140.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Griem, 744 So. 2d at 1140.
153. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 689.01 (2000).
154. Griem, 744 So. 2d at 1140; see also FLA STAT. § 117.05(6)(a) (2000); The Fla.
Bar v. Farinas, 608 So. 2d 22, 23 (Fla. 1992).
155. Griem, 744 So. 2d at 1140.
156. Id.
157. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 90.952 (2000).
158. Griem, 744 So. 2d at 1141.
159. Id.
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VII. EMINENT DOMAIN
A. Condemnation
Alternative Networking, Inc. v. Solid Waste Authority.IW The Authority
condemned a building that was partially occupied by tenants. 161 Three of
those tenants had been found by Alternative Networking under a contract
with the landowner that gave it fifteen percent of the monthly rents paid by
any tenants it procured for as long as they remained tenants. 62 Alternative
Networking sought part of the condemnation award on the theory that it had
a property interest, but the district court disagreed. 63 It characterized the
interest as merely a personal contract. 64 Alternative Networking was not the
beneficiary of a covenant that ran with the land because the covenant was
only binding between Alternative Networking and the landowner. 165
Alternative Networking did not have any land that was benefited by the
contract. 66 It could not enforce its right to payment by a lien on the land and
any tenant could terminate its lease upon giving proper notice. 67 By its
terms, the lease lasted only as long as a tenant remained on the land, so the
loss of the land in condemnation terminated Alternative Networking's right
to payment.' 68
Brevard County v. A. Duda & Sons, Inc.'69 The county had obtained an
order to take 240 acres of Duda's land for the construction of artificial
wetlands.170 After the order was entered, the county realized that it needed
an easement for the flow of partially treated wastewater from those artificial
wetlands to Lake Winder by way of a canal owned by Duda. 17 1 So the
county filed an amended complaint to acquire the easement..172  In
determining the value of the easement, there was evidence that the
government was considering more stringent pollution limits on water
160. 758 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
161. Id. at 1210.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1211.
164. Id.
165. Alternative Networking, Inc., 758 So. 2d at 1211.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1212.
169. 742 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
170. Id. at 477.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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flowing into Lake Winder from Duda's canal.173 The effect of the county
adding contaminants from its artificial wetlands, while the total
contaminants allowed was reduced, would be to limit the amount of
contaminants that could flow into the canal from Duda's land; and that could
"substantially impact Duda's operations and future development of its Cocoa
Ranch."' 74
The county attempted to reduce the amount of compensation ordered by
having the taking order place restrictions on its use of the easement.' 75 Both
parties submitted proposed language and the trial court adopted the county's
version.176 Duda appealed and the district court reversed, finding that the
fatal error in the language adopted was that it would "exceed the plans,
specifications and testimony presented at the hearing on the order of taking,
and attempt to impose contractual obligations.., in the absence of a
contractual agreement. ' 177  In addition, from Duda's perspective, the
contractual language was so vague that future litigation to interpret it would
be inevitable." The court concluded that "[tihe condemnee is entitled to
just compensation now.., not vague promises to act in the future to cure
future problems in an attempt to limit compensation.
179
Claussen v. Department of Transportation. Ig In this condemnation
proceeding, the DOT sought to reduce its liability by showing that the
landowner knew that a part of the land might be taken in a road widening
project. 8' On the stand, the landowner denied he had such knowledge.', 2
The DOT then produced a letter that had been written by an attorney to the
DOT two years earlier complaining about the proposed road widening. 83 At
the time the letter was written, the attorney represented the prior
landowner.184 Later, that attorney represented the current landowner in
173. ld. at 478.
174. A. Duda & Sons, Inc., 742 So. 2d at 478.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 479.
179. A. Duda & Sons, Inc., 742 So. 2d at 479.
180. 750 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1999).
181. ld. at 80.
182. Id. at 81.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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negotiations for the land's purchase. 8 5 On appeal, the district court found
the use of the letter so tainted the trial that reversal was necessary. 18
The DOT claimed that the letter was used for impeachment purposes
and, therefore, it had no obligation to disclose the letter during discovery. 87
The district court rejected both assertions.' 88  A witness can only be
impeached by the witness's prior inconsistent statement.189 This letter was
written by another person, so it could not be used for impeachment.' 9° Even
if it could, disclosure in discovery would be necessary to avoid trial by
ambush, which is contrary to the current theory of civil litigation. 9
The DOT also claimed that the letter was admissible as a public
record.'9 The district court rejected this argument because the letter was
based on information from an outside source.193  There is a hearsay
exception that allows an agency to "present proof of its activities by utilizing
its records or reports that demonstrate compliance by a government agency
with duties it was lawfully required to perform." 194 That was not what the
letter was used for in this case.
The court also rejected the DOT's claim that the letter was properly
used to refresh the witness's memory. 196 However, the statute allows such
use only when the witness expresses an inability to remember something.1 97
Here, the witness made no such statement. 98 To the contrary, he specifically
denied ever having knowledge of the road widening project.199 Moreover,
even if the letter had been properly used to refresh the witness's memory, the
DOT still could not publish the letter's contents to the jury as was done in
this case.2 In fact, the DOT's lawyer went even further and "also provided
his own interpretation of its substance in the jury's presence."2' Such action
185. Claussen, 750 So. 2d at 82.
186. Id. at 80.
187. Id. at 81.
188. Id. at 81-82.
189. Id. at 81.
190. Claussen, 750 So. 2d at 82.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 81; see FLA. STAT. § 90.606 (2000).
193. Claussen, 750 So. 2d at 82.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 90.613 (2000).
198. Claussen, 750 So. 2d at 82.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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was intended to prejudice the jury.2 Consequently, the landowner had been
denied his constitutional right to a jury trial.203
CSR Partnership v. Department of Transportation.2°4 The DOT made
an offer of judgment.205 Under Rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure the offer of judgment was served too late. M6 Under section
73.032 of the Florida Statutes the service was timely because it requires
service no later than twenty days before trial.207 The circuit court applied the
statute, but the district court reversed.2°8 It stated that "the supreme court
has previously found that time limits for offers of judgment are
procedural." 2 9 While the legislature has primary authority over substantive
matters, the court has primary authority over procedural matters.210 Thus,
the rules promulgated by the supreme court, rather than the statute, control
the timing of offers of judgment. 21
Department of Transportation v. Duplissey. The landowner sought
severance damages.213 The DOT admitted liability and made a good faith
deposit with the court.2 14 At trial, the landowner succeeded in excluding the
215proffered testimony of the DOT's expert. The jury had only the testimony
of the landowner's expert to consider in determining the severance damages,
216but arrived at a figure that was lower than what the expert had calculated.217
In fact, it was lower than the good faith deposit. Faced with a case of first
218impression, the trial court granted the landowner's motion for a new trial .
219The district court, however, reversed 9. If the jury had the good faith
deposit amount to consider, it would have been required to consider that the
202. Id.
203. Claussen, 750 So. 2d at 82.
204. 741 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
205. Id. at 625.
206. Id; see FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.442 (requiring service no later than 45 days before trial).
207. CSR P'ship, 741 So. 2d at 623; see FLA. STAT § 73.032 (2000).
208. CSR P'ship, 741 So. 2d at 623.
209. Id. (citing Knealing v. Puleo, 675 So. 2d 593, 596 (Fla. 1996)).
210. See id.
211. Id. at 624.
212. 751 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
213. Id. at 118.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 119.
217. Duplissey, 751 So. 2dat 119.
218. Id. at 118.
219. Id. at 119.
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minimum award.m However, the.only evidence before the jury was the
landowner's expert's testimony.221 The jury was not bound by that and
could, based on the facts before it, reach its own conclusion.222 Here, the
conclusion was for a lesser amount of severance damages.2 3 Excluding the
DOT's expert's testimony had backfired.
Seminole County v. Sanford Court Investors, Ltd.Y The county
engaged in a road widening project that required taking part of the parking
lot owned by Cumberland Farms.225 At that time, Cumberland Farms had
two tenants, Deis and Hancock Company.n6 Deis' original written lease had
expired and he was under a month-to-month lease.2 27 Hancock was under an
extension of its original leasem After the filing of the condemnation action,
Cumberland Farms notified these tenants that their leases would not be
renewed because it was going to build a new and bigger store.Y9 However,
but for the condemnation, the leases would have been renewed at least for
the indefinite future.m
In the condemnation proceeding, the tenants sought business
damages.23' Their expert witness was allowed to testify about their business
damages calculated on the theory that their leases would be continually
232renewed for the indefinite future. He based this on the past history of
renewals. 3 The district court found that the admission of this testimony
was error.n4 A tenant is entitled to recover business damages based only
upon its leasehold interest at the time of the taking.2 s Thus, Deis, who had a
220. Id.
221. Id. at 118.
222. Duplissey, 751 So. 2d at 120.
223. Id.
224. 743 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999). The original opinion was
withdrawn following the grant of a motion to supplement the record and review of the
supplemental materials. See Ronald Benton Brown & Joseph M. Grohman, 1999 Survey of
Florida Law: Real Property, 24 NOvA L. REv. 267, 297 (1999); Seminole County v. Sanford
Court Investors, Ltd., 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1056 (5th Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 1999).
225. Sanford Court Investors, Ltd., 743 So. 2d at 1167.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Sanford Court Investors, Ltd., 743 So. 2d at 1168.
231. Id. at 1167.
232. Id. at 1168.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Sanford Court Investors, Ltd., 743 So. 2d at 1169.
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month-to-month lease, was entitled to business damages suffered over a one-
month period, and Hancock was entitled to business damages for what
remained of its two-year term.
236
The tenants' claim for moving expenses was found to be without
merit.237  Moving expenses could be recovered "if the tenants] [are]
required to move [their] possessions off the property or to move them from
one part of the property to another as a result of the taking." 238 There was no
evidence indicating that had occurred here.239
In order to vacate the premises, the tenants had auctioned off their
inventory and trade fixtures. The tenants had suffered a loss because the
auction prices were so low and their expert had included this loss in his
calculation of business damages. 24' That was an error. 242 Recovery for the
trade fixtures would be severance damages, not business damages.2 ' The
jury was not given a special verdict form that separated severance damages
from business damages.2"4  Consequently, the case was reversed and
remanded.245
M.J. Stavola Farms, Inc. v. Department of Transportation.246 This case
involved the partial taking of land that had been leased out as a limerock
mine.247 The expert for the tenant testified that the tenant would suffer
business damages calculated on the amount of limerock located in the taken
land.2m The landowners and lessees appealed based on the trial judge's
order to strike that testimonr. The district court disagreed and held that the
trial court had not erred.24  The testimony revealed that the tenant had
consistently been removing about six hundred thousand tons of limerock per
year and that there was no evidence that it would ever mine more than that
annual amount?' 0 At the current rate, the tenant could continue to remove
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1171.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Sanford Court Investors, Ltd., 743 So. 2d at 1170.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Sanford Court Investors, Ltd, 743 So. 2d at 1171.
246. 742 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
247. Id. at 392-93.
248. Id. at 394.
249. Id. at 395.
250. Id. at 393.
[Vol. 25:115
136
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss1/1
Brown / Grohman
limerock for the next twenty-five years without being affected by the
taking.2 51 In year twenty-six the tenant would run out of limerock and suffer
business damages for the remaining nineteen years of the lease . At the
current rate, the tenant would never have removed all the limerock in the
taken land, so its business damages should not have been calculated on all
the limerock in the taken land. 53 Its business damages should only have
been calculated on its income from the limerock it would have removed in
the last nineteen years, but for the taking.254 Basing business damages on the
possibility that the tenant might begin removing limerock at a faster rate
would be speculation, and damages cannot be based on speculation.
2 55
Owens v. Orange County.26 The county brought this condemnation as
part of a road widening project.2" The landowners claimed business
damages and hired a certified public accountant as their business damages
expert.258  The parties reached a mediated settlement with two
components.259 First, the landowners would be paid $90,000 in full
settlement of all claims except attorneys' fees, experts' fees, and costs. °
Second, the county would make certain improvements to the landowners'
remaining property.261 The landowners filed a motion for expert fees due to
their business damages expert, but the county objected, arguing that the
landowners had abandoned their claim for business damages based on an
inference from the amount of the settlement.262 The statute provided for
payment of a reasonable accountant's fee only when business damages were
compensable.263 Accepting that argument, the trial court denied the
motion. 2"
The district court, however, reversed, finding that there had never been
an express abandonment of business damages.2 The nature of the
251. M.J. Stavola Farms, Inc., 742 So. 2d at 395.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. 747 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
257. Id. at 467.
258. Id. at468.
259. Id. at 467.
260. Id.
261. Owens, 747 So. 2d at 467.
262. Id. at 468.
263. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 73.091 (2000).
264. Owens, 747 So. 2d at 469.
265. Id. at 470.
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settlement indicated that the county was to make the promised improvements
to avoid having to pay business damages. 2 6 Accepting an alternative to
money did not suggest abandonment of the claim. 2 6 Rather, it suggested
268that the claim was compromised. Lawyers would be well advised to avoid
similar disputes in the future by expressly addressing the abandonment issue
in the settlement agreement.
B. Inverse Condemnation
Burnham v. Monroe County.269 The county adopted a "Rate of Growth
Ordinance" that limited the number of building permits that could be
issued. 27 A point system existed to allocate the permits. 271 Points could be
earned by including certain design features, such as solar hot water heaters
or low flow plumbing fixtures.272 These landowners unsuccessfully sought a
building permit.273 They were repeatedly informed by the county that a few
design changes would give them a high enough score to get the permit, but
they declined to make the changes and instead brought this suit.274 The
circuit court found the ordinance constitutional and that no taking had
275 276
occurred. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed. The ordinance
was constitutional because it "substantially advance[d] the legitimate state
interests of promoting water conservation, windstorm protection, energy
efficiency, growth control, and habitat protection. '277 Moreover, to prevail
on their claim that a taking had occurred, the landowners had the burden of
showing "that the challenged regulation denies all economically beneficial,,27829
or productive use of land. They failed to make that showing.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. 738 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
270. Id. at 472.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 472 n. 1.
273. Id. at 472.
274. Burnham, 738 So. 2d at 472.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Burnham, 738 So. 2d at 472.
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Saboff v. St. John's River Water Management District.280 As mandated
by the Florida legislature, the Water Management District created Riparian
Habitat Protection Zones.281 The landowners' land was in one of these
zones. 28 2 Consequently, in order to build a residence, the landowners needed
a permit from the District, but the District would issue the permit only if the
landowners would mitigate the loss of wildlife habitat caused by the
construction. 28 3 The District demanded a conservation easement over part of
the landowners' undeveloped land.2 4  The landowners complied but
challenged the requirement by filing suit in state court claiming inverse
condemnation, denial of substantive due process, and denial of equal
protection.281 The District removed the case to federal court based on
federal question jurisdiction and then moved to dismiss the federal due
process and equal protection claims as unripe.286  The landowners
voluntarily dismissed their federal claims and the case was remanded to state
court which dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. 28 7 The district
court of appeal affirmed.288 The landowners next filed suit in federal court
claiming denial of their federal substantive due process and equal protection
rights.28 The District's defense was that these claims were barred by the
doctrine of res judicata. 290
Two rules created a dilemma for the landowners. A federal court
plaintiff is required "to pursue any available state court remedies that might
lead to just compensation prior to bringing suit in federal court for a takings
claim." However, res judicata prevents a party from bringing a claim in292
federal court that has already been litigated in state court. The dismissal
of the landowners' claims was an adjudication on the merits against the
landowner.293 The doctrine of res judicata in Florida "'bars subsequent
litigation where there is (1) identity of the thing sued for, (2) identity of the
280. 200 F.3d 1356 (11th Cir. 2000).
281. Id. at 1358.
282. Id. at 1359.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Saboff, 200 F.3d at 1358.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Saboff, 200 F.3d at 1359.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1360.
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cause of action, (3) identity of persons and parties to the action, and (4)
identity of the quality or capacity of the person for or against whom the
claim is made."' 294 Of the four, there was only a question as to whether
there was identity of cause of action, but the court decided it existed since
the facts underlying the federal and state claims were identical.295
To avoid state court litigation preventing any subsequent federal claim,
a narrow exception to res judicata has been created. To claim the exception,
the landowner had to make a "Jennings reservation" by expressly reserving
on the state court records the federal claims for subsequent litigation in
federal court.296 The landowners, however, had not reserved their rights on
the record.297 Their assertions that there was an off the record agreement or
that the reservation was implicit were not enough to satisfy the rule and
qualify for the exception. 29 8
Department of Transportation v. S. W. Anderson, Inc.29 A bridge
building project resulted in the relocation of a state road. 300 The landowner
claimed that the effect of the relocation was the loss of access to its
commercial property, amounting to a taking and entitling it to
compensation. 3°1 The claim encountered two roadblocks. First, the
plaintiffs land did not abut the state road.3°2  The landowner tried to
establish abutter's status by claiming it had an easement by reason of
necessity to the state road across a neighbor's land.303 However, that
easement had not previously been established and it could not be established
in this litigation because the servient landowner was not a party. 3 04 Thus, the
landowner had failed to establish this crucial element of its case.
305
Even if this case involved land abutting the state road, the landowner
had failed to demonstrate that its access had been substantially
diminished.3 3'6 That is a factual determination, but it requires a showing of
294. Id. (citing Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport Auth., 953 F.2d 1299 (lth Cir.
1997)).
295. Saboff, 200 F.3d at 1360.
296. Id.; see Jennings v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 531 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1976).
297. Saboff, 200 F.3d at 1360.
298. Id.
299. 744 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
300. Id. at 1098.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 1099.
303. Id.
304. S.W. Anderson, Inc., 744 So. 2d at 1099.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 1102.
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more than a change to a less convenient route or a diminished flow of traffic
passing by.3 The plaintiff here showed that getting from the state road to
its front door involved more turns and increased distance, but that was not
enough.
308
IX. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Coastal Petroleum Co. v. Florida Wildlife Federation, Inc.309 The issue
here was a challenge to an order of the Department of Environmental Protec-
tion ("DEP") denying Coastal's application for a drilling permit "because oil
extraction is potentially too dangerous to the environment.,, 310 Coastal con-
tended that the order was unconstitutional because the DEP's interpretation
of the applicable statute was an unconstitutional taking of its property.
3 11
The statute at issue here was section 377.241 of the Florida Statutes,
which gives the following three criteria to guide the DEP when issuing
permits:
(1) The nature, character and location of the lands involved;
whether rural, such as farms, groves, or ranches, or urban property
vacant or presently developed for residential or business purposes
or are in such a location or of such a nature as to make such
improvements and developments a probability in the near future.
(2) The nature, type and extent of ownership of the applicant,
including such matters as the length of time the applicant has
owned the rights claimed without having performed any of the
exploratory operations so granted or authorized.
(3) The proven or indicated likelihood of the presence of oil, gas or
related minerals in such quantities as to warrant the exploration and
extraction of such products on a commercially profitable basis.
312
Coastal argued that in the past the DEP had issued permits when all three of
these criteria were met.3 13 Yet, when the DEP announced its intention to
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. 766 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
310. Id. at 227.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 227-28; FLA. STAT. § 377.241 (2000).
313. Coastal Petroleum Co., 766 So. 2d at 228.
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issue a permit in this case, due to the environmental groups challenging the
decision, the DEP reconsidered its past practice and stated that just meeting
the criteria was not legally sufficient, but that this must be balanced against
the danger to the coastal environment.3"4
The court held that the DEP correctly determined that its previous
practice was not consistent with the proper interpretation of the statute and
that the DEP had adequately explained why it made this determination.315
Further, the court held that Coastal did have a contract to explore for and
extract oil from submerged sovereignty lands, but that the DEP's action was
316
not unconstitutional unless just compensation is not paid. Therefore, the
matter was to be resolved in circuit court.
3 17
X. FORECLOSURE
318
Ahmad v. Cobb Corner, Inc. The question here was whether a
mortgagee holding guarantees as collateral is entitled to a deficiency
judgment when he has sold the property and made a reasonable return on his
investment.31 9
In this case, the mortgagee, Ahmad, purchased the note and mortgage in
a pool of loans. 3 20 When the mortgagor, Cobb Comer, defaulted, the
mortgagee sued for foreclosure, purchasing the property for $100 in the
foreclosure sale.32' Six months later, the mortgagee sold the property for
$775,000.322 The mortgagee then filed for a deficiency judgment against the
guarantors, Resolution Trust Corporation.?
The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the return on investment
made cannot be the determining factor as to a mortgagee's right to
recover.324 The court also held that the mortgagee is entitled to recover the
314. Id.
315. Id.; see FLA. STAT § 120.68(12) (2000). Cf. Dep't of Admin. v. Albanese, 445 So.
2d 639, 641 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (finding "the Department, however, possesses only
such authority as is specifically delegated to it by statute and cannot promulgate rules that go
beyond that grant of authority or are contrary to the intent of the legislature").
316. Coastal Petroleum Co., 766 So. 2d at 228; see FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6.
317. Coastal Petroleum Co., 766 So. 2d at 228.
318. 762 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
319. Id. at 945.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 945-46.
322. Id. at 946.
323. Ahmad, 762 So. 2d at 946.
324. Id. at 947.
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entire contract amount through any avenue available to him and his recovery
is not limited by the amount he has invested.325
Bowman v. Saltsman.326 The issue here was whether the trial court
properly granted Saltsman's request to reform deeds previously given, and
properly denied Bowman's purchaser any relief, thereby denyg Bowman
his right of redemption because foreclosure was not required.32 8
Bowman desired an easement across Saltsman's property.32s However,
"Saltsman would not convey an easement but agreed to sell the entire parcel
to Bowman if the deal could be arranged as a tax free exchange." 329 They
entered into an agreement for deed under which Bowman would pay
$425,000 to a trustee who would purchase property desired by Saltsman. 33
When all the money had been paid, Bowman would get legal title to the
property.331 At that time Saltsman would get the property he desired with no
332tax consequence. Bowman made over $300,000 in payments before
breaching.333 Saltsman claimed ownership of both parcels and filed an
action to reform certain deeds pursuant to the agreement, instead of
declaring a default and foreclosing the mortgage.3 4  Bowman
counterclaimed for, among other things, specific performance of the land
contract.335 The trial court found Bowman had defaulted by not maldng all
the payments that were due, denied him relief, and granted Saltsman's
request to reform the deeds.336 Bowman was denied his right of redemption
because foreclosure was not required.337
The appellate court held the agreement for deed was a mortgage and
carried all the burdens of such, including the right of redemption. 338 Since
Bowman's equitable interest in the land had not been foreclosed and
Bowman sought to resume payments under the agreement, even though he
325. Id.
326. 736 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 5th Dist. App. 1999).
327. Id. at 146.
328. Id. at 145.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Bowman, 736 So. 2d at 145.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 146.
335. Id. at 145.
336. Bowman, 736 So. 2d at 145.
337. Id. at 146.
338. Id.
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had defaulted, his rights needed to be enforced under the agreement.339 The
appellate court emphasized that "the secured party may either waive the
default or declare a default and foreclose," but cannot "treat the default as an
automatic termination of the buyer's interest."
340
Caple v. Tuttle's Design-Build, Inc.341 The issue here was whether the
Third District Court of Appeal properly held that section 702.10(2) of the
Florida Statutes, which allows a commercial mortgagee to request a court
order requiring the mortgagor to continue payments pending litigation, post
bond, or relinquish possession of the property, is unconstitutional because it
does not adequately protect the due process rights of the mortgagor and
impermissibly conflicts with the supreme court's rulemaking authority.
342
Tuttle purchased a plant nursery from Caple for a price of seventeen
million dollars. 343  "The purchase was financed by a bank, with three
promissory notes to Caple Enterprises, and one promissory note to George
Caple." 3" Tuttle subsequently defaulted on one of the notes to Caple
Enterprises and the one note to George Caple.345 Caple filed an action for
foreclosure and requested, pursuant to section 702.10(2) of the Florida
Statutes, an order to show cause. 346 Tuttle answered asserting various
affirmative defenses.347 The court ordered Tuttle to either pay Caple interest
retroactive to the date of the request of the order or alternatively post a bond
in the amount of $6,865,572, which was the amount of the unpaid mortgage
principal and interest. 8
Tuttle appealed the Third District Court of Appeal's decision.349 The
Third District found the statute unconstitutional under the United States and
Florida Constitutions, "because it forces a mortgagor who wants to retain
possession of the property to make payments without due process protection
in the form of a mortgagee's bond or sequestration."350 Further, the court
held that "because it only provides for an excessive bond to stay the
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. 753 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 2000).
342. Id. at 50.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Caple, 753 So. 2d at 50.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. at51.
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payments, that the section impermissibly regulates matters of practice and
procedure."
351
The Supreme Court of Florida held that section 702.10(2) of the
Florida Statutes was constitutional based on two analyses. 352 First, "[it is a
fundamental rule of statutory construction that, if at all possible, a statute
should be construed to be constitutional. 353 The supreme court opined that,
based on the totality of the statute as a whole, this statute gives some
flexibility to the court and, therefore, does not violate due process rights. 354
Further, the court stated that if the statute is 'substantive and that it operates
in an area of legitimate legislative concern,"' it is "precluded from finding it
unconstitutional. 355 Substantive law has been defined to include the "rules
and principles which fix and declare the pim y rights of individuals with
respect towards their persons and property.' The Supreme Court of
Florida held the statute "created substantive rights and any procedural
provisions [were] directly related to the definition of those rights." 357
Therefore, the statute does not infringe on the court's rulemaking authority
and is constitutional.358
Edwards v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.359 The issue here was
whether the trial court properly calculated the deficiency judgment amount
in a foreclosure when it failed to reduce the property's fair market value by
the amount of delinquent ad valorem taxes.3r°
The appellate court concluded the trial court failed to follow proper
procedure in this case by not including the amount of unpaid ad valorem
taxes in its deficiency calculation. 361 The Fourth District further held the
trial court has discretion with respect to granting or denying a deficiency
judgment.362 "However, granting a deficiency judgment is more the rule
than the exception.s 363
351. Caple, 753 So. 2d at 51.
352. Id.
353. Id.; see VanBibber v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Ins. Co., 439 So. 2d 880, 883
(Fla. 1983).
354. Caple, 753 So. 2d at 52-53.
355. Id. at 53 (citing VanBibber, 439 So. 2d at 883).
356. Id. at 54 (citing Adams v. Wright, 403 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1981)).
357. Caple, 753 So. 2d at 55.
358. Id.
359. 746 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
360. Id. at 1157.
361. Id. at 1158.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 1157; see Chidnese v. McCollem, 695 So. 2d 936, 938 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1997).
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Further, the court held that "'[e]quitable considerations upon which the
trial court might deny a deficiency should be presented after the potential
deficiency is determined (amount of judgment on note less fair market value
of property). ' ,'364  Prior to that "'the trial court would not be able to
determine what set-off might be appropriate.' ' 365 Pursuant to this case, the
appellate court remanded for recalculation of the deficiency amount after
which the appellants might appeal the deficiency judgment. 36
Hamilton v. Hughes. 36  The issue here was whether the trial court
properly awarded excess mortgage foreclosure sale proceeds to Hughes and
no portion of the excess sale proceeds to Hamilton.
36F
The action started with Chase Manhattan Mortgages Corporation's
("Chase") mortgage foreclosure complaint.369 Originally, Hamilton and her
former husband had mortgaged their property to Chase during their
marriage. 37  Later, the couple divorced and the husband defaulted on the
$26,000 mortgage.371  Further, Dolphin Hamilton, the former husband,
obtained a mortgage from the Hughes after the dissolution of the marriage.
372
This mortgage was only signed by Dolphin Hamilton.37 The Hughes agreed
to pay Chase $31,000 for assignment of the first mortgage. Hamilton
received copies of all significant filings in this case and did not make any
appearance through the trial.375 Yet, she did inform the court by letter that
she could not afford an attorney but claimed a fifty percent interest in the
encumbered property.376 The property sold for more than the outstanding
mortgages held by the Hughes. The trial court made disbursements to the
Hughes and the state to satisfy the amounts owed to them.378 It retained
$5600 in excess funds.379 The Hughes requested a disbursement of $5500 to
364. Id. at 1158.
365. Edwards, 746 So. 2d at 1158 (quoting Chidnese, 695 So. 2d at 938).
366. Id.
367. 737 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
368. Id. at 1249.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Hamilton, 737 So. 2d at 1249.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Hamilton, 737 So. 2d at 1250.
378. Id.
379. Id.
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them and $100 to Hamilton. ° Hamilton filed a response noting her half
interest in the property and that she and her former husband had owned the
property as tenants in common, requesting $3338.381
The Fifth District Court of Appeal held that Hamilton should be
awarded the entire $5600 in excess proceeds.382 It reasoned that "one tenant
in common cannot properly sell or dispose of more than his or her own
interest in the common property to a third person unless authorized to do
so.'
3 83
Further, the Second District held that foreclosure defendants who failed
to answer the first foreclosure complaint do not waive their right to excess
proceeds.3" Because Hamilton only contested the $5500 disbursement, that
was all that was reviewed.3 8 5  The Hughes had constructive notice of
Hamilton's interest in the property.386 Thus, their contention that they relied
on her silence was not valid.3
Mody v. California Federal Bank.388 The issue here was whether the
trial court properly concluded, when it vacated the sale of foreclosed
property, that the foreclosure sale bid was grossly inadequate and that the
inadequacy resulted from a mistake by the bank.
38 9
On February 19, 1999, the bank's bidding agent attended a foreclosure
sale with the intention of bidding up to $239,200 on the subject property.390
The bidding agent was to bid on three other pieces of property at the
foreclosure sale.391 But, the agent failed to bid on the property because he
had been furnished a different case name.3 2 Mody and Cava were the
highest bidders with a bid of $202,000. 393 The bank filed an objection to the
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Hamilton, 737 So. 2d at 1250.
383. Id. (citing 86 C.J.S. Tenancy in Common § 138); see Cadle Co. H v. Stauffenberg,
581 N.E.2d 882, 884 (11. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that "where a cotenant who owns
less than the entire interest attempts to mortgage the whole, the mortgage is valid [only] as to
the actual interest [of the mortgagor]").
384. Hamilton, 737 So. 2d at 1250; see Schroth v. Cape Coral Bank, 377 So. 2d 50,51
(Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1979).
385. Hamilton, 737 So. 2d at 1251.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. 747 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1999).
389. Id. at 1017.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Mody, 747 So. 2d at 1017.
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sale and moved to have it vacated because the Mody and Cava bid was
grossly inadequate. 94 The trial court was presented with several different
values for the property.395
Mody and Cava's expert valued the property at $225,000.396  The
bank's expert valued the property at $300,000. 97 The property's assessed
398value for tax purposes was $252,612. On June 22, 1999, the trial court
entered an order vacating the foreclosure sale and ordering a new sale.
399
The Third District Court of Appeal held that it was error to vacate the
foreclosure sale bid where it was not shown that the bid was grossly or
startlingly inadequate. 4w In order to vacate a foreclosure sale the trial court
is required to find that "the foreclosure sale bid was grossly or startlingly
inadequate" and "the inadequacy of the bid resulted from some mistake,
fraud or other irregularity in the sale." ' The court noted that the Supreme
Court of Florida had found that a foreclosure bid of seventy percent of the
value of the property is not a startling inadequacy.4m Further, the Third
District Court of Appeal had similarly found that a foreclosure sale bid of
seventy-two percent of the value of the foreclosed property is not startlingly
or grossly inadequate.4° 3 Here, even though the trial court did not assign the
property one of the proposed values, that was not necessary. 4" Even if the
highest appraisal value of $300,000 was used, the foreclosure bid price was
67.3% and was not grossly or startling inadequate.4°5 Further, if one of the
other possible values of $225,000 or $252,612 were used, the foreclosure bid
would have been 89.8% or 80% respectively.
406
Parsons v. Whitaker Plumbing of Boca Raton, Inc.4w The issue here
was whether the trial court properly amended its foreclosure judgment on a
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Mody, 747 So. 2d at 1017.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 1018.
401. Id. at 1017-18; see Arlt v. Buchanan, 190 So. 2d 575, 577 (Fla. 1996); Maule
Indus., Inc. v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 91 So. 2d 307, 311 (Fla. 1956).
402. Mody, 747 So. 2d at 1018; see Maule Indus., Inc., 91 So. 2d at 311.
403. Mody, 747 So. 2d at 1018; see Moody v. Glendale Fed. Bank, 643 So. 2d 1149
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
404. See Mody, 747 So. 2d at 1018.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. 751 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
[Vol. 25:115
148
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss1/1
Brown / Grohman
mechanics' lien to include attorneys' fees after the judgment debtors already
exercised their right of redemption for the judgment entered for labor and
material provided by the mechanic's lienor 40
8
Whitaker filed an action against Parsons and DeFalco to foreclose on a
mechanics' lien for plumbing work performed on Parsons' and DeFalco's
property.4 9 On March 24, 1998, the trial court entered a final judgment of
foreclosure, finding that Whitaker held a lien for $3117.43, including
interests and costs on Parson's property.410 On April 22, 1998, Parson and
DeFalco "exercised their statutory right of redemption by paying the total
amount due under the March 24 final judgment of foreclosure, plus a clerk's
fee."4' The clerk issued a certificate of redemption. 412 "On August 6,
1998... the court entered an amended final judgment of foreclosure,
awarding Whitaker $12,000 in attorney's fees and setting a foreclosure sale
to satisfy this debt.",41
3
The Fourth District Court of Appeal determined the entry of an
amended foreclosure judgment for attorneys' fees was proper procedurally
and in correct form. Parsons and DeFalco, exercising their redemption
rights regarding the first judgment, did not preclude the trial court from
entering the second judgment. The redemption only satisfied the specified
debt in the first judgment and not the liability for the attorneys' fees which
remained unpaid as of August 6, 1998.416 Whitaker sought to foreclose a
lien created by section 713.05 of the Florida Statutes.417 When there is an
action to foreclose this type of lien, "'the prevailing party is entitled to
recover a reasonable fee for the services of her or his attorney for trial and
appeal... in an amount to be determined by the court, which fee must be
taxed as part of the prevailing party's costs, as allowed in equitable
actions." 8 Attorneys' fees and costs awarded under section 713.29 are
included within the lien which is created by the statute.419
408. Id. at 655.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Parsons, 751 So. 2d at 655.
413. id.
414. Id. at 657.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Parsons, 751 So. 2d at 656.
418. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 713.29 (2000)).
419. Id. at 656; Zalay v. Ace Cabinets of Clearwater, Inc., 700 So. 2d 15, 17-18 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (examining section 713.06(1) of the Florida Statutes). The language
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Texas Commerce Bank National Ass'n v. Nathanson420 In this case
there was a request for a rehearing which was denied.421  However, the
appellate court issued a clarification of its original opinion.422
The issue here was whether the trial court properly ruled that the clerk
did not err when he refused to accept the highest bid in a foreclosure sale on
the grounds that the bidder, Texas Commerce Bank National Association
("TCBNA"), tendered a law firm check rather than cash for the clerk's
fee. 23 The trial court overruled TCBNA's objection to the foreclosure
sale.4U
TCBNA offered the highest bid at $151,000 for a piece of property
sought by both TCBNA and Jupiter Assets.425 Jupiter Assets "objected to
TCBNA paying the $40 clerk's fee for the sale with a law firn cost account
check as opposed to cash."426 The deputy clerk on the scene refused to
accept the check and Jupiter Assets was declared the successful bidder.4 27
TCBNA filed motions to correct the mistake and the trial court declined to
grant it relief, despite the clerk of the court's acknowledgment on the record
that erred in rejecting the cost check and bid submitted on behalf of
TCBNA.428 The trial court found that, because 'TCBNA had prepared the
proposed form of the final judgment in the foreclosure case, which was
signed as submitted, and which provided that the Clerk's fee would be paid
in cash and in advance of the sale," TCBNA failed to comply under contract
law with the terms of the agreement.429
The Fourth District Court of Appeal held the trial court grossly abused
its discretion and reversed with an order requiring the clerk to accept
TCBNA's bid and cost payment and declaring it the successful bidder on the
in section 713.06(1) is almost identical to that of section 713.05 and the reasons stated in
Zalay are equally applicable to the lien at issue and the court adopts them. See Parsons, 751
So. 2d at 656. Further, under section 713.29 of the Florida Statutes fees may properly be
taxed after the entry of a final judgment in a foreclosure lien action. NCN Elec., Inc, v. Leto,
498 So. 2d 1377, 1377-78 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
420. 763 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
421. Id. at 1108.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Nathanson, 763 So. 2d at 1108.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id
429. Id.
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property in question.430 Prior to this, the clerk established that a "for cash"
requirement in Palm Beach County "is understood to be cash or check."43'
Further, this is stated in Palm Beach County Administrative Order 95-3-R
which provides that "[i]f you are an attorney and you (or your client) are the
successful bidder, you may pay your deposit and bid... and costs and fees
by a trust account check... or law firm account check.' '432 This order was
in effect at the time of the sale.433
Zerquera v. Centennial Homeowners' Ass'n.43' The issue here was
whether the trial court erred when it entered a final judgment of foreclosure
as to Zerquera for the total amount owed, including attorneys' fees and costs
of $31,023.79 and ordered a foreclosure sale if Zerquera did not pay the
judgment within three days of the order.435
In 1989, Zerquera purchased Centennial property which was subject to
a "Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions"
("Declaration"). 436 The pertinent provisions were: "(1) assessments would
be a continuing lien on the property; (2) Centennial could foreclose on the
property if the continuing lien was not paid; and (3) Centennial could amend
the Declaration in the future. ' 437
"In 1991, Centennial amended the Declaration to provide that violators
of the Declaration's covenants could be fined and that said fines would be
treated as assessments .... ,,438 In 1995, Centennial fined Zerquera $200 for
keeping a boat and a truck on his property which violated the Declaration.
439
Zerquera challenged these fines and on appeal the court held that the
amendments to the Declaration were valid and enforceable." ° An award was
affirmed against Zerquera for $21,400 which included the fine, attorneys'
fees, and costs.4 1 On March 16, 1999, the trial court entered its final
judgment of foreclosure against Zerquera for $31,023.79 and ordered a
430. Nathanson, 763 So. 2d at 1109.
431. Id. at 118-09.
432. Id. at 1109.
433. Id.
434. 752 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
435. Id. at 695.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Zerquera, 752 So. 2d at 695.
440. Id.
441. Id.; see also Zerquera v. Centennial Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc., 721 So. 2d 751
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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foreclosure sale of his homestead property within three days if Zerquera did
not pay the judgment.442
The Third District Court of Appeal held that Zerquera's property may
be foreclosed upon to satisfy the $31,023.79 judgment. 443 A homestead
"may be foreclosed to satisfy a continuing lien on the property if the
homeowner had either actual or constructive notice of the covenant" that
provides for the lien when the owner took title to the property. 4" Here,
Zerquera had at least constructive notice of the Declaration when he took
title to the property in 1989. 45 Further, based on the Declaration, Zerquera
was on proper notice when this Declaration was later amended." 6 He was
aware that his homestead property was subject to foreclosure if fines were
not paid." 7
XI. HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS
Recent legislation prohibits homeowner associations from restricting
respectful displays of the United States flag.
4"
XII. HOMESTEAD
Bakst, Cloyd & Bakst, P.A. v. Cole.49 The issue was whether the trial
court correctly held that Cole's homestead property was not subject to her
attorney's charging lien.4 '4
Bakst represented Cole in her divorce.451  As a result of that
452
representation, Bakst obtained a charging lien. Bakst requested thatCole's homestead property be subject to attachment.4 53 The trial court
442. Zerquera, 752 So. 2d at 695.
443. Id.
444. Id.; see also Bessemer v. Gersten, 381 So. 2d 1344 (Fla. 1980).
445. Zerquera, 752 So. 2d at 695.
446. Id. at 696.
447. Id.
448. Ch. 2000-302, § 47, 2000 Fla. Laws 3129, 3031 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 617.3075(3) (2000)).
449. 750 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
450. Id. at 676.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Id.
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determined that Cole's homestead property should not be subject to the
attorney's charging lien.454
The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed that Cole's homestead
property was not subject to the charging lien.455 A waiver of the homestead
exemption was not enforceable on public policy grounds.4 56 The language in
the contract was insufficient to establish a knowing waiver of an important
.... 457
constitutional right such as homestead protection.
In re Coin. s The issue here was whether the Coins, debtors in
bankruptcy, were entitled to claim five contiguous lots and a house as part of
a homestead exemption when they took affirmative steps to have each lot
individually taxed and only claimed homestead exemption status on the lot
with the house situated on it.
459
The Coins purchased their house and lots five through nine on
December 20, 1985 in the same purchase transaction. 46 Their house was
located on lot seven, with lots five, six, eight, and nine being used as their
driveway and front lawn.4 61 All of the lots were contiguous and the Coins
never used lots five, six, eight, or nine other than for household purposes.462
In 1993, the Coins requested that Monroe County tax each lot separately and
only claimed homestead exemption on lot seven.46 3 On May 5, 1999, the
Coins filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and scheduled lots five through nine as
exempt homestead under Article X, section 4(a)(1) of the Florida
Constitution.
The court held that the Coins qualified for homestead exemption on lots
five, six, eight, and nine and for their house on lot seven.465 It based its
decision on Article X, section 4(a)(1) of the Florida Constitution which
states in part:
454. Cole, 750 So. 2d at 676.
455. Id.
456. Id. at 676-77; see also Sherbill v. Miller Mfg. Co., 89 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1956).
457. Cole, 750 So. 2d at 677.
458. 241 B.R. 258 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999).
459. Id. at 258-59.
460. Id. at 258.
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. Coin, 241 B.R. at 258.
464. Id. at 259.
465. Id. at 258.
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SECTION 4. Homestead; exemptions -
(a) There shall be exempt... the following property owned by a
natural person:
(1) a homestead, if located outside a municipality, to the extent of
one hundred sixty acres of contiguous land and improvements
thereon... or if located within a municipality, to the extent of one-
half acre of contiguous land, upon which the exemption shall be
limited to the residence of the owner or the owner's family.4
6
Further, the court held that the divisibility of the lots for zoning purposes and
tax purposes did not defeat the homestead claim.
467
Colwell v. Royal International Trading Corp.48 The issue here was
whether married individuals living on two distinct noncontiguous parcels of
property can be granted separate homestead exemptions, where their living
arrangements were not known to be the subject of fraud, and there was no
evidence brought forward to overcome the presumption in favor of the
exception. 46 9
The Colwells jointly filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.47 0 Although legal
separations are not recognized under Florida law, the Colwells had been
separated for three and one half years, and each had acquired a separate
home and had obtained a separate homestead exemption on that home.47 2
Florida has chosen to opt out of federal exemptions and to apply its own.472
The bankruptcy court ruled there was no case law to support the dual
exemptions. The Colwells appealed to the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida which reversed the bankruptcy court.474
The district court held that the Colwells were each entitled to separate
homestead exemptions when they were married but legitimately living apart
in separate residences and there was neither fraud nor evidence to overcome
the presumption in their favor.475 Florida state court decisions, as a matter of
466. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(1).
467. Coin, 241 B.R. at 259; see also In re Dudeney, 159 B.R. 1003, 1004 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1993).
468. 196 F.3d 1225 (11 th Cir. 1999).
469. Id. at 1226.
470. Id. at 1225.
471. Id. at 1225-26.
472. Id. at 1226.
473. Colwell, 196 F.3d at 1226.
474. Id.
475. Id.
[Vol. 25:115
154
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss1/1
Brown! Grohman
public policy, liberally construe the state's homestead exemption.4 76
Additionally, there is a presumption in favor of the exemption.
477
In re Harrison.4 78 The issue here was whether Harrison could claim as
exempt a residence located on Marco Island on which she did not reside but
in which she still owned a half interest.479
Harrison and Christopher Lewis Hoef, Harrison's former spouse, were
married in 1982 and had two children.480 They established their residence on
Marco Island, and it remained their marital home until their divorce in
1997.48 Afterwards, Harrison continued to reside in the home until July
1998, when she moved to Naples and rented a home where she resided with
the younger child. 2 Harrison contended she was forced to move because
the elder son's drug related activities created a harmful environment for the
younger child.8 3 Harrison's former spouse and elder son still resided in the
Marco Island home. 4" Further, Harrison was to receive the first $7000 from
the sale of the home.8 5
The court held Harrison was entitled to claim interest in the Marco
Island property as her homestead. 6 The homestead exemption established
by Article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution places the burden on the
objecting party to make a strong showing that Harrison was not entitled to
claim exemption.4 7 Further, abandonment may only be proven by a strong
showing that Harrison never intended to return to the residence and mere
absence for financial, health, or family reasons is not abandonment.48
Harrison still owned a half interest in the property and resided there after the
divorce.4 9 She left because of family reasons, which alone would not be
deemed abandonment.490
476. Id.
477. Id.; see also Snyder v. Davis, 699 So. 2d 999, 1002 (Fla. 1997).
478. 236 B.R. 788 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1999).
479. Id. at 789.
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. Id.
483. Harrison, 236 B.R. at 789.
484. Id.
485. Id.
486. Id. at 790.
487. Id.; see In re Imprasert, 86 B.R. 721,722 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988).
488. Harrison, 236 B.R. at 790; see Monson v. First Nat'l Bank of Bradenton, 497
F.2d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 1974).
489. Harrison, 236 B.R. at 790.
490. Id.
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In re Hendricks.4 91 The issue here was whether Hendricks would be
allowed to claim homestead exemption in a bankruptcy suit where the
claimed exempt property was owned as tenancy by the entireties by both
Hendricks and the nondebtor spouse, and the claims from the creditors were
only against Hendricks. 49 Further, there was the issue of whether
Hendricks' converting nonexempt assets into an exempt home caused
Hendricks to lose her homestead exemption.
4 93
Prior to moving to Florida, Hendricks owned a residence in
California.494 A large judgment was issued against Hendricks on August 7,
1997 in favor of her creditors.4 95 Shortly afterwards, Hendricks sold her
California residence.4% In September 1997, Hendricks and her spouse
purchased a home in Melbourne, Florida. 97 Hendricks used her personal
funds to make a cash payment: 98 The home was jointly owned by Hendricks
and her spouse as tenancy by the entireties.499 There was no dispute that
Hendricks and her spouse owned the home as a tenancy by the entireties and
also that there were no joint creditors of the couple. °°
The bankruptcy court held that Hendricks was entitled to summary
judgment501 It reasoned Article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution
does not provide that the right to exempt property is forfeited if property is
acquired or improved with the intent to hinder creditors where the property
qualified, as it did in this case, for homestead exemption.5m Further, the
bankruptcy court opined that section 222.29 of the Florida Statutes does not
apply to homestead property.5 3 Therefore, Hendricks established she was
entitled to exempt the home from creditors.
Havoco of America, Ltd. v. Hill.5 4 The primary issue here was whether
the trial court properly denied Havoco's objection to a claimed homestead
exemption and tenancy by the entirety, on the ground that Hill converted
491. 237 B.R. 821 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999).
492. Id. at 823.
493. Id.
494. Id. at 822.
495. Id.
496. Hendricks, 237 B.R. at 822-23.
497. Id. at 823.
498. Id.
499. Id.
500. Id. at 824.
501. Hendricks, 237 B.R. at 826.
502. Id. at 825.
503. Id.
504. 197 F.3d 1135 (llthCir. 1999).
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nonexempt assets into exempt assets with the intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud Havoco. 5 Because of the property involved, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified the following question to
the Supreme Court of Florida:
DOES ARTICLE X, SECTION 4 OF THE FLORIDA
CONSTITUTION EXEMPT A FLORIDA HOMESTEAD
WHERE THE DEBTOR ACQUIRED THE HOMESTEAD
USING NON-EXEMPT FUNDS WITH THE SPECIFIC INTENT
OF HINDERING, DELAYING, OR DEFRAUDING
CREDITORS IN VIOLATION OF FLA. STAT. § 726.105 OR
FLA. STAT. §§ 222.29 and 222.30? 506
The court held, however, that, in a case involving a tenancy by the
entireties where the wife's property rights may be terminated, her due
process rights require that she be a party to the proceeding.' °7 Therefore,
this court found that Hill's wife was an indispensable party to Havoco's
claim and Havoco's objection was denied.508 Havoco must seek to avoid this
transfer in an adversarial proceeding with both Hill and his wife as parties.5°
In the meantime, the court certified the aforementioned question to the
Supreme Court of Florida.510
Kellogg v. Schreiber.511 There were two issues here.512 The first was
procedurally oriented in determining whether the district court was correct
when it held that the bankruptcy judge did not abuse his discretion in
denying Kellogg's motion for continuance and rehearing.513 The court held
that missed deadlines for disclosing witnesses and evidence, and a last
minute attempt to terminate his counsel did not warrant a continuance and
affirmed.514 The second issue was whether the bankruptcy court was correct
when it ordered the sale of Kellogg's property, which exceeded the one-half
acre homestead limitation, because if Kellogg selected one-half acre to be
505. Id. at 1136-37.
506. Id. at 1144.
507. Id. at 1140.
508. Id.
509. Hill, 197 F.3d at 1140.
510. Id. at1144.
511. 197 F.3d 1116 (1lth Cir. 1999).
512. See id. at 1119-20.
513. Id. at 1120.
514. Id.
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exempt, the remaining nonexempt property would have no legal or practical
use because it would violate local zoning laws.515
In 1993, Schreiber obtained a judgment lien against Kellogg for
$512,863 and had been trying to collect it since then.5' In 1995, Kellogg
filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition claiming a Florida homestead
exemption on his Palm Beach oceanfront property.517 "Kellogg stated his
homestead was approximately 1.3 'indivisible acres,"' and had a tax
assessor's value of $799,432.:5 8 Schreiber objected to the claim because it
exceeded Florida's exemption for municipal property, which is limited to
one-half acre.519 Kellogg's property was zoned R-AA.52°  "For R-AA
property, Palm Beach's zoning laws required a minimum parcel size of
60,000 square feet with at least 150 feet fronting a road ....,,521 Kellogg's
property could not be divided in a legal or practical manner to meet this
requirement.522 Therefore, the court ruled that Kellogg's property must be
sold and the proceeds apportioned between Kellogg and the bankruptcy
estate.52'
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Kellogg could not
select a one-half acre portion of his property to be exempt homestead when
the local zoning laws prohibited him from subdividing his property.
52
Therefore, the bankruptcy court correctly ordered the property sold and the
proceeds divided. 525 This was based on the fact that Florida's homestead
laws must be liberally construed, but not so liberally that they become
"'instruments of fraud, an imposition on creditors, or a means to escape
honest debts."' ' Further, Kellogg may reasonably designate his one-half
acre portion of the property as homestead as long as the remaining portion
515. Id.
516. Kellogg, 197 F.3d at 1118.
517. Id.
518. Id.
519. Id.; see FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a).
520. Kellogg, 197 F.3d at 1118.
521. Id.
522. Id. at 1118-19.
523. Id. at 1119.
524. Id. at 1120.
525. Kellogg, 197 F.3d at 1121.
526. Id. at 1120 (citing Frase v. Branch, 362 So. 2d 317, 318 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App.
1978)).
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has legal and practical use.527 Here, the nonexempt parcel would have no
legal or practical use because it would violate local zoning laws.528
Law v. Law.5 29 The issue here was whether, when the husband and wife
separated and 'the husband moved from the home they had shared and
claimed as their homestead (his mother's home), the home became the
husband's homestead and therefore exempted the husband from any claim
for support payments to his former wife. 30
In May 1995, Law and his present wife, Barbara, separated and he
moved out of the home that the two of them owned in tenancy by the
entireties and into his mother's home. 31 He took his minor great grandson,
for whom he was the legal guardian, with him. 5 3 2 He received both his
grandson's and his mail at this home.533 Law's mother became ill in
February 1997 and Barbara moved into that home to help him care for his
mother.53 Law received power of attorney and contracted to sell his
mother's home. 35 His mother died in March 1997 and Law inherited her
home.536 The probate court entered an order on April 22 that the home had
passed to Law as his mother's only heir.537 The house was sold pursuant to
the contract on April 28.538
The court held the home that Law had inherited was his homestead and,
therefore, exempt from his ex-wife's judgment.5 39 The court stated that
homestead exemption can be extended to each of two people who are
married, but "legitimately" live apart in separate residences, if they meet the
other requirements of the exemption. s4 In this case there was evidence of a
legitimate separation between Law and Barbara in May 1995, and ample
evidence that Law was residing in his mother's home and that he intended to
527. Id. at 1120; see Englander v. Mills, 95 F.3d 1028, 1032 (11th Cir. 1996).
528. Kellogg, 197 F.3d at 1120.
529. 738 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
530. Id. at 523.
531. Id.
532. Id.
533. Id.
534. Law, 738 So. 2d at 523.
535. Id.
536. Id.
537. Id. at 523-24.
538. Id. at 524.
539. Law, 738 So. 2d at 524.
540. Id. at 525; see Isaacson v. Isaacson, 504 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1987).
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reside there until it was sold.541 There was no reason that Law could not
have one homestead and that it be different than his wife's since their
separation was bona fide and since Law intended to reside in the home he
had inherited from his mother.5 2
In re Simms.5 3 The issue here was whether the Simms should be
allowed a claimed exemption in an annuity that was invested together with
the net proceeds from the sale of their former homestead or, in the
alternative, should they be denied their claim of homestead exemption on
their Okeechobee property.544
Prior to January 29, 1999, the Simms resided at 1802 Montague Lane,
Lake Worth, Florida and used the Okeechobee property for recreational
purposes.5 45 During the summer of 1998, they sold the Lake Worth prope r
and established the Okeechobee property as their permanent residence.
They sold their Lake Worth property on January 29, 1999.:17 Afteraying
off their mortgage, they received net sale proceeds of $65,467.57. The
Simms endorsed this check over to USG Annuity and Life Company in
exchange for the annuity.M9 Both worked for John H. Simnms, Inc., a
janitorial service, which Mr. Simms owned.550 In March 1999, Mrs. Simms'
health declined sharply and she was no longer able to work, causing the
company to lose some major accountsY.55  The Simms decided to file
bankruptcy and filed for Chapter 7 on August 7, 1999.552
The bankruptcy court held that the Simms were allowed both the
exemption for the annuity and also the homestead exemption on the
Okeechobee property. 3 The court based the exemption for the annuity on
the Simms' conversion of the nonexempt funds and net proceeds from the
sale of the Lake Worth property, which was not done to hinder, delay, and
defraud creditors in violation of sections 726.105, 726.108, 222.29, and
541. Law, 738 So. 2d at 525.
542. Id.
543. 243 B.R. 156 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2000).
544. Id. at 157.
545. Id.
546. Id.
547. Id. at 157-58.
548. Simms, 243 B.R. at 158.
549. Id.
550. Id.
551. Id.
552. Id.
553. Simms, 243 B.R. at 160.
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222.30 of the Florida Statutes.' The Simms continued to pay their
creditors until March when Mrs. Simms became very ill.555 Therefore, the
facts did not suggest any intent on the part of the Simms to hinder, delay, or
defraud their creditors by purchasing the annuity.55 6 Further, the court noted
the Simms' decision to sell their Lake Worth property and transfer their
homestead to the Okeechobee property was made a year before the filing of
the bankruptcy petition.557 Again, there did not seem to be any intent to
defraud their creditors. The court acknowledged that Florida has very liberal
exemption laws, and that absent legislative intervention, these laws must be
applied with consistency.
558
Staten Island Savings Bank v. Morace.559 The issue here was whether
the trial court properly held the establishment of homestead could not be
defeated by statutory provisions for voiding a fraudulent transfer of
nonexempt assets converted into homestead property, even when the intent
of the debtor is to defeat creditors' claims.560
The appellate court held that the trial court was correct on the above
issues.561 The appellate court based its opinion on the fact that the Supreme
Court of Florida's prior statements that neither the legislature nor the
supreme court has the power to create an exception to the constitutionally
562provided homestead exemption.
XII. LANDLORD AND TENANT
3679 Waters Avenue Corp. v. Water Street Ovens, LtL 563 Here, the
tenant leased space for a restaurant in a shopping center, but never moved
in.5" Both the landlord and the tenant claimed the other had breached, but,
the trial court, finding the lease to be clear and unambiguous, held for the
tenant and awarded damages because the landlord had failed to make certain
improvements.565 The lease provided that the landlord was contemplating a
554, Id. at 159.
555. Id. at 160.
556. Id. at 159.
557. Id.
558. Simms, 243 B.R. at 160.
559. 745 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
560. Id. at 468.
561. Id.
562. Id.
563. 25 Fla. L. Weekly D441 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 18,2000).
564. Id. at D441.
565. Id. at D441-42.
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major renovation of the shoppingcenter which might involve demolition of a
portion of the leased building.5  It required the landlord to make certain
improvements after demolition and to abate the rent at certain times during
construction, but it never specifically required the landlord to demolish
anything. 567  Since this involved only the interpretation of the lease
document, the district court was not obligated to defer to the trial court.
56
After reviewing the language of the entire lease, it concluded that the lease
was ambiguous as to whether the landlord was obligated to demolish
anything and that, inferentially, demolition was the condition precedent to
the landlord's obligation to make the improvements.5 69 Thus, the trial
court's judgment that the landlord had breached that obligation was incorrect
and the case was remanded so that parol evidence could be introduced to
help in interpreting the lease.57°
Baldwin Sod Farms, Inc. v. Corrigan.571 The commercial tenant filed
for bankruptcy but the bankruptcy court granted the landlords limited relief
from the automatic stay to the extent that they could proceed in rem to
recover possession of the realty.572 The landlords subsequently filed a two
count complaint in circuit court.573 The first count sought eviction and
requested the court retain jurisdiction to determine damages when the
bankruptcy court lifted the stay on that issue.574 The second count sought a
temporary injunction to prevent the removal of certain personal property.575
The trial court found for the landlords and ordered eviction.5 76 That decision
made the claim for injunctive relief moot.577
On appeal, the tenant challenged the circuit court's subject matter
jurisdiction. 78 In eviction and equity matters, the county courts and circuit
courts have concurrent jurisdiction, however, the circuit courts' jurisdiction
extends only to cases that satisfy the statutory amount in controversy of
566. Id. at D442.
567. Id.
568. 3679 Waters Ave. Corp., 25 Fla. L. Weekly at D442.
569. Id.
570. Id.
571. 746 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
572. Id. at 1200.
573. Id. at 1201.
574. Id.
575. Id.
576. Corrigan, 746 So. 2d at 1202.
577. Id.
578. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 34.011(1) (2000).
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$15,000Y 9 The complaint must state the grounds on which the circuit
court's jurisdiction is based, but the landlord's complaint did not seek
damages because to do so would have violated the stay."8 However, the
landlord did ask that the court retain jurisdiction to determine damages.581
The three day notice letter, which was an exhibit to the complaint, and
therefore incorporated into the complaint by reference, demanded the past
due rent that was far in excess of the jurisdictional amount.58 2 According to
the district court, that was enough to give the circuit court jurisdiction.8 3
Moreover, the claim for equitable relief was sufficient to invoke the circuit
court's jurisdiction under the circumstances because the allegations in the
complaint were sufficient even though equitable relief was not granted.5 '
The tenant also challenged the trial court's denial of a jury trial.585 The
tenant made a timely demand for a jury trial and the district court held the
failure to remind the court of that demand did not constitute a waiver.586 But
the district court was faced with the question of whether the tenant had a
right to a jury trial.5 7 Neither chapter 51 nor chapter 83 of the Florida
Statutes expressly provided for a right to a jury trial in an eviction.5 88
Chapter 51 merely provides when to make a demand for a jury trial "[i]f a
jury trial is authorized by law" and chapter 83, governing nonresidential
tenancies, is silent in regards to the right to a jury trial.58 The question
turned on "whether the right was recognized at common law, at the time the
Florida Constitution was adopted."0 No Florida case provided an answer,
so the district court relied on a decision of the United States Supreme Court
which concluded that a jury trial was required because a modem eviction
action served the same function as a common law action of ejectment.591
In this case, the tenant had claimed that the three day notice was
improperly served, that it had not been given the notice of default required
by the lease, that rent payments had been tendered but rejected, and that the
579. Corrigan, 746 So. 2d at 1202; FLA. STAT. §§ 34.01(c), .011(1) (2000).
580. Corrigan, 746 So. 2d at 1203.
581. Id.
582. Id.
583. Id.
584. Id.
585. Corrigan, 746 So. 2d at 1202.
586. Id. at 1206.
587. Id. at 1203-06.
588. Id. at 1203; see tA. STAT §§ 51, 83 (2000).
589. Corrigan, 746 So. 2d at 1203; FLA. STAT. §§ 51.011(3), 83.21 (2000).
590. Corrigan, 746 So. 2d at 1203.
591. Id. at 1205 (citing Pemell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 376 (1974)).
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tenant had made accountings as required.592 Therefore, issues of fact existed
for a jury to decide. 93  Consequently, the case had to be reversed and
remanded for a jury trial.594
Carney v. Gambe.595 The plaintiff was the head of security for a
country club community.596 The defendants lived in the community.597 The
adult son of the defendants lived in their home. 9 The plaintiff alleged that,
while performing his duties, he was physically attacked by the defendants'
adult son.599 His claim against the defendants was based on the theory that
the defendants owed him a duty of care, both as parents and as landlords, to
protect him from the son's reasonably foreseeable criminal conduct.60° The
trial court disagreed and dismissed the complaint?6' The Fourth District
Court of Appeal affirmed because it could find no precedent or reason for
imposing a duty of care in the absence of a special relationship between the
parents and their son.6°2 The son was an emancipated adult even though he
was living with his parents. ' 3 Therefore, they had no power to control
him.0
4
Grant v. Thornton. 5 The landlord leased part of a duplex as a
residence. 6°6 The front door was secured with a double cylinder deadbolt
which required a key to unlock the door from either side.607 That type of
lock on exit doors of a residence was prohibited by the building code. A
fire started in the kitchen, but the tenant's keys were in the kitchen.6 9
Unable to escape through the locked front door, the tenant jumped through
the living room window and was seriously injured.610 The tenant filed suit
592. Id.
593. Id.
594. Id. at 1206.
595. 751 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
596. Id. at 654.
597. Id.
598. Id.
599. Id.
600. Carney, 751 So. 2d at 654.
601. Id.
602. Id.
603. Id.
604. Id.
605. 749 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
606. Id. at 531.
607. Id. at 530.
608. Id.
609. Id.
610. Grant, 749 So. 2d at 530.
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against the landlord for personal injuries. 61' The landlord's motion for
summary judgment was granted because the tenant had never notified the
landlord that a dangerous condition existed and the landlord was unaware
that the locks violated the code.
612
The second district reversed.613 The landlord had a duty to make the
leased residence reasonably safe.614 State statute obligated the landlord to
maintain the premises in compliance with the applicable code.615 The
statute, in effect, created a statutory warranty of habitability, the violation of61
which might be considered evidence of negligence. 616 The landlord gave the
keys to the tenant, so it was clear that he knew about the locks.617 His claim
that he did not know the locks violated the building code was not a valid
61defense. '8 Consequently, summary judgment should not have been granted
for the landlord.
619
Investment Builders of Florida, Inc. v. S. U.S. Food Market Investments,
Inc.62° The president of the tenant corporation was sick and failed to send
the notice needed to renew the lease.62' When his omission was called to his
attention eight days after the renewal deadline had passed, he immediately
sent the renewal notice.622 The landlord refused to renew the lease, so the
tenant brought this action for declaratory judgment.623 Equity can provide
relief from the consequences of a mistake, such as failing to give timely
notice of renewal, when "(1) the tenant's delay is slight, (2) the delay did not
prejudice the landlord, and (3) failure to grant relief would cause the tenant
unconscionable hardship. ' '62 The trial court held that the tenant had625
satisfied the test and the district court affined.
611. Id.
612. Id. at 532.
613. Id.
614. Id.
615. Grant, 749 So. 2d at 531; see FLA. STAT. § 83.51 (2000).
616. Grant, 749 So. 2d at 531-32.
617. ld. at 532.
618. Id.
619. Id.
620. 753 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
621. Id. at 759.
622. Id.
623. Id.
624. Id. at 760.
625. Inv. Builders of Fla., Inc., 753 So. 2d at 760.
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LPI/Key West Associates, Ltd. v. Sarah Luna, Inc.626 Plaintiff was a
tenant under a commercial lease which expressly provided that it would be
the only tenant "whose main business purpose is the sale or distribution of
bagels, or whose business otherwise functions as a 'bagel bakery. "627
Pursuant to that clause, the tenant unsuccessfully sought an injunction to
prevent the landlord from leasing space to a Dunkin' Donuts franchise. 628
The district court reasoned that the plain language of the lease was
controlling. 629 The testimony showed that Dunkin' Donuts would serve
bagels, but its main business was the sale of donuts and Dunkin' Donuts
would not be a "bagel bakery" because baking and selling bagels was not its
primary function. Consequently, leasing to Dunkin' Donuts would not
breach the plaintiff's lease.
Magnolia Village Homeowners Ass'n v. Magnolia Village, Inc. 631 The
owners of mobile homes who leased spaces in a mobile home park
632
challenged the landlord's rent increase. The judge certified the tenant
class but limited its membership to current tenants who were there when the
633
rent was increased. The district court held that the class should be
expanded to include assignees of leases from tenants who would have
qualified as class members but for their having assigned their leases, so long
as the assignees had paid the increased rent. The court relied on statutory
language that, "[tihe purchaser of a mobile home who becomes a resident of
the mobile home park in accordance with this section has the right to assume
the remainder of the term of any rental agreement then in effect.
'6 35
Consequently, a lease assignee succeeds to the original tenant's right to
challenge the propriety of the rent amount.
636
Mangum v. Susser.637 The landlord sued the commercial tenant for
possession and back rent.638 The tenant vacated the property and defended
626. 749 So. 2d 564 (Ha. 3d. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
627. Id. at 565.
628. Id.
629. Id.
630. Id.
631. 758 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
632. Id. at 1202. Such leases are regulated by chapter 723 of the Florida Statutes,
entitled "Mobile Home Park Tenancies." See FLA. STAT. § 723 (2000).
633. Magnolia Viii. Homeowners Ass'n, 758 So. 2d at 1202.
634. Id.
635. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 723.059 (1997)).
636. Magnolia Vill. Homeowners Ass'n, 758 So. 2d at 1202.
637. 764 So. 2d 653 (Ha. 1st Dist. Ct. 2000).
638. Id. at 654.
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the suit on the theory that the notice to vacate was defective."' The trial
court granted summary judgment for the tenant, but the district court
reversed."'4 The tenant had failed to follow the rules of civil procedure
requiring affirmative defenses to be raised in the answer and that failure of a
condition precedent, such as filing a notice to vacate, must be pled
specifically."1 Therefore, the tenant had waived its affirmative defenses by
failing to raise them properly." 2 Moreover, the claim for possession had
become moot when the tenant vacated, leaving only the claim for damages
for overdue rent.643 A notice to vacate is not needed before the landlord can
recover rent that is owed.644 The tenant had also claimed that the successor
landlord could not be the assignee of a claim for rent without a writing, but
the court could find no authority for the assertion that a rent claim could only
be assigned by a writing.64 5
Munao v. Homeowners Ass'n of La Buona Vita Mobile Home Park
Inc."64 The owners of mobile homes who rented space in a mobile home
park challenged the rent as being unconscionable under section 723.033 of
the Florida Statutes because the landlord had reduced the amenities." 7
Subsequent to the 1990 amendment of the statute, which lowered the
standard of the prohibition from "unconscionable" rent to "unreasonable"
rent, the trial court allowed the tenants to amend their complaint to charge
the rent was unreasonable." s  Then the trial court found that the
unreasonable condition of the park necessitated a reduction in rent.649 On
appeal the landlord challenged the application of the 1990 standard, inter
alia, as an unconstitutional impairment of an existing contract.650 The
district court rejected that challenge because the state had the reserved power
to regulate the landlord-tenant relationship.651
639. Id.
640. Id.
641. Id.
642. Mangum, 764 So. 2d at 655.
643. Id.
644. Id.
645. Id.
646. 740 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
647. Id. at 75.
648. Id.
649. Id.
650. Id. at 76.
651. Munao, 740 So. 2d at 76.
2000]
167
: Nova Law Review 35, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2000
Nova Law Review
The landlord also challenged the finding that the rent was unreasonable
652
when it did not exceed what comparable parks charge. The district court
found that the statute allowed the court to consider other factors, such as the
condition of the amenities, in determining whether the rent was
unreasonable. Moreover, the court found that section 723.033 of the
Florida Statutes still had sufficient standards to survive a vagueness
challenge.
614
Ocwen Federal Bank v. LVWD, Ltd.655 The lease provided that the
tenant would pay "additional rent" which was defined as a pro-rata share of
operating expenses.656 The lease divided operating expenses into twelve
categories and limited to four percent the amount that certain expenses could
657be increased. The landlord had calculated the additional rent on a line by
line, category by category basis for the first three years of the lease.658 The
landlord then billed the tenant on an aggregate basis that produced a
substantial rent increase.559 The tenant objected and filed this suit for
declaratory judgment and damages. 660
The landlord demanded arbitration and the trial court agreed, although
it characterized the arbitration clause as yUZZY.,,661 On review, the district
court noted that this was a question of contract interpretation, so the review
662 663would be de novo.662 It then reversed. The arbitration clause expressly
restricted the arbitrator to specific issues, such as whether a particular item
was improperly included in the calculation of additional rent.664 While
doubts about whether the parties had agreed to submit a particular issue to
arbitration should be resolved in favor of arbitration, arbitration should not
be ordered where there is no doubt.665 The district court found no room for
doubt.666 This complaint challenged the method by which the additional rent
652. Id. at 76.
653. Id. at 77.
654. Id.
655. 766 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
656. Id. at 248.
657. Id. at 249.
658. Id.
659. Id.
660. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 766 So. 2d at 249.
661. Id.
662. Id.
663. Id.
664. Id.
665. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 766 So. 2d at 249.
666. Id.
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was calculated, not whether a particular item was properly included. 667
Clearly, it was not within the scope of the arbitration clause.6
Park Avenue BBQ & Grille of Wellington, Inc. v. Coaches Corner,
Inc.69 Coaches Comer operated a sports bar in a shopping center.6 70 Under
the terms of its lease, the landlord was prohibited from leasing space to a
restaurant or bar that devoted "'more than ten percent of its space to use as a
sports bar/sports restaurant or for the viewing of sporting events."' 671 The
new landlord subsequently sold the property.672 Later, Coaches Comer
learned that the landlord intended to lease space to a restaurant that would
have televisions showing sports events, so Coaches Corner's attorney sent a
letter to the successor landlord reminding it of the restriction. 673  The
president of Park Avenue was made aware of the restriction and got the
successor landlord to agree to a term in its lease allowing it to televise
sports.674 Coaches Comer brought this action for an injunction against both
Park Avenue and the landlord.67
The first defense raised was laches.676 However, Coaches Corner had
brought this action less than one month after Park Avenue had signed its
lease and before it had opened for business.677 Since the plaintiff had acted
promptly, laches was not a viable defense.
678
Park Avenue next raised lack of privity as a defense.679 Its point was
that it had not undertaken an obligation to Coaches Comer to refrain from
showing sports; its only contractual duties were to the landlord under the
terms of its lease.mo This argument also failed.61 The evidence showed that
Park Avenue took with notice of the restriction, that Coaches Comer would
suffer irreparable injury from the violation of the restriction, and that
667. Id.
668. Id.
669. 746 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
670. Id at 481.
671. Id.
672. Id. at 482.
673. Id. at 481-82.
674. ParkAve. BBQ & Grille, 746 So. 2d at 482.
675. Id. at481.
676. Id.
677. Id. at 482.
678. Id. at481.
679. Park Ave. BBQ & Grille, 746 So. 2d at 482.
680. Id.
681. Id.
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682Coaches had no adequate remedy at law. In essence, Coaches Comer had
demonstrated the essentials for equitable relief based on the logic that the
restriction burdened the land with an equitable servitude.683
Springbrook Commons, Ltd v. Brown.(84 The landlord brought this
eviction action based on the tenant's alleged failure to pay rent." 5 Having
failed twice to personally serve the tenant, the landlord effected service by
686posting the complaint on the front door of the leased premises. The tenant
failed to respond to the complaint and the court awarded the landlord
judgment for possession. 687 The landlord, however, also wanted the court to
award costs, but the court refused.688
The landlord argued that it was entitled to costs under section 85.59(4)
of the Florida Statutes.69 However, the court reasoned that service b
posting did not confer personal jurisdiction on the court under the statute.
The district court affirmed, reasoning, "[i]f this tenant had been personally
served, the landlord would be entitled to costs under the statute, but in the
absence of personal service, a costs judgment would violate due process., 691
XIV. LIENS
Betaco, Inc. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 69  The issue here was
whether the trial court erred when it decided that an "execution sale" which
occurs beyond the twenty year period from the recording of a judgment lien
was ineffective because the judgment lien had expired before the execution
sale occurred.
6 93
Betaco's predecessor-in-interest recorded a judgment against the owner
694
of the property on March 10, 1977. In May 1979, a writ of execution was
682. Id.
683. id. at 482.
684. 761 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
685. Id. at 1193.
686. Id. Service by posting was allowed under section 48.183 of the Florida Statutes.
FLA. STAT. § 48.183 (2000).
687. Brown, 761 So. 2d at 1193.
688. Id.
689. See id. at 1194; see also FLA. STAT. § 89.59(4) (2000).
690. Brown, 761 So. 2d at 1193.
691. Id. at 1194.
692. 752 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
693. Id. at 697.
694. Id.
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issued .695 Then, in 1993, the property owner mortgaged the property to
Countrywide, who was the mortgage holder at the time of the default.6% On
January 27, 1997, Betaco delivered instructions to the sheriff, who levied the
property on February 18. 697 This was recorded several days later.69 & The
sheriff's sale was held on April 17, 1997.99 Betaco's predecessor-in-interest
took title through sheriff's deed at that time, and Betaco subsequently took
title to the property by warranty deed.7"0
The appellate court held that the trial court was correct in deciding that
the judgment lien on the property had expired before the execution sale,
stating that the deed held by Betaco's predecessor-in-interest was legally
null because the lien had expired before the sheriff held the execution sale.701
"An execution is valid and effective only during the life of the judgment on
which it is issued."702 Further, the court referred to section 55.091 of the
Florida Statutes, which provided that "'no judgment.., shall be a lien upon
real... property within the state after the expiration of 20 years from the
date of the entry of such judgment."' 7 3 Therefore, since the life of the
judgment expired on March 10, 1997, and the execution sale was not
completed before that date, the lien was no longer valid when the execution
sale took place.
CDS & Associates of the Palm Beaches, Inc. v. 1711 Donna Road
Associates, Inc.70 5 The issue here was whether the trial court proper held
that a construction lien cannot be based on a contract implied in law.
The appellate court noted that "[t]he trial court found as a factual matter
that no contract was created in this case by the parties' words or conduct,
and that CDS was limited to quasi contractual remedies., 707 Therefore, CDS
was not able to "enforce its quantum meruit recovery through the imposition
of a mechanics' lien."7 8 First, section 713.05 of the Florida Statutes states:
695. Id.
696. Id.
697. Betaco, Inc., 752 So. 2d at 697.
698. Id.
699. Id.
700. Id.
701. Id.
702. Betaco, Inc., 752 So. 2d at 697; see FLA. STAT. § 56.021 (2000).
703. Betaco, Inc., 752 So. 2d at 697 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 55.091 (1977)).
704. Id.
705. 743 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1999).
706. Id. at 1224.
707. Id. at 1225.
708. Id.
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[A] contractor who complies with the provisions of this part shall,
subject to the limitations thereof, have a lien on the real property
improved for any money that is owed to him or her for labor,
services, materials, or other items required by, or furnished in
accordance with, the direct contract.
70
Second, section 713.01(5) defines a contract as "an agreement for improving
real property, written or unwritten, express or implied, and includes extras or
change orders.7 ° Therefore, a contract under the mechanics' lien law
requires an agreement.711  No agreement, either express or implied, was
found to exist in this case.71 2 In regards to the quasi contractual claim, the
court defined such contract as "a contract implied in law.... . 713 Further, a
quasi contract does not require an agreement, as does the mechanics' lien
statute.1 4 Therefore, a quasi contract is not a contract for purposes of the
mechanics' lien statute.715
Diaz v. Plumhoff.7 16 The issue here was whether the trial court properly
"declared Plumhoff to be the owner of real property previously owned by
Diaz, but deeded to Plumhoff by sheriff's sale under section 56.061, Florida
Statutes."
717
718This was a case of first impression. Plumhoff obtained a money
judgment against Diaz for a total of $8774.719 The money judgment "did not
constitute a lien on the property of Diaz because no certified copy containing
the address of Plumhoff was ever recorded." 720 However, Plumhoff
proceeded directly under section 56.061 of the Florida Statutes, which
states, "[l]ands and tenements, goods and chattels, equities of redemption in
real and personal property, and stock in corporations, shall be subject to levy
and sale under execution. '' 721 The trial court held that Plumhoff was not
required to proceed under section 55.10 of the Florida Statutes because
709. FLA. STAT. § 713.05 (2000).
710. § 713.01(5).
711. CDS & Assocs. of the Palm Beaches, Inc., 743 So. 2d at 1224.
712. Id. at 1225.
713. Id. at 1224.
714. Id. at 1224-25.
715. Id. at 1225.
716. 742 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
717. Id. at 846.
718. Id.
719. Id.
720. Id. at 846-47.
721. Diaz, 742 So. 2d at 847; see also FLA. STAT. § 56.061 (2000).
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perfecting the lien was not necessary for the sheriff to proceed under section
56.061 of the Florida Statutes.722
The appellate court held that it was necessary for Plumhoff to comply
with the requirements of section 55.10 of the Florida Statutes before
proceeding under section 56 .0 6 1 .r Further, the appellate court stated that
chapter 55 deals with the subject of judgments, and chapter 56 with final
process.72 The requirements of chapter 55 must be met before moving to
chapter 56.72 7
Gulfside Properties Corp. v. Chapman Corp. The issue here was
whether the trial court properly held that "Gulfside could not assert lack of
proper notice to [the] owner as a defense to Chapman's suit to enforce a
construction lien against Gulfside's property" where Gulfside failed to sign
the notice of commencement as owner, as required by section 713.13(1)(g)
of the Florida Statutes.
727
Gulfside, the owner of a real estate development, entered into an
agreement with Willis Construction, Inc. ('Willis") for the completion of
phase seven of a beach villas project.72 Ronnie Willis signed his own name
on the line indicated for the owner's signature on the notice of
commencement. 7 9 This notice was filed and recorded in Walton County.73°
Willis and Chapman entered into a contract to provide materials and labor73173
for the project. Gulfside paid Willis in full.732  Willis did not pay
Chapman in full. Chapman filed a lien against Gulfside.73
The appellate court held that Chapman failed to comply with
construction lien law by failing to serve a notice to the owner and that
Gulfside could assert this as a complete defense. 735 Further, the court held
that serving a notice to an owner would be a separate requirement under
construction lien law and must be followed, even if there is another problem
722. Diaz, 742 So. 2d at 847.
723. Id.
724. Id.
725. Id.
726. 737 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
727. Id. at 605.
728. Id.
729. Id.
730. Id.
731. Gulfside Props. Corp., 737 So. 2d at 605.
732. Id.
733. Id.
734. Id. at 606.
735. Id. at 607.
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created by the other party.736 In this case, Gulfside was required to sign the
notice of commencement as owner.7 37 Because it failed to sign as owner, the
notice of commencement was not valid.738 The appellate court further noted
that a notice to owner must be served as a prerequisite for recording of a
lien, regardless of other violations, for the lien to be valid. 3  If it is not, this
failure can be used as a complete defense by the other party.740
Klein Development v. Ellis K. Phelps & Co.741 The issue here was
whether a fax copy of a release of lien would be binding and would prevent
the releasing party from later filing for foreclosure on that lien.742
In this case, the developer, Klein, stopped payment on its check to the
general contractor.743 The general contractor's check to the subcontractor,
Phelps, bounced when he tried to cash it.7 " The subcontractor then filed for
foreclosure on the lien.745 Klein tried to rely on the signed fax copy of a
release of lien.7"
The appellate court, after review of discovery, determined that the
subcontractor never intended to give up its right to foreclose on the lien until
the check it received had cleared.747 Therefore, it affirmed the lower court's
decision in favor of the subcontractor.
74
Lachance v. Desperado's of Holly Hill, Inc.749 The issue here was
which interest should have priority when there is a lien against a liquor
license. ° In this case there was an assignment of a lease to a third party,
with a provision requiring the license to be reconveyed to the assignor in the
event of a default or at the end of the lease.5
736. Gulfside Props. Corp., 737 So. 2d at 607.
737. Id.
738. Id.
739. Id.
740. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 713.06(2)(a) (2000); see also Torres v. Maclntyre, 334 So.
2d 59 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
741. 761 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
742. Id. at 442.
743. Id.
744. Id.
745. Id.
746. Klein Dev., 761 So. 2d at 442.
747. Id. at 443.
748. Id.
749. 760 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
750. Id. at 1023.
751. Id.
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The trial court found that the assignor had priority interest over an
investor who made a loan to the third party with the license as collateral. 52
The court said that having the agreement on file with the Division of
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Division and "available for any person to
examine or inspect" was enough to establish priority, especially where the
original lessor held an ownership interest and not a lien interest in the
license and, therefore, had priority over the investor's lien.753
The appellate court agreed with the outcome of the case but for
different reasons.7M The court found that the lessor should prevail because
of the rule which allows for security interests in such licenses to exist and to
be enough to put potential investors on notice that they should make an
inquiry with the Department. 755 The appellate court recommended in its
decision that the legislature expand section 561.65 of the Florida Statutes so
that persons having an interest in such a license other than security may
record it with the division to provide notice to subsequent investors.756
Sasso Air Conditioning, Inc. v. United Companies Lending Corp.757
The issue here was whether the trial court properly granted summary
judgment in favor of the mortgagee, United, and against a lienor, Sasso,
under a claim of lien, determining that while the notice of commencement
was recorded prior to the mortgage, the notice did not comply with the
mechanics' lien statute requiring the signature of all owners of the
property.
758
Kevin and Sita Martin, as tenants by the entireties, executed a mortgage
with United.759 This mortgage was recorded on February 21, 1996.76° Sita
Martin had previously signed and recorded a notice of commencement on
January 3, 1996.761 The notice listed Sita Martin as the owner of the
property and Plumb, Level & Square, Inc. ("PLS") as the contractor.762
Kevin Martin owned PLS.763 The notice also provided that the owner
752. Id. at 1025.
753. Id.
754. Lachance, 760 So. 2d at 1025-27.
755. Id. at 1026.
756. Id. at 1027.
757. 742 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
758. Id. at 469.
759. Id.
760. Id.
761. Id.
762. Sasso Air Conditioning, Inc., 742 So. 2d at 469.
763. Id.
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appoint Kevin Martin to "receive notices required under the mechanics lien
law and designated him to receive lienor's notices.
During September of 1996, Kevin Martin contracted with Sasso to
replace his home's central air conditioning. 76s The contract listed PLS as the
"job name" and stated the work was to be done on "Kevin's own house."76
Kevin Martin signed the contract in his name and listed his residential
768address. 767 Sasso filed a claim of lien after the Martins failed to pay.
Eventually, the Martins stopped paying their mortgage and United
foreclosed, listing Sasso as a junior lienor, because its claim of lien was filed
after United recorded its mortgage.71
9
The appellate court held Sasso had priority due to the notice of
commencement being filed by Sita Martin before United filed its
mortgage.770  The court based this on the fact that United could have
performed a title search and "[u]pon finding the earlier filed notice of
commencement, United could have required the Martins to file a notice of
termination pursuant to section 713.132 prior to United recording the
mortgage., 77r Further, the appellate court noted that Sasso had "a notice of
commencement which appeared regular and complete in all respects," and if
the notice of commencement provided the lienor with necessary information
enabling it to serve notice to owner, the lienor should be able to rely on this
information.772 "The law does not require every contractor to conduct a title
search to verify that the information contained in the notice is true and
correct."" 3
XV. PARTITION
Biondo v. Powers."4  The issue here was whether the trial court
properly held that upon the partition and sale of jointly owned property,
764. Id.
765. Id.
766. Id.
767. Sasso Air Conditioning, Inc., 742 So. 2d at 469.
768. Id.
769. Id.
770. Id. at 471.
771. Id.
772. Sasso Air Conditioning, Inc., 742 So. 2d at 471; see FLA. STAT. § 713.13(1)(a)
(2000).
773. Sasso Air Conditioning, Inc., 742 So. 2d at 471.
774. 743 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1999).
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where a co-tenant made excess payments towards obligations of the
property, it would be proper to increase her equity in the property." 5
While Biondo and Powers were dating, they purchased real property in
Palm Beach for approximately $650,000.76 They obtained a purchase
money mortgage from the seller for $350,000.' n Both parties paid the
balance due at closing equally." 8 However, the deed named only Biondo as
the grantee.n 9 At closing Biondo executed a handwritten note, also signed
by Powers, saying he had received half of the closing money from Powers
and that all monies received from the sale of the property would be divided
equally, prorated as to invested amounts paid at closing.7 8 Subsequently,
Powers paid off the mortgage. 781 On the same day this occurred, Biondo
executed a quitclaim deed of the property to both Powers and himself as
joint tenants with right of survivorship, which was later recorded. 712 Also, it
was not disputed that the expenses paid by Powers exceeded those paid by
Biondo.78 3 Biondo issued a note to Powers for $350,000 payable in five
years with six and one-half percent interest and a mortgage on Biondo's
interest in the property to secure the note.7
In July 1997, Powers brought suit against Biondo to foreclose on the
note and mortgage, and to partition the property.7 5  The trial court
concluded that Powers' investment in the property totaled $760,000, figuring
that Biondo's investment was only his initial investment at closing of
approximately $134,000.86 The trial court then ordered a distribution of the
sale proceeds in proportion to the parties' respective investments-eighty-
five percent to Powers and fifteen percent to Biondo.
7s7
The appellate court held that the sale proceeds should have been
divided equally between Powers and Biondo because each had an equal
interest in the property.78  Biondo was required to reimburse Powers for his
775. Id. at 162.
776. Id.
777. Id.
778. Id.
779. Biondo, 743 So. 2d at 162.
780. Id.
781. Id.
782. Id.
783. Id. at 163.
784. Biondo, 743 So. 2d at 163.
785. Id.
786. Id.
787. Id. at 164.
788. Id.
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789proportionate share of the expenses for the property. It based this on
section 64.071(1) of the Florida Statutes, which states that the proceeds
from such a sale shall be divided among the parties in proportion to their
interests.79° Further, upon partition, a co-tenant is entitled to a credit from
proceeds of the sale for the other co-tenant's proportionate share of
expenses. 9
XVI. QUIET TITLE
Hardemon v. United Companies Lending Corp.792 The issue here was
whether the trial court properly entered a final judgment quieting title in
favor of United.
793
Hardemon and Jacquelyn Harris, his girlfriend, bought a home in 1992
as tenants in common. Hardemon was incarcerated in 1994 as a result of a
violent domestic dispute with Harris and was subsequently charged with
attempted kidnapping and aggravated battery. 95 Hardemon proposed to
Harris that she drop the charges and pursue no further action.79 In
exchange, he would execute a quitclaim deed to the property.797 Harris
agreed. 98 On the day he was released from jail, Hardemon conveyed to
Harris a notarized quitclaim deed of his one-half interest in the property.79
All charges against Hardemon were dropped.8°° Harris recorded the deed in
April 1994.80' Nearly three months after the recording of the deed, United
extended a first mortgage loan to Harris.802
United performed a title search revealing that Harris was the sole and
exclusive record owner at that time.80 3  Next, United recorded the
789. Biondo, 743 So. 2d at 164.
790. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 64.071(1) (2000).
791. Biondo, 743 So. 2d at 164; see Whitely v. Whitely, 329 So. 2d 352, 353 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
792. 746 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
793. Id. at 1231.
794. Id.
795. Id.
796. Id.
797. Hardemon, 746 So. 2d at 1231.
798. Id.
799. Id.
800. Id.
801. Id.
802. Hardemon, 746 So. 2d at 1231.
803. Id.
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mortgage.8" In June 1994, almost a month after the mortgage was recorded,
Hardemon filed a suit against Harris and obtained a default judgment against
her setting aside the quitclaim deed.805 Hardemon claimed his signature was
forged.806 Harris never contested the action.807
United initiated the current action seeking to quiet title. 808 The
appellate court held that the trial court was correct when it entered a final
judgment quieting title in favor of United.W9 The evidence showed "United
was a bona fide purchaser without notice of any alleged irregularities in the
public record chain of title, and it is protected from claims outside that chain
of title.
'810
XVII. REAL ESTATE BROKERS
The Florida legislature continues to tinker with the chapter that
regulates real estate brokers. Chapter 2000-198 of the Laws of Florida
clarifies that it is not an appraisal when a real estate broker or salesperson
gives an opinion regarding the proper price for certain real estate or gives a
comparative price analysis.811 It also provides a modification to the escape
procedures that protect a real estate broker holding funds in escrow when a
dispute arises over those funds.812  Ordinarily, to be protected from an
administrative complaint by the escape procedures, the licensee must get an
escrow disbursement order from the Florida Real Estate Commission, or
have the matter submitted to litigation, arbitration, or mediation, or get the
parties to agree to disbursement.8 13  However, the protection has been
expanded to include returning the escrow deposit of the buyer of a new
residential condominium who exercises his or her right to statutorily cancel
the purchase under section 718.503 of the Florida Statutes.
814
804. Id.
805. Id.
806. Id.
807. Hardemon, 746 So. 2d at 1231.
808. Id.
809. Id. at 1232.
810. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 695.01(1)(2000); see also Koschler v. Dean, 642 So. 2d
1119 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
811. Ch. 2000-198, § 3, 2000 Fla. Laws 2026, 2034 (codified at FIA. STAT. § 475.612
(2000)).
812. Id. § 1, 2000 Fla. Laws. at 2026-27 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 475.25(1)(d)
(2000)).
813. FLA. STAT. § 475.25(1)(d) (2000).
814. Ch. 2000-198, § 1, 2000 Fla. Laws 2026, 2027 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 475.25(I)(d) (2000)).
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This year's act also changes the disclosure requirements for a licensee
who does not have a brokerage relationship with the potential buyer or
seller.815 The licensee must reveal that lack of relationship in writing before
showing the property.816 The disclosure may be incorporated into other
documents, but then it must be conspicuous.8 17 A number of exceptions to
the disclosure requirements have been added. For example, the disclosure
requirements do not apply: 1) when the licensee knows that the potential
buyer or seller already is represented by a broker or under circumstances
when the potential buyer should know from the setting that the licensee
represents only the seller, such as the project's sales office; 2) to non-
residential transactions; 3) in an "open house" or the showing of a model
home that does not involve obtaining confidential information, executing an
offer, and the like; and 4) to unanticipated casual conversations.818
Cabrerizo v. Fortune International Realty.8'9 The brokerage contract
allowed the seller to cancel by giving notice and paying a cancellation fee. 820
The seller gave the cancellation notice on May 16 as the contract allowed
and on May 29 delivered the cancellation fee to the broker.821 On May 20,
the seller entered into a sales contract with the buyers.8 The contract
showed a sales price of $140,000.823 Later the seller sued the buyers alleging
that the sales price was actually $700,000 because part of the price was a
check for $560,000.82 To the seller's consternation, the $560,000 check had
been rejected by the bank.825 In that suit, the seller testified that he first
heard the buyers were interested on May 14 and met with them on May
15.826
When the broker learned about the contract and breach of contract suit,
it filed suit for the brokerage commission.8Z7 Based upon the seller's
testimony in the breach of contract suit, the court granted summary judgment
for the broker and awarded the commission based on the sale price of
815. Id. § 2,2000 Fla. Laws at 2032 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 475.278(4)(b) (2000)).
816. Id.
817. Id.
818. Id. at 2033 (codified at RA. STAT. § 475.278(5)(b)1, 2 (2000)).
819. 760 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
820. Id. at 229.
821. Id.
822. Id.
823. Id.
824. Cabrerizo, 760 So. 2d at 229.
825. Id.
826. Id.
827. Id.
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$700,000.828 The seller appealed claiming his affidavits in the current case
contradicted his testimony in the breach of contract suit, so there was a
genuine issue of fact as to when the sales contract was entered into and the
amount of the sale price.829 The district court disagreed.830 It found that the
seller's conduct, attempting to contradict his own sworn testimony, was
inherently wrongful and he should not be allowed to benefit from it.
831
Harris v. Schickedanz Bros.-Riviera Ltd. 2  Harris apparently was
licensed as a salesman but not as a broker.8 33 He signed a contract with a de-
veloper under which he was to attempt to procure buyers for the developer's
residential units (thereby earning a commission), market the development,
and, if he kept expenses below a certain percentage of gross sales, earn a
bonus. 834 The developer terminated the contract and Harris sued.
835
The first count of the complaint was dismissed because it sought a
brokerage commission and Harris was not a broker.836 That ruling seemed
unassailable, so Harris did not appeal that ruling.837 But Harris appealed the
dismissal of the other counts.838 Count three was based on "quantum meruit
for the marketing services rendered under the original [written] contract. 8 39
However, quantum meruit is available only when there is no express
contract.m So this count was properly dismissed and the district court
aff'rmed.? 1 Counts two and four sought compensation for marketing the
development and the bonus for keeping marketing expenses low in relation
to sales . 2 This was an action for breach of contract.! 3 Since the services
828. Id.
829. Cabrerizo, 760 So. 2d at 229.
830. Id. at 230.
831. Id.
832. 746 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
833. See id. at 1153-54.
834. Id. at 1153.
835. Id.
836. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 475.41 (2000).
837. Harris, 746 So. 2d at 1153.
838. Id. Count five involved the claim by another plaintiff, ReMac, for the recovery of
sums advanced to the developer who had agreed to repay. Id. at 1155. The trial court
incorrectly held that this claim was barred by the Statute of Frauds provisions found in section
671.206 of the Florida Statutes, which applies only to the sale of goods, and section 687.0304
of the Florida Statutes, which applies only to credit agreements. Id. at 1155-56.
839. Id. at 1155.
840. Harris, 746 So. 2d at 1155.
841. Id. at 1156.
842. Id. at 1153, 1155.
843. Id.
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provided were not the direct procurement of customers, they were not
brokerage services under the statutory definition, 8" and, therefore, this
recovery was not prohibited by the brokerage act.85 The developer had,
however, successfully raised a Statute of Frauds defense in the trial court.'
The claim was based on an unwritten reaffirmation of a written contract that
had been terminated.8 7 The district court rejected the defense because the
services had already been performed, taking the contract out of the Statute of
Frauds.8 On these counts, the district court reversed.849
XVII. REFORMATION
Florida Masters Packing, Inc. v. Craig.850  The common grantors
acquired the land, identified as the "parent tract."85'  Out of that, they
conveyed the "outparcel" to Wright.852 Unfortunately, the legal description
853in the deed was inaccurate. When Wright subsequently conveyed the
outparcel to Haffield, the same erroneous description was used.85 Haffield
lost the property through foreclosure.855 Throughout the foreclosure, the
same erroneous description was used.856 The plaintiff was the buyer at the
foreclosure sale.857 By the time the error was discovered, the common
grantor had sold the parent tract to the defendants using a deed that
described the land as the parent tract minus the outparcel according to the
same erroneous description.8
The plaintiff sued to reform its deed and to quiet its title.859 At the
conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the trial court dismissed the case with
prejudice and the plaintiff appealed.86 The district court focused upon
844. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 475.01(1)(c), (d) (2000).
845. Harris, 746 So. 2d at 1155; see FIA. STAT. § 475.41 (2000).
846. Harris, 746 So. 2d at 1155; see FLA. STAT. § 725.01 (2000).
847. Harris, 746 So. 2d at 1154.
848. Id. at 1155.
849. Id. at 1156.
850. 739 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
851. ld. at 1289.
852. Id.
853. Id.
854. Id.
855. Craig, 739 So. 2d at 1289-90.
856. Id. at 1290.
857. Id.
858. Id.
859. Id.
860. Craig, 739 So. 2d at 1290.
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reformation. 61 Since it is an equitable remedy, it would not be available
against a subsequent bona fide purchaser for value without notice." 2 Here,
the defendants did not have actual notice because no information revealing
the problem had been communicated to themY.863 The defendants did not
have constructive notice because there was nothing in the record that might
reveal the problem.8 According to the record, the common grantor could
convey the title to the defendants that the deed purported to convey.865 Nor
did the defendants have implied actual notice, i.e., actual notice of facts that
would have led a prudent person to inquire and, consequently, discover the
problem. 6 Thus, defendants having paid for the land and taken without
notice were bona fide purchasers and the plaintiff's reformation action
should have failed.867
The court did not, however, explain why the defendants were not on
inquiry notice. 8 They did not have a survey done or even have the old one
checked.8 69 The defendants did not even go to the land to check the
boundaries.870 Monuments had been placed there by the surveyor and a
minimal inspection might have raised doubts about the boundaries.8 71 The
defendants never took any steps to check the physical boundaries. 872 Their
inaction would seem to be at odds with what a reasonably prudent person
would do under the circumstances. Consequently, it seems that the burden
should have shifted to the defendants to show that they were not negligent
and, even if they were, that the problem would not have been discovered by
their exercise of due diligence.87
861. Id.
862. Id.
863. Id.
864. Id. at 1291.
865. Craig, 739 So. 2d at 1291.
866. Id.
867. Id.
868. Id.
869. Id.
870. Craig, 739 So. 2d at 1291.
871. Id.
872. Id.
873. Id.
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XIX. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
New legislation modifies the rule against perpetuities as it relates to
trusts. The former ninety-year provision is modified to 360 years, thereby
extending the permissible life of a trust."
XX. SALES
Attanasio v. Excel Development Corp.' Land buyers sued the
developer based on a number of alleged misrepresentations. 76 These
included misrepresentations that: 1) each lot on the canal would have an
easement across the land at the rear; 2) each lot would have the use of the
canal; 3) the wooded area at the back of each lot would be a natural buffer;
and 4) the maintenance fees paid to the association would cover the costs of
water usage in the underground sprinkler system.877 The defendant pointed
out that the sales contract contained an integration clause providing that the
writing constituted the entire agreement. 878 Then, it raised the defense that
the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the Statute of Frauds.8" The trial court
agreed, but the district court reversed.880
The Statute of Frauds requires any contract for the sale of any interest
in land to be in writing."' This case did not involve the breach of a promise
to do something in the future, and it did not involve the transfer of an interest
in land.882 The allegation here was that the defendant misrepresented a state
88v3 etd tt
of existing facts as an inducement to enter into a contract. Thus, the trial
court should not have held the Statute of Frauds was a bar to the recovery of
damages 4 .8
Engle Homes, Inc. v. Krasna.885 The buyers signed a contract to have a
custom home built in 1994.8 A year later, they closed on the contract,
874. Ch. 2000-245, § 1, 2000 Fla. Laws 2392, 2392 (codified at FIA. STAT.
§ 689.255(2)(f), (7) (2000)).
875. 757 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
876. Id. at 1253.
877. Id. at 1253-54.
878. Id. at 1254.
879. Id.
880. Attanasio, 757 So. 2d at 1255.
881. Id. at 1254; FLA. STAT. § 725.01 (2000).
882. Ananasio, 757 So. 2d at 1254.
883. Id. at 1254-55.
884. Id. at 1256.
885. 766 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
886. Id. at 312.
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accepted title, and moved in.887 Almost two years later, they learned that
they might have a statutory right to rescission under the Interstate Land Sales
Full Disclosure Act.8 They quickly decided to rescind, tendering title to
the home back to the seller and demanding a full refund of the purchase
price.89 Whether these buyers could rescind presented the court with a case
of first impression.890
The seller conceded that the Act applied 91 The Act required the
buyers be given notice of their statutory right of rescission, and the seller
conceded that buyers had not been given such notice.8 92  The Act also
required that an action to enforce the rights it provided must be brought
within three years after the contract is signed.893 These buyers gave the
seller notice of rescission less than thirty-one months after signing the
contract, yet the seller claimed that the action was barred by the statute of
limitations.894 The court rejected the statute of limitations defense based on
the plain language of the Act.8 95 The court similarly rejected the seller's
waiver defense.8  These buyers did not know they had a right to rescission
when they accepted the deed or started living in the house.89T Rescission is a
knowing act, so these actions could not be the basis for rescission.898
The court also rejected the seller's attempt to limit the buyers' recovery
by invoking the liquidated damages clause in the contract and claiming a set-
off for the buyers' use of the premises. 899 Admittedly, the buyers had lived
in the house for two years, but the statute was very clear that a rescinding
buyer was entitled to "all money paid by him or her" if the property was
returned substantially unchanged.9' The Act simply did not provide for any
set-off for use and occupancy and it did not allow the seller to limit its
liability by a liquidated damages clause. 90'
887. Id.
888. Id.; see 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1700-1720 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000).
889. Krasna, 766 So. 2d at 312.
890. Id.
891. Id.
892. Id.
893. Id.
894. Krasna, 766 So. 2d at 313.
895. Id.
896. Id.
897. Id.
898. Id.
899. Krasna, 766 So. 2d at 313.
900. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1703(e) (1994)).
901. Krasna, 766 So. 2d at 313.
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Grosseibl v. J. Chris Howard Builders, Inc.902  When the buyer
purchased the home, he got a warranty from the Preferred Builders Warranty
Corporation. 903 The warranty contained an arbitration clause that required
any dispute "arising out of or related to this warranty" be submitted to
arbitration. 904 Problems did arise. The buyer claimed that the home was
poorly built of substandard materials, not up to code, and on "improper and
insufficient soil."9 5 The buyer apparently attributed the problems to the
builder's improperly filling the land after removing the swimming pool that
had previously been on the property.9°6 The buyer did not file a claim
against the warrantor. 907  Instead, he filed this action against the
builder/seller seeking damages for breach of contract, rescission of the sale,
and damages for fraud based on alleged misrepresentations made in the
seller's disclosure statement.9°8 On the seller's motion, the trial court stayed
his suit _pending arbitration, but the Second District Court of Appeal
reversed.9
In Florida, arbitration clauses are valid and enforceable. 910 A party who
has agreed to arbitration has no choice but to arbitrate. 911 However, the
critical question here was whether the buyer had agreed to arbitrate the
controversies involved in this suit.912 "In determining whether a dispute
must be submitted to arbitration, the scope of the arbitration provision
governs. ' '913 This arbitration provision only covered disputes "arising out of
or related to this warranty."9'4 The warranty revealed that it specifically
excluded from coverage defects caused by soil problems, and it did not
warrant that the home complied with any building code.915 Nor did it cover
misrepresentations that the builder might have made, and that formed the
916basis for the rescission and fraud claims. Attempts to avoid an arbitration
902. 739 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
903. Id. at 1256.
904. Id.
905. Id.
906. Id.
907. Grosseibl, 739 So. 2d at 1256.
908. Id.
909. Id. at 1256-57.
910. Id. at 1256.
911. Id.
912. Grosseibl, 739 So. 2d at 1256.
913. Id.
914. Id.
915. Id.
916. Id.
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clause by adding a fraud claim failed in cases involving an agreement to
arbitrate all disputes, but this limited arbitration clause was clearly
different. 9' 7  This plaintiffs claims went far beyond what the warranty
covered, and the agreement to arbitrate only related to claims under the
warranty.
918
XXI. SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS
Pomerance v. Homosassa Special Water District.919 The issue here was
whether the trial court erred when it granted a final judgment in favor of the
district for its special assessment for water lines by owners ofdroperty,
which consisted primarily of wetlands that could not be developed.
In 1988, the District annexed Halls River Estates, located north of the
Pomerance property.921 After annexing the property, the District ran water
lines to serve Halls River Estates and to serve land that includes the
Pomerance property which was previously within district boundaries.9"2 The
District specially assessed the Pomerance property and other properties
which abutted the water lines. 3 The Pomerances sued for relief contending
that their property would not be benefited by the water line because the
property consisted mostly of wetlands which were not able to be
developed. " The trial court concluded that the Pomerances "did not prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that there was no benefit to the property
from the extension of water service to it.
'9
The Fifth District held that the trial court properly found that the
property owners did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they
did not receive a benefit to their property from the extension of the water
lines.m The appellate court noted that the burden is on the property owner
to overcome the rebuttable presumption that its property benefited from the
improvement and the presumption that the district court correctly determined
917. Grosseibl, 739 So. 2d at 1257.
918. Id.
919. 755 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
920. Id. at 733.
921. Id.
922. Id.
923. Id.
924. Pomerance, 755 So. 2d at 733.
925. Id. at 734.
926. Id.
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that the property received a special benefit.9  The court stated that the trial
court's finding was supported by the evidence and that the Pomerances did
not overcome the presumptions.
928
XXII. SUBMERGED LANDS
West Palm Beach v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement
Trust Fund.929 The issue here was whether the Fourth District Court of
Appeal properly concluded that the city's dredging of submerged land did
not constitute a permanent improvement under the Butler Act and, therefore,
title to the submerged lands did not vest in the city.
930
In 1946, the city "obtained a permit to construct a municipal marina on
state sovereignty lands submerged under the intracoastal waterway."931 "The
marina was built between 1947 and 1949, pursuant to the Butler Act and its
predecessor Riparian Rights Act of 1856, which divested the State of... fee
simple title to submerged lands upon which upland owners constructed
certain improvements in the interest of encouraging" the development and
improvement of Florida's waterfront.
932
The Supreme Court of Florida held that dredging submerged lands did
not constitute a permanent improvement and that fee simple ownership of
submerged lands is properly confirmed in the Board of Trustees of the
Internal Improvement Trust Fund.933 The court stated that "divestiture of
sovereign lands under the Butler Act is in derogation of the public trust and
the Butler Act 'must be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign."'934
The reenacted Butler Act of 1921 added the condition that the
submerged land was "actually bulk-headed or filled in or permanently
improved continuously from high water mark in the direction of the
channel. 9 35 Further, the Supreme Court of Florida stated that "permanently
improved" denotes, at the very least, significant structures which are the
927. Id.; see Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now/Acorn v. Fla. City, 444 So. 2d 37,
38-39 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (citing Meyer v. Oakland Park, 219 So. 2d 417 (Fla.
1969)).
928. Pomerance, 755 So. 2d at 734.
929. 746 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 1999).
930. Id. at 1087.
931. Id. at 1086.
932. Id.
933. Id. at 1091-92.
934. Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund., 746 So. 2d at 1089 (citing
Trs. of Internal Improvement Fund v. Claughton, 86 So. 2d 775, 786 (Fla. 1956)).
935. Id.; see Ch. 21-8537, § 1, 1921 Laws of Florida 332, 333.
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functional equivalent of the "wharves... warehouses, dwellings, or other
buildings," which are referred to in the first paragraph of section one of the
Act.936 Finally, the court rejected the case by case basis which the district
court of appeal adopted in State Board of Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Trust Fund v. Key West Conch Harbor, Inc.
937
XXIII. TAXATION
Bullock v. Houston Realty & Investment, Inc.938 The issue here was
whether the trial court properly concluded that certain tax deeds were valid
to Houston regardless of any interest by Bullock.939
Houston filed suit to quiet title on property it had acquired by a
quitclaim deed from PB Horizons, Inc., an entity which had purchased the
property by a tax deed.94° Houston was aware that Bullock might have had
an interest in the property by virtue of certain recorded final judgments.94'
Bullock raised the affirmative defense that prior to the tax deed sale she had
not received proper statutory notice of the sale.942 Notice of the sale should
have been sent to her attorneys whose names and addresses appeared on the
face of the final judgment.943 Bullock also counter-claimed "seeking
cancellation of the tax deed and foreclosure of her final judgment."9W
Further, the court "ordered Bullock to deposit $28,900 with the clerk of the
court within thirty days 'as preliminary costs' required by section 197.602
of the Florida Statutes to invalidate a tax deed.945 Bullock failed to make the
required deposit, and the court entered an Order on Validity of Tax Deeds.946
Further, it deemed Bullock had received notice of the tax sale prior to the
sale and adjudged the tax deed held by Houston to be valid.947
The appellate court held that Bullock had received notice of the tax
sale.94 This was based on section 197.522(l)(a) of the Florida Statutes,
936. Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Tr. Fund, 746 So. 2d at 1090.
937. Id. at 1091-92.
938. 739 So. 2d 1251 (FIa. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
939. Id. at 1252.
940. Id.
941. Id.
942. Id.
943. Bullock, 739 So. 2d at 1252.
944. Id.
945. Id. at 1253.
946. Id.
947. Id.
948. Bullock, 739 So. 2d at 1253.
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stating that if no address is listed in the tax collector's statement then no
notice is required.949 Further, Bullock subsequently received notice by virtue
of the filing of Houston's action to quiet title.950 Finally, though there is
nothing in section 197.602 of the Florida Statutes that expressly imposes a
requirement on a lienor to deposit the tax arrearage with the clerk of the
court, the procedure was not inconsistent with the statute.951
Department of Revenue v. Race.952 The issue here was whether the trial
court properly held that taxes are not due when a husband files a quitclaim
deed of his residence from himself to himself and his wife as tenants by the
entireties where his wife's name was left off the deed by error.
953
In 1991, the Races moved from California and purchased a home in
Maitland, Florida.954 Karen, the wife, was pregnant at the time and it was
anticipated she would not attend the closing.955  Therefore, "the deed,
mortgage and note were prepared solely in David's, the husband's, name.
' '9s6
However, at the last moment Karen attended the closing.957 Her name was
added to the signature page of the mortgage and its balloon rider but left off
the promissory note and deed.958 Therefore, title to the property was not
conveyed to Karen.959 To cure this, David executed a quitclaim deed and
paid the minimum documentary stamp taxes.9 ° The deed recited that the
transfer was "'for and in consideration of the sum of $10.00." '961 Four
months after this the Department of Revenue claimed documentary stamps
were due, based on the value of the mortgage on the residence.
962
The court held that taxes were not due under section 201.02(1) of the
Florida Statutes when a deed merely corrects an error and no new purchaser
or new or additional consideration is involved.963 Further, the court held that
949. Id.
950. Id. at 1254.
951. Id. at 1254-55.
952. 743 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
953. Id. at 169.
954. Id. at 170.
955. Id.
956. Id.
957. Race, 743 So. 2d at 170.
958. Id.
959. Id.
960. Id.
961. Id.
962. Race, 743 So. 2d at 170.
963. Id.; see An. Foam Indus. v. Dep't of Revenue, 345 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1977).
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tax laws are to be construed strongly in favor of taxpayers and against the
government, with all ambiguities resolved in favor of taxpayers. Here,
Karen was already liable on the mortgage together with her husband, and
documentary stamp taxes had already been paid on this encumbrance. 965
Karen's name was left off due to error and there was no new, additional, or
previously nonexistent encumbrances which would have required a new
documentary tax due under section 201.02(1).96 Further, the Department's
Rule 12A-4.014(3) provided that conveyances made to correct a deficiency
in a previous deed are subject only to the minimum tax due.967
Fuchs v. Robbins.968 The issue before this court dealt with whether the
lower court improperly upheld the property appraiser's original assessment
and improperly declared section 192.042 of the Florida Statutes
unconstitutional.969
In 1992, Joel W. Robbins, a Miami Dade County property appraiser,
assessed the property in question. 970 He assessed the land at a value of
$2,277,000 and the building at $3,790,227. 97 The taxpayer appealed the
assessment to the value adjustment board, which reduced the assessment of
the building to a value of $50,000.972 Robbins brought an action in the
circuit court to defend the original assessment.973
At trial, Robbins established that he conformed to the eight factors
provided in section 193.011 of the Florida Statutes and when the taxpayer
argued that the value of the building set by the value adjustment board was
correct pursuant to section 192.042, Robbins alleged that section 192.042
was unconstitutional.974 The general master found that section 192.042 was
unconstitutional because the section improperly creates a class of property
not enumerated in Article VIL section 4 of the Florida Constitution.975 The
taxpayer challenged the order, alleging the property appraiser, as a
964. Race, 743 So. 2d at 171; see Dep't of Revenue v. Ray Constr., 667 So. 2d 859
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
965. Race, 743 So. 2d at 171.
966. Id.
967. Id.
968. 738 So. 2d338 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
969. Id. at 339.
970. Id.
971. Id.
972. Id.
973. Fuchs, 738 So. 2d at 339.
974. Id.
975. Id.
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constitutional officer, does not have standing to challenge the
constitutionality of section 192.042.976
Robbins did have standing because when a statute is brought into issue
by another party, such as it was in the case at hand, an officer may question
the validity of the statute as a defense.m" In Fuchs, the taxpayer introduced
section 192.042.978 Section 192.042 provides that real property be assessed
on January 1 of each year, with the exception that portions not substantially
completed on January 1 shall not have any value.9 79
In 1968 there was an amendment to the Florida Constitution which
required that regulations secure a "just valuation" of all property. 980 This
court found that section 192.042 is constitutional. 98' The statute in the case
at hand treats all property not substantially completed the same, and
therefore, a just valuation is present.982 Therefore, this court reversed the
lower court's decision holding that the property was not substantially
completed and should not have been assessed pursuant to section 192.042.9
Gulf Coast Recycling, Inc. v. Turner.9" The issue here was whether the
trial court erred when it entered a judgment reinstating the property
appraiser's original ad valorem tax assessment that the property had a value
of $1,704,166. 9"
The property at issue here was the Normandy Park apartment
complex. 986 Following receipt of the property appraiser's 1997 assessment
of the property, Gulf Coast filed a petition with the value adjustment board
to have the assessment reviewed.9r Its argument was that the property was
contaminated and that the cost of the cleanup required by the Environmental
Protection Agency exceeded the value of the property. 988 Therefore, no
potential purchaser would buy the property and it was without present cash
value. 989 After an evidentiary hearing, the hearing master found that the
976. Id.
977. Id. at 340; see Dep't of Educ. v. Lewis, 416 So. 2d 455,458 (Fla. 1982).
978. Fuchs, 738 So. 2d at 340.
979. FLA. STAT. § 192.042 (2000).
980. Fuchs, 738 So. 2d at 340.
981. Id.
982. Id.
983. Id. at 341.
984. 753 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
985. Id.
986. Id.
987. Id.
988. Id.
989. Turner, 753 So. 2d at 712.
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property appraiser had failed to consider all of the factors required in section
193.011 of the Florida Statutes when he made his assessment.9  He further
found that Gulf Coast's evidence concerning the cost of the required cleanup
was convincing and reduced the assessed value of the property to a nominal
$100.991 The value adjustment board later adopted these findings. 992 The
property appraiser filed suit under section 194.036 of the Florida Statutes
requesting that the original assessment be reinstated because the property
was currently being used as an apartment complex, and therefore, pursuant
to section 193.011 of the Florida Statutes, its use had not been reduced due
to the contamination. 993 The trial court agreed and reinstated the original
assessment.9
The appellate court held that the trial court erred when it reinstated the
original assessment by the property appraiser.9" The court based its opinion
on the requirement by section 193.011 to consider all the factors listed in
that section when reaching an assessment. 9  The property appraiser failed
to consider the property's present cash value, which is the amount a willing
purchaser would pay a willing seller for the property. 997  Gulf Coast
presented several experts that testified that the property had no present cash
value. 9 The presumption of the correctness of the property appraiser's
assessment is lost when he or she fails to consider all the factors in section
193.011, which occurred here.9
Havill v. Lake Port Properties, Inc. 1°o The question before this court
was whether the trial court properly concluded that the property appraiser's
exclusive reliance on the cost approach was not appropriate and that the
income approach was superior. °°
Lake Port contended that its 1995 ad valorem tax assessment on Lake
Port Square was in excess of "just value" and that the property appraiser
failed to follow the requirements of section 193.011 of the Florida
990. Id.
991. Id.
992. Id. at713.
993. Id.
994. Turner, 753 So. 2d at 713.
995. Id.
996. Id.
997. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 193.011(1), (6) (2000).
998. Turner, 753 So. 2d at 713.
999. Id.
1000. 729 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
1001. Id. at 467.
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Statutes.1' 2 In particular, it contested the correctness of the assessment of
the independent living facility.1003 The property appraiser contended that the
trial court erroneously placed the burden on him to prove the validity of his
assessment, incorrectly placed emphasis on methodology, instead of proof of
correctness of the value, failed to treat the assessment as presumptively
correct, and made its determination on evidence insufficient to overcome
that presumption. '0 4
There are three traditional approaches to value-cost, income, and
market-that will individually, or in any combination, support an
assessment. 1005 The property appraiser decides the weight given to each
approach depending on the type of property being assessed. 'M
In this case, both sides agreed that the market approach was
inappropriate because of the unique nature of the property and lack of
comparable sales. 100 7 Lake Port argued, and the trial court agreed, that the
only valid way to appraise the facility was the income approach. 1 °8 The
property appraiser stated that he considered but rejected the income
approach for several reasons including: 1) a lack of comparable properties;
2) he did not believe he had been given all needed information; 3) the
information supplied was incomplete or incorrect; and 4) the complex and
unorthodox "income stream" of Lake Port Square made it difficult to
accurately assess using the income method.1009 Further, he pointed out that
information supplied did not accurately reflect the integrated nature of the
facility, but attempted to separate income related only to the living center. 0 10
Indeed, Lake Port's expert testified at trial that he had only conducted an1011
appraisal of the living center. Royce said that in his opinion this was a
"special purpose" property, best valued using the cost approach. 0 12 Finally,
1002. Id. at 468-69.
1003. Id. at 469.
1004. Id. at 469-70.
1005. Id.; see Bystrom v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 416 So. 2d 1133, 1144 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
1006. Havill, 729 So. 2d at 470; see Atlantic Int'l Inv. Corp. v. Turner, 383 So. 2d 919,
921 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
1007. Havill, 729 So. 2d at 470.
1008. Id.
1009. Id.
1010. Id. at 471.
1011. Id.
1012. Havill, 729 So. 2d at 471.
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Royce testified the county may make a fifteen percent reduction based on the
"eighth criteria adjustment" but this is done on a case by case basis. 10 13
The appellate court held that it is not for the trial court to determine
which method is superior, as long as the property appraiser's valuation takes
into account the statutory factors.10 1 4 The property appraiser must rely on his
judgment as to the best method and is given "great leeway" as long as he
follows the requirements of the law. 01 5 Finally, the trial court overlooked
the Second District's holding in Daniel v. Canterbury Towers, Inc.10 16 The
court held that the county appraiser was within his authority to use the cost
approach to value a "nursing home" and treat it as a "special purpose"
property.
0 17
Kerr v. Broward County.018 The issue in this appeal was whether a
party claiming entitlement to property as an assignee of a judgment against
the prior owner of the property can be denied his right to participate in a
surplus, which existed after a tax sale was overbid, and where the party's
address was not placed on the assignment of judgment.10 19
A tax sale was conducted on certain real property located in Broward
County, for which there existed a surplus after all tax obligations on the
property were paid.'m The excess funds were placed in the court registry
since both the county and Kerr made claims to the surplus funds1 °21 Kerr,
who claimed entitlement to the funds as the assignee of a judgment against
the prior owner, did not have her address placed on the assignment of
judgment or the assignment of note and mortgage, and therefore, Kerr's
name was not in the tax collector's statement pursuant to section 197.502 of
the Florida Statutes.1° The county replied that Kerr did not qualify as a
person entitled to excess proceeds of a tax sale under sections 197.582(2) or
197.522(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes10 23 The county further asserted that it
1013. Id.
1014. Id.; see Walker v. Trmp, 549 So. 2d 1098, 1103 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
1015. Havill, 729 So. 2d at 471 (citing Walker, 549 So. 2d at 1103).
1016. Id. (citing Daniel v. Canterbury Towers, Inc., 462 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1984)).
1017. Id.
1018. 718 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1019. Id. at 197.
1020. Id.
1021. Id. at 198.
1022. Id.
1023. Kerr, 718 So. 2d at 198.
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had two judgment liens against the prior owner of the property which were
recorded in July and December of 1988.1
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment for declaratory relief
to determine the rights of each party.1°2 The appellate court looked to
sections 197.582, 197.522, and 197.502 of the Florida Statutes and found
that the appellant, who had superior lien rights, should not be denied her
right to participate in the excess funds merely because the instrument that
created her liens did not contain her address.
1°2
Furthermore, this court referenced two cases, Dawson v. Saada0 7 and
DeMario v. Franklin Mortgage & Investment Co.'0 8 In Dawson, the
Supreme Court of Florida emphasized that only "notice reasonably
calculated to apprise landowners of the pending deprivation of their
property" is required. 1 29 The DeMario court held that the clerk of the court
is required to assemble all interested parties when there are excess funds so
that the funds may be distributed according to the legal priorities of the
claims.10 30 Therefore, this court reversed and remanded the grant of
summary judgment with directions for the trial court to determine the
priorities of the parties.1031
Metropolitan Dade County v. Brothers of the Good Shepherd, Inc.1032
The issue presented was whether the assignee of a ninety-nine year lease,
who uses the property for charitable purposes, is entitled to a charitable
exemption from ad valorem taxation under sections 196.012(1), 196.196,
and 196.192(1) of the Florida Statutes.1°33 The appellate court found that,
although the property was used for charitable purposes, the assignee was not
the "equitable owner" of the property, and therefore was not entitled to the
exemption. °34
Northcutt v. Balkany. 3s The issue presented before this court was
whether tax certificates issued for unpaid ad valorem taxes were
1024. Id.
1025. Id.
1026. Id. at 199.
1027. 608 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 1992).
1028. 648 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
1029. Dawson, 608 So. 2d at 808.
1030. DeMario, 648 So. 2d at 213.
1031. Kerr, 718 So. 2d at 199.
1032. 714 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1033. Id.
1034. Id. at 573-74; see Leon County Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Hartsfield, 698 So. 2d
526, 530 (Fla. 1997); Gautier v. Lapof, 91 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 1956).
1035. 727 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
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unenforceable when the owner of the tax certificates, who was involved in a
bankruptcy proceeding for twenty months, failed to apply for a tax deed
within the seven year limit under section 197.482(1) of the Florida
Statutes. °36 The tax collector asserted that the bankruptcy tolled the seven
year period.
10 37
The landowner involved failed to pay ad valorem taxes in 1987 and
1988 and two certificates were issued.1o38 The landowner filed for
bankruptcy in 1991.°9 In 1992, the bankruptcy court ordered the property
involved to be conveyed to the appellee, as trustee. 1w In 1992, the
landowner was discharged from bankruptcy. 1 ' In February of 1997, the
landowner, who was still the holder of the certificates, applied for tax
deeds. 1042 In order to avoid losing the property, the appellee paid for the tax
deeds.1°43 The appellee then filed a complaint against the tax collector for
the expenses incurred in purchasing the tax deeds, attorneys' fees, and court
costs. 104 The appellee alleged that the tax collector's refusal to declare the
tax certificates null and void violated his duty under section 197.482 of the
Florida Statutes.1045  The trial court granted summary judgment to the
appellee.
104
Section 197.482 provides that after seven years, if a tax deed is not
applied for and no other legal proceeding has existed of record, the tax
collector shall cancel the tax certificate. 1047 The tax collector argued that the
bankruptcy was a legal proceeding affecting the property covered by the
certificates. 1m The appellate court agreed."
Until 1973, the limitation time for applying for a tax deed was twenty
years. 10 50 The former statute, section 197.430, provided a twenty year statute
1036. Id. at 383.
1037. Id.
1038. Id.
1039. Id.
1040. Balkany, 727 So. 2d at 383.
1041. Id.
1042. Id.
1043. Id.
1044. Id.
1045. Balkany, 727 So. 2d at 384.
1046. Id.
1047. FLA. STAT. § 197.482(l) (2000).
1048. Balkany, 727 So. 2d at 384.
1049. Id. at 386.
1050. Id. at384.
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of limitations but was very strict. 10 51 When the legislature changed the
twenty year time period to seven years, it also expanded the scope of
exceptional circumstances in which the normal limitation period would not
apply. 10 52 The exceptions included a situation where a legal proceeding "has
existed" affecting the property. 0 53 The appellate court found that since the
legislature used the words "has existed" rather than "is pending" it provided
for a tolling of the seven year limitation for periods where the property was
the subject of a legal proceeding of record. 054 Therefore, since the court
found that the bankruptcy proceeding acted as a stay of any legal actions
regarding the property, and was never lifted, the seven year statute of
limitations in section 197.482 was tolled during the period in which the
property was subject to the bankruptcy's stay.10  The final judgment was
vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's
opinion.'
x56
Sartori v. Department of Revenue.1°57 The issue that was decided by
this court was whether it was correct to dismiss James Sartori's declaratory
judgment action against the Department of Revenue ("DOR") and the
Brevard County Tax Collector as untimely. 105'
Sartori brought suit hoping to obtain an order directing the DOR to
refund ad valorem taxes, which had been paid on pollution control
equipment located on his dairy farm.1° 59 Sartori asserted that he filed the
action within the applicable four year statute of limitations provided in
section 197.182(1)(c) of the Florida Statutes. ' 6 In 1990, Sartori installed
pollution control equipment on his dairy farm and three years later the tax
collector claimed that the equipment was subject to real estate taxes.1061
Sartori disagreed and asserted that he was not obligated to pay the taxes on
the equipment pursuant to section 193.621 of the Florida Statutes because
his equipment was subject to taxation at salvage value rather than its fair
market value. 1 2 However, the tax collector assessed taxes against Sartori's
1051. Id.
1052. Id.
1053. Balkany, 727 So. 2d at 385.
1054. Id.
1055. Id.
1056. Id. at 386.
1057. 714 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1058. Id. at 1137.
1059. Id.
1060. Id. at 1138.
1061. Id. at 1137.
1062. Sartori, 714 So. 2d at 1137.
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property based upon the fair market value."° 3 In June 1993, Sartori was
directed to pay taxes for the years of 1990 through 1993.'064 Sartori first
filed a petition with the county's value adjustment board, which was never
presented. °65 Thereafter, in October 1993 the taxes were certified for
collection.106
In the meantime, pursuant to section 193.621(6) of the Florida Statutes,
the tax collector filed a request with the state Department of Environmental
Regulation ("DER") for a recommendation concerning the equipment and
section 193.621.1°67 Sartori paid the bill and in July 1994 the DER advised
the tax collector that Sartori's argument was correct and that the equipment
was subject to assessment at salvage value.1 6 The tax collector requested
that the DOR refund Sartori, however, the DOR denied the request as
untimely. °69  Therefore, Sartori filed a declaratory judgment action
requesting that DOR be directed to refund the taxes paid ° 7 The trial court
concluded that Sartori's suit was untimely filed pursuant to section 194.171
of the Florida Statutes because the August 1996 suit constituted a "contest
to a tax assessment" and that Sartori only had until December 18, 1993 to
file the lawsuit.1071 Sartori argued that section 194.171 was not applicable
because he was not asserting a "contest to a tax assessment," but rather was
requesting a tax refund since the tax collector had improperly classified his
equipment.1 72 Further, Sartori asserted that under section 197.182 of the
Florida Statutes and rule 12D-8.021 of the Florida Administrative Code, he
had four years to institute a lawsuit for a refund.10 73 This court looked to
both of these authorities and section 95.11(3)(m) of the Florida Statutes,
which provides a four year statute of limitation for actions regarding money
paid to a governmental authority by mistake or inadvertence.
1074
The DOR brought this court's attention to Department of Revenue v.
Goembe. 1°75 In that case, the Fifth District found that Goembel did not
1063. Id.
1064. Id.
1065. Id.
1066. Id.
1067. Sartori, 714 So. 2d at 1137.
1068. Id.
1069. Id.
1070. Id. at 1138.
1071. Id.
1072. Satori, 714 So. 2d at 1138.
1073. Id.
1074. Id. at 1138-39.
1075. 382 So. 2d 783 (Fa. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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discuss the specific issue that was presented in this case and was not
controlling.10 76 Therefore, the appellate court found for Sartori stating that
his claim was not barred by the statute of limitation in section 194.17 1, since
the suit did not challenge the tax collector's valuation of his property. 077 In
the past, courts had distinguished cases involving suits that contest tax
assessments and suits contesting property classifications.1°7s This court
looked at past cases and the legislature's intent to afford favorable tax status
to owners of pollution control equipment.1 79 This intent is seen in section
403.021 of the Florida Statutes.)°s Further, both section 193.621 and
section 193.441 of the Florida Statutes explain that pollution control
equipment is classified as a special class of property.108
The appellate court also answered the DOR's argument that the refund
sought was based upon the retroactive application of a tax exemption and
that such request falls within the limitation of time in section 194.171 of the
Florida Statutes.118 However, the court stated that the tax status accorded to
pollution control equipment is not by a tax exemption, but rather a favorable
tax status because of the equipment's classification. 1" Therefore, the
appellate court reversed and remanded the case in favor of Sartori.'
084
Schultz v. Love PGI Partners.'08 The issue before the Supreme Court
of Florida was whether the Fifth District Court of Appeal decision, which
conflicted with Robbins v. Yussem,1°s6 was correct that zoned use of land is
not determinative of actual, good faith agricultural use of land for ad
valorem tax assessment purposes.
108 7
The Fifth District Court of Appeal held that when determining the
actual, good faith use of the land for tax purposes, the zoned use is but one
factor that an assessor or reviewing court may consider along with other
factors specified in section 193.461(3)(b) of the Florida Statutes, and that
1076. Sarior, 714 So. 2d at 1139.
1077. Id.
1078. See Dep't of Revenue v. Gerald Sohn, P.A., 654 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1995); see also Dep't of Revenue v. Stafford, 646 So. 2d 803, 804 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1994).
1079. Sartori, 714 So. 2d at 1139.
1080. Id. at 1140.
1081. Id. at 1140-41.
1082. Id. at 1141.
1083. Id.
1084. Sartori, 714 So. 2d at 1141.
1085. 731 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 1999).
1086. 559 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
1087. Shultz, 731 So. 2d at 1271.
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zoning alone is not determinative as a matter of law. °"" The Fifth District
reasoned that the assessment must be based on an evaluation of the various
factors as provided in section 193.461(3)(b), which include: 1) the duration
and continuity of the use; 2) the purchase price and size of the land;
3) whether the land is cared for in a matter to support the alleged use;
4) whether there is a lease, and, if so, its terms; and 5) "such other factors"
as may be apparent. 1089 Since the zoned use of land was not included as a
specific factor by the legislature, it enters the analysis in the catch-all
category contained in section 193.461(3)(b)7.' 90 The Fifth District stressed
that the key is the actual physical activity being conducted on the land and a
determination based exclusively on -zoned use as a matter of law would
violate the broad examination required by the statute.
1091
The Supreme Court of Florida held that the Fifth District Court of
Appeal's reasoning was sound and consistent with Greenwood v. Oates.1m
Therefore, it approved the Fifth District's decision below and disapproved
Robbins to the extent it was inconsistent with its opinion.
1093
Sebring Airport Authority v. McIntyre.1'9 This case addressed the
constitutionality of section 196.012(6) of the Florida Statutes.10 95 The
raceway applied for an ad valorem tax exemption under section 196.199 of
the Florida Statutes and was denied. 109 The trial court granted summary
judgment to the0roperty appraiser and the DOR under a declaratory
judgment action.
The property was owned by the City of Sebring and leased to the
raceway.1098 It was used as a racetrack with permanent seating and annual
races.10" Section 196.012(6) of the Florida Statutes provides that the use of
property as a sports facility with permanent seating by a lessee is deemed a
use that serves a governmental, municipal, or public purpose when it is open
to the general public.11 °
1088. Id.
1089. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 193.461(3)(b) (2000).
1090. Shultz, 731 So. 2d at 1271.
1091. Id.
1092. 251 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1971).
1093. Shultz, 731 So. 2d at 1272.
1094. 718 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1095. Id. at 297.
1096. Id.
1097. Id.
1098. Id.
1099. McIntyre, 718 So. 2d at 297.
1100. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 196.012(6) (2000).
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The raceway fell within this provision, but the question before this
court was whether the legislature can by statutory enactment change the
meaning of the terms in Article VII, section 3(a) of the Florida
Constitution. 10' The state constitution permits the legislature to provide
exemptions by general law in certain situations, however, there is nothing in
Article VII, section 3 that allows the legislature to make such an exemption
as it did in this case. 11°2 Other than what is provided in the Florida
Constitution, the legislature cannot enact general laws that permit
exemptions from ad valorem taxation. 1°3 The Supreme Court of Florida in
Franks v. Davis"°4 stated that the state's constitution is a limitation on the
power of the legislature 105 The specifications of permissible exemptions in
the constitution excludes other exemptions.' 105 The legislature cannot alter
the tax exemption provisions of the constitution. 1 07
The Florida Constitution in Article VII, section 3 clearly establishes
that exemptions are permissible for municipal property owned and used by
the municipality. In the present case, the property was owned by the
municipality but not used by the municipality and therefore should not have
been entitled to an exemption.11 9 Therefore, the appellate court held that the
statute was unconstitutional, since the legislature cannot by statutory
enactment change or alter the meaning of a provision in the state
constitution, as it did in McIntyre.i 10
Turner v. Tokai Financial Services, Inc.1111 The issue here was whether
the property appraiser was required to make a deduction for the cost of sales
when determining the fair market value.11
2
In this case, Turner and Fuchs were sued by Tokai. l  Turner and
Fuchs assessed the value of some 500 pieces of office equipment.! 114 Tokai
1101. Mclntyre, 718 So. 2d at 297.
1102. Id. at 298.
1103. Id.
1104. 145 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1962).
1105. McIntyre, 718 So. 2d at 298.
1106. Id.; see Hillsborough County Aviation Auth. v. Walden, 210 So. 2d 193 (Fla.
1968).
1107. McIntyre, 718 So. 2d at 298.
1108. Id. at 299.
1109. Id. at 299-300.
1110. Id. at 300.
1111. 767 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
1112. Id. at 497.
1113. Id. at 496.
1114. Id.
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disagreed with the value Turner and Fuchs appraised the equipment and
based its claim under section 193.011(8) of the Florida Statutes, which
identifies the net proceeds of the sale of property as one factor to be
considered when determining just valuation or market value.1115
The appellate court found that from the title of the section itself that the
property appraiser need only consider the factors but does not have to apply
them. Further, the method used for valuation and the weight given to the
individual factors is left to the discretion of the tax appraiser." 7 Therefore,
the appellate court reversed the portion of the trial court's opinion that
required a twenty percent reduction from the fair market value of Tokai's
equipment.118
XXV. TIMESHARES
New legislation impacts timeshares in various ways. There is no longer
a prior review by the Department of Business Regulation of timeshare
advertising1119 Liability of concurrent or successor timeshare developers is
reduced.1 Additionally, timeshare disclosures are now simplified.
112P
XXV. TITLE INSURANCE
Department of Insurance v. Keys Title & Abstract Co." z2 The issue
here was whether the trial court properly held that section 627.782(8) of the
Florida Statutes is unconstitutional on its face, because it imposes a burden
on nonlawyer title insurance agents that is not also imposed on lawyers who
sell title insurance. 123
Title insurance can be sold in Florida either by a title insurance agent
who is licensed by the Department of Insurance or by a lawyer who is in
good standing with the Florida Bar."7 Title insurance rates are regulated by
1115. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 193.011(8) (1997)).
1116. Turner, 767 So. 2d at 497.
1117. Id. (citing Valencia Ctr., Inc. v. Bystrom, 543 So. 2d 214,216 (Fla. 1989)).
1118. Id. at500.
1119. Ch. 2000-302, § 17, 2000 Fla. Laws 3031, 3085-3086 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 721.11 (2000)).
1120. Id. § 9,2000 Fla. Laws at 3049 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 721.05 (2000)).
1121. See id. § 6, 2000 Fla. Laws at 3039-41 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 719.503
(2000)).
1122. 741 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
1123. Id. at 600.
1124. Id. at 600-01.
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the Department of Insurance under chapter 627 of the Florida Statutes."25
Section 627.782(8) authorizes the department to promulgate a rule requiring
its licensees to provide relevant information for use in setting rates.11 Based
on this authority, the department adopted Rule 4-186.013 of the Florida
Administrative Code, which requires all licensees under chapter 626 to
provide statistical data for use in setting rates.1127  However, section
626.8417(4)(a) of the Florida Statutes provides that lawyers who are in good
standing are exempt from licensure requirements under chapter 626.1
Therefore, since lawyers are not "licensees" of the department, they are not
subject to the department's reporting requirements authorized by section
627.782(8) and required by Rule 4-186.013.129 Keys challenged the statute
arguing that it violated the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the
law." 3° Keys maintained the statute made an arbitrary distinction between
lawyers and nonlawyers who sell title insurance. The trial court declared
the statute unconstitutional as a violation of the right to equal protection of
the law."
132
The appellate court held that the statute was constitutional because it
serves a legitimate governmental purpose and the legislature had valid
reasons to exclude lawyers from the reporting requirement.1 33 First, an
equal protection challenge to a statute that does not involve a fundamental
right or a suspect classification is evaluated by the rational basis test.1 4 A
proper application of the test requires consideration of two distinct issues,
whether the statute serves a legitimate governmental purpose and whether it
was reasonable for the legislators to believe that the challenged classification
would promote the purpose." 35 There is no doubt that the first requirement
is met in that the statute serves a legitimate purpose in enabling the
1125. Id. at 601; see FLA. STAT. § 627.782 (2000).
1126. Keys Title & Abstract Co., 741 So. 2d at 601; see FLA. STAT § 627.782(8)
(2000).
1127. Keys Title & Abstract Co., 741 So. 2d at 601.
1128. Id.
1129. Id.
1130. Id.
1131. Id.
1132. Keys Title & Abstract Co., 741 So. 2d at 601.
1133. Id. at 602.
1134. Id.; see Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981); Idaho Dep't of Employment v.
Smith, 434 U.S. 100 (1977); State v. Bales, 343 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1977).
1135. Keys Title & Abstract Co., 741 So. 2d at 602; see W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981); see also Minn. v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449
U.S. 456 (1981).
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Department of Insurance to make informed decisions regarding the premium
1136
rates for title insurance. Second, the legislature had valid reasons to
exclude lawyers from the reporting requirement1 37 Some of these reasons
include: 1) that the inclusion of lawyers would make the reporting
requirement more difficult because it is difficult to identify those Bar
members who sell title insurance; 2) that the information provided by the
lawyers would not be as accurate because many lawyers who sell title
insurance do it as part of a broader legal practice; and 3) the expense
information rovided may not be limited to that involved in selling title
insurance."113
XXVI. TRUTH IN LENDING
Essex Home Mortgage Servicing Corp. v. Fritz.1139 The issue here was
whether the trial court properly awarded damages to the Fritzes for each
interest rate change that occurred during the term of the loan.1'
4
This case involved an original variable rate loan from Essex's
predecessor in interest, Financial Securit Savings and Loan Association, for
the purchase of the Fritzes' residence." 1 The Fritzes were provided with a
truth in lending disclosure statement for variable rate mortgages which
advised them that interest rates may increase when the index increased.1142
In actuality, the interest rates could also increase in the second year even if
the index decreased because of the effect of the interest rate discount
applicable to only the first year."143 The Fritzes defaulted on the loan and
Essex sued for foreclosure with the Fritzes countersuing for damages under
the Truth in Lending Act ('TILA") for statutory damages! 1 4 The trial court
entered a final judgment in foreclosure against the Fritzes, but awarded a set
off in the amount of $22,000, finding that the original lender had "'misstated
the effect of the index on the APR of the variable rate loan,' and that '[e]ach
successive change in the interest rate resulted in a new transaction and an
additional violation."'
114 5
1136. Keys Title & Abstract Co., 741 So. 2d at 602.
1137. Id.
1138. Id. at603.
1139. 740 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1999).
1140. Id. at 1225.
1141. Id.
1142. Id.
1143. Id.
1144. Fritz, 740 So. 2d at 1225.
1145. Id.
20001
205
: Nova Law Review 35, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2000
Nova Law Review
The appellate court held that the trial court erred in awarding statutory
damages for each interest rate change that occurred during the term of the
loan. 14 It based this on the fact that the TILA states at Title 15 of the
United States Code section 1640(a)(2) that if a lender fails to comply with
the requirements of TILA, the lender is liable to the borrower for statutory
damages equal to twice the amount financed, but not less than $200 and not
more than $2000.1147 Further, section 1640(g) limits statutory damages in
cases of multiple failures to disclose to a single recovery unless the lender
continues to fail to disclose after recovery has been granted. This case
did not involve post-recovery disclosure violations. 1149 Further, there were
no subsequent rate changes that constituted new transactions.' ° "[Aifter
the first rate change, the statement that 'the interest rate may increase if the
index increased' would be correct because the previous year's interest rate
would no longer be a discounted rate."1' 51 Further, increases in interest rates
are not considered new transactions when a creditor, as was done in this
case, gives prior disclosure that rates are subject to change.' 52 Therefore,
the Fritzes' total recovery was limited to $2000.1153
XXVII. UTILITY FRANCHISES
Central Waterworks, Inc. v. Town of Century.154 The issue here was
who has the right to provide water to the Department of Juvenile Justice
("DJJ") when one party has an exclusive franchise agreement and the other
has been given the right to purchase its water from others."55 In this case,
Central Waterworks was granted an exclusive franchise in 1966 to provide
water within a certain geographic location." 56 In 1996, the town leased land
for the DJJ which provided that it could purchase water from the town." 57
1146. Id.
1147. Id.
1148. Id.; see Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(a)(2) (West 1995 & Supp.
2000).
1149. Fritz, 740 So. 2d at 1225.
1150. Id.
1151. Id. at 1226.
1152. Id.; see Key Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. Dean, 695 So. 2d 808, 810 (Fia. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1997).
1153. Fritz, 740 So. 2d at 1227.
1154. 754 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
1155. Id. at 816.
1156. Id.
1157. Id.
[Vol. 25:115
206
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss1/1
Brown! Grohman
The court began by restating that a franchise constitutes a private
property right."58 If the franchisee has the ability to meet its obligations and
provide the service proscribed, the franchisee's right can only be alienated
by consent, unless full compensation is paid.1159 The first thing the court
looked at was the element of consent by Central." 60 The appellate court
found that the trial court did not base its determination on this issue on
competent, substantial evidence, and therefore, was incorrect in its decision
for the town.
1161
The appellate court further found that the trial court erred when it ruled
in regards to sections 958.41(14), (16), and (19) of the Florida Statutes."62
The trial court interpreted the statute so that it authorized the DJJ to contract
with whomever it chooses and to ignore Central's franchise rights. 1163 The
appellate court stated this was a misinterpretation of the statute and that it
merely provided that the siting of juvenile facilities was to be given priority
by other affected governmental agencies and that such provisions did not
authorize the abrogation of Central's vested franchise rights in the manner
determined by the trial court.116
Finally, the apellate court determined that the trial court erred in its
application of law. 65 The appellate court, following City of Mount Dora v.
JJ's Mobile Homes, Inc.,"' stated:
When each of two public service entities, whether governmental or
private, has a legal basis for the claim of a right to provide similar
services in the same territory, and each has the present ability to do
so promptly and efficiently, the entity with the earlier acquired
legal right has the exclusive legal right to provide service in that
territory without interference from the entity with the later acquired
right.1
1 67
Therefore, the appellate court reversed and remanded the case.
11 68
1158. Id.
1159. Cent. Waterworks, Inc., 754 So. 2d at 816.
1160. Id.
1161. Id. at 816-17.
1162. Id. at 817.
1163. Id.
1164. Cent. Waterworks, Inc., 754 So. 2d at 817.
1165. Id.
1166. 579 So. 2d 219, 223-24 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
1167. Cent. Waterworks, Inc., 754 So. 2d at 817.
1168. Id.
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XXVIII. CONCLUSION
The foregoing survey presents selected cases and legislation of
significance to real estate professionals. Florida real estate law is not static,
and there seems to be no consistent pattern to its development. The Florida
courts and the legislature are actively involved in its continuing evolution.
We hope that this survey proves interesting and useful to professionals who
may ponder what will happen next.
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L INTRODUCTION
Public sector employment law overlaps and diverges from the law
governing private employment. Several federal laws governing private
employment, such as collective bargaining, occupational health and safety,
and employee benefits and pensions do not apply to public employees. For
this reason, the State of Florida has enacted laws that govern only public
employees in these areas. At the same time, public employees may bring
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claims under the federal and state constitutions that are unavailable to
private sector employees. As for overlap, a wide array of federal and state
statutes govern both private and public employment in the areas of civil
rights, wages and hours, and family medical leave.
This article explores the several stages of public employment,
beginning with the law governing the hiring of employees. Part I outlines
the law governing civil service examinations. Related issues include
whether public employers are prohibited from hiring relatives and whether
cities and counties may face liability if they fail to check the criminal
background of applicants for employment. Finally, this section discusses
some local governments that require certain public employees to live in the
same county in which they work.
Part I explores the law governing public officials who are often held to
higher standards than rank and file public employees. For example, state and
local ethics commissioners regulate the behavior of public officials who
break the law in a variety of ways: from flawed financial disclosures;
violations of campaign finance laws; lobbying by former public officials;
conflicts of interest; and unfair campaign tactics. This section also examines
the new state task force aimed at policing public corruption. Wrongdoing on
the part of public officials is broken down by job title, judges, city and
county officials, police officials, government inspectors, legislators, and
others.
Part Ill examines the law governing the terms of public employment.
For example, this section discusses the efforts that are underway to remedy
the wage gap between men and women. Under the Equal Pay Act men and
women must receive equal pay for equal work, however gender gap has yet
to be bridged. Some courts have even questioned Congress' authority to
extend the Equal Pay Act to the states, a question the United States Supreme
Court may soon be called upon to sort out. This section also examines issues
raised under federal, state, and local prevailing wages law. In addition, Part
III looks at efforts to regulate the way public employees dress. A wide array
of employee benefits is examined including: jury duty release; domestic
partnership benefits; family medical leave rights, health benefits; public
pension issues; and unemployment compensation benefits. Employee
privacy is also addressed in this section, including issues of drug testing,
financial disclosures, and prying into the private lives of public employees.
Part IV surveys the wide range of legal issues surrounding the
disciplining and discharging of public employees. While it is harder to
dismiss an employee for off-duty misconduct than for on-the-job
wrongdoing, both categories are addressed. Public employers are advised to
take care in the disciplining of whistleblowers who report public wrongdoing
to ensure that any punishment meted out is not in retaliation for expressing
views protected, for example, by the First Amendment. This section also
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canvasses federal, state, and local anti-discrimination laws that protect
public employees from being singled out on the basis of race, gender,
religion, age, or disability. Part IV additionally discusses what remains of
affirmative action in public employment. Finally, this section ends with a
review of the array of remedies available for wrongful discipline or
dismissal, including money damages, attorneys' fees, and reinstatement.
Part V looks at the law governing collective bargaining in the public
sector. This section sums up the largest pudblic employee union vote taken in
South Florida in over a decade at four public hospitals after a bitter
campaign. In addition, Part V offers statistical data on public sector unions
and ends with a brief discussion of labor disputes involving public school
teachers and police officers after negotiations over terms of a labor contract
reached an impasse.
II. HIRING
A. Housing for Public Employees
The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
("HUD") launched a program aimed at selling HUD-owned homes to police
at half-price.' The initiative was expanded to public and private school
teachers.2  Two Miami-Dade school teachers have already purchased
foreclosed homes at half-price. Under the federal program, known as the
"Teacher Next Door" project,4 the half-price offer is only open to those
teachers willing to buy in "revitalization areas," meaning low to middle
income neighborhoods.5 Under the program, "[iteachers must live in the
county in which they work.",
6
The Hollywood City Commission is contemplating a similar program,
'known as the "Officer Next Door," that taps drug forfeiture money to pay
police officers to live in neighborhoods singled out for redevelopment.
Under the program, officers would live rent-free in four neighborhoods. For
1. Andrea Robinson, Teachers Get Homes Under HUD Program, MIAMI HERA
(Broward), June 7, 2000, at 10B.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Frank Davies & Susan Ferrechio, Half-price Homes Offered to Teachers, MiAwM
HnnAun (Broward), Mar. 14,2000, at lB.
6. Id.
7. Erika Bolstad, Hollywood Plan Gives Some Cops Free Rent, MIAMI LD
(Broward), May 3, 2000, at lB.
8. Id.
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their part, officers must sign three-year leases and agree to pay utility bills
and maintain the premises.
By contrast, four correctional officers suspected of beating an inmate to
death are under investigation.' 0 As a result, the officers are being evicted
from state-owned housing." Accordingly, "[b]ecause they are not able to
come into work, there's no more reason for [the Department of Corrections]
to keep them in state housing."'
12
The Monroe County Sheriff's Office is losing personnel primarily due
to the shortage of affordable housing.13  Since the turnover rate among
deputy sheriffs has doubled over the past few years, short staffing has led to
mandatory overtime and twelve-hour shifts over extended periods.' 4  A
deputy who pays $1200 a month for a two-bedroom apartment pays more
than half of his $2250 monthly salary in rent. 15
B. Nepotism and Cronyism in Hiring
Hiring people to fill positions solely by reason of their blood or marital
relationship has become an increasing problem in Florida. For example, the
Miami-Dade County School District has been accused of hiring unqualified
relatives to fill open slots in a program aimed at helping welfare recipients
move into the work-force.16 Although Florida's public school districts are
not covered by anti-nepotism laws, the county will seek corrective action if
the allegations turn out to be true. 17 In response, top school administrators
insisted their relatives received no special treatment. Similarly, the Florida
Commission on Ethics found probable cause to believe that a Miami-Dade
Fire Rescue official may have violated the state's anti-nepotism law and
9. Id.
10. Steve Bousquet, State Evicts Prison Guards Probed in Death, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Sept. 23, 1999, at 12B.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Nancy Klingenier, Deputies Hit Hard by Costs of Living, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Aug. 22, 1999, at 6B.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Jack Wheat & Analisa Nazareno, Dade Officials Investigate Possible School
District Nepotism, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Feb. 8, 2000, at 8B.
17. Id.
18. Tom Duboeq, Dade Schools Executives Defend Hiring of Relatives, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Feb. 9, 2000, at 12B.
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abused his office by aiding his brother.19 If the charges are sustained, the top
official could face dismissal or a $10,000 fine.2°
Some Broward judges have come under criticism for selecting public
defenders from the ranks of relatives and friends.21 Judges are left with total
discretion in selecting public defenders when the public defender's office is
unable to represent a defendant owing to a conflict.2 Such specially
appointed public defenders receive $700 for every felony case, no matter
how much time is invested.Y
C. Hiring Restrictions and Hiring Strategies
Although it has been seven years since Florida voters imposed term
limits on state lawmakers, it was not until September 1999, that the Supreme
Court of Florida sustained the cap.2 The per curiam ruling turned back a
challenge from long-term state senators who claimed that voters were
targeting members of Congress, not state legislators.2 About half the state
house and a quarter of state senators will be affected by the term limits
amendment to the Florida Constitution in 2000.2 After eight years, state
lawmakers face mandatory retirement.2 7 By contrast, the United States
Supreme Court concluded in 1995 that efforts to set term limits for members
of Congress were unconstitutional.
An affirmative action officer was dismissed after writing critical
accounts of Fort Lauderdale's poor record on hiring minority and female
employees. 29 Shortly after being fired, the officer sought another job with
19. Don Finefrock, Nepotism Charges Reviewed, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), June 11,
2000, at 3B.
20. Id.
21. Larry Lebowitz & Sabrina L. Miller, Friends of the Court, MLAMI HERALD
(Broward), Jan. 23, 2000, at IA.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Ray v. Mortham, 742 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 1999).
25. Id. at 1278.
26. Lesley Clark, Florida Term Limits Upheld, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Sept. 3,
1999, at lA.
27. Id.
28. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (holding that a term
limit amendment to the Arkansas Constitution was unconstitutional).
29. Brad Bennett, Fired Official Wants New Post, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), May 8,
2000, at lB.
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the city.30 Fort Lauderdale, however, has a rule that prohibits rehiring
employees the city has previously terminated.3'
The tight job market has left the Broward Sheriff's Office ("BSO") with
100 open positions.32 In an effort to quickly fill the vacant positions, the
BSO held a job fair.33 The BSO, however, required applicants to be United
States citizens, over age nineteen, have a high school diploma or equivalent,
and have no felony or misdemeanor convictions involving certain crimes.
34
D. Civil Service Examinations
Police officers complained to the Miramar Civil Service Board after the
first half of a two-part sergeant's exam was rescored.35 With only seventy-
five questions, the regraded exam enabled sixteen police officers, who had
36initially failed, to qualify for the second round of testing. Some of the
questions on the exam were eliminated after test takers grumbled that they
covered subject matter not found in the study guides.37
E. Background Checks
Eighty-five percent of all employers undertake no background
investigation of job applicants.38 For example, an investigation by the BSO
revealed that Broward County's district hiring chief failed to disclose a
twenty-year-old shoplifting arrest.39 As a result, the BSO has recommended
that the school district revamp the way it investigates backgrounds of
potential employees.40 Similarly, the St. Petersburg Times ran a background
check on 511 state correctional officers and learned that eighty-nine had
arrest records for such crimes as shoplifting, marijuana possession, and
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Johnny Diaz, Sheriffs Office Hosts Job Fair to Help Fill Deputy Openings,
MiAMI HERALD (Broward), Aug. 25, 1999, at liB.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Juan Carlos Rodriguez, Rescored Tests Create Flap for Miramar Police, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), May 27, 2000, at lB.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Bea Garcia, Background? Check it Out, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Oct. 12,
1999, at IC.
39. Elena Cabral, Review: Hiring Process Flawed, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Nov.
2, 1999, at lB.
40. Id.
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hunting out of season.41 In a similar situation, eleven guards, including two
repeat offenders, were arrested for violent crimes.42 However, state law
governing guards only rules out hiring applicants convicted of a felony or
first-degree pejury.43 Additionally, the BSO background check on its new
police chief cleared the new head of the police department of rumors that she
fired her gun in a domestic dispute ten years earlier when she was a major
with the Miami Police Department.
44
F. Negligent Hiring
Failure by a public employer to undertake a reasonable background
check on prospective employees may leave it open to the charge of negligent
hiring, a fairly recent tort claim.45 Worse, the employer who knows it is
hiring an individual with a record of sexual harassment, for example, may
wind up liable for damages along with the harasser who strikes again.4
G. Residency
Some cities and counties require that certain public employees and
public officials reside in the city or county in which they work. For
example, Hialeah has a one year residency requirement for candidates
running for city council. 47 In October 1999, Hialeah's mayor claimed that a
candidate who was challenging the mayor's ally on the council violated the
city's residency rule.48 In response, the candidate criticized the mayor for
41. The Associated Press, Report Says One in Six Guards at Florida State Prison has
Record, MIAMIHERAMD (Broward), Aug. 30, 1999, at 8B.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. David D'Addio, Miramar Employees to See Increase in Insurance Payments,
MIAMI HERAM (Broward), Aug. 19, 1999, at 3B.
45. See, e.g., Tallahassee Furniture Co. v. Harrison, 583 So. 2d 744,751-52 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
46. See, e.g., Ajowa Nzinga Ifateyo, Receptionist Wins Sex-Assault Suit, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Apr. 5, 2000, at 10B. (reporting case in which Miami federal jury held
Opa-locka liable in the negligent hiring of a former city manager who sexually harassed and
assaulted a city receptionist and awarded a two million dollar judgment against both the
harasser and the city).
47. Karen Branch, Hialeah Mayor Uses Police Files to Challenge Candidate, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Oct. 8, 1999, at 9B.
48. Id.
20001
217
: Nova Law Review 35, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2000
Nova Law Review
asking the police to investigate the candidate's background. 49 The candidate
claimed that police surveillance of his private life was improper.5
In order to sit on Miramar's commission board, which oversees hiring
practices for city employees, the candidate generally must be a resident of
the city.5 1 State law requires Miami-Dade School Board candidates to live in
52the voter district on the date they file to run for the board. Questions
cropped up in one case examining whether a candidate for the District Seven
School Board seat lived in District Six or in District Seven.
5 3
H. Workforce Development Bill
Privatization may be Governor Jeb Bush's key legacy as governor.
Under his administration, efforts are underway aimed at privatizing public
pensions, state prisons and county jails,54 work-release facilities, state
hospitals,56 and public schools. Most recently, a bill before the 2000
Legislature was aimed at transferring many of the Department of Labor's
job-creation duties to a public-private entity known as Workforce Florida
Inc., a corporation with a board of directors. Democrats and labor unions
opposed the measure after a House Appropriations Subcommittee approved
the bill, claiming that the bill removes some of organized labor's guaranteed
seats on boards that regulate job-training programs.
I. Selection of Trial Judges: November 2000 Ballot Measure
The Legislature debated, but ultimately failed to enact, a bill aimed at
giving Governor Jeb Bush more power and clout on the commissions that
submit nominations to the governor for all appellate judges and for midterm
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See D'Addio, supra note 44.
52. Analisa Nazareno, Residency Again Issue in Race, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), July
25, 2000, at 7B.
53. Id.
54. Editorial, Open Door to Jail, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Aug. 11, 1999, at 10A.
55. Jacqueline Charles & Sue Corbett, Providing Sex Can Bring Favors at Work-
Release Facility, Inmate Says, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Aug. 17, 1999, at 4A.
56. See Shari Rudavsky, State Hospital's Privatization Goes Smoothly-So Far,
MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Aug. 17, 1999, at4A.
57. Editorial, House Amends Workforce Florida Bill, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), May
5, 2000, at 9B.
58. Robert Sanchez, House Bill Criticized as Hostile to Unions, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Apr. 27, 2000, at 10B; see also CS/SB 2050, 2000 Leg. (Fla. 2000).
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vacancies on trial courts.5 9  A Miami Herald editorial criticized these
measures as eroding the independence of the judiciary. 60 Moreover,
Floridians voted on November 7, 2000 to keep the current system of electing
trial judges rather than handing that power over to the government.6'
II. REGULATION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS
A. Ethics
The Florida Commission on Ethics is "the state board that recommends
punishment for public officials who violate ethics laws." 62 Formed in 1974,
the commission reviews complaints filed by individual citizens against
public officials. 63 The governor appoints its members.
64
In May 2000, the Florida House of Representatives defeated a package
of reforms that had been approved by the Senate, aimed at strengthening the
state's ethics, campaign finance, and anti-corruption laws.
65
Recommendations by the Study Commission on Public Corruption included
stiffer financial disclosure laws and longer criminal sanctions for public
corruption.66  The proposal also contains an exemption to the state's
Sunshine Laws aimed at preserving the confidentiality of whistleblowers.67
An editorial in the Miami Herald labeled the House's inaction as "an outrage
and insult to voters and taxpayers. 68
The Florida Commission on Ethics has faced a number of issues this
past year. In March 2000, the commission issued a special waiver for five
former state lawmakers holding top posts in the governor's administration
enabling them to lobby their former colleagues during the 2000 session.63
The waiver undercuts the Sunshine Amendment aimed at stopping influence
59. See H.R. 1035,2000 Leg. (Fla. 2000); S. 826,2000 Leg. (Fla. 2000).
60. Editorial, Stacking, Packing the Bench: Leave the Nominating Process Alone,
MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Apr. 3, 2000, at 12B.
61. Jay Weaver, County Voters Reject Bid to Allow Governor to Appoint Tial
Judges, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Nov. 8, 2000, at 14B.
62. Steve Bousquet, Broward Clergymen Named to State Ethics Commission, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Aug. 21, 1999, at 3B.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Editorial, How About Zero Tolerance for Public Corruption?, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), May 9, 2000, at 10B.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Lobbyist Rules Eased for Ex-legislators, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Mar. 17,
2000, at 9B.
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peddling by barring lawmakers from lobbying for two years after leaving
office.
7
In another ethics violation case, the commission levied its largest fine in
twenty-five years, $20,000, against a college professor who hid his financial
interest in a privately operated state prison system he openyy promoted while
a professor of criminology at the University of Florida. In spite of the
violation, the professor received a $3 million consulting fee for brokering a
merger concerning the Corrections Corporation of America. The professor
was hired by the state to serve as a consultant on a study to privatize the state
prison system.
73
Florida's Commission on Ethics also found probable cause to fine
public employees in other situations. One example concerned a Pembroke
Pines mayor who had a conflict of interest when he took part in a vote to
modify an agreement for advertising involving a man with whom the mayor
had a consulting arrangement.74 Another example was a Miami-Dade Fire
Rescue official who may have violated the state's anti-nepotism law.75 The
commission also found that a Miami state representative had failed to report
"a $22,000 debt for unpaid child support during an election campaign"--a
special legislative committee was convened to determine his fate. On the
other hand, the commission found no probable cause when Davie's vice
mayor had a conflict of interest arising from his association with a law firn
which represented a firefighters' union." Despite the commission's efforts
to fine public employees for ethical violations, the court has imposed a
standard of clear and convincing evidence that must be met before any
penalty can be imposed.
78
The Florida Commission on Ethics exonerated public officials in many
cases. For example, Miramar's mayor was cleared of claims that she secured
a discount on her new residence as quid pro quo for favorable votes for a
70. Id.
71. Steve Bousquet, Ex-professor Gets Largest Ethics Fine, MIAMi HmAtD
(Broward), Oct. 22, 1999, at 9B.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Ethics Panel Frowns on Pines Mayor's Vote, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Sept. 9,
1999, at 6B.
75. Finefrock, supra note 19, at 3B.
76. Lesley Clark, Panel to Decide Penalty for Barreiro's Ethics Breach, MIi
HERALD (Broward), Jan. 28, 2000, at 8B.
77. Adam Ramirez, Charges Against Davie Official Dropped, M[AMI HERAi
(Broward), June 7, 2000, at 3B.
78. Latham v. Fla. Comm'n on Ethics, 694 So. 2d 83, 84 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1997); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 112.313-.316 (2000).
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developer.79 Also, a Sunrise city commissioner was cleared of allegations
that she omitted to report a free gym membership. 80 Miramar's city
commissioner, another exonerated public official, was cleared of charges
that he lobbied commissioners while receiving money from developers.81
Not every conflict of interest involving public officials, however, is
unethical. For example, in one case a state representative from Dania Beach
doubled as the city's code enforcement attorney. 8 The conflict arose over
code enforcement of a local convenience store owned by the state
representative's uncle by marriage.83 Even so, the state ethics commission
did not find a conflict of interest violation.8
4
In January 2000, Broward county commissioners enacted an ordinance
urging candidates for elected office to voluntarily agree not to make race
religion, gender, national origin, or sexual orientation a campaign issue8s
Further, those runninpg for public office pledged not to publish anonymous
campaign literature.8"- Violators of the ordinance will face censure by the
Fair Campaign Practices Committee ("FCPC").8 7  Elected officials are
prohibited from serving as members of the committee.88 Although fines and
removal of candidates from ballots have been ruled out as remedies, the
FCPC may still alert the media of unfair campaign tactics.89 Regulating
campaign rhetoric walks a fine line between maintaining fair elections and
interfering with the First Amendment rights of candidates for public office.90
79. Caroline J. Keough, Moseley Cleared of Ethics Complaint, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Dec. 3, 1999, at lB.
80. Lisa Arthur, Ethics Panel Clears Sunrise Commissioner, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), June 8, 2000, at lB.
81. Juan Carlos Rodriguez, Panel Clears Lewis of Ethics Complaints, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Mar. 16,2000, at lB.
82. Steve Harrison, Dania Official Cries Uncle, Says Lawyer has Conflict of Interest,
MIAIHERALD (Broward), Aug. 19, 1999, at lB.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Jacqueline Charles, Campaign Ethics Pledges Approved, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Jan. 26, 2000, at lB. Judicial elections are already governed by Canon 7 of the
Florida Code of Judicial Conduct. See generally Charles J. Kahn, Jr., Judicial
Elections: Canon 7, Politics, and Free Speech, 72 FLA. BAR J. 22 (1998).
86. See Charles, supra note 85.
87. Id.
88. Erika Bolstad, Ethics Panel Chooses Officers, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), July 1,
2000, at 3B.
89. Id.
90. See Cleveland Ferguson III, The Politics of Ethics and Elections: Can Negative
Campaign Advertising Be Regulated in Florida?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 463 (1997).
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The system may also be abused by individuals filing a flurry of false charges
against a candidate.91
In April 2000, Fort Lauderdale city commissioners adopted a measure
prohibiting former city commissioners and former city managerial
employees from lobbying the commission within two years of leaving
office. Under a different proposal, ex-city officials would also be
prevented from lobbying against advisory boards and city staff members.93
The new proposed rule, however, will not apply to unpaid lobbyists.94
The Miami-Dade Commission on Ethics and Public Trust made clear in
a case that the perception of impropriety comes close to unethical behavior.
95
Several members of the Jackson Memorial Hospital's board of directors had
96business dealings with the hospital they regulate. While such business
dealings may not amount to a conflict of interest, in the view of an ethics
official, it may still be improper.97 In another case, the Commission ruled
that a Miami-Dade commissioner and her husband collected federal rent
subsidies from the county housing agency, the same entity the commissioner
regulates.98 Local law bars county employees or members of their
immediate families from having a stake in the county's Section Eight
Housing Program.99 As a result, the ethics commission ordered the
commissioner to end the arrangement.1
B. Public Corruption
A new state task force is reviewing public corruption.' 0 Governor Jeb
Bush has asked the group to find better ways to crack down on this
problem. °2 The group is considering the following proposals: asking state
lawmakers for a "strong and clear" anti-public corruption law modeled on
91. See generally id.
92. Brad Bennett, Proposal Would Make Ex-Officials Wait to Lobby, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Apr. 19, 2000 at 2B.
93. Id.
94. Ronnie Greene, Hospital Trust Members Face Ethics Scrutiny, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Oct. 5, 1999, at 10B.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Don Finefrock, Dade Commissioner's Conflicts of Interest Cited, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Sept. 10, 1999, at 10B.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Sue Reisinger, Bush Leads Way in Corruption Fight, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
Oct. 28, 1999, at lB.
102. Id.
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the Federal Hobbs Act-Florida has not had an anti-corruption law since the
state's highest court knocked out key sections in 1978 and 1985.103 The
group is also considering more stringent criminal penalties for public
corruption, and authorizing the state ethics commission to launch
investigations. 104  On the agenda is strengthening contracting laws,
regulating privatization, lobbying, voter fraud, and campaign financing.105
After three months of proposal development, the group made its
recommendations to Governor Jeb Bush and to the state Legislature.1' 6
Proposals included making corruption charges serious felonies rather than
misdemeanors, strengthening state ethics commissions, and requiring
lawmakers to take ethics classes. 107 The most controversial recommendation
called for concealing corruption probes that do not lead to criminal charges
for three years after the case is closed.'0 8
The 2000 Legislative session ended without action on the task force's
proposals.1 9 Several high profile corruption cases this past year include a
state senator who pleaded guilty to federal charges of Medicare fraud, a
former House Speaker who is in prison for income tax evasion, and a county
commissioner who was ousted from office by the state attorney's public
corruption unit.' 10
At the local level, Miami-Dade has developed anti-corruption proposals
of its own."1 Some of the recommendations include: increasing county
commissioners' salaries; prohibiting commissioners from voting on matters
involving big campaign contributors; setting up a "lifestyle audit" of former
elected officials to ensure they have not benefitted illegally; and framing a
lobbyist code of ethics, among other things."
2
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Lesley Clark, Task Force Recommends Crackdown on Corruption, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Dec. 16, 1999, at liB.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.; see also Arnold Markowitz, State Attorney in Fight for Police Vote for
Reelection, MIAMI H" (Broward), Mar. 27,2000, at 8B.
111. Karen Branch-Brioso, Anti-corruption Group Unveils its Proposals for Miami-
Dade, MAM HERAL (Broward), June 22,2000, at 1 lB.
112. Id. The code is modeled after the Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce Model
Code of Business Ethics which requires executives to sign this statement: "We will not,
directly or indirectly, offer to give a bribe or otherwise channel kickbacks from contracts
awarded, to government officials, their family members or business associates. We will not
seek or expect preferential treatment on bids based on our participation in political
campaigns." Id.; see generally MODELCODE OFBUSnESS ETmcs (2000).
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C. Campaign Finance
A bill passed by the State Senate but defeated in the House included a
"$5000 limit on 'soft money contributions' to political parties."113 Miami-
Dade's chief public corruption prosecutor sought enactment of an ordinance
that would bar individuals doing business with the county from gin
money to the election campaigns of county commissioners and the mayor.
Earlier, a state grand jury proposed a ban on fund-raising by County Hall
lobbyists." 5 But in March 2000, the Miami-Dade County Commission voted
seven to four to reject proposed campaign finance reform.' 16
In the past year, the Florida Division of Elections investigated several
allegations of violations of campaign finance laws. For example, a Broward
County commissioner received more than the $500 limit on contributions
from a corporation or individual donor per election cycle;1 7 a Broward
County commissioner used campaign money for personal expenses and as
loans to friends and family;11 8 and, another former county commissioner
agreed to one year of probation for accepting contributions over the $500
cap and other campaign finance reporting lapses.' 19 In another campaign
finance case, a losing candidate in a state senate race accused his rival of
violating state laws banning contributions five days before an election and
requiring candidates to reveal campaign income four days before the
election.' 2° A Broward County commissioner is contemplating pleading
113. Editorial, Rescue Florida Ethics Package, Senate-Passed Reforms Languish in
House, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), May 5, 2000, at 10B.
114. Don Finefrock, Prosecutor Calls for Campaign Reform, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Feb. 2,2000, at 1lB.
115. Id.
116. Don Finefrock, Miami Officials Reject Campaign Finance Reforms, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Mar. 10, 2000, at 9B.
117. Charles Savage, Abramowitz Returns Cash to Seven Backers, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), June 23, 2000, at 3B. Violations can result in fines of up to $1000 if committed
willfully. Id.
118. Beth Reinhard, Broward Official is Set to Dispute Alleged Violations, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Dec. 18, 1999, at 3B. State law makes clear that candidates can give back
unused money to donors, pay for campaign expenses, or donate it to charity, government
agencies, or political parties. Id.
119. Frances Robles, Hardemon Gets Probation for Campaign Violations, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Mar. 21, 2000, at 8B. In his defense, the former county commissioner
estimated that 90% of all candidates make technical violations of campaign finance laws. Id.
120. Karen Branch, Rival Questions Source of Funds for Candidate's 11th-hour Push,
MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Dec. 20, 1999, at 8B.
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guilty to six misdemeanor election law violations.12 1 The commissioner,
who faces up to six years in jail, is accused of a number of illegalities
including writing campaign checks to imaginary people, then cashing the
checks and using the money to buy furniture for his home.'2 The Miami
Herald has called for the embattled commissioner's resignation.12 Under
Florida's Constitution, "the governor can suspend a public official chaged
with a felony or for 'malfeasance, misfeasance, and neglect of duty."124- A
former Miami-Dade County commission aide, sentenced to a year of
probation after breaking state campaign finance laws, but cleared of federal
bribery charges, returned to his former job with back pay.12
D. Public Official Misconduct
1. Judges
Operation Court Broom, an extensive Federal Bureau of Investigation
and Florida Department of Law Enforcement undercover investigation,
wrapped up its work in April 2000 when the last of the judges and attorneys
found guilty of corruption were sentenced.'2 All together, three judges, two
former judges, six lawyers, and one businessman were convicted Over
the last year, judicial misconduct has included: a Manatee County judge
who was accused of orchestrating a trade with another judge so he could
preside at a hearing for a driving under the influence case he reported;1 the
Supreme Court of Florida publicly reprimanded a Broward Circuit Court
judge for "accepting free Marlins tickets from a law firm that argued cases
before him;"'129 the chief judge of Miami's Third District Court of Appeal
was publicly reprimanded by the court for making "rude, sarcastic remarks
121. Beth Reinhard, Cowan Explores a Change of Plea, MIAMI HmAL (Broward),
Apr. 29,2000, at lB.
122. Id.
123. Editorial, Resign, Scott Cowan: Admissions Reflect Poorly on Broward Politics,
Mum HERALD (Broward), Apr. 28,2000, at 10B.
124. Beth Reinhard, Governor Mum on Cowan's Fate, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Apr.
1, 2000, at lB.
125. Don Finefrock, Ex-aide Reinstated Despite Plea, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), June
12,2000, at 9B.
126. Elaine De Valle, Court Broom Runs its Course, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Apr.
3, 2000, at 8B.
127. Id.
128. Judge Accused of Ethics Violation, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Apr. 2, 2000, at
7B.
129. Lesley Clark, Judge Scolded for Taking Freebies From Attorneys, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), June 7,2000, at lB.
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to two college interns trying a case" in his court;130 the Supreme Court of
Florida publicly reprimanded a Miami-Dade County judge for behavior
"unbecoming a member of the judiciary" during his arrest for soliciting an
undercover prostitute;131 and Broward's top judge undertook a review of
whether a longtime judge acted improperly when he excused two influential
and rich individuals from jury duty. In one case, a Miami-Dade County
judge unsuccessfully requested that the Supreme Court of Florida postpone
his public reprimand for conduct "unbecoming a member of the judiciary"
until after the November 2000 elections.
2. City and County Officials
A group of individuals from the Citizens For A Better Miami launched
an effort to recall the mayor of Miami. 134 A former South Miami vice mayor
was charged with conspiracy to launder $150,000 in drug money. 135 A jury
found a former Hialeah Gardens mayor guilty of asking a hairdresser and
council aide to shoot her husband and to set his car on fire." 6 Miami's city
manager accused Miami's mayor of ordering him to investigate four city
commissioners and the publisher of the Miami Herald.137 Fort Lauderdale
city officials were cleared of allegations that they destroyed a public record
that undermined the city's position in an employee discrimination claim
138
And, Fort Lauderdale's employees' union president was cleared of
wrongfully withholding dues from the state union.139
130. Lesley Clark, State's Top Court to Give Scolding to Appeals Judge, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Mar. 31, 2000, at 10B.
131. Lesley Clark, State Justices to Reprimand Dade Judge for Misbehavior, MAfm
HERALD (Broward), June 2, 2000, at 7B.
132. Lisa Arthur, Top Judge to Review VIP Jurors Controversy, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Dec. 3, 1999, at lB.
133. Lesley Clark, Court Won't Hurry Judge's Reprimand, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
July 25, 2000, at 9B.
134. Charles Rabin, Carollo-recall Group Faces Tough Task, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), May 22, 2000, at 7B.
135. David Kidwell, Informant Testifies Against Former Mayor, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Mar. 24,2000, at 6B.
136. Frances Robles, Ex-Hialeah Gardens Mayor Guilty, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
July 1, 2000, at 7B.
137. Tyler Bridges, Warshaw Loses Bid to Stay on Job Longer, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), May 5, 2000, at 7B.
138. Brad Bennett, 2 Probes of City Workers Fizzle, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Nov.
18, 1999, at 8B.
139. Id.
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3. Fire Officials
Davie's interim town administrator dismissed the town's besieged
deputy fire chief and is negotiating an early retirement package with the fire
chief after reprimanding him for tolerating racist and sexist comments by his
deputy.14° The sanctions came after the town's firefighter's union compiled
four years of complaints against the two top fire officials. 141 The complaints
accused the two of professional incompetence and safety violations,
improper sexual and racial comments, and unprofessional behavior.142 In
July 2000, Davie's town clerk was dismissed after a Davie police probe
discovered that she gave the results of the psychological evaluation of a
firefighter applicant to her boyfriend, the former deputy fire chief.
143
4. Police Officials
An internal police investigation report accused Opa-locka's former
police chief of misusing his officers as political henchmen to be set loose
against city commission candidates and their supporters, and abusing the
civil rights of some citizens.144 Moreover, the former police chief was
accused of retaliating against officers who refused to do his bidding.
1 45
Miramar's police captain was terminated more than a year after he was
demoted. 14 The ex-captain sued the city, claiming he was demoted for
blowing the whistle about how a towing firm had secured the city's contract
unfairly.' 47 The ex-captain was replaced by a new chief who faced problems
of her own.'4 As previously referred to in the background check discussion
of this article, the BSO cleared Miramar's new police chief of allegations
contained in an anonymous letter, claiming that while she was a major with
the Miami Police Department, she fired a gun during a domestic dispute with
140. Adam Ramirez, New Davie Town Chief on Hot Seat, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
July 4, 2000, at lB.
141. Fire Department Probe to End in January, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Dec. 23,
1999, at 2B.
142. Marianne M. Arnshaw, Davie Police Wrapping Up Investigation, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Oct. 26, 1999, at 3B.
143. Steve Harrison, Another Official Loses Job in Davie, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
July 21, 2000, at lB.
144. Ajowa Nzinga Ifateyo, Opa-locka Ex-Police Chief Abused Power, Report Says,
MIAMI HERA D (Broward), Dec. 25,1999, at 7B.
145. Id.
146. City Fires Captain Who Sued Over Demotion, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Nov.
17, 1999, at 2B.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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her former husband.149 A former Miami police chief's payroll and travel
records were subpoenaed by a federal grand jury looking into the looting of a
police pension fund.' 5°
5. Inspectors: Building, Electrical, and Customs
Public employees must report each time they earn a sum greater than
five percent of their annual pay.151 Technically, however, if each payment is
less than five percent of the employee's pay, he or she need not disclose the
sum.152 A Miami-Dade building official, accused of omitting to report
$62,000 in unaccounted extra pay, was cleared of felony charges owing to
this loophole in financial disclosure laws. 153 Prosecutors were unable to
identify the source of the extra pay." 4 The same building official was later
accused of altering building records so a woman could install a sliding glass
door in her home without following the usual procedure.155 Removed from
his job and indicted last year, the official was ultimately cleared of all
wrongdoing. 5 6  A former Cooper City building department director was
sentenced to twenty-seven months in prison and a $5000 fine for conspiring
to extort $10,000 from a residential contractor.15 7 In essence, the building
official was shaking down the home builder for cash as quid pro quo for
foregoing inspections.
158
A Pembroke Pines electrical inspector was suspended for five days
without pay for neglecting to follow through on an inspection and for
159looking the other way at building violations at another site. Earlier,
another Pembroke Pines building inspector had resigned over claims that he
149. David D'Addio, Probe of Miramar Police Chief Over, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
Aug. 11, 1999, at 8B; see discussion supra Part 1.E.
150. Manny Garcia, Warshaw's Records are Subpoenaed, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
June 23, 2000, at 7B.
151. Frances Robles, Case Against Building Official Unravels, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Aug. 11, 1999, at 9B.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Don Finefrock, Former Building Official Cleared of Wrongdoing, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Dec. 23, 1999, at 7B.
156. Id.
157. Paul Brinkley-Rogers, Building Chief Gets 27 Months for Extortion, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Aug. 28, 1999, at lB.
158. Id.
159. Elena Cabral, Electrical Inspector in Pines Suspended, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
Apr. 3, 2000, at 3B.
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was loafing on the job.16 As a consequence, the city manager ordered the
city's fire department to investigate such inaction in the building division.
161
A veteran customs inspector was dismissed for marking an unopened
box of cargo as if he had inspected it and denied the charge when
confronted. 12 It turned out there were six pounds of cocaine inside the
box.163 A wide-ranging newspaper review of the United States Customs
Service in Miami found "how careers have flourished at Customs after such
transgressions as tampering with evidence, soliciting prostitutes in Customs
cars, soliciting underage boys for sex, dating drug smugglers, falsifying
timecards, lying on job applications, burglary, theft and sexual
harassment."' The new chief of the United States Customs Service,
brought in to redress wrongdoing at the agency, has himself been accused of
dismissing whistleblowers along with cleaning house. 6
6. Legislators
In the past year, state lawmakers have also come under criticism in a
number of cases. For example, Florida TaxWatch, a taxpayer advocacy
group, has criticized state and local public officials for billing taxpayers for
their personal travel and entertainment. 16 In other cases, lawmakers have
been accused of a wide range of wrongdoing: a Central Florida state
representative apologized to the House for commenting that a former
speaker's official House portrait "should be hanging in a post office not on
the walls of the hallowed chamber, because he's a convicted felon' "V; a Fort
Lauderdale state senator was reprimanded by the senate president for
missing forty-nine roll call votes on five of the twelve days the senate had
been in session;168 and a former state senator was sentenced to five years infederal prison for Medicare fraud committed while he served as chair of the
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. David Kidwell, Inspector Loudly Critical of Customs Fights Firing, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Nov. 19, 1999, at IA.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Editorial, Reform in U.S. Customs Service?, MIAIM HERALD (Broward), Dec. 4,
1999, at 12B.
166. Caroline J. Keough, Politicians: Travel Vital, Necessary to Job, MAMI HERALD
(Broward), Dec. 12, 1999, at lB.
167. Lesley Clark, Legislator's Dig at Imprisoned Speaker Creates Sparks, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Mar. 10, 2000, at 1OB.
168. Steve Bousquet, Broward Lawmaker Chastised, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Apr.
7,2000, at lB.
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Senate Criminal Justice Committee. 6 9 In addition, the former senator was
fined $50,000, ordered to pay $98,174 restitution to Medicare, and to make
honest financial disclosures after he leaves prison. 170  An editorial in the
Miami Herald criticized the practice of politicians doubling as public school
officials.17 1 As a result of these dual roles, these politicians/employees are
absent multiple days each year from their taxpa er-paid job without ever
having their pay reflect such rampant absenteeism.
7. Prison Chief
Florida's corrections chief came under fire from the state legislature.
73
One state lawmaker, a member of the committee that regulates the prison
system, accused the corrections chief of failing to put up video cameras to
catch wrongdoing within the prisons.' 74 The legislature controls the prison
system's budget and pay raises for prison guards. 175 Later, legislators from
both parties alleged that the state prisons chief had "muzzled" his employees
to keep them from talking about the decision by the Department of
Corrections to close a North Florida prison without conferring with
lawmakers. 176 Moreover, an angry lawmaker complained to Governor Jeb
Bush about the job performance of the number two man at the embattled
Department of Corrections. 1
77
8. Teacher's Duty to Report Suspected Cases of Child Abuse
A state law that took effect July 1, 1999, requires teachers, doctors, and
judges to report suspected cases of child abuse to the Department of
Children and Family Services' abuse hot line. 17 As a result of this new law,
169. David Kidwell, Ex-Senator Gutman Gets 5 Years for Fraud, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Apr. 29, 2000, at 10B.
170. Id.
171. Editorial, When Educators Are Also Politicians, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Nov.
16, 1999, at 14B.
172. Id.
173. Lesley Clark, Lawmaker Blasts Corrections Chief, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
Aug. 14, 1999, at 13B.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Lesley Clark, Legislators from Both Parties Criticize State Prisons Chief, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Dec. 8, 1999, at lB.
177. Lesley Clark, Legislator Complains About Deputy Prison Secretary, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Nov. 17, 1999, at 13B.
178. FLA. STAT. § 39.201 (2000) (this statute is known as the "Kayla McKean Act").
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thousands of alleged cases of child abuse have swamped a state system that
is already overloaded." 9
IV. TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT
A. Wages and Hours
The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that women earned 76.5 cents
for every dollar men earned last year doing the same full-time work.18 Since
1979, women have closed the pay gap by 14 cents."' In 1999, African-
American and Hispanic women earned 64.1 and 54.5 cents respectively for
every dollar earned by white men."8 A bill introduced in April 2000 would
require employers of fifteen or more people to document that employees who
do equal work receive equal pay.18 3 The Department of Labor would serve
as the depository for such records and employees would be entitled to sue
employers who failed to keep such records or turn over annual statements
identifying how their salary was computed.1' Lobbyists for business
owners, however, helped defeat the senate bill.1' 5 Another bill passed a
Senate Committee in April 2000 that would entitle abused women who are
afraid that their husbands or boyfriends will hurt them at work to resign and
still be eligible for state unemployment benefits.18t
In Hundertmark v. Florida Department of Transportation,8 7 the
Eleventh Circuit ruled that Congress had the power, under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, to extend the protections of the Equal Pay Act'88 to
the states.18 9  In essence, Congress constitutionally abrogated states'
179. Shari Rudavsky & Amy Driscoll, Calls Pour in to Florida's Child Abuse Line,
MIM IHERALD (Broward), Nov. 23, 1999, at IA.
180. Pay Disparity Between Sexes Persists, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), May 30, 2000,
at 1IB. But see Matthew Barakat, Study: Women Narrow Pay Gap, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), July 4, 2000, at IC (a survey by Working Woman magazine found that women's
salaries equal and even exceed men's salaries in some occupations such as advertising
CEO's).
181. See Pay Disparity Between Sexes Persists, supra note 180.
182. Id.
183. Beth Reinhard, Equal-pay Bill Defeated in Committee, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
Apr. 5, 2000, at 6B.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Beth Reinhard, Jobless Benefits Sought for Abused Women, MLIAM HERALD
(Broward), Apr. 5, 2000, at 6B.
187. 205 F.3d 1272(11th Cir. 2000).
188. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994).
189. Hundertmark 205 F.3d at 1274.
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sovereign immunity so that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits
against the State of Florida in federal court.190
Teachers' salaries were much in the news during 1999-2000. At the
state level, teachers won an eight percent increase in salaries in the Senate's
final budget and also the possibility of huge cash bonuses to keep and recruit
teachers in low-performing schools.1 9' In September 1999, the State
Commissioner of Education unveiled an incentive plan for Florida teachers
under which the best public school teachers could hike up their salaries by
fifty percent-to $80,000 a year.192 The proposed salary incentive plan aims
both at rewarding teachers based on student performance and at remedying
the statewide teacher shortage. 193  Over 500 teachers statewide earned
certification from the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards in
the 1998-1999 academic year.194 Certification increased those teachers'
"annual income by as much as $9000 per year.' ' 195 Teacher certification is
akin to preparing for a bar exam. 196 Fewer than half the applicants succeed
the first time. The process includes having teachers' classroom performance
videotaped and scrutinized. 197 At the local level, the Broward School
District and union officials reached agreement on a two-year teacher contract
that secures a 4.5% increase in 1999 and an average 3.7% raise in 2000-
2001.198 A proposed agreement would make Miami-Dade's first time
teachers the highest paid in the state, would increase salaries 5.35%, and
would entitle teachers to speak more freely about school matters.
199
190. Id.
191. Steve Bousquet, 8% Raises Offered for Florida Teachers: Senate Plan Also
Features Bonuses, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Mar. 18, 2000, at IA. But see Steve Bousquet,
Helmets Are Off, Tax Breaks Are On, MiAMI HERALD (Broward), July 1, 2000, at lB. Florida
teachers' salaries fall about $5000 a year below the national average. Id. While the budget
containing these raises was enacted July 1, 2000, pay raises do not begin until Oct. 1, 2000.
Id.
192. Sabrina Walters, Incentive Plan Unveiled for Florida Teachers, MIAMi HERALD
(Broward), Sept. 14, 1999, at 9B.
193. Id.
194. Daniel de Vise, Teacher Incentive Program a Success, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
Nov. 23, 1999, at lB.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Editorial, To Reward Good Teachers, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Nov. 23, 1999,
at 10B.
198. Beth Reinhard, Tentative Deal Would Give Schoolteachers 4.5% Pay Raise,
MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Sept. 16, 1999, at 3B.
199. Analisa Nazareno, Teachers Get Solid Raise in Contract Offer, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), July 4, 2000, at 6B.
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The Hollywood City Commission announced that construction
companies that secure building contracts over $500,000 with the city must
pay fair wages to its employees, no less than the prevailing rate of wages and
fringe benefits set by the federal government. 2  Besides Hollywood,
Broward County, Sunrise, and Dania Beach have modeled their "prevailing
wages" law on the Davis-Bacon Act,20 1 a federal law aimed at setting
minimum wags that contractors with the federal government must pay to
their workers.
Governor Jeb Bush was sued by the public union that represents the
state's 20,000 probation and corrections officers, alleging that the state
legislature reneged on the governor's promise to increase officers' pay five
percent, receiving, instead, only half of that sum recommended by the
govemor.203  The state legislature is considering the largest overall paV
increase for about 4000 state police officers in ten public agencies.
Despite the $51 billion budget passed in May 2000, the largest in Florida's
history, tens of thousands of the lowest-paid state employees received the
smallest raise in three years--two and a half percent.2 By contrast, police
officers and teachers received eight percent raises. 2m The state's chief
prison boss was roundly criticized in October 1999 for raising mid-level
managers' salaries by as much as seventy percent in one case.m7
Several public officials have gone to court over the amount of
severance pay they think they are entitled to.2s The former head of
Broward's Housing Authority, who lost his job after he was convicted in
1996 for income tax fraud, will also lose about $157,000 in severance pay
for the eighteen months left on his contract. 
2 0
200. Pedro Acevedo, New Hollywood Law Requires Contractors to Pay Fair Wages,
Maw HERALD (Broward), Sept. 23, 1999, at 8B.
201. 40 U.S.C. § 276(a)(b) (1994 & Supp. 1998).
202. See Acevedo, supra note 200.
203. Phil Long, Probation, Corrections Union Sues Bush, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
June 25,2000, at 6B.
204. Phil Long, Officers May Get Pay Raise, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Jan. 23, 2000,
at 6B.
205. Phil Long, Lowest-paid State Employees Receive the Smallest Raises, MmI
HERALD (Broward), May 5,2000, at 8B.
206. Id.
207. Steve Bousquet & Lesley Clark, Top Prison Boss Battles Tide of Criticism, MIAMi
HERALD, Oct. 18, 1999, at lB.
208. Beth Reinhard, Imprisoned Housing Chief Won't Get Pay, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Sept. 4, 1999, at lB.
209. Id.
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B. Regulation of Dress and Grooming
The Broward County School District decided to crack down on casual
wear by school personnel during summer sessions. At bottom, employees
211
were told to dress in a professional manner. Beach or sportswear, sun
dresses, slip-ons, tank tops, T-shirts, flip flops, and sandals were deemed
inappropriate attire while lightweight summer suits, jackets, stockings, and
ties pass muster.
212
C. Benefits
1. Jury Duty Release
A county judge ruled that Broward County public school teachers who
are prepping students for the Florida College Aptitude Test and other key
tests may be excused from serving on juries.Z13 As Broward County's
School Superintendent noted, "teachers are really needed in the
classroom. '2 4 Other public employees who by law are excused from jury
duty are Governor Jeb Bush and his cabinet, judges, their clerks, and law
enforcement officers.
2 15
2. Domestic Partner Benefits
Last year, Broward County enacted a domestic partners ordinance, that,
among other benefits, entitled the unmarried partner of county employees to
be treated the same as any spouse of a county employee. 216 Opponents of the
measure, defeated at the ballot box and in a series of court battles testing the• , . . . .217
ordinance's constitutionality, tried again to get the measure repealed . This
time the case is before the Fourth District Court of Appeal in West Palm
Beach.218 Miami-Dade's 1998 ordinance banning discrimination on grounds
210. Daniel de Vise, Summer Fashion Police Strike, MIAMi HERALD (Broward), Aug.
10, 1999, at 3B.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Daniel de Vise, County Teachers With Excuse Can Skip Jury Duty, MIAMi
HERALD (Broward), Mar. 23, 2000, at 3B.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Jacqueline Charles, Foes of Domestic-Partners Law Back in Court, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Feb. 24,2000, at 3B.
218. Id.
[Vol. 25:207
234
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss1/1
Sanchez
of sexual orientation in housing, employment, and public accommodations
also faces repeal efforts by the Christian Coalition and its supporters.219 If
opponents of the gay-rights ordinance garner four percent of the county
voters' signatures, the issue would be placed on a countywide ballot.m The
same group has lost twice in efforts to overturn Tampa, Florida's gay rights
ordinance, but won in Alachua County in 1994.
2 1
3. Family Medical Leave Act
Under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 2 public
employees may take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave in a twelve month
period when faced with family medical problems.22 President Clinton has
proposed allowing states the option of granting unemployment insurance
benefits for new parents.22 This initiative, wholly voluntary, would allow
states to subsidize a leave following the birth or adoption of a child.22 While
Vermont, Maryland, and Washington are considering legislation to extend
unemployment benefits to parental leave, Florida has not. 2M The national
Chamber of Commerce, however, has sought to enjoin the Labor Department
from promulgating regulations that would execute Clinton's proposal.27 In
California, meanwhile, Governor Gray Davis vetoed a measure aimed at
expanding that state's family care and medical leave act to allow employees
time off to care for ill siblings, adult children, grandparents, or domestic
partners.2  The Clinton administration has also proposed extending the
FMLA to many small businesses, but many Floridians are olpposed to this
measure, including the editorial board of the Miami Herald. In O'Connor
v. PCA Family Health Plan,23° the Eleventh Circuit addressed the
circumstances under which an employer may deny an employee the right to
219. Don Finefrock, Struggle Over Gay-Rights Ordinance Drawing Near, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Feb. 3, 2000, at 13B.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994).
223. Editorial, Paid Leave for Parents, N.Y. TImEs, Dec. 1, 1999, at A30.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Group Sues to Block Paid Parental Leave, N.Y. TIMES (Nat'l ed.), June 27,2000,
at A20.
228. Gov. Davis Vetoes Bill to Expand Family Leave, N.Y. TIMES (Nat'l ed.), May 25,
2000, at 24A.
229. Editorial, Family Leave Act Needs Fine Tuning, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Feb.
8, 1999, at 10A.
230. 200 F.3d 1349(l1th Cir. 2000).
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reinstatement upon return from FMLA leave.2 31  As a matter of first
impression, the court ruled that the employer has the opportunity to prove it
would have dismissed the employee on FMLA leave, even had she not been
on leave. 232
4. Vacation, Sick Pay, and Teacher Absenteeism
A former mayor of Plantation ended up reimbursing the city $38,000 he
received for unused vacation and sick pay in the 1990s.23 3 Earlier, the city
council ruled that the city charter classifies the mayor as a public official and
not a city employee.M For this reason, he was ineligible for vacation and
sick leave benefits.
2 35
A study undertaken by the Miami Herald revealed that "the average
Broward County student spent twenty-two days of the past school year under
the tutelage of an educational temp. '26 The typical Broward County teacher
was absent eighteen days in 1999.3 7 Teacher absenteeism has risen eighteen
percent in Broward County in the last four years.23 8 Some cite the FMLA for
the increase in teacher absenteeism.239 I-Iih rates of teacher absenteeism
also exist in Miami-Dade public schools. Miami-Dade County Public
Schools has also drawn criticism for paying local politicians for roles in
which they did not always have to do anything.241 One politician missed 121
242days of work as a social worker but was paid a $61,112 salary.
231. Id. at 1353.
232. Id. at 1353-54.
233. William McGee, Plantation Ex-Mayor Pays Back $38,442, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Aug. 10, 1999, at lB.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Daniel de Vise, Broward Teacher Absences on Rise, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
Nov. 14, 1999, at IA.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Editorial, Find What's Ailing Teachers, MIAM HERL (Broward), Nov. 16,
1999, at 14B.
241. Analisa Nazareno, Legislators Draw Criticism for Absences in School Roles,
MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Nov. 15, 1999, at 8B.
242. Id.
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5. Health Benefits
a. Mental Health Benefits
Under the 1996 Mental Health Parity Act, group health plans may not
set annual or lifetime dollar limits on an employee's mental health care
below the amount for general medical and surgical services.2 3 However, a
congressional investigation has found that thousands of employers are
violating the federal law by providing lower mental illness coverage than for
physical illness.7 A new study found that the government receives more
disability-act complaints from employees with emotional or psychiatric
problems than from employees with any other type of ailment.
2 45
b. Prescription Drug Benefits
A proposal by Governor Jeb Bush and some lawmakers, that would
have reduced the state's spending on prescription drugs for its 97,000
employees, was withdrawn last year after testimony that complained of
hardships if the measure were enacted.2 The repealed plan would have
provided doctors with a list of state approved prescription drugs.247 A
similar proposal involving Medicare drug limits for poor people is also being
considered by the legislature.2
c. Health Benefits for Disabled Workers
A new federal law expanding Medicaid and Medicare will enable
disabled individuals to return to work without losing their health insurance
benefits.24 9  The new law has been heralded as the most important
development for the disabled since the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA") became law in 1990Y This law may especially help
243. Robert Pear, Many Employers Found to Violate Law Requiring Parity for Mental
Health Coverage, N.Y. TIMEs (Nat'l ed.), May 18,2000, at A26.
244. Id.
245. Barbara Whitaker, For Employers, Pitfalls in Treating Workplace Depression,
N.Y. TbMS (Nat'l ed.), Nov. 7, 1999, at sec. 3, p. 4 .
246. The Associated Press, State Eyes Medicare Drug Limits Dropped from
Employees' Plan, SUN SENTINL (Ft. Lauderdale); Nov. 28, 1999, at BI.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Robert Pear, Bill Expands Health Benefits for Disabled People Who Work, N.Y.
IM (Nat'l ed.), Nov. 19, 1999, at A29.
250. Id.
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asymptomatic HIV positive individuals by allowing Medicaid to help pay for
powerful drugs that inhibit the virus, thereby allowing infected individuals to
continue working.2s1
d. Costs of Health Insurance
Miramar city employees saw their health insurance rates rise more than
eleven percent under an agreement brokered by Miramar commissioners
with HIP Health Plan.252 At the same time, benefits will remain the same.2
3
e. Health Insurance Fraud
The head of Hollywood's employee health-care plan was accused of
lying to city commissioners and ngglecting to alert officials that a key health
care contract was about to expire.' The city risk manager, who runs a $14
million self-insurance fund, is also accused of overstepping his authority by
making decisions about the plan without consulting superiors. 25  The
official is on paid leave pending resolution of outstanding claims. z  Soon
after the story broke, the employee health care plan administrator was
dismissed.257 Three months later, three City of Hollywood employees
claimed they were victims of retaliation and discrimination over testimony
they gave in a police investigation into whether unauthorized health benefits
were given to city employees and dependents.25
f. Public Employee Health
In other health and safety matters, the Miami-Dade School Board was
sued after a ten-year-old became ill with tuberculosis, allegedly contracted
251. Id.
252. David D'Addio, Miramar Employees to See Increase in Insurance Payments,
MIAmi HERALD (Broward), Aug. 19, 1999, at 3B.
253. Id.
254. Neff Reisner, City Lists Claims Against Manager, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Mar.
22, 2000, at lB.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Neil Reisner & Wanda Demarzo, Health Plan Boss Fired, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Mar. 24,2000, at lB.
258. Wanda J. DeMarzo, Health Benefits Scandal Broadens, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), June 28, 2000, at lB.
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from a school employee 2 9  As a result, a school board member tried
unsuccessfully to make tuberculosis testing for school employees
mandatory.2  In March 2000, union organizers through out Florida
protested further budget cuts in worker safetyprograms in the state
Department of Labor and Employment Security. Studies indicate the
number of employee deaths is on the rise in Florida, unlike the trend in the
rest of the country.2 6 A bill was introduced in the state Senate that would
make it a felony for an inmate to fling bodily fluids at a corrections officer,
potentially exposing guards to serious health risks, including the AIDS
virus.261
6. Public Pensions
a. Public Pension Legislation
Under new legislation, state employees' pensions now vest in six years
instead of ten while state employees' insurance rates stay the same.2"
Surpluses in the state's $77 billion retirement fund led lawmakers to reduce
annual contributions and improve benefits for the more than 600,000 public
employees in Florida.2 Moreover, calculating pension benefits is changing
from a "high-five," the best in five years of earnings, to a "high-three"
system.2 6 The pension plan overhaul will allocate over $3 billion of the
plan's $9 billion surplus to sweeten benefits while cutting premiums paid by
state, counties, cities, school districts and law enforcement agencies.
Pension reform came over the protests of Governor Jeb Bush who wanted
lawmakers to include a reserve fund before tapping into the pension plan
259. Jay Weaver, Suit: Girl Got TB From School Worker, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
Mar. 15, 2000, at liB.
260. Id.
261. Jay Ducassi, Labor Protests Safety Programs' End, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
Mar. 22,2000, at 13B.
262. Id.
263. Steve Bousquet, Senate Acts to Protect Prison Guards, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
Apr. 7, 2000, at IB; see also S. 88, 2000 Leg. (Fla. 2000).
264. Phil Long, Lowest-paid State Employees Receive the Smallest Raises, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), May 5,2000, at 8B.
265. Steve Bousquet, Robust Economy Fuels Call for Pension Overhaul, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Apr. 19, 2000, at 7B.
266. Id.
267. Steve Bousquet, Senate Approves Pension Plan Hike, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
Apr. 12,2000, at liB.
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surplus.268 In addition, the Governor recommended restoring lost pension
credits to police and firefighters. 9
Surpluses in the public pension fund owe much to the stock market
where Florida invests its pension funds in a wide array of investments,
including private equity funds and real estate.270 Public pension fund profits
from stock market investments have been rising more than eight percent a
year.27'
Just as President George W. Bush has proposed partial privatization of
Social Security, his brother, Governor Jeb Bush, has proposed privatizing the
state public pension fund. 272 In fact, the director of Florida's retirement
system was replaced, in light of his opposition to Bush's privatization
proposal.273 Under Bush's plan, public employees would be given the option
of managing their own retirement accounts by 2002 and making pensions
portable, i.e., movable from job to job, and in and out of government. 274 The
proposal essentially converts the traditionally defined benefit public pension
scheme in to a so-called defined contribution system.275
b. Severance Pay and Rules Against Double Dipping
In May 2000, the Plantation City Council enacted an ordinance aimed at
barring former elected officials, who subsequently re-enter public office,
from receiving retirement benefits and salary simultaneously.
A recurring issue over the granting of severance pay to public officials
who resign under a legal cloud came to the forefront when the executive
director of Miami's agency that regulates Bayfront Park, under investigation
268. Governor Stands Firm on Retirement Fund, MAMI HERALD (Broward), Apr. 14,
2000, at 13B.
269. Steve Bousquet, In Pension Battle, Law Officials Win, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
Apr. 20,2000, at 9B.
270. Steve Bousquet, Pension Profits Tempt Lawmakers, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
Mar. 17, 2000, at 9B.
271. Id.
272. See Philip P. Frickey, The Communion of Strangers: Representative Government,
Direct Democracy, and the Privatization of the Public Sphere, 34 WILLAMErm L REv. 421
(1998).
273. Steve Bousquet, State Pension Fund Director Ousted, Opposed System's
Privatization, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), May 25, 2000, at 9B.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Robyn Meadows, Plantation City Council: Officials May Take Salary or
Retirement Pay, Not Both, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), May 4, 2000, at 7B.
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for alleged misspending, agreed to resign in exchange for a $20,000
severance package. 2 "
c. Widow's Annuity
The surviving widow of the public school teacher killed by one of his
students has agreed not to sue the Palm Beach County School Board in
exchange for a $245,000 annuity. 278 The annuity will provide a source of
income equal to the amount the widow's wife would have earned until her
retirement at sixty-two years of ageY 9 The settlement is in addition to life
insurance proceeds and worker's compensation benefits due to the widow.20
d. SEC Regulation of Political Contributions to Public Pensions
The Securities and Exchange Commission has proposed a rule, G-37,
aimed at limiting political contributions to individuals who run public
pension funds in an effort to combat a practice known as pay-to-play in the
municipal finance arena.2 1 The proposed rule prohibits a firm from
soliciting asset management contracts for two years after it or its members
make a political contribution. 282 Moreover, firms may not contribute over
$250 to state and local officials with authority to grant government
contracts.U3 Rule G-37 has been criticized on First Amendment grounds,
specifically, the right to make and solicit political contributions, but the
Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the rule.2"
e. Public Pension Plan Misconduct
Miami's city manager was accused of using his police pension fund
credit card to purchase $16,775 worth of hockey tickets.m Calling it an
277. Tyler Bridges, Park Trust Chief to Get Big Severance, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
Feb. 15, 2000, at 7B.
278. The Associated Press, Widow Takes Annuity Over Teacher's Slaying, MAMI
HERALD (Broward), June 23, 2000, at 9B.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Limits Urged For Managers of Pensions, N.Y. TIM, (Nat'l ed.), Aug. 5, 1999,
at C6.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Manny Garcia & Tom Dubocq, Accountant, Not Warshaw, Wrote Check to Police
Fund, MW HERALD (Broward), Sept. 3, 1999, at 9B.
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innocent mistake, he later reimbursed the pension fund for the cost of the six
286Panthers season tickets. It turns out, however, that an accountant, who
seemingly committed suicide over claims that he looted the pension fund,
reimbursed the $500,000 he allegedly took from the fund. 7
f. New State Public Pension Board Regulations
A recent change in Florida law forces cities to create separate public
pension boards: one for police officers and one for fire rescue employees.28 8
As a result of this change in the law, cities like Tamarac are restructuring
their pension boards.289 Also, a 1997 state law imposed new reporting and
paperwork requirements on city police and fire pension boards.2w Failure to
comply, as the Town of Davie found out, can result in the state withholding
its contributions to the town's police and fire pension boards.
291
g. Supreme Court Ruling Affecting Public Pensions
In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,292 the Supreme Court
unanimously struck down a Massachusetts law boycotting companies that do
business in Myanmar owing to that Asian country's repressive military
government.293 The Court made clear, however, that under the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution, Congress has exclusive power to regulate foreign
policy, and the state law stood in the way of Congress' diplomatic aims.29
Yet, a state might achieve roughly the same outcome, the Court said, through
seeking divestment by public pension funds of the stock of companies that
do business in Myanmar.295
286. Id.
287. Manny Garcia & Tom Dubocq, Feds Probe Books of Group Once Run by
Warshaw, MIAMI HERAD (Broward), Sept. 19, 1999, at 3B.
288. See FLA. STAT. § 175.041 (2000).
289. Jeremy Milarsky, Pension Boards Seek New Members in City, SUN SENTINEL
(Broward), Nov. 28, 1999, at CP19.
290. Marianne M. Armshaw, Davie Pension Funds in Question, MIANI HERALD
(Broward), Oct. 9, 1999, at 3B.
291. Id.
292. 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000).
293. Id. at 2290-91.
294. Id. at 2293-94.
295. Uinda Greenhouse, Justices Overturn a State Law on Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES
(Nat'l ed.), June 20, 2000, at A23.
[Vol. 25:207
242
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss1/1
Sanchez
h. Suits for Back Pension Benefits
A ten-year City of Hollywood employee, who was told he was not
entitled to pension benefits at age fifty-five but must wait until age sixty-
two, sued the city for back pension benefits.i9a A state circuit court ruled in
the employee's favor and an appellate court affirmed the lower court's
decision.297 Earlier, five other former Hollywood employees sued the city
for back pension benefits and the city ended up owing $78,000 in legal fees
and $500,000 in back pension benefits to the employees.29
8
7. Unemployment Compensation Benefits
As part of its tax relief program, the 1999 Legislature approved, for the
second year in a row, a reduction of one-half percent of the unemployment
compensation tax that most employers pay, costing the unemployment fund
$187 million.2 The Legislature also approved an increase in
unemployment compensation benefits for people out of work .
D. Privacy
1. Drug Testing
Fewer employees are using illicit drugs in the workplace, except at
medium-sized firms, according to a new study by, the federal Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. 
'0
Relying on the Fourth Amendment's ban on government searches
absent probable cause, a United States District Judge overturned the City of
Hollywood's practice of testing all prospective employees in April 2000.32
To warrant drug testing, the court held, the city needs to prove a "special
296. Wanda J. DeMarzo, City's Lawyers Losing Big Suits, MAMI HERALD (Broward),
May 28, 2000, at 1BR; see also City of Hollywood v. Rozos, 745 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 4th Dist Ct.
App. 2000).
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Mark Silva, Legislature Ready to Approve $1 Billion in Tax Cuts, MAMI HERALD
(Broward), Apr. 16, 1999, at IA.
300. Id.
301. Mike Hudson, Mixed Results on Workplace Drug Use, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
Sept. 9, 1999, at 3C.
302. Steve Harrison, Judge Throws Out Drug Test Rule, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
Apr. 14,2000, at IA.
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need" such as safety.3°3  Presumably, those applying for jobs as police
officers, firefighters, and arguably even public school teachers, 304 might fall
within this "special need" category. 3°5 The city's drug testing policy, the
judge ruled, was "overbroad because it applies to applicants of all positions
with the City of Hollywood, without regard to the particular job
classification/duties involved, or distinguishing between jobs that are safety
sensitive and those that are not., 306 The ruling will likely lead many Florida
cities that currently have drug testing in place to review their practices.
307
For example, Fort Lauderdale and Pembroke Pines have drug testing for all
of their city workers as well as the Broward County School Board.308
2. Financial Disclosures by Public Officials
Many public officials are required by law to file income statements as
part of the job.3°  Some nominees for public office think this is too high a
price to pay.31° For example, an appointee to the Property Advisory Board
of Coral Gables turned down the appointment, finding the financial
disclosure requirement an unreasonable intrusion into his private life.31'
3. Surveillance of Public Employees' Private Lives
The Florida Department of Law Enforcement disclosed that a private
investigator hired by an insurance firm followed a Department of Insurance
employee in an effort to find out embarrassing information that would force
the Insurance Commissioner to fire the employee who happens to be the
state official charged with overseeing the Joint Underwriting Association.
312
The insurance company that hired the private eye was upset over losing a
$16 million contract."' The public employee was followed to a gay bar, had
his friends investigated, and had his bank account and telephone records
303. Id.
304. See Bill 0. Heder, The Development of Search and Seizure Law in Public
Schools, BYU EDUC. & L. 71 (1999).
305. Id.
306. See Harrision, supra note 302.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Nick F. De Martino, letter to the editor, Appointment Has a Disturbing Price,
MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Feb. 19, 2000, at 13B.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Lucy Morgan, Bankers Insurance Forced to Disclose Secret Records, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Sept. 3, 1999, at IC.
313. ld.
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scrutinized.314 The state employee sued the insurance company for invasion
of privacy. 15
4. Gag Orders
A group of Miami-Dade narcotics detectives and their supervisor,
accused of confiscating drugs illegally, asked a court to keep their pictures
out of the media, including newspaper and television.316 In defense of their
petition, the officers claim their lives are at risk after their booking photos
and addresses were released to the media. 7 Under state law, police
officers' personal addresses are exempt from public records laws.3' s The
Miami Herald claimed a First Amendment right to publish the officers'
pictures.3 19 The judge ordered the officers' home addresses and Social
Security numbers be omitted from their court files and enjoined the media
from broadcasting the officers' pictures.32 In a similar matter, an attorney
for four guards accused in the beating death of a death row inmate asked for
an emergency court order to prevent the release of fourteen boxes of reports,
pictures, and transcripts.321 The attorney argued that the four guards could
not get a fair trial if the contents of the boxes were released to the news
media.---
A former Hollywood police chief sued the police officers' union, claim-
ing, among other things, that the union: "engaged in a public records witch
hunt" by applying for the ex-chief's confidential psychological test results,
e-mail messages, and cell phone records.32 In another invasion of privacy
case involving public employment, a former Broward County School Board
candidate and part-time teacher recovered $850,000 in damages against the
school district for disclosing his confidential psychological records.3
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Frances Robles, Officers Want Limit on Publicity, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
Sept. 8, 1999, at 10B.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Phil Long, Guard Wants Prison-Death Files Sealed, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
July 20, 2000, at 9B.
322. Id.
323. Caroline Keough & Wanda De Marzo, Ex-Chief Sues Police Union, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Apr. 14, 2000, at lB.
324. Beth Reinhard, Bills Seek More Cash for Plaintiff, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
Dec. 1, 1999, at 3B.
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However, a public employee cannot recover more than $100,000 from the
district unless the Florida legislature agrees.
325
V. DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE
A. Off-Duty Misconduct
In the past year, public employees have been arrested for misconduct
committed while away from the workplace. Offenses ranged from: drug
possession; 3 traffic offenses;327 credit card theft;3 tax fraud;329 insurance
30331 332 S333 fihig334fraud; selling stolen property; moonlighting; guns; fighting;
325. Id.
326. David Green, Sheriffis Deputy Among 8 Men Accused of Running Drug Ring,
MIAMI HERALD (Broward), June 17, 2000, at IB; David Green, BSO Deputy Arrested in Drug
Sting, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Mar. 22, 2000, at 8B; Steve Bousquet, State Prison Guard
Fired After Arrest in Drug Sting, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Sept. 25, 1999, at lIB; Arnold
Markowitz, Miami Police are Charged in Drug Case, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Oct. 29,
1999, at 10B; Sabrina Walters, Dade Teacher's Drug Arrest Latest in Recent Trend, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Aug. 31, 1999, at 10B; David Kidwell, Broward Deputy Among 58 Held
in 2-year Sting, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Aug. 26, 1999, at IA; Adam Ramirez & Wanda
DeMarzo, Dania Mom: Teacher Gave Son Drugs, Booze, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Aug.
25, 1999, at lB.
327. Caroline J. Keough, Ambulance Driver Once a 'Habitual Traffic Offender',
MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Feb. 15, 2000, at IA; Johnny Diaz, Hollywood Cop Busted for
DUI Keeps Job-Barely, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Dec. 23, 1999, at 3B; Johnny Diaz,
Review Board: Suspended Officer Should be Fired, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Oct. 30, 1999,
at 3B (Oakland police officer fired for driving drunk while off-duty); David Green, Twin
Officers Accused in Hit-and-Run Scam, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Oct. 13, 1999, at 3B.
328. Brad Bennett, Officer Charged in Credit Card Theft, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
Apr. 22, 2000, at IA; Joan Fleischman, If the Shoe Fits, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Dec. 22,
1999, at 4A (clerk for City of Miami, moonlighting as cashier, caught putting money in her
shoe).
329. Wanda J. DeMarzo & Lisa Arthur, Firefighters Refused to Pay Taxes for Years,
MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Feb. 9,2000, at lB.
330. Arnold Markowitz, Public Workers Hauled Off to Jail for $300,000 Insurance
Scam, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Feb. 9, 2000, at 12B.
331. Manolo Barco, Arrested with Stolen Phones, Cop Fired, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Dec. 18, 1999, at 2B.
332. Arnold Markowitz, Moonlighting Cops in Jam for Working at Club, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Aug. 30, 1999, at 6B.
333. Arnold Markowitz, Weapons Purchase Gets DOT Officers Fired, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), June 5, 2000, at 8B; Wanda J. DeMarzo, Jail Guard Charged with Pulling Gun on
Driver in Crash, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Nov. 24, 1999, at 3B.
334. Sara Olkon, Bar Brawl May Cost Officer His Job, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
Sept. 4, 1999, at lIB.
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engaging in consensual sex at a sex club;335 sex with a minor;33 touching a
male police officer's private parts;337 appearing nude in a magazine
38
meeting in a hotel for sex during working hours;339 and soliciting an
undercover officer.
340
B. On-the-Job Misconduct
In the past year, public employees have been disciplined for the
following on-the-job categories of misconduct.
335. Beth Reinhard & Daniel de Vise, Teachers in Sex Club Raid Suspended, MIAMI
HERAM (Broward), Aug. 4, 1999, at lB. Subsequently, however, the public school teachers'
pay was restored, enabling them to go back to work somewhere in the 201-school Broward
district-though probably not as teachers. Daniel de Vise, Sex-Case Teachers' Pay to be
Restored, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Aug. 18, 1999, at IA. In June 2000, a Broward judge
threw out the lewdness charges, ruling that group sex is not illegal absent intent to offend.
Paul Brinkley-Rogers, Trapeze Sex Club Case Takes a Tumble, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
June 15, 2000, at lB. In July 2000, the co-owner of the Trapeze H vowed to sue the Broward
County Sheriff for false arrest. Id. Paul Brinkley-Rogers, Angry Swingers Plan Legal Action
Against Sheriff, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), July 19,2000, at lB.
336. Judy Odiema, Accused Coach Gets Lift From Supporters, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), June 22, 2000, at 12B (coach suspended over allegations he molested two of his
players); Johnny Diaz, Fondling Suspect Has Prior Arrests, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Apr.
22, 2000, at 3B (program director at a Broward social service agency suspected of molesting a
thirteen-year-old boy); Wanda J. DeMarzo, Cop in Child-Sex Case Freed on Bail, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Nov. 25, 1999, at 2C; Wanda J. DeMarzo, Sunrise Detective Arrested,
Accused of Molesting Girl, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Nov. 24, 1999, at 3B; Adam Ramirez,
Schoolteacher Pleads Not Guilty to Sex Assault Charges, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Sept. 8,
1999, at 3B.
337. Jay Weaver, Man Cleared of Sex Charge Wants Job Back, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Nov. 4, 1999, at 7B.
338. Nancy Klingener, Key West Officer Stars in Magazine 'Sex Show', MIAMI HERD
(Broward), Aug. 13, 1999, at liB.
339. Don Finefrock, 'Public Integrity' Issue Prompts Police Probe, MIAMI HELD
(Broward), Nov. 28, 1999, at lB.
340. Gail Epstein Nieves, Decoy Prostitute Recounts Officer's Offer, MIAMI HERA
(Broward), July 22, 2000, at 7B (Miami police major caught by his own department's decoy
prostitute); A Ranking Police Officer is Reassigned in Miami, N.Y. TIMES (Nat'l ed.), June 27,
2000, at A20 (Miami police officer who took part in the Elian Gonzalez raid was removed
from his job for soliciting sex from an undercover police officer); Elaine De Valle, Judge
Exonerated on Charge of Soliciting Undercover Officer, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Sept. 3,
1999 at 9B.
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1. Sex
A Hollywood High School marine biology teacher was accused of
exposing himself to a student during a field trip and attempting to kiss
another student's navel at school. 34' Three Okaloosa County sheriff's
deputies were suspected of having sex with high school interns while on the
job and supplying the interns with alcohol. 342 North Miami's 1998 Police
Officer of the Year was discharged after allegations that he masturbated in
front of a female city employee. 34  A Fort Lauderdale police officer was
accused of fondling a woman and her two daughters while searching them
amid a fake drug raid.344 A guard was accused of raping a Mexican
transsexual twice at the Krome Immigration Detention Center.345 Five
employees at Broward County's privately run work-release center for
nonviolent criminals have quit or been fired after claims they engaged in
sexual liaisons with inmates under their control.
346
2. Negligence
A firefighter was disciplined for failing to report for his night shift after
serving jury duty all day.3 47 A Fort Lauderdale police officer was suspended
thirty days without pay for standing idly by while a fellow officer allegedly
committed grand theft.34 A former building inspector was investigated for
341. Adam Ramirez, Hollywood Teacher Accused of Exposing Himself to Student,
MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Sept. 10, 1999, at 3B; see also Andrew Speranzini, Comment,
Paying for Sex-When is a School District Liable for Teacher-Student Sexual Harassment
Under Title IX?, 51 FLA. L. REV. 589 (1999).
342. Deputies Linked to Sex Scandal with Interns, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Aug. 20,
1999, at 9B.
343. Ivonne Perez, N. Miami Cop Fired After Masturbation Investigation, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Nov. 9, 1999, at lIB.
344. David Green, Police Officer Charged in Fondling Incidents, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Mar. 30,2000, at 3B.
345. Andres Viglucci, Krome Detainee Alleges Second Sex Assault by Guard, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), June 6, 2000, at 8B.
346. Jacqueline Charles, Sheriff Told to Clean Up Private Jail, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Aug. 18, 1999, at lB.
347. Hearing Considers Firefighter's Case, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Nov. 20, 1999,
at 2B.
348. Brad Bennett, Let One Accused Cop Keep Job, Panel Urges, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Apr. 27, 2000, at 7B.
[Vol. 25:207
248
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss1/1
Sanchez
allegedly shoddy inspections at several homes.3 9 A Pembroke Pines
building inspector resigned over allegations he neglected his duties.350 Five
state child care agency employees were fired after the death of a two-year-
old girl for failing to protect the child.351 Finally, a court reporter was jailed
after missing deadlines for handing in transcripts in a murder trial.
352
3. Public and Private Records Violations
A jury found an Escambia County School Board member guilty of
violating Florida's "Sunshine law" for withholding files from a parent-
although, a judge later reversed the conviction 313 In Broward County, a
deputy fire chief was fired over alleged violations of the confidentiality of
medical information about a job applicant.354
4. Public School Employee Misconduct
Two school resource officers received written warnings after allegedly
transmitting explicit e-mails on school computers. 55 A Silver Trail Middle
School teacher from Broward County was placed on paid leave for allegedly
teaching his science students how to build bombs. 56 Finally, allegations
349. Steve Harrison, Building Inspector is Target of Probe, MIAMI HERAm (Broward),
Mar. 10, 2000, at 3B.
350. Steve Harrison, Pines Inspector Resigns Amid Loafing Allegations, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), May 31, 2000, at 3B.
351. Two Lose State Jobs After Toddler's Death, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Sept. 5,
1999, at 6B.
352. Frances Robles, Ex-Court Reporter Jailed for Failing to do Transcript, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Dec. 4, 1999, at 10B.
353. Ruling May Limit Access to Records, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Nov. 9, 1999, at
12B.
354. Elena Cabral, Davie's Deputy Fire Chief Fired, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), July 2,
2000, at lB.
355. School Officers Get Warning for Explicit E-mail Videos, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), July 3, 2000, at 9B. Dismissal, not simply a warning, was the punishment meted
out to a Miami-Dade prosecutor for receiving sexually explicit e-mail at the office on a state
computer. Id.; Joan Fleischman, Prosecutorial Misconduct?, MIAMI HERAW (Broward), Dec.
8, 1999, at 4A; see James Garrity & Eoghan Casey, Internet Misuse in the Workplace: A
Lawyer's Primer, 72 FLA. BAR J., (1998), at 22.
356. Lisa Arthur, Pines Police: No Evidence Teacher Taught Bomb Class, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Apr. 5, 2000, at 9B. For an analysis of the law governing public school
teacher speech in and out of the classroom, see Rachel E. Fugate, Choppy Waters Are
Forecastfor Academic Speech, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 187 (1998).
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surfaced that Miami-Dade public school teachers changed grades of star
athletes.357
5. Phone Calls
A City of Miami audit found that city employees made hundreds of
personal long-distance calls on city phones during two months in 1999. 358
6. Safety Violations
A Miami-Dade County bus driver lost his job twice for allegedly
committing safety violations.3
7. Overtime Violations
Opa-locka police, working on overtime, allegedly protected a private
gym owned by a drug 
kingpin.31l
8. Unlawful Compensation
A former Hollywood police officer was acquitted of charges that he
promised a motorist that he would not give her a speeding ticket if she
agreed to go out with him.
361
9. Violence
Four veteran corrections officers were charged with a murder seven
months after a death row inmate was fatally beaten in his cell at a Florida
state prison.362 Two Broward County Sheriff's Office SWAT officers were
357. Ken Rodriguez, Teachers Silent in Grade Probe, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Nov.
17, 1999, at 11lB.
358. Charles Rabin, Audit: Personal Phone Calls Cost Miami Plenty, MIAMI HERAD
(Broward), June 16, 2000, at 7B.
359. Robert Steinback, Bus Driver's Firing Needs Closer Look, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Oct. 3, 1999, at lB.
360. Joseph Tanfani & Ajowa Nzinga Ifateyo, Cops: Dealer's Gym Protected, MAMI
HERALD (Broward), Aug. 29, 1999, at lB.
361. Wanda J. DeMarzo, Acquittal Allows Hollywood Ex-Cop to Move Forward,
MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Apr. 21, 2000, at lB.
362. Phil Long & Steve Bousquet, 4 Charged in Inmate Death, MIAMI HERAL
(Broward), Feb. 3, 2000, at IA.
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on paid leave pending an investigation into their shooting of a hostage taker
in Pompano Beach. In Broward County, an assistant state attorney was
charged with battery after allegedly slugging a defense attorney over a
pending case.36 A former Miami-Dade corrections officer was convicted of
beating a veteran jailhouse snitch and lying about it under oath.365
10. Lying, Unbecoming Conduct, and Vulgar Language
In Department of Business & Professional Regulation v. Doyle,36 a
public employee appealed the decision of the Public Employees Relations
Commission's ruling sustaining her dismissal from the Department for lying,
unbecoming conduct, and vulgar language.367 In another "lying" case,
prosecutors decided not to indict I-ialeah's police chief for giving false
testimony about his son's auto theft arrest when he sought to join his dad's
department.
368
11. Health-Care Fraud
Twenty-five Sunrise police officers are under investigation for their
alleged role in a medical fraud scheme in which doctors wrote illegal
prescriptions for the twenty-five police officers and conspired with them to
commit insurance fraud.3 69
C. Whistleblowing, Retaliatory Discharge, and the First Amendment
While public employees do not shed their First Amendment right to free
speech at the workplace door, public employers may place reasonable
363. 2 Officers on Paid Leave After Fatal Shooting, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Mar. 3,
2000, at 1OB.
364. Sabrina L. Miller, Judge Grants Mistrial After Attorneys' Brawl, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Aug. 25, 1999, at 3B.
365. Frances Robles, Jail Guard Convicted in Beating of Inmate, MIAM HERALD
(Broward), Nov. 12, 1999, at 12B.
366. 750 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
367. Id. at 747.
368. Frances Robles, Prosecutor: Police Chief Lied, but Won't be Charged, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), July 20, 2000, at 7B.
369. Herald Staff & Wire Reporter, Sunrise Police Records Subpoenaed in FBI
Health-Care Fraud Investigation, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), July 23, 2000, at 3BR.
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restrictions on speech in the public workplace.370 In a nutshell, speech on
matters of private concern receive virtually no protection, but speech on
matters of public concern must then be balanced against the public
employer's right to run an efficient agency.
371
In the past year, public employees' First Amendment free speech rights
cases took on many different forms. Among them was a proposed agreement
reached between Miami-Dade county and public school teachers whereby
teachers were iven more freedom to speak out on matters involving the
school district. 72 Additionally, on March 17, 2000, a federal judge ruled
that the Miami-Dade County Commission did not infringe on the free speech
rights of a member of an advisory board when it removed her for criticizing
the county's policy on Cuba. 373 As the judge put it, "Ms. McKinley was
removed because the expression of her political views affected her ability to
do her job., 374  Yet, an assistant to a state senator was dismissed after
writing a letter to a newspaper on the state e-mail system, speaking out about
the litter left by a Florida plan protester.375
In June 2000, a retired public school teacher successfully challenged the
Broward School Board's decision to fire him for refusing to remain in the
classroom while his students said the Pledge of Allegiance.376 In yet another
key case, the director of the Miami-Dade Community Relations Board was
removed from his osition for allegedly telling the former board chairman to
"kiss my a-. ,37P Finally, two employees of the Miami-Dade Police
370. See, e.g., FLA. CODE OF JuD. CONDUCT, Canon 7 (spelling out what speech by
judges and judicial candidates is permissible).
371. See, e.g., Judge Dismisses Lawsuit by Fired Assistant County Attorney, MLAMI
HERALD (Broward), Feb. 2, 2000, at 3B. A former interim Broward County attorney's claim
that he was discharged in violation of his First Amendment rights was dismissed by a federal
court judge.
372. Analisa Nazareno, Teachers Get Solid Raise in Contract Offer, MIAMI HERAD
(Broward), July 4, 2000, at 6B.
373. Don Finefrock, Judge: No Free Speech Violation, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
Mar. 25, 2000, at 8B.
374. Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 7, McKinley v.
Kaplan (S.D. Fla. 2000) (No. 97-CV-3291); see also McKinley v. Miami-Dade County, 177
F.3d 1253 (1 th Cir. 2000).
375. Steve Bousquet, Senator Fires Aide Who Wrote E-mail, MIAMI HERAD
(Broward), Mar. 11, 2000, at 10B.
376. Olivier Stephenson, Leroy Bates, Who Refused to Pledge Allegiance, MIAMI
HERAL (Broward), June 28, 2000, at 4B.
377. Andrea Robinson, County Official Fired for Remark After a Meeting, MIAMI
HERAD (Broward), Apr. 22, 2000, at 9B.
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Department were "counseled" after allegedly speaking out against Miami-
Dade's mayor who talked tough during the Elian Gonzalez affair.
3 7 8
A whistleblower is an individual who speaks out about illegal or
improper activity that he or she has witnessed and who is subsequently
punished for blowing the whistle. 379 There were a number of whistleblower
cases decided in the past year. In Fields v. United States Department of
Labor Administration Review Board,"' the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that employees who intentionally caused a violation of the
Energy Reorganization Act8 were not entitled to protection under the Act's
whistleblower provision. 82 Also, an administrative judge ordered the United
States Customs Service to clear the records of one of the most outspoken
critics of the Customs Service in Miami who had been punished for his
criticism.383 In yet another whistleblower case, three City of Hollywood
workers claimed they were victims of retaliation and discrimination after
they made statements to police probing into whether undue health benefits
were wrongfully approved for city employees and their families.3 4 In
another case, a former police officer decided to cross the blue wall of silence
and testify against other officers who shot an innocent homeless man in
Coconut Grove-a breakthrough in one of Miami's largest corruption
cases. 311 Lastly, in Chase v. Walgreen Co., 386 an employee claimed his
employer violated Florida law by retaliating against him for filing a workers'
compensation claim.3s
378. Don Finefrock, Dade Cops 'Counseled' for Remarks, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
Apr. 19,2000, at 1lB.
379. See generally FLA. STAT. § 448.102 (2000).
380. 173 F.3d811 (llthCir. 1999).
381. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a) (1994).
382. Fields, 173 F.3d at 814.
383. David Kidwell, Judge Slams U.S. Customs Targeting Whistle-Blower, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Apr. 17, 2000, at 10B; David Kidwell, Inside Critics Say Customs
Crackdown is Targeting Them, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Nov. 29, 1999, at 6B; Editorial, A
Customs Snare?, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Nov. 20, 1999, at 12B; Editorial, Reform in U.S.
Customs Service?, MIAMiHERALD (Broward), Dec. 4, 1999, at 12B.
384. Wanda J. DeMarzo, Health Benefits Scandal Broadens, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), June 28, 2000, at 1B; Neil Reisner & Wanda DeMarzo, Health Plan Boss Fired,
MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Mar. 24,2000, at lB.
385. Frances Robles, Ex-Cop Agrees to Testify Against Fellow Police Officers, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Mar. 9, 2000, at 9B.
386. 750 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
387. Id. at 94.
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D. Employment Discrimination
1. Statistics
The number of civil rights employment cases filed in federal courts has
leveled off in recent years at roughly 23,000 per year.388  By contrast,
employee lawsuits claiming their employers retaliated against them for filing
or assisting with discrimination claims has risen dramatically: twenty-four
percent of all claims lodged with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") stem from retaliation, up from fifteen percent in
1992.3"9 Indeed, Fort Lauderdale's own diversity specialist has spoken out
about the increase in retaliation against city employees who file employment
discrimination complaints.l State law prohibits retaliation against
employees for filing employment discrimination suits. 
391
Employment discrimination claims in Broward County based on race
have doubled, from eighty-eight in 1992, to 194 in 1999, according to the
EEOC.3 2 Similarly, sexual harassment claims in Broward have risen from
thirty-two in 1992, to ninety-three in 1999.393 Despite this rise, Broward
County's Human Rights Division Director, charged with investigating
discrimination claims by Broward County residents, was dismissed after
receiving a vote of "no confidence" last year from Broward's Human Rights
Board for inaction in investigating claims of bias over the years. 394 The rate
of growth of employment discrimination claims in Miami-Dade has been
slower: sexual harassment claims have gone from eighty-eight in 1992 to
170 in 1999.395 All told, harassment complaints have increased thirty-three
percent in Miami-Dade from 219 in 1992 to 292 in 1999.31
388. Richard A. Oppel Jr., Retaliation Lawsuits: A Treacherous Slope, N.Y. TllME
(Nat'l ed.), Sept. 29, 1999, at C8; see generally Bradley R. Johnson & Kevin E. Hyde, The
World of Retaliation After Robinson v. Shell Oil, 72 FLA. BAR J. 40 (1998).
389. Oppel, supra note 388.
390. Brad Bennett, Memo: Workers Punished for Complaining, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Oct. 21, 1999, at lB.
391. FLA. STAT. § 760.10(7) (2000).
392. Brad Bennett, Workplace Bias on Rise, Expert Says, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
June 16,2000, at 3B.
393. Id.
394. Brad Bennett, County Fires Embattled Anti-Discrimination Leader, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Mar. 30,2000, at lB.
395. Bennett, supra note 392.
396. Id.
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2. Race
In the past year, a wide range of cases involving employment
discrimination on grounds of race have emerged. There have been several
articles alleing that Fort Lauderdale discriminates against minority
employees. In January 2000, the EEOC ruled that the city discriminated
against two African-American workers, then retaliated against one of them
for complaining.398 The EEOC also sustained a city firefighter's claim of
racial and gender bias.3 9 Even a memorial service held by the city for
employees who have died on the job sparked racial protest. Moreover,
hiring the first African-American city manager has done little to quell
employment discrimination complaints in Fort Lauderdale. 40 1  Recently,
however, community leaders have drafted a list of recommendations aimed
at strengthening fairness for city workers and will submit them to the City
Commission.4°r Fort Lauderdale released a report in July 2000, which
showed that the city's work force is twenty-one percent black, which is
higher than the percentage of blacks in Broward County, fifteen percent,
while admitting that most minority employees fill the lower ranks.4 s Black
state legislators urged the governor to conduct an outside investigation into
the alleged "long history" of racial discrimination against African-American
employees in Florida's prisons." A Miami-Dade teacher, who was
dismissed, alleged she was discriminated against for her hih-profile work
on behalf of South Florida's African-American community. The NAACP
397. Brad Bennett, City's Bias Claims Persist, MIAMI HERAD (Broward), Apr. 10,
2000, at IA; Brad Bennett, Finding: Fort Lauderdale Discriminated Again, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Apr. 1, 2000, at lB.
398. Brad Bennett, Workers' Charges Upheld, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Jan. 21,
2000, at IA.
399. Adrienne Samuels, U.S. Panel Backs Firefighter's Claims of Bias, MMI HERALD
(Broward), Mar. 14,2000, at lB.
400. Brad Bennett, Memorial for Lauderdale Employees Sparks Debate, MIAMI
HERAL (Broward), Apr. 29, 2000, at 3B.
401. Brad Bennett, Black Activists Criticize Fort Lauderdale, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Nov. 17, 1999, at 3B; Brad Bennett, Lauderdale Leader Committed to Making a
Difference, M IHERAlD (Broward), Nov. 21, 1999, at 1BR.
402. Brad Bennett, Plan Seeks Fairness for City Employees, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Nov. 13, 1999, at lB.
403. Brad Bennett, Ft. Lauderdale Report Touts City Record for Hiring Blacks, MiAm
HERALD (Broward), July 22,2000, at lB.
404. Lesley Clark, Prison Racism Probe Demanded by Legislators, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Mar. 30,2000, at 9B.
405. Robert Sanchez, Race Accusations Fly Over Teacher's Impending Firing, MAMI
HERALD (Broward), April 10, 2000, at 8B.
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characterized Sarasota County's reassignment of the sole black man holding
the key post at a county public school as racist.406
3. Gender
a. Sexual Harrasment
A recurring theme over the last year involving sexual harassment stems
from the situation of a public employer rehiring a known sexual harasser.407
Less than a year after a Hollywood police officer was dismissed for
"leering" at a female officer, he was rehired as a police officer by the Fort
Lauderdale Police Department. 408  A parking enforcement officer for Fort
Lauderdale who was warned he would be dismissed for sexually harassing
female colleagues got a second chance, but harassment complaints
continued.409 In another case involving Fort Lauderdale, the city was
ordered to pay $70,000 to a female city employee who filed for harassment
410that took place after the city had fired, and then rehired the harasser. In
yet another incident, a state representative twice pressured the Department of
Corrections administrators to rehire a former prison chief earlier dismissed
for, among other things, sexual harassment.411
b. Sexual Assault
A federal jury found a former Opa-locka City Manager liable for sexual
harassment and awarded the receptionist $1.5 million for assault and
$500,000 for sexual harassment.412
406. Reassignment Questioned, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Nov. 26, 1999, at IC.
407. See Jason L. Gunter & Tammie L. Rattray, Recent Developments in Employer
Liability for Sexual Harassment; Elerth & Faragher, 72 FLA. BAR J. 94 (1998); see also
Graham Penn, "Because I'm the Boss:" Employer Liability for Supervisors' Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment, 51 FLA. L. REV. 373 (1999).
408. Pedro Acevedo & David Green, Cop's Sex Misconduct Record No Secret, MIAMI
HERAL (Broward), Apr. 1, 2000, at lB.
409. Brad Bennett, Sex Harassment Case Comes Back to Haunt Fort Lauderdale,
Official, MiAMI HERALD (Broward), Sept. 30, 1999, at IA.
410. Editorial, Lauderdale's Slow Learners, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Oct. 1, 1999,
at 10B.
411. David Cox, Corrections Says Legislator Taking Revenge on Agency, SuN
SENTINEL (Broward) at 10B.
412. Ajowa Nzinga Ifateyo, Receptionist Wins Sex-Assault Suit, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Apr. 5,2000, at 10B.
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c. Sexually-Explicit Comments
The vice mayor of Pembroke Park, located in Broward County, was
sued by a former city employee who alleged the vice mayor made sexually
explicit comments over a five year period.411 The director of Broward
Community College's Buehler Planetarium was placed on administrative
leave pending an investigation into a secretary's claim of sexual
harassment.414 By one account, the county employee alleges she overheard
the director tell a joke containing sexual content.415  Subsequently, the
director's contract with Broward Community College was not renewed,
allegedly on grounds unrelated to the sexual harassment complaint.416 A
Miami-Dade county employee sued the county, alleging her boss told sexual
jokes, remarked about her attire, invited her to the movies, wrote her about
his fantasies, and staged a hotel room tryst on a business trip.4 17 A jury
found a former Northwestern High School principal liable for sexual
harassment and awarded the victim $500,000 plus $100,000 for humiliation
and $100,000 in punitive damages.4 8 Allegedly, the principal waved a wad
of $100 bills in the victim's face while asking, "Is this enough for you?" 419
What is severe or pervasive conduct? In Mendoza v. Borden, Inc.,42
the Eleventh Circuit ruled in a Florida case that a supervisor's persistent
following and staring at an employee did not amount to severe or pervasive
conduct sufficient to change the employee's terms or conditions of
employment.421 For this reason, the employee's hostile environment sexual
harassment claim was dismissed.422
413. Andrea Elliott, Ex-Pembroke Park Worker Charges Sexual Harassment, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), May 24,2000, at 1lB.
414. Wanda J. DeMarzo, BCC Planetarium Chief Accused of Sex Harassment, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Feb. 19,2000, at 3B.
415. Id.
416. Shari Rudavsky, BCC Officials Oppose Renewing Contract of Planetarium
Director, MIAM HERAW (Broward), June 27,2000, at 3B.
417. Harriet Johnson Brackey, Sex and Work Mix Poorly, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
Oct. 8, 1999, at IC.
418. Editorial, She Sued, She Won-and Now She Forgives, MAMI HERALD (Broward),
Jan. 7, 2000, at 12B.
419. Id.
420. 195 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1674(2000).
421. Id. at 1252.
422. Id. at 1253.
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4. Religion
Under federal and state anti-discrimination laws, employers bear the
duty of reasonable accommodation of their employees' religious beliefs and
practices. In a recent case, Hellinger v. Eckerd Corp.,42 3 a Jewish pharmacist
was turned down for employment because his religious beliefs compelled
him to refuse to sell condoms. 4 2 The court denied the employer's motion
for summary judgment reasoning that a jury must decide whether it is an
undue burden for the employer to accommodate Hellinger's religious beliefs
by, for example, relocating condoms to another part of the store, or allowing
him to direct condom buyers to cashiers at the front of the store, 25
5. Age
Since 1995, the United States Supreme Court has struck down twenty-
four federal statutes, ruling that in each case Congress had exceeded its
authority under the Constitution of the United States.42 The latest casualty
in the Court's foray into federalism was congressional efforts to extend the
federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act to state employees. 427 In a
case out of Florida, Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,428 the Court held that
neither the Commerce Clause, nor section five of the Fourteenth Amendment
enabled Congress to waive states' sovereign immunity. 429 As a result of this
ruling, state employees have the following options in remedying age
discrimination: 1) they can sue under Florida's statute banning age
discrimination-although procedures, standards and remedies may not
reflect erstwhile protection under the Federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act; 2) the federal government can sue states-but scarce
resources make this option illusory; 3) public officials can be sued in their
individual capacities for age discrimination-but you can't squeeze blood
out of a turnip; 4) the state can waive its immunity-which is highly
423. 67 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
424. Id. at 1361.
425. David Kidwell, Jewish Pharmacist Battles Eckerd Over Condoms, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Feb. 5, 2000, at 1 lB.
426. See generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
427. See Joanne C. Brant, The Ascent Of Sovereign Immunity, 83 IOWA L. REV. 767
(1998); see also Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: The Proper
Textual Basis of the Supreme Court's Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 Nw. U.
L. REV. 819 (1999).
428. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
429. Id. at 78-82.
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unlikely; and 5) states can be sued for injunctive relief-arguably allowing
reinstatement as a partial remedy, but no recovery of damages.
430
6. Disability
The United States Supreme Court has agreed to hear a case calling into
question Congress' authority to give state employees the right to sue other
state employees in federal court under the ADA.431 Judging by the Court's
ruling in Kimel and its newfound inclination to challenge congressional
power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, disabled state
workers may end up with the same weak options victims of age
discrimination that they had before that Supreme Court decision.
In other disability cases, Miami Beach settled an "excessive force-false
arrest" lawsuit against an IV-positive police officer who sustained cuts on
his hands during an arrest even though the law denies damages "for the fear
of having AIDS, even if you don't get it.''4 32 The plaintiff's attorney claimed
it was a health hazard for the city to allow an BIV-positive officer to have
contact with the public.433 The Broward County clerk of records came under
fire for not resignin his position despite being disabled and unable to fulfill
his official duties. A Miami Herald editorial urged state lawmakers to
find ways to encourage disabled public officials to resign or to provide a
means of removing them without disgracing them.435
Another ADA case, Davis v. Florida Power & Light Co., 36 addressed
the question of what is an essential function of an employee's job for
purposes of proving that an employee is a qualified individual under the
ADA.437 In this case, the court ruled that mandatory overtime work was an
430. See Kimel, 528 U.S. 62.
431. Garrett v. Univ. of Ala., 193 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct.
1669 (2000) (holding that where state employee sued state after allegedly suffering disability
discrimination at the University of Alabama following treatment for breast cancer, states have
no constitutional immunity from ADA lawsuits). Id. at 1216.
432. Joan Fleischman, Beach Settles Brutality Suit Filed Against HIV Cop, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Apr. 5, 2000, at liB; see Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998)
(providing that asymptomatic HIV disease is a disability under the ADA); see also Joanne L.
Wisner, Comment. Asymptomatic HIV Disease as a Disability Under the Americans With
Disabilities Act: A Contrast Between Bragdon v. Abbott and Runnebaunm v. Nations Bank of
Maryland, 33 NEW ENG. L R-v. 217 (1998).
433. Id.
434. Editorial, Dignity For Disabled Officials, MIAl HERALD (Broward), Jan. 13,
2000, at 10B.
435. Id.
436. 205 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied 121 S. Ct. 304 (2000).
437. Id. at 1304; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
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essential function of an employee's job and that accommodating the
employee's request of no overtime or selective overtime was not required by
the ADA, since it entailed violating the collective bargaining agreement's
seniority provisions.
438
7. Affirmative Action
On July 13, 2000, the Supreme Court of Florida ruled that four
proposed constitutional amendments offered by the Florida Civil Rights
Initiative that would have ended affirmative action in public employment, as
well as in public education and purchasing, were misleading and
overbroad.439  The unanimous decision made clear that the proposed
amendments were too wide-ranging and would short circuit state efforts
aimed at protecting citizens against discrimination, a role mandated by
Florida's Constitution."
°
On the issue of bidding for construction contracts, many municipalities
have prescribed so-called "set-aside" laws, which require that a certain
percentage of public construction contracts go to minority-owned
businesses.4 1 As a version of affirmative action on grounds of race and
gender, these laws have been challenged as violations of equal protection.4
2
Despite the trend of striling down this version of preferential treatment,
some laws have survived judicial scrutif. ,3
In United States v. City of Miami, a public employees' union sued the
City of Miami, claiming that promotions of two African-American police
officers violated a consent decree ordering the city to set promotional goals
for members of minority groups." 5 While the federal district court held the
city in contempt and awarded full relief to white and Hispanic police officers
who were injured by the city's action, the court of appeals ruled that the
438. Davis, 205 F.3d at 1305.
439. In re Amendment to Bar Gov't from Treating People Differently Based on Race in
Pub. Educ., 25 Fla. L. Weekly S546 (Fla. July 13, 2000).
440. Fla. Court Rejects Measures Against Affirmative Action, Los ANGELES TIMES,
July 14, 2000, at A15.
441. See Steven A. Holmes, What is a Minority-Owned Business, N.Y. Tam (Nat'l
ed.), Oct. 12, 1999, at C6 ("Some say 51% ownership; others go with 30%.").
442. Fred Grimm, Low-Income Housing it Isn't, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Oct. 19,
1999, at lB.
443. Don Finefrock, Judge Refuses to Stop Minority Set-Asides, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Oct. 5, 1999, at 10B (a Miami federal judge sustained Miami-Dade County's set-
aside program for minority architects and engineers).
444. 195 F.3d 1292 (1 lth Cir. 1999).
445. Id. at 1294.
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proper remedy was pro rata share, not full share, of the monetary value of the
promotion for which each injured officer was eligible."
E. Remedies for Wrongful Discharge
1. Money Damages
After eight years of legal wrangling, a former Broward County School
Board candidate recovered $600,000 from the school board for leakin
confidential psychological reports of the candidate to the news media.
Transcripts of interviews described the former Oakland Park teacher as
plotting to kill his aunt in an inheritance dispute." s Five hundred thousand
dollars of the total damage award needed legislative approval since state law
requires legislative approval of large negligence claims against government
agencies. The jury had awarded the successful litigant $750,000, but the
full Senate only approved an additional $500,000. Finally, a jury awarded
a former Hollywood police chief $200,000 in damages and attorneys' fees
against the city for discharging him in violation of whistleblower laws, after
he reported hiring problems in his department to the state attorney's
office.
451
2. Attorneys' Fees
The City of Fort Lauderdale was ordered to pay $31,000 in legal fees
incurred by an African-American city employee who sued the city for
destroying documents that would have helped his employment
discrimination case against the city.452 Similarly, the City of Hollywood was
ordered to pay its wrongfully dismissed police chief $269,000 in legal
446. Id. at 1300.
447. Daniel de Vise, Oakland Park Teacher May Get $600,000, MiAMI HERALD
(Broward), Mar. 21, 2000, at 3B.
448. Id.
449. Daniel de Vise, Teacher Awarded an Extra $500,000, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
Mar. 9,2000, at 3B.
450. Daniel de Vise, Ex-Teacher Nears Award in Suit Against School Board, MIAMI
HERAL (Broward), Feb. 10, 2000, at 3B.
451. Caroline J. Keough, Ousted Hollywood Chief Wins Lawsuit, MIAMI HERA
(Broward), Mar. 10, 2000, at IA.
452. Brad Bennett, Lauderdale Loses Records Dispute, MIAMI HERA (Broward),
May 19,2000, at lB.
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fees.453  The former chief convinced a jury that the city violated
whistleblower laws by firing him after he disclosed hiring improprieties in
his department to state officials.454 When a public employee convinces the
Public Employees Relations Commission ("PERC") that he or she was
wrongfully disciplined, state law dictates that the Commission award
455 46
reasonable attorneys' fees. In Gaston v. Department of Revenue, 5
however, the court ruled that the statutory amendment did not apply to a case
that was no longer pending before PERC on the amendment's effective
date.457
3. Reinstatement and Back Pay
A former City of Miami employee who pleaded guilty to five felonies
involving voter fraud asked an arbitrator for his job back and $52,000 in
back pay. 58 The former employee claimed the city failed to investigate over
twenty other employees who allegedly committed voter fraud as well.
459
Similarly, a Miami-Dade building inspector, indicted for allowing Dadeland
Station to open in shoddy condition, sued the county seeking reinstatement,
and $5 million for emotional distress, after state prosecutors dropped their
case against him."0
4. Appeals to Public Employees Relations Commission
In Noone v. Florida Department of Corrections,461 the question raised
was whether PERC properly refused to hear an appeal by a dismissed public
employee after he failed to show up at a hearing." 2 PERC ruled that the
employee was not at fault for failing to keep in touch with his attorney.
463
453. Wanda J. Demarzo, $269,000 More Goes to Fired Cop, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), May 6, 2000, at 6B.
454. Id.
455. FLA. STAT. § 447.208(3)(e) (2000).
456. 742 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
457. Id. at 520.
458. Manny Garcia, Vote-Fraud Player Seeks Old Job as City of Miami's Systems
Worker, Lost Wages, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Aug. 26, 1999, at lB.
459. Id.
460. Don Finefrock, Suspended Dade Building Official Sues for His Job-Plus
Damages, MIAMIHERALD (Broward), Dec. 3, 1999, at 5B.
461. 745 So. 2d481 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
462. Id. at 481.
463. Id. at 482.
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As a result, the court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for an
evidentiary hearing. 44
5. Section 1985(3) Claims Alleging Conspiracy Under the Civil Rights Act
In a case of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit, Dickerson v.
Alachua County Commission,45 the court was faced with the question of
whether a Title VII claim preempts a subsection three of section 1985 claim
where the same facts support both claims.'4 Subsection three of section
1985 provides for the recovery of damages by an individual who is harmed
by a conspiracy to deprive such person of equal protection of the laws or of
equal privileges and immunities under the laws.46 7 The question raised in
this case was whether Title VII, with its comprehensive remedial scheme,
affords the sole remedy for employment discrimination raised by a public
employee. 8  The court concluded that Title VII does not preempt a
constitutional cause of action under subsection three of section 1985, relying
on congressional intent to retain that section as a parallel remedy for
unconstitutional workplace discrimination.4
9
The second issue in Dickerson involved the "intracorporate conspiracy
doctrine," which provides that a corporation's employees, serving as agents
of the corporation, are deemed incapable of conspiring among themselves or
with the corporation, just as it is not possible for an individual to conspire
with himself. This doctrine has been applied to public universities as
well.471  Relying on circuit precedent, the court concluded that the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine barred the employee's civil rights
conspiracy claim.4
2
464. Id.
465. 200 F.3d 761 (1 Ith Cir. 2000).
466. Id. at 765.
467. Id. at 766.
468. Id.
469. Id. at 766-67.
470. 200 F.3d at 767; see also Chambliss v. Foote, 562 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1977),
aft'g, 421 F. Supp. 12, 15 (E.D. La. 1976) (applying the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to
foreclose a section 1985(3) claim against a public university and its officials).
471. Chambliss, 562 F.2d at 1015.
472. See Dickerson, 200 F.3d at 770.
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6. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
In Public Health Trust v. Hernandez,4" the court denied an employee's
motion to compel arbitration of his dispute with his employer, a Miami-Dade
County agency.474 Instead, the employee was ordered first to exhaust his
administrative remedies, i.e., the four step grievance procedure set out in the
collective bargaining agreement.
475
VI. PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ISSUES
A. Union Election Issues
The biggest public employee union vote in over a decade in South
Florida, involving 5400 employees in four public hospitals and two dozen
clinics, ended after eighteen months of bitter campaigning. 476 Nurses and
other hospital professionals at the North Broward Hospital District voted
1242 to 957 against joining the Service Employees International Union in
November 1999.477 The union has vowed to appeal the outcome to Florida's
Labor Relations Board, alleging wrongdoing by the hospital district and state
election monitors.478 A few days before the nurses and professional
employees voted, the non-professional employees at the public hospital
voted against joining a union as well. 479 The vote took place after the state
PERC turned down union claims that the election process was undermined
because the chair of the commission had a conflict of interest-she is
married to a paid district lobbyist.40 The union also tried to delay the vote
owing to the hospital district's failure to hand over an accurate list of eligible
employees' addresses,48' because no hearing had been held addressing union
allegations that the hospital district had committed unfair campaign
473. 751 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
474. Id. at 125.
475. Id.
476. Bob LaMendola, Union Campaign Nearing Bitter End, SUN SENT i (Broward),
Nov. 14, 1999, at lB.
477. Staff Reports, Professionals, Nurses Nix Union, SUN SENTNERL (Broward), Nov.
21, 1999, at 3B.
478. Id.
479. Karen Rafinski, Union Fights Uphill Battle to Sign Up Hospital Workers, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Nov. 20, 1999, at 4B.
480. Union Election Begins at Hospital District, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Nov. 17,
1999, at 2B.
481. See id. The district relied on a state law effective July 1999, that bars it from
disclosing the home addresses of healthcare workers.
[Vol. 25:207
264
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss1/1
Sanchez
practices,8 and because of practical problems over the way the election was
being conducted. 3 Nurses triggered the union drive after layoffs owing to a
1995 budget deficit increased their work load. In March 2000, the district
and the union reached a settlement over some of the union's outstanding
claims of unfair labor practices committed during the campaign.484
B. Government Unions
Union membership in the public sector grew from 37.2% in 1997 to
37.5% in 1998, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 45 During the
same period, membership in the private sector fell to 9.5% from 9.7% 46
This trend owes much to the fact that generally government employers do
not fight unionization, while many private employers do. 8 7
The nation's largest public sector union, the American Federation of
State, County and Municipal Employees ("AFSCMB"), faced charges of
corruption recently. An internal audit spelled out how union officers
"forged checks, made unauthorized withdrawals from- union accounts,
siphoned union dues into their personal accounts and used union credit cards
for personal expenses.
'
"
9
Closer to home, the Broward State Attorney's office launched an
investigation into AFSCME Local 532, the union representing Fort
Lauderdale city employees.490 City employees claim the union refused to
release financial records detailing where members' dues money was
going.491 The investigation came amid a challenge by the Fraternal Order ofPolice to replace AFSCME Local 532 to represent 1000 city employees.492 In
482. Vivi Abrams, Union: Hospital District Unfair, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Oct.
13, 1999, at 3B.
483. Union Seeks Delay In Hospital Workers' Vote, MAMI HERALD (Broward), Nov. 9,
1999, at 2B.
484. Hospital District, Union Settle Grievances, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Mar. 11,
2000, at 2B.
485. Steven Greenhouse, Union Membership Rose in '98, but Unions' Percentage of
Work Force Fell, N.Y. TZIEs (Nat'l ed.), Jan. 26, 1999, at A20.
486. Id.
487. Id.
488. Steven Greenhouse, Document Details Abuses in a Union of Civil Servants, N.Y.
Ti1as (Nat'l ed.), Jan. 21,2000, at Al.
489. Id.
490. Brad Bennett, City Workers Union Target of Investigation, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Feb. 10, 2000, at 3B.
491. Id.
492. Brad Bennett, Union Aims to Compete for Workers, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
Feb. 9, 2000, at 3B.
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Miami, the head of the AFSCME union representing city employees
criticized Miami commissioners, the police, and fire unions during a
commission meeting on the city's budget.493 In sum, the union leader
criticized the police department's paying overtime to officers-instead of
civilian public employees-to manage its central communications
network.494  Similarly, he criticized the fire department for relying on
firefighters rather than civilian union employees to manage its
communications.
495
C. Bargaining Impasses
The law enjoins employers and the union elected as the employees'
exclusive bargaining representative to bargain in good faith over the terms
and conditions of employment until they reach impasse, i.e., a deadlock. In
the past year, collective bargaining disputes have arisen primarily among
public school teachers and police officers.
For instance, Broward County's 13,000 public school teachers reached
an impasse with the Broward County School Board just before classes began
last year.4 96 Disagreement ranged over wages, requiring teachers to meet
after school hours, and the fate of an early retirement plan.497 Miami-Dade
Community College ("MDCC") teachers still had no contract with the
MDCC District eighteen months after they voted to unionize in March,
1998.498 To make matters worse, the faculty union filed suit to revoke a four
year contract extension for the district's president who negotiated with the
union.499  Finally, on February 1, 2000, MDCC's unionized professors
ratified a collective bargaining agreement containing their first pay raise in
two years, but it required professors to spend thirty-five hours a week on
campus-the agreement ended bitter fighting at the nation's largest
community college. 500 Meanwhile, faculty at Broward Community College's
Central Campus were up in arms over a reorganization that eliminated
493. Tyler Bridges, Union Leader Decries Budget Choices, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
Sept. 16, 1999, at 8B.
494. Id.
495. Id.
496. Beth Reinhard, Teachers, Board at Impasse in Talks Over New Contract, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Aug. 26, 1999, at 3B.
497. Id.
498. Jack Wheat, Union Slams MDCC President's Contract, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Aug. 31, 1999, at 10B.
499. Id.
500. Jack Wheat, Community College, Professors Hammer Out Contract, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Feb. 1, 2000, at 8B.
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faculty positions.50' It is estimated that Florida will need 100,000 new
public school teachers by the end of the decade, leading school districts and
teachers unions to come up with innovative ways of reducing the attrition
rate among all teachers, but especially among beginning teachers.5 2
In law enforcement, the City of Miramar and its police union have all
but agreed to a new contract after ten months of negotiations.50 3 In June,
1999, the union rejected the city's contract terms, 107 to zero." Finally, the
parties resolved differences over salary and overtime pay °50 5  Other
noteworthy provisions of the proposed contract include cutting off-duty
overtime pay for time spent on standby for court appearances in exchange
for across-the-board wage increases, and increasing the minimum pay
officers receive for their court appearances.5 6  Several months later,
relations between the Miramar police officers and the police chief were
strained over new policies, and a department reorganization was undertaken
.507by the chief without consultation with the union. Similarly, a survey
conducted by the Pinecrest Police Union uncovered unrest in the department
over understaffing and fears of retaliation against whistleblowers
5 08
VII. CONCLUSION
Public sector employment law covers a lot of ground. Every stage of
employment, from hiring, to the terms of employment, to employment
discrimination, to discipline and discharge, and even retirement,
unemployment, and pensions raise a host of legal issues that sorted out under
federal or state constitutions, under federal, state, or local statutory law, or
under the common law governing torts and contracts. To complicate
matters, some laws cover both private and public employees, some cover
only one or the other, and some employees are not covered at all. As this
article makes clear, both public employees as well as public officials are
501. Lisa Arthur and Wanda DeMarzo, Faculty, Provost Skirmish at BCC, MAAH
HERALD (Broward), Mar. 23,2000, at lB.
502. Robert Sanchez, Schools, Unions Do Homework to Cut Teacher Attrition Rates,
MIAMI HER (Broward), Mar. 21, 2000, at 8B.
503. David D'Addio, Miramar, Police Union Move Closer to Settling on a Three-Year
Contract, Aug. 5, 1999, at 3B.
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. Juan Carlos Rodriguez, Miramar Officers, Chief Will Meet in Attempt to Ease
Strife, MANH HERAL (Broward), Feb. 10, 2000, at 3B.
508. Eunice Ponce, Survey of Pinecrest Ranks Shows Problems, Police Union Says,
MIAMI HERALD (Broward), June 25, 2000, at 3B.
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always under the watchful eye of the news media. This means that any
measure of wrongdoing, whether willfully or innocently committed, is grist
for the newspaper mill. For this reason, legal issues involving public
officials (and even employees) are fresh as this morning's headlines.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Everyday in courtrooms throughout Florida, plaintiff and defendant trial
lawyers and trial judges engage in a healthy debate over jury instructions. It
is here that the law of Florida is really made and unmade. No area of the law
engenders more of a debate than product liability law.' These debates
routinely dissect warranty, negligence, and strict liability causes of action.
Thankfully, the Supreme Court of Florida provides guidance for trial lawyers
and trial judges through the Florida Standard Jury Instructions.2 These
standard jury instructions cover express and implied warranty product
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center.
J.D., car laude, Gonzaga University, 1977; B.A., magna cum laude, Gonzaga University,
1973. The author gratefully acknowledges and thanks Karen Slater, J.D., Nova Southeastern
University Shepard Broad Law Center, 2002, for her superior work in the preparation of this
article.
1. John Howie & Ladd Sanger, Failure to Warn: The Difference Between Strict
Liability and Negligence from a Plaintiff's Perspective, 13 AIR & SPACE L. 3 (1999).
2. See generally Fa. Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases (1998).
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liability claims, strict liability manufacturing and design defect claims,3 and
negligence claims.4 Yet, something is missing!
What is missing are Florida Standard Jury Instructions for negligent
failure to warn and strict liability failure to warn causes of action. Absent
this guidance from the supreme court, trial lawyers and trial judges scramble
to put together jury instructions of which neither the lawyers, nor the judges,
can be confident will hold up on appeal. What should be a healthy debate
becomes a needless, unhealthy debate.
The purpose of this article is to propose standard jury instructions for
product liability negligent failure to warn and strict liability failure to warn
causes of action for use in the Florida courts. The article first examines
Florida law concerning negligent failure to warn and strict liability failure to
warn product liability causes of action. Next, the article presents proposals
for negligent failure to warn and strict liability failure to warn jury
instructions based on Florida law. Finally, the article concludes with an
analysis of the proposed standard jury instructions.
]H. THE FLORIDA LAW OF NEGLIGENT AND STRICT LIABILITY FAILURE TO
WARN CLAIMS IN PRODUCT LIABILITY CASES
Whether a substantive difference exists between theories of negligent
failure to warn and strict liability failure to warn has long been a topic of
debate. 5 Because theories of strict liability and negligence in the failure to
warn context use some of the same terminology and address some of the
same issues, many courts blur the line that separates each theory into distinct
causes of action. Some have gone as far as to deny that any practical
difference exists, insisting that strict liability and negligent failure to warn
claims are interchangeable. This debate seemingly. originated with the
writing of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and continues with the drafting
of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, Product Liability.9 While other states
and academics characterize the difference between negligent and strict
3. Id.§§PL4,5.
4. Id. § 3.2.
5. See Richard N. Pearson, Strict Liability and Failure to Warn, 3 PROD. LIAB. L.J.
108 (1992); see also Howie & Sanger, supra note 1, at 3.
6. THE FLORIDA BAR CONTNUING LEGAL EDUCATION, PRODUCTS LABILITY IN
FLORIDA § 2.4, (3d ed. 1995) (hereinafter PRODUCTS LLABIIrIY).
7. Howie & Sanger, supra note 1, at 3.
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
9. RESTATEMENT (IMD) oFTORTS: PRODuCTS LIABMrY § 2 (1997); Pearson, supra
note 5, at 108.
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liability failure to warn claims as "fuzzy,"'' "difficult,"'" and "illusory, 12
Florida has chosen to separate strict liability failure to warn and negligent
failure to warn claims. Perhaps the easiest way to understand the
distinction between these two causes of action under Florida law is to first
examine how these claims are the same.
Under either a negligence theory or a strict liability theory, product
sellers and manufacturers must warn foreseeable users of a product.
14
Further, liability for failure to warn foreseeable product users will extend to
those who suffer personal injury or property damage as a result of using the
product, or being within the vicinity of the use of the product. 15 Hence, a
manufacturer's liability in negligence and strict liability extends to
bystanders.' 6 An exception to this rule can be found in cases where the
product is a drug, prescribed for a patient's use through a physician. In these
cases, the manufacturer is only required to warn the prescribing physician.1
7
Florida's adoption of this "learned intermediary rule," did not, however,
protect the manufacturer of fingerprint ink cleaner for injury to a prisoner
because the police were not considered "learned intermediaries.
A failure to warn claim, whether sounding in negligence or strict
liability, includes not only failing to warn of a particular risk, but also giving
an inadequate warning.' In short, the mere existence of a warning is not
dispositive of the adequacy of the warning. An adequate warning must
notify the user not only of the dangerous propensities of the product, but also
of the dangers of use and misuse.20 The wording in a warning must be
directed to the significant dangers arising from the failure to use the groduct
in the prescribed manner, such as the risk of serious injury or death. 1 The
failure of a warning to effectively communicate the risk consistent with this
10. PRODUCrS LiAnIrrY, supra note 6, at § 2.4.
11. See Michael A. Pittenger, Note, Reformulating the Strict Liability Failure to
Warn, 49 WAsH. & LEaL. REv. 1509, 1510 (1992).
12. Howie & Sanger, supra note 1, at 3.
13. Ferayomi v. Hyundai Motor Co., 711 So. 2d 1167, 1169 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
14. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Janssens, 463 So. 2d 242, 248-49 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1984); 3 Fla. Torts (MB) § 70.21 [2][d] (2000).
15. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 89 (Fla. 1976).
16. Id.
17. Upjohn Co. v. MacMurdo, 562 So. 2d 680, 683 (Fla. 1990).
18. Hayes v. Spartan Chem. Co., 622 So. 2d 1352, 1354 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1993).
19. Howie & Sanger, supra note 1, at 4.
20. Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So. 2d 603, 607 (Fla. 1958).
21. Brown v. Glade & Grove Supply, Inc., 647 So. 2d 1033, 1036 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1994).
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standard renders the warning inadequate and the product seller or
manufacturer liable.22
The wording or language of a product warning must be of such intensity
as to attract the attention of a product user and be commensurate with the
potential danger in using the product.23 For example, a warning label on a
chemical sealant was considered inadequate because it "did not particularly
call attention to itself' by its composition, type, or color, and failed to
communicate with sufficient intensity the severity of the danger in the use of
the sealant.2
A warning may also be considered inadequate by virtue of its location.
Where the driver of a tractor was killed when the tractor he was operating
rolled over, a warning in the user's manual would not preclude a finding that
the manufacturer was liable for failing to adequately warn.2 The court
explained that just because a warning in an instruction manual is adequate, ajury could find a manufacturer liable for failing to warn because the warning
was not affixed to the tractor.27 Further, the fact that a warning complies
with industry guidelines for warnings does not automatically render the
warning adequate.2
Finally, both a negligent and strict liability failure to warn case can be
based on the failure of a manufacturer to warn of potential dangers from the
misuse of a product. A manufacturer must warn of a product danger, which
could cause injury, if the misuse of the product is foreseeable.29
From the foregoing, it would be quite easy for trial lawyers and judges
to conclude that with so many overlapping principles, a negligent failure to
warn and a strict liability failure to warn claim are identical and
interchangeable.30 But if Florida trial lawyers and judges so concluded, theywould be fooled.
Ill. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN AND STRICT
LIABILITY FAILURE TO WARN CAUSES OF ACTION
The key to understanding the real difference between negligent and
strict liability failure to warn claims rests with an analysis of the seller's or
22. Brito v. Palm Beach, 753 So. 2d 109, 113 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct App. 1998).
23. Radiation Tech., Inc. v. Ware Constr. Co., 445 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1983); Am.
Cyananid Co. v. Roy, 466 So. 2d 1079, 1082 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
24. Roy, 466 So. 2d at 1082-83.
25. Brown, 647 So. 2d at 1035.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. High v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 610 So. 2d 1259, 1262 (Fla. 1992).
30. See PRODUCTS I.AxLrrY, supra note 6, at § 2.4.
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manufacturer's knowledge of product risks.31 Negligent failure to warn is
just that, a negligence cause of action.32 Therefore, a product seller or
manufacturer must warn of product risks if a reasonably prudent product
seller or manufacturer would supply such a warning.33 Implicit in this rule
of law is the requirement that a reasonably prudent product seller need only
warn about product risks known to such seller or those kinds of product risks
which a reasonably prudent product seller should have known about.3 A
reasonably prudent product seller or manufacturer is considered an expert
with expert knowledge about its own product.35 Therefore, if a reasonably
prudent product seller could reasonably foresee injury to a product user,
however rare, the product seller or manufacturer has a duty to warn.36
In contrast, strict liability is not concerned with the reasonably prudent
seller or manufacturer standard.37  Strict liability does not require an
evaluation of the product seller or manufacturer's conduct.38 A product
seller can be found strictly liable for failing to warn even though the seller
was completely non-negligent.39 Under Florida law, a prima facie case of
strict liability does not require a showing of negligence.' In a strict liability
failure to warn case, the product seller will be liable for failing to warn about
a product risk that was known or knowable in light of the prevailing and
generally recognized best scientific information available at the time of
product manufacture and sale.
4
'
Florida law recognizes that absent the requirement that the product
seller have actual or constructive knowledge of product risk, a strict liability
failure to warn claim would render a product seller an insurer.42 Florida
clearly rejects imposing strict liability on a product seller for failing to warn
of product risks it could not have known about.43 Further, Florida rejects the
theory of imputing knowledge of product risks which were not knowable at
the time of product manufacture and sale to the product seller to set up a
31. 3 Fla. Torts (MB) § 70.21 [2][d][v] (2000).
32. See 41A FLA. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 19 (1995).
33. See id.
34. See 3 Fla. Torts (MB) § 70.21 [2][d][i] (2000).
35. Advance Chem. Co. v. Harter, 478 So. 2d 444, 448 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
36. I
37. Ferayorni v. Hyundai Motor Co., 711 So. 2d 1167, 1172 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
38. Id.
39. Jennings v. BIC Corp., 181 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 1999); Ferayorni, 711 So. 2d at
1171.
40. Ferayorni, 711 So. 2d at 1172.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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strict liability claim." Finally, it is important to note that a product seller is
required to warn only of those risks which are known or discoverable based
on the prevailing and best scientific information available, as opposed to
every risk which might be suggested by some obscure piece of research or
information.45
The foregoing distinction in Florida law between a negligent and a strict
liability failure to warn claim can be traced to the Ferayorni v. Hyundai
Motor Co. case. This 1998 Fourth District Court of Appeal case relied on
and adopted the reasoning of the Supreme Court of California in Anderson v.
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.47  In Anderson, the Supreme Court of
California was concerned that applying strict liability to a failure to warn
cause of action would reduce the product seller to an insurer.4 It is this
concern, shared by the Ferayorni court, that prompted the subtle but
substantial difference in the knowledge required of a product seller in a
negligent failure to warn claim and a strict liability failure to warn claim.49
IV. PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The consequence of Florida recognizing the distinction between a
negligent and strict liability failure to warn cause of action is that a plaintiff
who pleads both claims is entitled to two jury instructions." As the
Ferayorni court noted, the giving of a negligent failure to warn jury
instruction does not satisfy the need for a strict liability failure to warn jury
instruction.51 Although there exists Florida Standard Jury Instructions for
negligence in Aeneral, and product liability for manufacturing and design
defect claims, Ferayorni specifically points out that, not only is there no
jury instruction for a negligent failure to warn claim, but also that "[t]he
Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases has notpFrovided
standard instructions on any theory of strict liability duty to warn.' Florida
Standard Jury Instructions Product Liability IV, comment 2, specifically
states, "[p]ending further development of Florida law, the committee
reserved the question of whether there can be strict liability for failure to
44. Id.
45. Ferayorni, 711 So. 2d at 1172.
46. Id. at 1167.
47. 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991).
48. Id. at 552-53.
49. Ferayorni, 711 So. 2d at 1170.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Fla. Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases § 4.1 (1998).
53. Id. §§ PL 4, 5.
54. Ferayorni, 711 So. 2d at 1171.
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warn and, if so, what duty is imposed on the manufacturer or seller."'55 The
Ferayorni case appears to have resolved this question.56 Now, all that is
needed is the publication of standard jury instructions for both types of
claims. The following are proposed standard jury instructions for a
negligent failure to warn and strict liability failure to warn cause of action.5
NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN
The issue for your determination on the claim of (claimant) against
(defendant) is whether (defendant) was negligent [in failing to warn of
the dangers of (describe product)] [or] [in failing to give an adequate
warning of the dangers of (describe product)].
Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care. Reasonable care is
that degree of care which a reasonably careful [manufacturer] (or]
[distributor] would use under like circumstances. Negligence may
consist either in doing something that a reasonably careful person
would not do under like circumstances or in failing to do something that
a reasonably careful person would do under like circumstances. A
reasonably careful [manufacturer] [or] [distributor] would possess
expert knowledge in the area of (describe product). A reasonably
careful [manufacturer] [or] [distributor] would warn of the dangers in
using a product if [he] or [she] or [it] knew of, or should have known of
the dangers, and should have foreseen (claimant's) use of (describe
product), and (claimant's) particular injury, however rare. A product
is considered dangerous when the risk of injury to the user of the
product is not obvious.
A warning is inadequate if its [wording is inadequate] [or] [its
location is inadequate] [or] [if the manner in which it was conveyed is
inadequate]. The wording is inadequate unless it makes apparent the
product's potentially harmful consequences and contains specific
language directed at the significant dangers caused by a failure to use
the product in the prescribed manner. The location of a warning is
55. Fla. Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases §§ PL 1-5, cmt. 2. (1998).
56. See Ferayorni, 711 So. 2d at 1172.
57. The idea for this article actually grew out of a writing assignment I gave to the law
students in my Product Liability class. As is almost always the case, my students exceeded my
expectations in drafting model jury instructions. In particular, one student, Mary Clarke, J.D.
Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center, 2000, distinguished herself in this
writing assignment. In fact, the proposed jury instructions in this article are taken in large part
from Ms. Clarke's writing assignment. Therefore, Ms. Clarke deserves all of the credit for
putting together these proposed jury instructions. Any mistakes or inaccuracies are clearly
due to my attempt to add and revise her draft. By the way, she deserved and received an "A"
grade for her work on these instructions.
Flynn
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inadequate if it is not likely to reach the user. The manner of the
warning is inadequate unless it is of such intensity to cause a reasonable
person to exercise caution, for his or her own safety, equal to the
potential danger.
PL
PRODUCT LIABILITY
The issues for your determination on the claim of (claimant)
against (defendant) are whether the (describe product) [sold] [supplied]
by (defendant) was defective when it left the possession of (defendant)
and, if so, whether such defect was a legal cause of [loss] [injury] [or]
[damage] sustained by (claimant or person for whose injury claim is
made). A product is defective
PL 6 strict liability (warning defect)
if due to [a failure to provide a warning] [and] [or] [an
inadequate warning] the product does not adequately warn of
a particular risk that was known or knowable in light of the
generally recognized and best scientific and medical
information available at the time of manufacture and
distribution and the product is expected to and does reach the
user without substantial change affecting that condition.
A warning is inadequate if its [wording is inadequate] [or]
[its location is inadequate]. The warning's wording is
inadequate unless it makes the potential harmful consequences
apparent and contains specific language directed at the
significant risks or dangers caused by a failure to use the
product in the prescribed manner. The location of a warning
is inadequate if it is not likely to reach the user. The manner of
the warning is inadequate unless it is of such intensity to cause
a reasonable person to exercise caution equal to the potential
danger.
If the greater weight of the evidence does not support the
claim of (claimant), your verdict should be for (defendant).
[However, if the greater weight of the evidence does support
the claim of (claimant), then your verdict should be for
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(claimant), and then you shall consider the defense raised by
(defendant).] *[However, if the greater weight of the evidence
does support the claim of (claimant), then you shall consider
the defense raised by (defendant). On the defense, the issues
for your determination are (state defense issues).]
* "Greater weight of the evidence" means the more persuasive
and convincing force and effect of the entire evidence in the
case.
NOTE ON USE
1. When defense issues are to be submitted, use the charge contained
within the second pair of brackets. In other cases, use the first bracketed
sentence instead.
2. The committee intends for part PL6 of this instruction to be used in
conjunction with the current Product Liability Florida Model Jury
Instruction, and should be inserted after PL5 (strict liability).
COMMENT
1. Inherently Dangerous. The plaintiff is not required to show that the
product was inherently dangerous to maintain a strict liability for failure to
warn cause of action because whether or not a product is "inherently
dangerous" is not determinative of the applicability of a strict liability cause
of action. Brown v. Glade & Grove Supply, Inc., 647 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Ferayorni v. Hyundai Motor Co., 711 So. 2d 1167
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
2. Knowledge. Florida law requires a showing of knowledge for a
strict liability failure to warn claim. Ferayorni v. Hyundai Motor Co., 771
So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998). However, the theories of
negligent failure to warn and strict liability failure to warn remain distinct
and separate because the required showing of knowledge is less burdensome
for a strict liability action-the plaintiff need not show that the
manufacturer's or distributor's conduct fell below the standard of care. Id.
Rather, the plaintiff need only show that the risk of danger was known or
knowable in light of the generally recognized and best scientific and medical
information available at the time of manufacture and distribution. Id.
3. Risk-utility. The committee recommends that no charge be given
regarding the risk of the danger in relation to the utility of the product on the
issue of failure to warn because the cost of precaution, the warning label, is
2000]
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so minimal that it virtually never outweighs the likelihood of harm and
severity of harm from failing to provide such a warning.
4. Adequacy of Warning. The committee finds that the adequacy of a
warning as explained by American Cyanamid Co. v. Roy, 466 So. 2d 1079
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984), should be addressed in the jury instructions
for a strict liability failure to warn case.
V. CONCLUDING ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The two key aspects of the proposed negligent and strict liability
standard jury instructions are that they substantively confirm and guide trial
lawyers and trial judges regarding Florida law and mechanically follow the
same format as the other standard jury instructions.
The negligent failure to warn jury instruction mirrors the definition of
negligence found in the Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases
section 4.1, and accurately advises jurors that negligence, in the context of
product warnings, can be both in the failing to give a warning or in giving an
inadequate warning. Further, the proposed jury instruction avoids any
mention of "inherently dangerous" in reference to a product risk or danger
because that term is outdated and no longer applicable in Florida.58 Instead,
the proposed jury instruction excludes obvious product dangers from the
product sellers' duty to warn.
59
The second part of the negligent failure to warn instruction, which is
also present in the strict liability failure to warn jury instruction, is essential
for jurors to be able to measure the adequacy of a warning. Without being
either plaintiff or defendant friendly, this part of the jury instruction leaves
the determination of the reasonableness and sufficiency of the product
warning to the jury, where it belongs. The breakdown of the jury instruction
into the wording, location, or manner of a product warning enables a jury to
consider any one of the three inadequacies as the basis for liability.
The proposed instruction avoids any juror confusion about whether
product warnings include directions or instructions on the use of a product
by defining a warning in terms of product dangers. Further, the proposed
instruction shields the product seller from liability for the unintended,
unforeseeable misuse of a product by defining product dangers in terms of
using a product in the prescribed manner. Finally, the proposed jury
instructions use of the words "wording," "location," "manner," and
"intensity" is a purposeful choice to use and define legal concepts in plain
and straightforward language.
58. Advance Chem. Co. v. Harter, 478 So. 2d 444,447 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
59. Sanders v. Am. Body Armor & Equip., Inc., 652 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1995).
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The proposed strict liability failure to warn jury instruction not only
incorporates previous language concerning the adequacy of a product
warning, but also patterns the Product Liability Standard Jury Instructions
already adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida. Therefore, the language
of the proposed instruction is consistent with the previously adopted jury
instructions. The critical addition to this proposed jury instruction is the
knowledge requirement that distinguishes a negligent failure to warn cause
of action from the strict liability failure to warn cause of action.
The adoption of these proposed jury instructions does not amount to a
reform of product liability law in Florida. Rather, such adoption provides
needed guidance to trial lawyers and trial judges and ends an unhealthy and
needless debate.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The locution "inextricably intertwined," an alliterative coupling of
adverb and adjective purporting to justify the introduction at a criminal trial
of evidence of crimes for which the defendant is uncharged, appears
nowhere in Magna Carta. It is unmentioned in connection with the reforms
of Edward I, or those following the restoration of the Stuarts, or those
associated with the enthronement of William and Mary. Baron Gilbert, in
his seminal work on evidence in 1726, has nothing to say about it. It is not
to be found in the evidentiary treatises of Starlde, Phillips, or Thayer. The
Federal Rules of Evidence make no express reference to it. It is a fair
summary of the history of the law of evidence to say that, until about the
year 1980, no one thought that evidence of uncharged crimes could be
rendered admissible by the simple expedient of describing it as "inextricably
intertwined" with evidence of the crime or crimes actually pleaded in the
indictment.
The past two decades have seen a jurisprudential revolution. During
that time, state and federal appellate courts having jurisdiction over criminal
litigation in Florida have authored some two hundred opinions considering
* Milton Hirsch received his B.A. in 1974 from the University of California. He
received his J.D. in 1982 from Georgetown University. The author gratefully acknowledges
the contributions made in the preparation of this article by Steven Bronis, Lynn Dannheisser,
Professor Steven Friedland, Theodore Klein, David 0. Markus, Honorable Marilyn Milian,
and Barbara Parker.
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the doctrine of "inextricably intertwined" evidence.' Most of those federal
opinions are in drug cases, and in those cases, the demised evidence is
almost always found to be admissible because "inextricably intertwined." It
is a fair summary of the history of the law of evidence to say that, since
about the year 1980, evidence of uncharged crimes can be rendered
admissible by the simple expedient of describing it as "inextricably
intertwined" with evidence of the crime or crimes actually pleaded in the
indictment.
It is difficult to view this doctrinal volte face as anything but result-
oriented jurisprudence. This powerful neoteric rule of "inextricably
intertwined" evidence-"This new-born babe an infant Hercules' "2 -
supports the admission of highly prejudicial and otherwise inadmissible
other-crimes evidence. It enables the prosecution to circumvent the
procedural obstacles set up by Rule 404(b) governing the admissibility of
1. As discussed infra Part IV, the term "inextricably intertwined" was spawned and
continues to be nurtured in Eleventh (former Fifth) Circuit narcotics cases. The doctrine is an
occasional visitor to other jurisdictions, where it may be cited in non-drug cases as well as
drug cases. See, e.g., United States v. Carboni, 204 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2000) (business crimes);
United States v. Shkolir, 182 F.3d 902 (2d Cir. 1999) (securities, mail, and wire fraud);
United States v. Gonzalez, 110 F.3d 936 (2d Cir. 1997) (possession of firearm by convicted
felon); United States v. King, 126 F.3d 987 (7th Cir. 1997) (tax crime); United States v.
Mundi, 892 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1989) (fraud and related crimes); United States v. Rodriguez-
Estrada, 877 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1989) (business crimes). The focus of this article, however, is
on the state and federal courts having jurisdiction over Florida, in support of the thesis that the
expansion by the Eleventh Circuit of the "inextricably intertwined" doctrine is best understood
as a judicial contribution to the "war on drugs."
2. EDMOND RosTAND, CYRANO DE BERGERAC 105 (Hooker transl., Bantam Books)
("Ce nouveau-ne, Madame, est un petit Hercule").
3. Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the
prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of
trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown,
of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
FED. R. EviD. 404(b).
Section 90.404 of the Florida Statutes, the state law congener to Rule 404(b), provides
in pertinent part:
OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS. -
(a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible
when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
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prior similar fact evidence. It prompts conviction for crimes of which an
accused may be charged and innocent, on the basis of evidence of crimes of
which the accused is uncharged but may be guilty. It facilitates prosecution
of the "war on drugs" by depriving the defendant of one of the ancient and
honorable premises of the Anglo-American system of justice: that the jury
sits in judgment on the act a man is alleged to have done, not on the life a
man is alleged to have led.4
II. THE COMMON LAW RES GESTAE RULE
Common law courts viewed uncharged crimes evidence as irrelevant
and the introduction of such evidence as unfair, the defendant having been
afforded no notice by the indictment or otherwise that such evidence would
be offered.5
The [common law] rule which requires that all evidence which is
introduced shall be relevant to the guilt or the innocence of the
accused is applied with considerable strictness in criminal
proceedings.... [The defendant] can with fairness be expected to
come into court prepared to meet the accusations contained in the
indictment only, and, on this account, all the evidence offered by
mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely
to prove bad character or propensity.
(b) 1. When the state in a criminal action intends to offer evidence of other
criminal offenses under paragraph (a), no fewer than 10 days before trial, the
state shall furnish to the accused a written statement of the acts or offenses it
intends to offer, describing them with the particularity required of an
indictment or information. No notice is required for evidence of offenses
used for impeachment or on rebuttal.
2. When the evidence is admitted, the court shall, if requested, charge
the jury on limited purpose for which the evidence is received and is to be
considered. After the close of evidence, the jury shall be instructed on the
limited purpose for which the evidence was received and that the defendant
cannot be convicted for a charge not included in the indictment or
information.
RA. STAT. § 90.404 (2000); see discussion infra notes 27-28, 55, and 255.
4. "[A] defendant starts his life afresh when he stands before a jury, a prisoner at the
bar." People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466,468 (N.Y. 1930).
5. H.C. UNDEm LL, A TREATIsE ON THE LAw OF CRMINAL EvIDENCE (1898) § 87, at
20001
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the prosecution should consist wholly of facts which are within the
range and scope of its allegations.
6
Apart from the inherent unfairness of obliging an accused to defend against
charges of which he has had no notice, the introduction of uncharged crimes
evidence was viewed at common law as resulting in damning prejudice.
Jurors:
[W]ill very naturally believe that a person is guilty of the crime
with which he is charged if it is proved to their satisfaction that he
has committed a similar offense, or any offense of an equally
heinous character. And, it cannot be said with truth that this
tendency is wholly without reason or justification .... 7
To the general rule, "applied with considerable strictness," that no
evidence could be offered of uncharged crimes, the common law made
certain exceptions. One such exception was a manifestation of the res
gestae rule, that many-headed hydra. When the uncharged crimes evidence
was part of the res gestae-when "several crimes are intermixed, or blended
with one another, or connected so that they form an indivisible criminal
transaction, and a complete account of any one of them can not be given
without showing the others.. ." -- then the uncharged crimes evidence was
admissible. No single trope or form of words (other than the unhelpful res
gestae) was used to state the test for admissibility. The general idea,
however, was, as stated by Underhill: the demised other-crimes evidence
must be "indivisible" from the evidence of the charged crimes, such that the
tale of the charged offenses could not be told without relating the evidence
of the uncharged offenses.9 Courts allowed evidence of an uncharged crime
only if it was "part and parcel of the same transaction" as the charged crime,
6. Id.; see also 1 CROOM-JOHNSON & BRIDGMAN, TAYLOR ON EVIDENCE § 326, at
228 (1931):
This rule ... is founded on common sense and common justice... for, as one
of the chief objects of an indictment is to afford distinct information to the
prisoner of the specific charge which is about to be brought against him, the
admission of any evidence of facts unconnected with that charge, would be
clearly open to the serious objection of taking the prisoner by surprise. No
man should be bound at the peril of life or liberty, fortune or reputation, to
answer at once and unprepared for every action of his life. Few even of the
best of men would choose to submit to such an ordeal.
Id.
7. UNDERHILL, supra note 5, § 87, at 107.
8. Id. § 88, at 108-09 (emphasis added).
9. Idl
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or "so directly and immediately connected with the crime for which the
[defendant] was on trial '1° that it was "impossible to give a complete or
intelligent account of the crime charged without referring to the otherc ,,n.' II
crime."
When a collateral offense, or, as it is sometimes called, an
extraneous crime, forms part of the res gestae, evidence of it is not
excluded by the fact that it is extraneous. As an isolated or
disconnected fact, it is not relevant.., but when offered under the
exceptions to the rule, it becomes of substance with the charge on
trial. 
2
"Evidence may be given, not only of the act charged itself, but of other acts
so closely connected therewith, as to form part of one chain of facts which
could not be excluded without rendering the evidence unintelligible-part in
fact of the res gestae."13 Lord Ellenborough stated the rule as follows: "If
several and distinct offences [sic] blend themselves with one another, the
detail of the party's whole conduct must be pursued. 14 Wigmore limited
such evidence to "other criminal acts which are an inseparable part of the
whole deed."' 5 He explained:
Suppose that A is charged with stealing the tools of X; the evidence
shows that a box of carpenter's tools was taken, and that in it were
the tools of Y and Z as well as of X; here we are incidentally
proving the commission of two additional crimes, because they are
necessarily interwoven with the stealing charged, and together form
one deed. The other two crimes are not offered as affecting A's
character, nor do they affect his character; because all were done, if
at all, as parts of a whole, and if we believe or disbelieve his doing
of one part, we believe or disbelieve his doing of all. The two
other crimes do not affect his character in the way forbidden by the
reasons of the character-rule.., i.e. by-way of undue prejudice, in
that we might condemn him now, though innocent of the act
charged, because we are prejudiced by his former crimes; nor by
10. Killinsv. State, 9 So.711,715 (Fla. 1891).
11. Nickels v. State, 106 So. 479,489 (Fla. 1925).
12. 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CRMINAL ISSUES
§ 33, at 121 (Hilton, 10th ed. 1912) (footnotes omitted) (collecting cases); see also State v.
Wilson, 233 P. 259,261 (Or. 1925).
13. HAWKE, ROscOE's CRviNALEVIDENCE 101 (1928).
14. The King v. Ellis, 6 Bamewall & Cresswell 145, 147 (K.B. 1826).
15. 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 218, at 271 (1904) (emphasis omitted).
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way of unfair surprise, in that he cannot be prepared to defend
himself against evidence of former misconduct of which he had no
notice. While thus, on the one hand, these concomitant crimes are
not obnoxious to the reasons of the character rule, so also they are
necessarily gone into in proving the entire deed of which the act
charged forms a part. There is therefore not only a necessity for
proving them, but no objection against proving them.' 6
Killins v. State17 and Oliver v. State18 are substantially similar to one
another. In each case, the defendant shot one person to death, and at the
same time shot at or menaced a bystander, who later testified against himl 9
Applying the common law res gestae rule, the Oliver court explained that
"[t]he shooting was done in rapid succession, and, according to the son's
version of the affair, the altercation preceding it had commenced between
him and the accused. It was thus all one and the same transaction, and the
testimony was competent. The defendant in Nickels v. State" was
charged with rape. The testimony of the victim necessarily made
incidental reference to conduct by the defendant that might have given rise
to charges of robbery or burglary:
When attacked, the victim resisted her assailant with the utmost
vigor and determination and a violent struggle between them
occurred in the bathroom of the victim's home, in which room the
actual attack was precipitated and consummated. The testimony
indicates that the victim was wearing, among other things, two
rings. During the course of the struggle, the assailant forcibly
removed one of these rings, but was unable to remove the other, a
wedding ring. The struggle continued unabated until
unconsciousness on the part of the victim intervened as her
assailant was about to consummate his carnal attack upon her.
Immediately after the accomplishment of the latter purpose and
while the victim lay upon the bathroom floor, her hands bound by a
towel, her assailant visited other parts of the house where he
procured several other articles of jewelry and personal
paraphernalia. After thus occupying himself for about ten minutes,
16. Id.
17. 9 So. 711 (Fla. 1891).
18. 20 So. 803 (Fla. 1896).
19. In Killins, the witness was the decedent's mother; in Oliver, the decedent's son.
20. Oliver, 20 So. at 804.
21. 106 So. 479 (Fla. 1925).
22. Id. at 481.
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he returned to the bathroom where the victim still lay, and after
speaking briefly with her there, fled the scene.23
The court quite properly concluded that testimony regarding the taking
by the defendant of the wedding ring, as well as "other articles of jewelry
and personal paraphernalia," was within the scope of the res gestae rule and
therefore admissible.
Thus the common law drew a firm line between other-crimes evidence
that was truly inextricable from evidence of crimes charged, and evidence
that was merely adminicular.24 Evidence of uncharged misconduct was
admissible only when it could not be elided from the narrative of the charged
misconduct without leaving that narrative confusing, incomplete, or
incomprehensible. Evidence of uncharged misconduct was not admissible,
however, simply because it provided the prosecution with narrative depth or
better story telling. To fall within the res gestae rule, the demised evidence
must be truly essential to the presentation of the evidence in chief. If the
evidence in chief were comprehensible and told a complete tale without the
other-crimes evidence, then the other-crimes evidence would be
inadmissible, even if it rounded out the prosecution's case.
This common law res gestae rule was narrow in its scope and
infrequent in its application.25 An unremarkable caterpillar, it languished for
centuries. But when in 1979 it burst from its chrysalis, what emerged was
not a butterfly but a bird of prey named "inextricably intertwined."
IIU. SIMILAR CRIME EVIDENCE
Of course the res gestae rule was not the only provision made by the
common law for the admission of evidence of uncharged crimes. Long
before the adoption of Rule 404(b)-indeed long before the codification of
rules of evidence-the common law of Florida, as elsewhere, recognized that
evidence of uncharged crimes might be admitted for the purposes set out in
Rule 404(b) and section 90.404 of the Florida Statutes: to prove "motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.... ,26
23. Id.
24. I have borrowed this term from the jurisprudence of the ecclesiastical courts,
because I can find no term in our common law jurisprudence that fits my meaning so
precisely. Adminicular evidence bolsters and corroborates the principal evidence. It is
intertwined, but not inextricably so. It confirms, fortifies, and vivifies the principal evidence;
but the principal evidence is capable of being presented without it.
25. See UNDERHIL supra note 5, § 87; see also WIGMORF, supra note 15, § 218 n.1.
26. FED. R. EviD. 404(b); FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(a) (2000); see, e.g., Nickels v.
State, 106 So. 479, 489 (Fla. 1925) (admitting other-crimes evidence "to establish the identity
2000]
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Codification brought important limitations on the power and utility of
such similar crime evidence. The prosecution became bound to provide
timely notice of its intent to offer such evidence at trial.27 The defense could
demand a limiting instruction at the time the evidence was admitted, and
again as part of the court's charge to the jury.28 Courts became obliged to
engage in a balancing test under Rules 404 and 403,29 weighing probative
value against unfair prejudice, before admitting such evidence. At a time
when prosecutorial legions were clamoring for a doomsday machine with
of the person committing the crime laid in the indictment"); Ryan v. State, 92 So. 571, 573
(Fla. 1922) (admitting other-crimes evidence "as tending to show the defendant's state of
mind shortly after he had [committed the charged crime], and the intent with which the act
was done. It was admitted as tending to show a criminal intent in [committing the charged
crime], malice and premeditation."); West v. State, 28 So. 430, 432 (Fla. 1900) (allowing
evidence of other crimes to show "purpose"); Roberson v. State, 24 So. 474, 475-76 (Fla.
1898) (permitting evidence of spoliation to show guilty knowledge); Oliver v. State, 20 So.
803, 805 (Fla. 1896) (admitting evidence of uncharged crimes to "show the animus of the
defendant"); Killins v. State, 9 So. 711, 715 (Fla. 1891) (holding uncharged crimes evidence
admissible to "show the vicious intent, the animus, by which the defendant was
actuated .... ); see generally Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959).
27. Section 90.404(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes requires the prosecution "no fewer
than 10 days before trial... [to] furnish to the accused a written statement of the acts or
offenses it intends to offer, describing them with the particularity required of an indictment or
information." FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(b)1 (2000). Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence was amended in 1991 to require "reasonable notice in advance of trial ... of the
general nature of any such evidence [the prosecution] intends to introduce at trial." FED. R.
EVID. 404(b). Previously, some federal district courts had enforced a notice requirement by
custom, court order, or local rule. See, e.g., S.D. Fla. Local R. 88.10 (obliging the prosecution
to "advise the defendant of its intention to introduce during its case in chief proof of evidence
pursuant to Rule 404(b)," which advice is to be given "not later than fourteen (14) days after
the arraignment").
28. Section 90.404(2)(b)2 of the Florida Statutes provides:
When the evidence is admitted, the court shall, if requested, charge the jury on
the limited purpose for which the evidence is received and is to be considered.
After the close of the evidence, the jury shall be instructed on the limited
purpose for which the evidence was received and that the defendant cannot be
convicted for a charge not included in the indictment or information.
FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(b)2 (2000).
29. Rule 403 provides that, "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403.
30. See, e.g., United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1979). Beechum, for
many years the cynosure of Rule 404(b) analysis in the Fifth and later the Eleventh Circuit,
was decided the same year the Fifth Circuit decided Aleman. See United States v. Aleman,
592 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1979).
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which to wage the war on drugs, one of their principal existing weapons,
evidence of prior similar crimes, was being stripped of much of its
firepower. Then in 1979, the Fifth Circuit authored its opinion in United
States v. Aleman.3
On January 13, 1978, D A Agent Castro arrested two individuals
32
named Vela and Ramirez for the sale of heroin. Eleven days later, DEA
Agent Reina, acting in an undercover capacity, met with Aleman to negotiate
a purchase of cocaine.33 In the course of that meeting, Aleman made
reference to the arrests of Vela and Ramirez, and indicated that he had
attempted to help Vela and Ramirez sell heroin.3 At the conclusion of the
meeting, Aleman handed Reina a sample of cocaine. 3
Aleman, Vela, and others were charged in a multi-count indictment
with crimes relating to the distribution of heroin.36 There were no charges
involving cocaine." At trial, however, Agent Reina testified to his
conversation with Aleman about cocaine, and made reference to the cocaine
sample Aleman had provided to hin.3s On appeal, Aleman assigned the
admission of this evidence as error, in that it was evidence of an uncharged
crime not properly within the scope and purpose of Rule 404(b).39 The court
of appeals, however, held that a Rule 404(b) analysis was inapplicable to
other-crimes evidence where, as here, the other-crimes evidence and the
evidence used to prove the crime charged are inextricably intertwined.
40
If by use of the trope "inextricably intertwined" the court meant to
invoke the common law res gestae rule, its statement of the law was no
doubt correct. Other-crimes evidence that is truly inextricable from, and not
merely adminicular to, the principal evidence is indeed admissible without
regard to the limitations of Rule 404(b). By way of illustrating this
principle, the Aleman court posited the case of a "person (who] breaks into a
house, murders the occupants, and steals a television set.' 41 Undoubtedly,
evidence of the unlawful taking of the TV set would be admitted at a trial in
which only the homicides were charged, just as evidence of the unlawful
taking of jewelry and other personal effects was admitted at the trial in
31. 592 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1979).
32. Id. at 883.
33. IL
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Aleman, 592 F.2d at 883.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 884.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 885.
41. Aleman, 592 F.2d at 885.
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Nickels in which only the rape was charged. 42 The explanation given by the
Aleman43 court for its ruling seems to fall within the rationale of the common
law res gestae rule:
Reina's testimony would have been incomplete and confusing had
he not been able to explain how, eleven days after Ramirez and
Vela had been arrested for heroin dealing, he and Aleman came to
discuss Aleman's participation with Ramirez and Vela in the
distribution scheme. It would have detracted from the search for
truth to require that Reina attempt to testify without mentioning the
purpose of the meeting and what occurred in it.4
There were, however, troubling suggestions that the Aleman court was
departing from, or not even relying upon, the common law res gestae rule.
By way of case authority, Aleman cites not to the pre-codification cases
construing the res gestae rule, but to a single case from the Eighth Circuit:
United States v. Calvert.4'
The defendant in Calvert was charged with insurance fraud."4 At trial,
witnesses testified to other crimes or bad acts engaged in by Calvert, which
misconduct related in various ways and degrees to the crimes charged.47 The
Eighth Circuit held that this evidence was properly admitted under a variety
of rationales, none of which seem to adumbrate the Aleman court's
"inextricably intertwined" holding. The Calvert court began by discussing
the principles of the then newly enacted Rule 404(b).4 The closest that the
Calvert court gets to the notion of "inextricably intertwined" is in its
42. Nickels v. State, 106 So. 479, 494 (Fla. 1925).
43. Aleman, 592 F.2d at 885.
44. Id. Whether the Aleman court applied the common law res gestae rule
appropriately or not is a question about which reasonable minds may differ. Presumably the
trial testimony of Agent Reina took something like the following form: I was conducting an
undercover investigation in cocaine trafficking; in that capacity I met with Aleman; in the
course of our meeting he made reference to the heroin trafficking operation of Ramirez and
Vela, whom I knew had been arrested eleven days previously; Aleman made certain
statements acknowledging his complicity in that heroin trafficking operation; when we parted
company, Aleman gave me a sample of cocaine to encourage me to purchase cocaine from
him.
A strict application of the res gestae rule would have obliged Reina elide to the first and
last facts, viz., that he was conducting an investigation into cocaine trafficking, and that
Aleman gave him a sample of cocaine. Query whether such a redaction would have rendered
Reina's testimony incomplete, confusing, or misleading.
45. 523 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1975).
46. Id. at 899-900.
47. Id. at 905-06.
48. Id. at 906-07.
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characterization of some of the other-crimes evidence as constituting
"integral parts of the very crime for which [Calvert] was convicted."4 9 But
in the same breath the court, analogizing this misconduct to "the 'casing' of
several banks before robbing the most suitable target," held the evidence
"properly admitted as evidence of preparation and planning."
50
Calvert seems an odd choice as a foundation for the Aleman court's
"inextricably intertwined" doctrine. Perhaps by way of acknowledging the
problem, Aleman conducts a lengthy Rule 404(b) analysis, purporting to
justify the admission of the other-crimes evidence on that basis as well as on
the "inextricably intertwined" theory.51 This "either/or" jurisprudence
serves no good purpose. Their first-blush similarity notwithstanding, Rule
404(b) evidence and "inextricably intertwined" evidence in the true res
gestae sense are very different things. Evidence under Rule 404(b) is
admitted only for certain limited purposes, and the jury must be so
instructed; failure to instruct violates the prohibition against adducing
evidence simply to damn the defendant's character. But other-crimes
evidence that is truly inextricable from evidence of the charged crimes is
admitted without limitation or instruction. It may be received, irrespective
of any bearing on character, and yet not as evidential of design, motive, or
the like. Evidence offered under Rule 404(b) is subject to the "probative
versus prejudicial" balancing test of Rule 403. But other-crimes evidence
that is truly inextricable cannot, as a matter of tautology, be excluded no
matter how unfairly prejudicial it may be. "[O]ften... the 'inextricably
intertwined' evidence.., is extremely, if not ultimately, prejudicial as to the
jury's understanding of the defendant's guilt. This does not affect the
propriety of admitting such evidence.' a  If evidence is genuinely
inextricable from the evidence in chief, "the trial judge need not formally
weigh its probity [sic; probative value] against its potential prejudice, 4
because exclusion of such evidence would, by hypothesis, leave the evidence
of the charged offenses so exiguous and incomprehensible that it would be
impossible to go forward with the trial. It is these distinctions that render the
49. Calvert, 523 F.2d at 907.
50. Id. (citing Rule 404(b)). Further muddying the analysis, the court then dropped a
footnote stating that, in any event, the defendant had failed to object to this particular other-
crimes evidence at trial and therefore waived the issue of admissibility. See iUL at 907 n.12.
51. SeeAleman, 592 F.2d at 885-86.
52. WIGMORE, supra note 15, § 218; see also United States v. Leichtman, 742 F.2d
598, 605 (lth Cir. 1984) (because evidence was "inextricably intertwined" rather than
404(b), "the trial judge did not err in refusing defendants' requested instructions limiting
the.., evidence to proof of motive").
53. United States v. Foster, 889 F.2d 1049, 1054 (11th Cir. 1989).
54. Id. at 1054 n.5.
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"inextricably intertwined" doctrine the powerful prosecutorial weapon it has
become.
55
The Aleman and Calvert opinions seem to give little, if any,
consideration to these defining distinctions, treating two very different
evidentiary doctrines as if they were variations on a single theme. This sin
has been propagated by other courts seizing upon Aleman's holding. 6
The inapplicability of 404(b)-based jurisprudence to "inextricably
intertwined" evidence is apparent in a case involving evidence which is
genuinely inextricable. Consider, for example, a stripped-down version of
Nickles: A woman is assaulted on the street by a man who seeks to pull a
diamond ring off her finger. They struggle violently, and the assailant
succeeds in ripping the ring from the finger of his victim. He is apprehended
some minutes later, but the ring is not in his possession and it is not
recovered. He is charged with a single count of aggravated batteryY7 At
trial, the victim testifies, describing the injury done to her finger when the
ring was torn off. Defense counsel need not bother objecting that this
testimony constitutes evidence of the uncharged crime of strong-arm
robbery. 8  It does indeed, but the testimonial evidence of the strong-arm
55. Another conceptual distinction between 404(b)-typ evidence and res gestae
'Inextricably intertwined" evidence that sometimes seems to give courts difficulty has to do
with relevance. Rule 404(b) and section 90.404 of the Florida Statutes are rules of
conditional or limited relevance. See FED. R. Evin. 404; FLA. STAT. § 90.404 (2000).
Evidence admitted under these rules is typically deemed relevant for some purposes, but
irrelevant for others. By contrast, where "inextricably intertwined" evidence is concerned,
relevance is irrelevant. Thus if probens A is relevant to the proof of probandum X, and if X is
material to the issue, A is, as a general rule, admissible; if A cannot be said without also
saying B, B becomes admissible as "inextricably intertwined." And this is so whether or not B
is relevant (i.e., probative of X, or of anything else material to the issue). It would be
pointless even to consider the relevance or not of B.
56. See, e.g., United States v. McLean, 138 F.3d 1398, 1404 (11th Cir. 1998)
(suggesting in dicta that any error resulting from introduction of putatively "inextricably
intertwined" evidence could be remedied by a jury instruction, because "the use of...
evidence by the jury under a Rule 404(b) theory or an 'inextricably intertwined' theory is not
materially different"); United States v. Utter, 97 F.3d 509, 514 (11th Cir. 1996) (applying
probative value versus unfair prejudice test to "inextricably intertwined" evidence); United
States v. Fortenberry, 971 F.2d 717, 721 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Foster, 889 F.2d
1049, 1054 n.5 (lth 1989); United States v. Martin, 794 F.2d 1531, 1533 n.4 (lth Cir.
1986) (other-crimes evidence admitted but jury instructed that "defendants are not on trial for
any act or conduct or offense not charged in the indictment"); United States v. Richardson,
764 F.2d 1514, 1522 (11th Cir. 1985) (applying probative value versus unfair prejudice test);
United States v. McDowell, 705 F.2d 426, 429 (1lth Cir. 1983); see also Consalvo v. State,
697 So. 2d 805, 813-14 (Fla. 1996) (other-crimes evidence properly admitted as "inextricably
intertwined," but held error for prosecutor to argue the evidence in closing).
57. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 784.045 (2000).
58. See § 812.13.
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robbery is genuinely inextricable (in the common law res gestae sense) from
the evidence of the crime charged. The defense is not entitled to pretrial
notice, under section 90.404 of the Florida Statutes, of the prosecution's
intent to elicit this testimony. 59 The defense is as much on notice of the
other-crimes evidence as it is of the evidence in chief. It can scarcely be
otherwise because the two classes of evidence are, by hypothesis,
inextricable. The defense is not entitled to have the jurors instructed that
they may receive the other-crimes evidence only for this or that limited
purpose. The evidence is properly considered by the jurors without
limitation or instruction in their deliberations as to the charge of aggravated
battery. The defense is not entitled to a judicial determination whether the
probative value of the evidence outweighs its unfair prejudice. Even if the
court were to conclude that unfair prejudice outweighed probative value,
there would be nothing the judge could do about it. Bowdlerizing the
evidence to eliminate or reduce the prejudice would leave the remaining
admissible evidence incomprehensible and therefore utterly lacking in
probative value.
Conflating the jurisprudence of the common law res gestae rule with
that of 404(b)-type evidence has no doubt been one factor contributing to the
metamorphosis of the meek, mild-mannered res gestae rule into the
plenipotent "inextricably intertwined" rule. The result is a jurisprudential
mare's nest. Did the prosecutor, whether through overwork and
inadvertence or in bad faith, fail to give pretrial notice of his other-crimes
evidence? Let him, even in midtrial, take refuge in the argument of last
resort: the other-crimes evidence is "inextricably intertwined" with the
evidence in chief.6 Is the judge uncertain whether to admit the proferred
evidence as "inextricably intertwined?" Let him compound one error with
another, admitting the evidence but instructing the jurors in typically
translucent legal argot that they are to consider the evidence only for certain
limited purposes. The burdens of Rule 404(b) are dispensed with, the
blessings, for the erring prosecutor and the wavering judge, remain.
It is unpleasant to attribute the expansion of the "inextricably
intertwined" doctrine to a judicial inability to distinguish between the proper
understanding of that doctrine and Rule 404(b); or to a judicial eagerness to
enable the prosecution to avoid the procedural limitations with which Rule
404(b) is burdened. It is tempting to attribute the expansion of the
"inextricably intertwined" rule to another cause entirely: the common law
59. § 90.404.
60. "[A]t the charge conference... the district court asked whether a 404(b)
instruction was necessary. For the first time, the prosecutor put forward the position that the
[other-crimes] evidence was admissible because it was 'inextricably intertwined' with the
charges in the indictment." McLean, 138 F.3d at 1403 (emphasis added). The evidence was
admitted, and the ensuing conviction affirmed on appeal. Id.
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res gestae rule was easy of application as long as courts were concerned only
with common law crimes. A murder, rape, or robbery typically is
perpetrated in a brief period of time and by a small number of persons.
Determining whether evidence of a crime or crimes not charged is truly
inextricable and not merely adminicular is a relatively straightforward
matter. By contrast, the drug trafficking cases that have come before the
federal courts in Florida and elsewhere in the past couple of decades involve
crimes such as conspiracy that may persist over the course of months or even
years and may involve dozens of coconspirators, named and unnamed. In
such cases-so runs the argument-it is a more difficult and complicated
matter to determine whether other-crimes evidence is "inextricably
intertwined," and uncertainty should be resolved in favor of a judicial
determination of admissibility.
Tempting or not, this argument must be rejected. If a federal indictment
is so capacious in its scope that the court is hampered in its ability to make
the kinds of evidentiary determinations the law obliges the court to make,
then the law provides the remedy. Counts may be severed.61 Defendants
62
may be severed. But it is no remedy to deracinate the jurisprudence of the
common law res gestae rule. Regrettably, however, that is just what courts
proceeded to do.
IV. "INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED" METASTASIZES
The jurisprudence of the "inextricably intertwined" doctrine developed
rapidly after the partition of the Eleventh Circuit from the Fifth Circuit.
3
The defendant in United States v. Costa,6 for example, was charged with
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and conspiracy to possess
cocaine with intent to distribute. The case against him consisted
principally of the testimony of "flipped" codefendants Cole and Campbell.6
Cole sold an ounce of cocaine, obtained from Campbell, to an
undercover agent of the Drug Enforcement Agency .... The agent
pressed Cole about obtaining a kilogram of cocaine, and Cole
asked Campbell whether it could be procured. After
unsuccessfully attempting to acquire the kilogram from another
61. See FED. R. CRIm. P. 8, 14.
62. See id.
63. The Eleventh Circuit, in the en banc decision of Bonner, adopted as precedent the
decisions of the Fifth Circuit decided prior to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard,
661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981).
64. 691F.2d 1358 (llthCir. 1982).
65. Id at 1360.
66. Id.
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source, Campbell reached Costa... and learned Costa had a
kilogram he wished to sell. After a series of negotiations, first a
sample and then the entire kilogram were delivered by Campbell to
Cole [and then] to the agent. Upon Cole's arrest she named
Campbell as her source, and he was then arrested.
Campbell cooperated with the DEA, naming Costa as his
source. 
6 7
At trial, Cole and Campbell testified to the foregoing events." In addition,
however, Campbell was permitted "to testify concerning his prior
relationship with Costa, even though his testimony showed Costa previously
had dealt in cocaine." 69 Campbell testified as to the circumstances in which
he came to know Costa as a dealer in cocaine to show why he could expect
Costa to provide him with a kilogram of cocaine.70 Citing Aleman,7 1 the
Costa court held this "prior relationship" testimony to be "inextricably
intertwined" with proof of the charged crimes.72 "Campbell's testimony
about Costa's previous dealing in cocaine was necessary because it formed
an integral and natural part of the witness's accounts of the circumstances
surrounding the offenses for which the defendant was indicted.
73
The Costa court's version of the "inextricably intertwined" doctrine
cannot be derived from the common law res gestae rule. Campbell testified
as to the crimes charged that he learned from Cole of the existence of a
willing buyer for a kilo of cocaine; that he shopped around for a willing
seller, ultimately locating Costa; that after the customary negotiations, Costa
delivered first a sample, then the kilo itself, to Carpbell; who in turn
delivered it to Cole, who delivered it to the DEA agent.7 4 Somewhere during
or after the foregoing narrative, the prosecutor apparently succeeded in
asking a question such as, "and what made you believe that you might obtain
a kilogram of cocaine from Costa?" Campbell apparently succeeded in
providing an answer such as, "because I had personal knowledge that on
several occasions in the past Costa had engaged in drug transactions." There
can be no serious suggestion that it was "impossible to give a complete or
intelligent account of the crime charged without referring to the other
crime[s]" or that Costa's former drug dealing and his involvement in the
charged crimes were "connected so that they form an indivisible criminal
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Costa, 691 F.2d at 1360-61.
70. Id. at 1361.
71. United States v. Aleman, 592 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1976).
72. Costa, 691 F.2d at 1361.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1360-61.
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transaction, and a complete account of... [the latter] cannot be given
without showing [the former] ."75 Campbell's narrative as to the charged
offenses was complete, intelligible, and probative without his testimony as to
uncharged antecedent misconduct.
Nor can the Costa court's departure from common law precedent be
attributed to an inherent difference between common law crimes and federal
drug conspiracies. This was not a multi-defendant case involving dozens of
transactions extending over the course of many weeks. The entire case, from
the first contact between Cole and the undercover agent to the arrest of
Costa, took place during about a three week period in July of 1981.76 So far
as appears from the opinion, there were no unindicted coconspirators and the
prosecution's case in chief consisted mainly of testimony from Cole and
Campbell.
77
In defense of the admissibility of the evidence of uncharged
misconduct, the Costa court, apart from citing without comment to Aleman,
observed that "Campbell's testimony about Costa's previous dealing in
cocaine was necessary because it formed an integral and natural part of the
witness's accounts of the circumstances surrounding the offenses for which
the defendant was indicted."78 How Campbell's testimony as to Costa's
uncharged crimes was "integral" to his or any other witness's testimony as to
Costa's charged crimes is left unsaid. If by "integral and natural" the court
meant that the demised testimony gave contextual corroboration to the
evidence in chief, the court was entirely correct. But evidence which
provides such corroboration is adminicular, not inextricable. Its presence
fortifies the evidence in chief, but its absence does not cripple the evidence
in chief. No doubt the admission of such evidence lent force to the
prosecution narrative, but this, without more, does not justify its admission.
The Costa court provides no more, although its last word on the subject-
perhaps most troubling of all-is one of commendation to the trial court for
its "sensitivity to the problems arising under Rule 404(b)." 79
Costa soon proved itself no mere aberration. In a series of Eleventh
Circuit cases, "inextricably intertwined" became the talisman by which
evidence of uncharged crimes was rendered admissible.
The defendant in United States v. McCrary80 was an inmate at the
Federal Correctional Institute, in Talladega, Alabama. 81 He was charged
with bribing a corrections officer, distributing a small amount of
75. UNDERHIL, supra note 5, § 87, at 108-109.
76. Costa, 691 F.2d at 1360.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1361 (citing United States v. Aleman, 592 F.2d 881, 886 (5th Cir 1996)).
79. See id.
80. 699 F.2d 1308 (1 1th Cir. 1983).
81. Id. at 1310.
[Vol. 25:279
295
: Nova Law Review 35, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2000
Hirsch
methac alone, and two counts of introducing contraband cigarettes into the
prison. At trial, testimony was elicited from prosecution witnesses that
McCrary "dealt in marijuana and quaaludes on several other occasions
not... covered in the indictment."83 With an incantation of the shibboleth
"inextricably intertwined" and a single reference to Aleman, the court found
the other-crimes evidence to have been properly admitted.84 In United States
v. McDowell,8 the defendant xurchased two kilos of cocaine from one
Dalmau in the autumn of 1980. Unbeknownst to McDowell, Dalmau was
later arrested for unrelated misconduct and agreed to become an informer for
the DEA.87 During the summer of 1981 Dalmau (in his capacity as informer)
and McDowell began negotiating another cocaine deal, which negotiations
ended in McDowell's arrest and prosecution. 8  Evidence of the 1980
cocaine transaction was offered and received at trial.89 The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed without discussion, citing Aleman and noting desultorily,
"[a]rguably evidence concerning the dealings between Dalmau and
McDowell is 'inextricably intertwined' with the crime charged. 9' Dalmau's
testimony might have been incomplete and confusing had he not been
permitted to mention the first cocaine deal."91 How Dalmau's testimony
about a drug deal in 1981 would have been rendered unintelligible, without
testimony about an unrelated drug deal in 1980, must remain a matter of
speculation. The tepid and diffident language employed in the opinion-the
demised evidence "arguably" was inextricable because its absence "might
have" left the evidence in chief incomplete-suggests a court embarrassed
by being caught in the act of affirming on insupportable theory the
conviction of an obviously guilty man.
92
82. Id. The cigarettes were contraband simply by virtue of their having been brought
into the prison without authorization from prison officials. Id.
83. ld. at 1311.
84. McCrary, 699 F.2d at 1311. Although the court provided no analysis whatsoever
on the "inextricably intertwined" issue, it did engage in "either/or jurisprudence": "[Elven if
the evidence of Mr. McCrary's numerous other illegal dealings is treated as 'other acts'
evidence [i.e., is not "inextricably intertwined"], it is admissible under" Rule 404(b). Id.
85. 705 F.2d 426 (1 th Cir. 1983).
86. Id. at 427.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. McDowell, 705 F.2d at 429.
91. Id. Again, the court engaged in "either/or jurisprudence," commenting that
"[e]ven if the first transaction is treated as an extrinsic act, admission of the evidence was
proper" under Rule 404(b) "to show intent" Id. What particular intent was purportedly
demonstrated by this evidence is not set forth in the McDowell opinion; intent to be a drug
dealer, perhaps, or intent to get convicted.
92. Id.; see also United States v. Males, 715 F.2d 568 (11th Cir. 1983).
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A scant three or four years after the term was coined by the Aleman
court, "inextricably intertwined" referred to a principle that bore no
recognizable resemblance to its common law antecedents. It had become a
doctrinal juggernaut capable of battering down ancient evidentiary walls as
surely as the cacophony made by Joshua and the armies of Israel battered
down the ancient walls of Jericho.93 During the balance of the twentieth
century, evidence admitted in Eleventh Circuit drug cases as "inextricably
intertwined" fell into two general categories: evidence admitted simply
because the other crimes occurred during the same time period as the
charged crimes, and evidence admitted to show context, background, or the
motivation of witnesses.
A. The "Same Time Period" Rule
The defendants in United States v. Williford 4 were charged with
conspiracy and related "offenses involv[ing] large quantities of marijuana
flown into rural Georgia in small aircraft." 95  A prosecution informant
testified at trial that, during the time period of the conspiracy, he
orchestrated a meeting between the defendants and an undercover agent to
negotiate a sale of a kilogram of cocaine, but no sale actually occurred.96 On
appeal, the court rejected the prosecution's argument that the testimony as to
the cocaine negotiations was admissible under Rule 404(b).97 "Intent is the
only issue to which this extrinsic act is relevant .... This evidence is
insufficiently similar to establish" intent.98 Having characterized the other-
crimes evidence as "extrinsic," and thus by defimition not "inextricably
intertwined" the court then ruled that the evidence was admissible as
"inextricably intertwined," because it fell within the conspiracy period.
99
"While not all bad acts occurring within the time frame of a conspiracy are
automatically admissible, the fact that the cocaine negotiations occurred with
a witness coconspirator during the time of the conspiracy weighs heavily
toward finding the acts are intertwined." 100
93. See Joshua 6:1-20.
94. 764 F.2d 1493 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
95. Id. at 1497.
96. Id. at 1496.
97. Id. at 1497.
98. Id.
99. Williford, 764 F.2d at 1497.
100. Id. at 1499. The court misspeaks when it says that the cocaine negotiations
"occurred with a witness coconspirator." The witness, one Hammond, had become a
prosecution informer in June of 1982. Id. at 1496. The cocaine negotiations took place
among the defendants, Hammond, and an undercover agent on August 3, 1982. Id. At that
time, Hammond had ceased to be a coconspirator, although of course he still posed as one. If
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A decade later, the court was no longer reticent to state frankly that all
bad acts occurring within the time frame of a conspiracy are automatically
admissible as "inextricably intertwined." United States v. Ramsdale'°I
involved a conspiracy to the manufacture of methamphetamine.1' Most of
the evidence in the case concerned the purchase in Florida and transportation
to Oregon by bus of phenylactic acid, a chemical necessary to manufacture
methamphetamine.1 3  The trial court also allowed the testimony of a
uniform patrol officer, Chantal Marie Thomas.1°4 Officer Thomas knew
nothing of the charged conspiracy and had nothing to say about phenylactic
acid.10 Her entire testimony was that on September 21, 1991, a date within
the conspiracy time period, she stopped co-defendant Charles
Christoferson's car for a defective rear license, and incidental to the stop
conducted a search in which she found Christoferson to be in possession of
3.05 grams of methamphetamine, $7801 in cash, a shotgun and a .9
millimeter pistol.1°6 Observing that "Christoferson's vehicle stop occurred
during the time of the conspiracy as charged in the indictment,"'0 7 the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that "[e]vidence of possession of the drug which
Christoferson was accused of conspiring to manufacture, during the period
of time alleged in the indictment, and under circumstances... suggest[ing]
drug trafficking, is not extrinsic" and is admissible as "inextricably
intertwined."10 8
In neither Williford nor Ramsdale is there any attempt to preserve a
vestige of the common law res gestae rule. The informer in Williford
testified at length to the particulars of, and his involvement in, the marijuana
smuggling conspiracy. The single and discrete act of negotiating but not
consummating a cocaine transaction was thoroughly excisable from the
narrative of the marijuana conspiracy. No more was required than to instruct
Hammond's testimony as to the cocaine negotiations was admissible as "inextricably
intertwined" with the evidence of the marijuana conspiracy, it must be because all other-
crimes evidence occurring during the conspiracy time period is automatically "inextricably
intertwined," the court's protestations to the contrary notwithstanding.
The court also found the demised evidence to be "inextricably intertwined" under the
contextlbackground/witness motivation theory. See discussion infra Part IV.B.; see also
United States v. Montes-Cardenas, 746 F.2d 771 (11th Cir. 1984).
101. 61 F.3d 825(11th Cir. 1995).
102. Id. at 827.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 829.
105. Id.
106. Ramsdale, 61 F.3d at 829.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 830.
109. Williford, 764 F.2d at 1496.
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the informer to omit the matter from his testimony. Such a redaction would
have left no gaping lacunae in the story of the marijuana conspiracy. It
would not have affected that story at all. In Ramsdale, Officer Thomas was
called to the witness stand for the sole purpose of testifying to an event that
was neither pleaded as being, nor proven to be, in furtherance of the charged
conspiracy. The proposition that the testimony of one witness about
certain facts can become admissible because "inextricably intertwined" with
the testimony of other witnesses about other facts is given little if any
consideration in the common law res gestae cases.
The defendant in United States v. Jimenez"' was charged with
conspiring to possess methamphetamine with the intent to distribute it."
2
Over what must have been an apoplectic defense objection, the trial court
received evidence that during the conspiracy period not only did Jimenez
possess marijuana and a firearm, but he also beat his live-in girlfriend." 3
In affirming, it appeared at first that the court of appeals was headed in
the direction of "inextricably intertwined." Citing Ramsdale, the court
stated the general principle that uncharged other-crimes evidence is
"admissible if it is (1) an uncharged offense which arose out of the same
transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense, (2) necessary to
complete the story of the crime, or (3t inextricably intertwined with the
evidence regarding the charged offense.
The court then abandoned any attempt to demonstrate the inextricability
of the other-crimes evidence, at least as to the marijuana possession. In-
stead, it proceeded on a theory of relevance, or more particularly of "non-
irrelevance." Evidence of possession of marijuana, said the court, "is not
necessarily irrelevant to proof of methamphetamine distribution."" 5 This
sort of averment is difficult to rebut. It would be an interesting challenge to
attempt to posit some form of conduct that is necessarily irrelevant to proof
of methamphetamine distribution. On these facts, the court of appeals found
the "non-irrelevance" of the marijuana evidence to arise from taped
telephone conversations in which reference was made to "cupcakes with
white icing" and "cupcakes with green icing."'" 6  Agents testified that
"cupcakes with white icing" was drug slang for methamphetamine, and that
110. See Ramsdale, 61 F.3d at 829.
111. 224F.3d 1243 (llthCir. 2000).
112. Id. at 1245.
113. Hl at 1246.
114. Id. at 1249 (citing United States. v. McLean, 138 F.3d 1398, 1403 (11th Cir.
1998) and Ramsdale, 61 F.3d at 829). What the court appears to offer as alternatives are
really appositives: evidence that arose out of the same course of conduct as the charged
crimes and is necessary to complete the story of the charged crimes is inextricably intertwined.
115. Id. at 1250.
116. Jimenez, 224 F.3d at 1250.
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"cupcakes with green icing" was drug slang for marijuana. 7 If "cupcakes
with green icing" really did mean marijuana, said the court, then it was likely
that "cupcakes with white icing" really did mean methamphetamine; if
"cupcakes with white icing" really did mean methamphetamine, then it was
likely that Jimenez was discussing the distribution of methamphetamine; and
if Jimenez was discussing the distribution of methamphetamine, then it was
likely that he was guilty of the charged crimes. 18 Thus is demonstrated the
admissibility, on the theory of "non-irrelevance," of evidence of the
uncharged marijuana crime. At the conclusion of this demonstration, the
court admitted that this "may not be the most obvious case for admissibility
of this evidence."'1 9
But even if the foregoing analysis makes a powerful case for the
admissibility of "non-irrelevant" other-crimes evidence, the fact remains that
the marijuana crimes were neither charged in the indictment nor noticed
under Rule 404(b). That being so, the marijuana evidence was inadmissible.
If the marijuana evidence was "inextricably intertwined" with the
methamphetamine evidence, then it was admissible without regard to its
relevance. But the court does not even consider whether, for example,
testimony that Jimenez possessed marijuana or discussed "green cupcakes"
could have been excised from the prosecution's case without rendering that
case confusing or unintelligible.
As to the evidence of Jimenez beating his girlfriend, the court was
obliged to acknowledge that even the "same time period" version of the
"inextricably intertwined" theory would not support admissibility. "[W]e
find it hard to believe that the government could not have successfully
redacted the abuse-related comments from [the] taped conversations."' u
That being said, however, the court determined that it need not "actually
decide whether the abuse references were inextricably intertwined with other
government evidence" because the error, if any, was harmless.1
2
'
With no conceptual or historical foundation, the "inextricably
intertwined" doctrine sponsors into evidence testimony that is eminently
extricable from the evidence in chief, apparently on the theory that any bad
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. In making this remark, the court was also referring to the evidence of gun
possession. It appears that when the police burst into his home, Jimenez at first drew a gun.
lI. Prior to trial, however, Jimenez moved to suppress physical evidence on the grounds that
the police had failed to 'knock and announce." Jirinez, 224 F.3d at 1250. If Jimenez was
initially unaware that the armed men entering his house were agents of the law, his instinct to
reach for a weapon with which to protect his home and hearth was perfectly understandable-
and in any event, not evidence of conspiring to distribute methamphetamine.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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thing a drug dealer does during the time period covered by a conspiracy
charge-which time period, of course, is determined by the prosecutor
offering the evidence, not the alleged drug dealer against whom it is
offered-is fair game. 22  This rule of admissibility has two things to
commend it: it is supremely easy of application, and it provides the
prosecution with an unexampled weapon with which to wage the "war on
drugs."
B. The "Context, Background, and Motivation" Rule
The "same time period" rule was not the only basis for admission of the
uncharged crime evidence in Williford. Testimony may be admitted as
"inextricably intertwined" even though "not part of the crime charged" if it
"pertain[s] to the chain of events explaining the context, motive and set-up
of the crime."'123 Thus to be "inextricably intertwined," the evidence need
not pertain to the crime charged. It need not pertain to the context, motive,
and set-up (whatever these terms mean) of the crime charged.12 It need not
"explain ... the context, motive, and set-up of the crime" charged. 25 It need
not form a fixed and identifiable part of the chain of events explaining the
context, motive, and set-up of the crime charged. It need only "[pertain] to
the chain of events explaining the context, motive, and set-up of the crime"
charged. Is it possible to imagine any evidence so evanescent in any given
case as not to pass this test?
The defendant in United States v. Gomez 27 was observed engaging in a
hand-to-hand drug deal and was arrested immediately. 28 A search of his
person and his car incident to the arrest revealed a loaded pistol in the glove
compartment, a mobile telephone, and a book with the phone numbers of
several persons then under investigation. 129 Also in Gomez's vade mecum
122. A charge of conspiracy pleaded as "beginning on a date unknown to the grand
jury" and ending at the time of arrest arguably embraces the defendants' entire lives. If the
prosecutor then learns in mid-trial that a defendant has done a bad thing-particularly a bad
thing involving drugs--of which the prosecutor was previously unaware, there is no
impediment to its admission. It is "inextricably intertwined" with the charged crimes. That
the grand jury was never told of it in considering the indictment, and that the defendant has
had no notice of it in preparing to meet the indictment, is no objection.
123. Williford, 764 F.2d at 1499; see also United States v. Prosperi, 201 F.3d 1335
(11th Cir. 2000).
124. Williford, 764 F.2d at 1499.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. 927 F.2d 1530 (llth Cir. 1991).
128. Id. at 1532.
129. Id. at 1532-33.
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was a listing and phone number for a man identified only as "Sammy."'130 At
trial, the prosecution was permitted to introduce evidence that, some two
months after Gomez's arrest, a Sammy Zuluago, who Rroved to be the
"Sammy" in Gomez's book, engaged in a drug transaction. "Although this
evidence concerned an event which occurred after [Gomez's] arrest, this
circuit has held that evidence inextricably intertwined with the chain of
events surrounding the crime charged is admissible." ' The evidence of
Zuluago's misconduct "was relevant to the scheme and chain of events
surrounding the charged importation conspiracy.' ' 133 How, precisely, it was
relevant is left unsaid. There is no suggestion that Gomez was involved in
the drug transaction in which Zuluago engaged at a time when Gomez was
safely behind bars. There is no suggestion that Zuluago's transaction was a
part of, or a continuation of, the drug crimes for which Gomez was
convicted. But "inextricably intertwined" evidence need not be intertwined,
inextricably or otherwise. It need only pertain, in some fashion, to the chain
of events explaining the context, motive, and set-up of the crime or crimes
charged. The Gomez evidence easily met this "test." The prosecution gives
"context" to the charged drug crimes by showing that at the time of his arrest
for those crimes, Gomez had the phone number of a man who, two months
later, would engage in an unrelated drug crime.
134
Similarly, in United States v. Herre, 35 the court allowed evidence of
the defendant's prior state court arrest for marijuana smuggling in a federal
prosecution for criminal contempt, the contempt consisting of the
defendant's failure to testify before the federal grand jury. 136 Herre had been
immunized and ordered to testify, but refused to do So. 37 To establish the
offense charged, the prosecution was obliged to prove nothing more.138 The
prior drug arrest was deemed "inextricably intertwined," because it provided
the jury "necessary background information showing why Herre had been
subpoenaed and provided the Jury with some basis to understand the reasons
behind the charged offense.""'
130. Id. at 1533.
131. Id.
132. Gomez, 927 F.3d. at 1535 (citing United States v. Williford, 764 F.2d 1493, 1499
(llth Cir. 1985)).
133. Id.
134. IME
135. 930 F.2d 836 (11th Cir. 1991).
136. Id. at 837.
137. Id
138. See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1994).
139. Herre, 930 F.2d at 838.
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Both Gomez and Herre cite Williford's "chain of events" language.
Neither Gomez nor Herre explains what is meant by this language. 14° What
sort of chain must exist between the uncharged crimes evidence and the
charged offenses? How far may the chain extend, and how attenuated may
each succeeding link be from the charged crimes? In Gomez, the uncharged-
crime evidence consisted of proof that a person with whom Gomez
apparently had some involvement committed a crime in which Gomez
apparently had no involvement. 141 Whether this evidence would have been
admissible under traditional Rule 401/403, balancing of probative versus
unfair prejudicial value is a nice question. Fortunately for prosecutors,
"inextricably intertwined" is a means for end-running that balancing test.
The prosecution in Herre could easily have demonstrated that Herre was
duly subpoenaed; was immunized pursuant to section 6001 of Title 18 of the
United States Code; appeared before the grand jury; and refused to testify.
That the subject matter of the subpoena was drug smuggling was surely
irrelevant to the act of contumacy. Herre would have been just as much in
violation of section 401 of Title 18 of the United States Code if he had
unlawfully refused to testify about a parking meter violation. But if Herre's
trial jury had any reluctance to convict him, that reluctance was surely over-
come when the jurors learned that Herre was himself a drug smuggler. If
evidence that in all likelihood could not withstand scrutiny under Rules 401,
403, and 404(b) can avoid such scrutiny and gain admission on the bare
allegation that it relates in some fashion to a chain of events explaining the
context, motive, and set-up of charged crimes, then nothing remains of the
fundamental Anglo-American legal principle that evidence of uncharged
crimes is presumptively inadmissible.
That certainly appeared to be the case after United States v.
Fortenberry.'42 Although not a drug case, Fortenberry makes bold use of
the "inextricably intertwined" doctrine. Police suspected Fortenberry in two
murders. 43 No murder charges were ever brought, but federal authorities
prosecuted Fortenberry for, inter alia, unlawful possession of a Mossberg
500 twelve-gauge shotgun.'" Prior to trial, the prosecution notified
Fortenberry of its intent to introduce, pursuant to Rule 404(b), evidence of
Fortenberry's participation in the murders to establish his illegal possession
of the shotgun which the prosecution believed was used to commit the
murders.' 4s In its case in chief, the prosecution "presented numerouswitnesses linking Fortenberry to the double murder and the murder weapon
140. See Gomez, 927 F.2d at 1535; Herre, 930 F.2d at 837-838.
141. Id.
142. 971 F.2d 717 (11th Cir. 1992).
143. Id. at 719.
144. Id.
145. Id. (footnote omitted).
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itself,"14 but the shotgun was never found and therefore never produced at
trial.47
The trial court's analysis was a hedge podge of Rule 404(b) and the
"inextricably intertwined" theory. 48 The district court found the murder
evidence to be "inextricably intertwined" with evidence of the charged
possession count subject only to Rule 403 limitations 149-- which limitations,
by definition, have no applicability to evidence truly inextricable from the
evidence of charged offenses. The district court, at the time it admitted
evidence of the murders, cautioned the jury that Fortenberry was on trial not
for murder but only for possessing firearms.'" "The district court explained
that the murder evidence was admissible solely for the jury to determine
whether it created an inference that Fortenberry possessed the shotgun in
question."151 Genuinely inextricable evidence neither requires nor invites a
cautionary instruction.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.152 Evidence of the double murder was
properly admitted on the charge of possession of a firearm.153 The homicide
evidence was "inextricably intertwined" with the evidence of possession,
because it was "an essential part of the chain of events explaining the
context, motive, and set-up of the possession charge and was necessary to
complete the story of the crime for the jury."'54 Again, the court offers no
definition or explication of the terms "context, motive, and set-up" upon
which it relies. The closest the court gets to amplifying these terms is to say
that the other-crimes evidence "explained the context of how and why
Fortenberry acquired possession of the shotgun." 155 Whatever "context" and
"set-up" mean, they must mean a great deal. Their use enabled the
prosecution to adduce on a trial of simple5possession of a firearm otherwise
inadmissible proof of a double homicide. Because this proof was offered
as demonstrating "context, motive, and set-up," it must be inextricable;
because inextricable, it must be admissible.15  The long-standing general
rule that only evidence of charged offenses is admissible has been reduced to
an inconsequential exception (if it has any continued vitality at all) to the
146. Id.
147. Fortenberry, 971 F.2d at 721.
148. Id. at 720-21.
149. Id. at 721.
150. Id. at 720.
151. Id
152. Fortenbeny, 971 F.2d at 720.
153. Id at721.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Fortenberry, 971 F.2d at 721.
2000]
304
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
new general rule that any evidence of any bad act or crime is admissible if it
can be said in some fashion to pertain to a chain of events bearing upon the
context, motive, and set-up (terms helpfulla undefined, therefore all the more
capaciously applied) of the crime charged.
Stranger even than "context" and "set-up" is "motive." Most of the
cases in which the Eleventh Circuit employs the "inextricably intertwined"
rule are drug cases. Drug crimes are not crimes of passion; they are crimes
of financial gain. Motive is seldom an issue. The defendant sold the drugs
for money, or he bought the drugs to use and to sell for more money to buy
more drugs. Knowledge and intent may be at issue, particularly in
possession cases, but motive is clear. In United States v. Foster,15 9 a DEA
agent in Savanah, Georgia received a tip that three people would deplane
from Miami carrying cocaine.' 6 The agent observed Foster and his traveling
companions Stephanie Davis and Jeffrey Smith arrive at the airport, and
detained them there. A subsequent search of Ms. Davis revealed that she
had a kilo of cocaine secreted in her girdle. 62 Prior to Foster's trial, Davis
made a deal with the prosecution and agreed to testify. 63 She was permitted,
as part of her trial testimony, to relate that two and a half weeks prior to her
arrest with Foster, she had carried drugs at Foster's direction in the same
girdle while flying from Miami to Savannah. 64 In holding that this evidence
was properly admitted, the court of appeals seemed to speak the language of
Rule 404(b), e.g., the testimony was "relevant to Mr. Foster's opportunity,
intent, preparation, planning, and knowledge."'1 65 But the reason for the
court's ruling was that the other-crimes evidence was necessary to explain
the witness's, not the defendant's, motive.
66
Ms. Davis' explanation of the [earlier] transaction was necessary in
order for the jury to understand why Davis agreed to hide the
cocaine for Mr. Foster on the [later] trip with little or no advance
notice or apparent reflection on her part. Evidence concerning the
success of the [earlier] venture and the payment of $500.00 from
158. See also United States v. Pessefall, 27 F.3d 511 (1lth Cir. 1994) (holding other-
crimes evidence occurring eight years prior to charged crimes admissible as "inextricably
intertwined").
159. 889 F.2d 1049 (11th Cir. 1989).
160. Id. at 1050.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1051.
164. Foster, 889 F.2d at 1051.
165. Id. at 1053.
166. Id.
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Foster to Davis explains her willingness to participate in the [later]
transaction.
167
This entirely artificial rationale highlights just how false the doctrine of
"inextricably intertwined" really is. Those unwilling to pretend that the
emperor is wearing new clothes know perfectly well why the testimony
regarding the first drug deal was admitted: to show that the defendant is a
habitual drug dealer, and someone the jury should have no hesitation in
convicting. At a stretch, the evidence could be justified under Rule 404(b)
as going to negate mistake or accident, and as showing a pattern of conduct.
But to suggest that testimony regarding the earlier drug deal is somehow
"inextricable" from testimony regarding the latter drug deal, and admissible
as such, is untenable. In what sense is it "inextricable?" Clearly, Davis
could relate the events of the second drug transaction in full without so much
as a passing reference to the first transaction. The other-crime evidence bore
not at all upon any element of the actus reas. And to the extent it bore upon
the mens rea, it was alleged to bear, not upon the mens rea of the defendant,
but upon the mens rea of the witness. A witness's motive to testify may be
at issue, but Davis' motive to engage in the crime about which she was
testifying was of no relevance at all. And even if somehow it could be made
relevant, what could be plainer than the source of her motivation to act as a
drug courier? Davis did it for money. Nor is there much force to the
suggestion that the jury needed to learn why Davis acted "with little or no
advance notice or apparent reflection on her part. 168 Davis received all the
notice, and indulged all the reflection, she required when she was promised
five hundred dollars.
V. "INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED" IN STATE COURT
Given Florida's central importance as a battlefield in the "war on
drugs," and given the number of federal cases deploying the "inextricably
intertwined" doctrine as a weapon in that war, the paucity of drug cases in
the state courts of Florida in which the applicability of that doctrine has been
raised is remarkable. Remarkable, too, is the constancy with which Florida
courts have resisted the temptation to distort the notion of "inextricably
intertwined" out of all proportion in order to permit the introduction of any
and all prosecution evidence.
"Inextricably intertwined" evidence did not make its first appearance in
Florida jurisprudence until 1986, in an opinion captioned Tumulty v. State.169
167. Id. at 1050.
168. Id at 1053.
169. 489 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
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Jean Tumulty had participated in three drug smuggling ventures with the
same group of colleagues. 70 These individuals undertook a fourth such
venture in which Tumulty was not involved. 171 Although marijuana was
successfully brought into the United States, the importers were unable for
some reason to sell it. The pilot, one Marrs, refused to relinquish posses-
sion of the airplane until he was paid, thus rendering all future smuggling
business impossible.'7 Tumulty solved this problem by arranging to have
Marrs murdered.17 4 It was for the murder, and not for drug smuggling, that
Tumulty was charged. 75 The court of appeal determined that evidence of
176the drug smuggling, however, was properly admitted at trial .
It was relevant because it was "inextricably intertwined" in the
scenario of the fourth trip to show the context of the crime. It was
"inseparable crime" evidence that explains or throws light upon the
crime being prosecuted. In order to present an orderly, intelligible
case the state had to show the relationship between [the owner of
the plane] and Tumulty, close personal friends and business
associates, supplier and middleman.... The motive for the killing
was directly related to the "conversion" of [the] airplane by Marrs
and the urgent need for [Tumulty and the others] to get it back in
service. 17
In support of this proposition, the Tumulty court cites, not the common law
cases-not Killins and Oliver-but Professor Ehrhardt's treatise on Florida
evidence. Ehrhardt, in turn, cites to Aleman and progeny.
179
But there was no need to rely upon Aleman or other federal authorities.
Tumulty falls squarely within the res gestae version of "inextricably
intertwined" evidence. The defendant's motive to commit the charged
offense (as opposed to a witness's motive to testify at the trial of the
defendant for the charged offense) is inseparable from the charged offense
itself. Although a defendant's motive is often obvious, 18 it is not always
170. Id. at 151.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Tumulty, 489 So. 2d at 151.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 153.
177. Id.
178. CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 404.16, at 206 (2000 ed.).
179. Id.
180. Willie Sutton famously observed that his motivation for robbing banks was
because that was where the money was. In Sutton's autobiography he confessed that this oft-
quoted remark was not really his own. WuILm SUTrroN & EDWARD LINN, WHERE THE MONEY
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so-as in Tumulty. In such cases, evidence of uncharged crimes to establish
motive as to charged crimes may be admissible under the res gestae rule.
[Flacts and circumstances ... will [sometimes] warrant a
presumption that the [charged offense] grew out of, and was, to
some extent, induced by... [the uncharged offense]; in which
case, such circumstances connected with the [uncharged offense] as
are calculated to show the quo animo or motive by which the
[defendant] was actuated or influenced in regard to the [charged
crime], are competent and legitimate testimony.181
And again:
When the acts form one transaction, the evidence is admis-
sible .... Where the scienter or quo animo is requisite to, and
constitutes a necessary and essential part of the crime with which
the person is charged; and proof of such guilty knowledge, or
malicious intention, is indispensable to establish his guilt in regard
to the transaction in question, testimony of such acts, conduct, or
declarations of the accused, as tend to establish such knowledge or
intent, is competent; notwithstanding they may constitute in law a
distinct crime."
Although Tumulty was undoubtedly correctly decided, it would be a
dangerous oversimplification to say that evidence of uncharged crimes is
"inextricably intertwined" whenever such evidence bears upon the
defendant's motive as to the charged crimes. The test for "inextricably
intertwined" evidence--the proper res gestae test-is whether the evidence
in chief is rendered unintelligible, confusing, or misleading without the
other-crimes evidence. If the tale of the charged crimes can be told without
including the other-crimes evidence, then the other-crimes evidence is not
inextricable. Thus where the defendant's motive as to the charged crime is
readily inferred from the evidence in chief, or is otherwise not in issue, it
would be wrong to admit other-crimes evidence as "inextricably
intertwined" to establish motive.
183
WAs (1976). "I never said it. The credit belongs to some enterprising reporter who
apparently felt a need to fill out his copy... [but] [i]f anybody had asked me, I'd have
probably said it. That's what almost anybody would say.. . it couldn't be more obvious." Id.
181. FRANCiS WHARTON, I A TREATISE ON THE CRMINAL LAW 443 (6th ed. 1868)
(footnotes omitted).
182. Id. at 445.
183. The tendency of the courts to blur the conceptual distinction between Rule 404(b)
evidence and "inextricably intertwined" evidence may be attributable in part to the difficulty
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Although it was possible to narrate the events of Marrs' murder without
describing the prior drug deals that led up to it-although they were
separated in terms of time, place, manner, victim, and the like-it is
probably true that the narrative of Marrs' murder would have made little
sense without the evidence of the prior drug dealings. Tumulty, after all, did
not choose Marrs out of the telephone book. Unlike the federal cases,18
here, the other-crimes evidence of "motivation" was not offered to show the
motivation of witnesses, but to show the motivation of the defendant. 185
Tumulty was decided by an intermediate appellate court. The Supreme
Court of Florida had no occasion to give consideration to the "inextricably
186intertwined" principle until it decided Griffin v. State in 1994. Griffin was
accused of a variety of serious felonies, including the theft of an automobile
which he used during burglaries.187 The car in question had been rented by
one Marshall. 188 At trial, Marshall testified:
[O]n the evening of April 23, 1990, he returned to the Miami
Beach hotel where he was staying, placed the car keys on the
dresser, and retired for the evening. When he awoke the next
morning, Mr. Marshall found that the car keys and the car were
gone. Griffin concedes that his possession of the automobile was
admissible because grand theft was a charge the jury was
considering. However, Griffin argues that the testimony relating to
the missing keys was inadmissible.., because it suggested that the
hotel room had been burglarized, and was used by the State to
show that Griffin had a propensity to burglarize motel rooms.18
9
Clearly the evidence of the taking of Marshall's keys was admissible.
Griffin was charged with theft of the car, and stealing the keys was the
means by which he stole the car. Perhaps the matter might have been
different if there were, for example, evidence that the car had been "hot
wired," or towed away, or that someone else had a second set of keys. But
on the facts reflected in the opinion, Griffin's taking of the keys was as
in handling evidence of motive. Such evidence may be admissible by the plain terms of Rule
404(b) and section 90.404 of the Florida Statutes. See, e.g., Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d 9 (Fla.
2000). Such evidence may also be admissible as "inextricably intertwined"--but only when
the test for inextricability is met.
184. See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 889 F.2d 1049 (1lth Cir. 1989).
185. Tumulty v. State, 489 So. 2d 150, 153 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
186. 639 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 1994).
187. Id. at 967.
188. Id. at 969.
189. Id.
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inseparable from his taking of the car as was the defendant's taking of the
victim's ring and other personal items in the course of the rape prosecuted in
Nickels; as inseparable as the taking of Y's and Z's tools in connection with
the theft of X's toolbox in Wigmore's example. 190
The Supreme Court of Florida's dispositive treatment of "inextricably
intertwined" evidence is presented in the companion cases of Hartley v.
State191 and Ferrell v. State.192 Hartley and Ferrell were tried separately for
a murder and kidnapping they committed together. At Hartley's trial, a
police officer "testified that when he arrested Hartley and Ferrell for the
victim's murder, Hartley denied knowing the victim. The police officer then
testified that he told Hartley they knew he had robbed the victim two days
before the murder."193 The Supreme Court of Florida had no difficulty
concluding that the officer's testimony was improperly admitted, whether on
a theory of "inextricably intertwined" or otherwise. 1 4 The court reasoned
that "[t]he officer was not testifying to the fact that Hartley admitted robbing
the victim; the officer was merely repeating the officer's own statement that
he knew Hartley robbed the victim two days before the murder."' 195 At
Ferrell's trial, however, the court admitted "evidence that Ferrell and Hartley
robbed the victim two days before the murder." 196  This evidence was
admitted as "explain[ing] Ferrell's motivation [for the murder] in seeking to
prevent retaliation by the victim" for the prior robbery.'97
The Florida courts have hewed to the common law version of
"inextricably intertwined," admitting other-crimes evidence only when it is
truly inseparable from the actus reas of the charged crime, or from the mens
rea of the charged crime, 198 or both.199 In less than a handful of instances,
Florida courts have spoken the language of their federal counterparts,
admitting other-crimes evidence by way of a general reference to
,context. ,200
190. WIGMORE, supra note 15, § 218.
191. 686 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 1996).
192. 686 So. 2d 1324 (Fla. 1996).
193. Hartley, 686 So. 2d at 1319-20.
194. Id. at 1320.
195. Id.
196. Ferrell, 686 So. 2d at 1328.
197. Id. at 1329.
198. Cf Erickson v. State, 565 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (actus reus)
with Strausser v. State, 682 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1996) (mens rea), and Pugh v. State, 518 So. 2d
424 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (actus reas and mens rea); see also State v. Shaw, 730 So.
2d 312 (Fla. 4th Dist CL App. 1999); State v. Cohens, 701 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App.
1997).
199. See, e.g., Pugh v. State, 518 So. 2d 424,426 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
200. See, e.g., Coolen v. State, 696 So. 2d 738, 743 (Fla. 1997). In Coolen the court
found "the testimony was necessary to establish the entire context out of which the crime
20001
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In Griner v State,20 1 the defendant perpetrated two separate robberies
within two blocks and twenty-two minutes of each other.2°= Admitting
evidence of the first robbery at the trial of the second was error. The two
were not "inextricably intertwined." "The most we can say about the
relationship between these two events is that one occurred very soon after
the other, which is not sufficient to make the evidence regarding the first
incident admissible.... .203
In Porter v. State,"4 the police received a call regarding an incident of
domestic violence at the Porter residence.205 When Officer Walters arrived
on the scene, Mrs. Porter called out, "[h]e's trying to kill me."'  Walters
and another officer separated the Porters, ultimately finding it necessary to
put handcuffs and leg restraints on Mr. Porter.207  His manacles
notwithstanding, Porter continued to assault and struggle with the officers.208
He was charged with resisting an officer with violence and battery on a law
enforcement officer.? 9 The court of appeal determined that the wife's cry
for help "was not inextricably intertwined with the crimes for which Porter
was charged."'210 This was so because:
There was a clear break between the wife's statement and Porter's
altercation with the [officers]. The only relevance [of] the wife's
out-of-court statement was to explain the [officers'] presence at the
Porter residence. However, the [officers'] presence was sufficient-
ly explained by... Walter's testimony that he received a call con-
cerning a domestic violence incident. There was no need to reveal
the wife's statement .... 2 1
212The flip-side of Porter was Carrillo v. State. Carrillo was arrested for a
domestic incident with his live-in girlfriend and charged with aggravated
arose. [The] testimony was relevant and was not unduly prejudicial. Therefore, we find no
error in the admission of this testimony." Id.; see also Shively v. State, 752 So. 2d 84, 85
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Osborne v. State, 743 So. 2d 602, 602 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1999); T.S. v. State, 682 So. 2d 1202, 1202 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
201. 662 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
202. Id. at 759.
203. Id.
204. 715 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
205. ld. at 1019.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Porter, 715 So. 2d at 1019.
210. Id. at 1020.
211. Id.
212. 727 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
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battery.213 In the police car as he was being taken away Carrillo kicked,
struck his head against the window, cursed, and threatened, "if I'm going to
jail for this bitch, I might as well kill her."214 Rightly rejecting the argument
that this conduct was "inextricably intertwined" as bearing upon "motive" or
anything else, the court ruled that "Carrillo's threats and disruptive behavior
in the police car were so far removed in time from the incident [of domestic
violence that] they had little probative value as to his intent or state of mind
at the earlier time. Furthermore, the two incidents were not inextricably
intertwined."2 5
As the foregoing cases illustrate, most of the development of the
"inextricably intertwined" doctrine in Florida has been in non-drug cases.
But Huhn v. State216 involved a falling-out among drug dealers that led to
armed kidnapping and aggravated assault.217 Relying upon the Fourth
District's opinion in Tumulty, the prosecution offered evidence of previous
drug transactions in which the victim and the perpetrators of the
kidnapping/assault had participated together.218 The Huhn court, however,
distinguished Tumulty. In that case, the prior drug dealing provided the
motive for an otherwise inexplicable murder; the murder was simply the
consequence-in effect, the dramatic conclusion-of a falling-out during the
previous drug transactionsY In Huhn, the previous drug deals had been
consummated uneventfully, and formed no part of the crimes of kidnapping
and assault for which the defendant was charged.221
In D.M. v. State,222 the court of appeal for the Third District found
evidence to have been properly admitted as "inextricably intertwined" in a
drug case.=
During a period of fifteen minutes, a surveillance officer observed
D.M. and... A.E. standing on a sidewalk in front of a duplex. On
three occasions, someone approached the duo and handed money
to A.E. A.E. handed the money to D.M. While D.M. remained on
213. Id. at 1047.
214. Id. at 1048.
215. Id.; see also Beckett v. State, 730 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999); St.
Louis v. State, 584 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
216. 511 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
217. Id. at 584.
218. Id. at 586-87.
219. Id. at 590.
220. Tumulty v. State, 489 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
221. Huhn, 511 So. 2d at 590; see also Adams v. State, 743 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1999); Selver v. State, 568 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
222. 714 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
223. Id. at 1119.
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the sidewalk, A.E. walked to a utility room at the rear of the
duplex, returned from the utility room, and handed over a small
object to the person who had paid the money. U 4
After a fourth such transaction, one of D.M.'s customers was arrested and
found to be in possession of a cocaine rock.225 The police then arrested
D.M. and A.E. The two juveniles were charged with sale of cocaine in the
fourth transaction and-crucially for the "inextricably intertwined" issue-
possession with intent to sell a supply of packaged-for-sale cocaine rocks
found in the utility room.227 At trial, the prosecution offered in evidence the
first three sales viewed by the surveillance officer.228 Evidence of the
conduct giving rise to these sales was genuinely inseparable from the
charged possession offense.229 To prove the possession crime as against
both defendants, the prosecution:
[W]as required to show dominion and control by the [defendants]
over the drugs in the utility room. During the fifteen-minute
surveillance, the officer observed four transactions and four trips to
retrieve objects from the utility room. The evidence of the
trips... was inextricably intertwined with the evidence of the
sidewalk transactions.
230
This analysis is unimpeachable.
VI. CONCLUSION
"The law," said no less an authority than Benjamin Nathan Cardozo,
"has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was
the sovereign talisman .... ,z3' Nearly a century later, the phrase
"inextricably intertwined" has taken on the status of a sovereign talisman
which, with primitive formalism, conjures up the admission of inadmissible
evidence.
Meantime, the expression "res gestae" has been cast aside by all
courts. 232 Wigmore himself describes the phrase as:
224. Id. at 1118.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. D.M., 714 So. 2dat 1118.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1119.
230. Id. at 1119-20.
231. Wood v. Lucy, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
232. But cf. Lucy v. State, 340 So. 2d 840 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976).
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[U]nsatisfactory, first, because it is obscure and indefinite, and
needs further definition and translation before either its reason or
its scope can be understood; and, secondly, because its very loose-
ness and obscurity lend too many opportunities for its abuse. It is
not too much to say that it is nowadays most frequently used
merely as a cover for loose ideas and ignorance of prin-
ciples.... [T]he result is only to make rulings on evidence arbitr-
ary and chaotic, when we ignore the correct purposes of admission
and substitute an indefinite and meaningless phrase of this sort. 23
There is irony here. Having rejected, as "obscure and indefinite," as
"need[ing] further definition and translation," as a mere "cover for loose
ideas" the term res gestae, the Eleventh Circuit has simply substituted in its
place the term "inextricably intertwined"--a figure of speech as obscure and
indefinite, as much in need of definition and translation, as likely to shelter
loose ideas, as any form of words ever visited upon the law.
Such figures of speech have their purpose. If the jurisprudential goal is
a rule of law so capacious and indefinite as to provide all drug convictions
with a safe harbor on appeal, "inextricably intertwined" is ideal. If,
however, the jurisprudential goal is clarity of thought and expression, and a
due regard for the fair trial rights of accused citizens, the "inextricably
intertwined" rule as presently applied in the Eleventh Circuit is very far from
ideal.
Without reverting to the term res gestae, the courts in the Eleventh
Circuit should revert to the common law understanding of what is today
termed "inextricably intertwined" evidence. Evidence of uncharged
misconduct should be admitted only when such evidence cannot be redacted
from the narrative of the charged misconduct without leaving that narrative
confusing or incomplete. "Inextricably intertwined" evidence should be
received infrequently, as a narrow exception to the general rule against the
admission of evidence of uncharged crimes.
That the "inextricably intertwined" rule, properly defined and
understood, is a necessary part of our evidentiary jurisprudence cannot be
gainsaid. In United States v. Kerris,2Z 4 undercover agent Flagg was
investigating a stolen car ring, and in that capacity came to Florida to obtain
a stolen auto for delivery to New York.25 In his undercover role, Flagg met
Kerris.236 When Flagg told Kerris that he (Flagg) was taking two kilos of
233. WIGMORE, supra note 15, § 218.
234. 748 F.2d 610(llth Cir. 1984).
235. Id. at613.
236. Id.
200
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cocaine to New York with him, Kerris offered to supply all of Flagg's future
cocaine needs.237
Kerris then introduced Flagg to DeMeo, Kerris' partner and future
codefendant. 238 It was DeMeo who supplied Flagg with the stolen vehicle to
be transported to New York.239 At the time Flagg took delivery of the car,
DeMeo asked Flagg if he needed additional cocaine.m Flagg answered that
he did not but, should a need arise in the future, he would be in touch.21
Flagg then drove the auto to New York, telephoning Kerris several times
along the way to discuss both the delivery arrangements for the car and plans
for future cocaine transactions. 242 As a result of these discussions, cocaine
was later delivered to Flagg in New York.2 3 Finally, Flagg "had several
telephone conversations with both Kerris and DeMeo... in which Flagg
[discussed] ... pay[inw) $250,000 in exchange for five kilograms of cocaine
and two stolen cars." Kerris and DeMeo were charged with drug crimes,
but no count in the indictment expressly referenced the stolen vehicles.245 On
these facts, however, the court quite properly found the evidence of the
misconduct involving the cars to be inextricable from that of the drug
offenses.2 Flagg's testimony would have been expurgated beyond all
recognition if he had been obliged to delete references to the stolen autos.27
Compare United States v. Chilcote.24" There, an undercover agent
named Matthews had infiltrated a cocaine operation in which Chilcote was
involved.2A9 On an occasion when Chilcote and Matthews "were engaged in
weighing and analyzing the cocaine, they had a conversation in which
Matthews asked [Chilcote] whether he was a pilot. [Chilcote] replied that he
was not a pilot, but that he had once flown a DC-3 to Colombia and back."5 0
The inference, of course, was that Chilcote's unlicensed flight to Colombia
was for the purpose of a prior drug deal. Rejecting the application of the
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Kerris, 748 F.2d at 613.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Kerris, 748 F.2d at 613.
245. Ia
246. Id. at 615.
247. Id. (inexplicably citing to United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir.
1979), the controlling authority for admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b)); see also
United States v. King, 126 F.3d 987 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying the doctine of res
gestae/inextricably intertwined in a non-drug case).
248. 724 F.2d 1498 (11 th Cir. 1984).
249. Id. at 1500.
250. Id. at 1501.
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"inextricably intertwined" doctrine (one of the few such instances in a drug
case in the history of the Eleventh Circuit), the court ruled that "agent
Matthews' testimony about [Chilcote's] involvement in the crime charged
would have been completely comprehensible without the testimony
regarding [Chilcote's] claimed flight to Colombia. The evidence regarding
the flight was entirely unrelated to the transaction at issue here and
constitutes extrinsic evidence...."251
Had the Chilcote court been inclined to do so, it could easily have
treated the evidence of the prior flight to Colombia as giving "context" to the
charged offense. The chain of induction from Chilcote's admission that he
had unlawfully piloted a plane to Colombia and back, to the conclusion that
he was a practiced and determined drug smuggler was no more attenuated
than the chain of induction required to link the other-crimes evidence to the
charged crimes in McDowell, 2 for example, or Herre253 or Foster.
2 54
Commendably, the Eleventh Circuit excluded the other-crimes evidence, and
did so on the correct grounds: that proof of the charged offenses "would
have been completely comprehensible without the testimony regarding
[Chilcote's] claimed flight to Colombia." 5
Thus application of the correct test for "inextricably intertwined"
evidence proves to be no more difficult than many of the other evidentiary
determinations courts routinely make in drug cases. That being conceded,
there can be no justification for admission of evidence on the "same time
period" theory or the "context, background, or witness's motivation" theory.
If proof of the charged crimes is not rendered incomprehensible, confusing,
or misleading without the other-crimes evidence, then the other-crimes
evidence is not admissible as "inextricably intertwined." 6
251. Id.
252. United States v. McDowell, 705 F.2d 426 (11 th Cir. 1983).
253. United States v. Herre, 930 F.2d 836 (1 th Cir. 1991).
254. United States v. Foster, 889 F.2d 1049 (11th Cir. 1985).
255. Chilcote, 724 F.2d at 1501.
256. When the prosecution seeks to offer evidence under Rule 404(b) or section 90.404
of the Florida Statutes, it must give pretrial notice of that intent. See supra note 3. Such
pretrial notice affords the trial court an opportunity to devote mature reflection to the issue of
admissibility, and to fashion a ruling (necessarily provisional, but still providing guidance to
counsel and litigants) tailored to the facts and circumstances of the case. Such a ruling is
necessarily better considered than one made in the hurly-burly of trial. Extending this pretrial
notice requirement to evidence sought to be admitted as "inextricably intertwined" would be
similarly salutary. Courts should view putatively "inextricably intertwined" evidence with an
even more jaundiced eye than they do evidence offered under Rule 404(b) or section 90.404
of the Florida Statutes. The former is subject to redaction or limitation under the Rule 403
balancing test; the latter, by definition, cannot be elided or limited without rendering the
evidence in chief incomprehensible, misleading, or confusing.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1776, John Hancock signed his name with ink on a document known
as the Declaration of Independence.' As the first and largest name on the
Declaration, John Hancock's name has become a synonym for the word
"signature."2 This paper-based system of recording signatures has been an
important method of communicating for hundreds of years, with contract
jurisprudence being based upon the fundamental principle that a handwritten
signature indicates a person's intent to transact business However, since
John Hancock signed the Declaration of Independence, technological
advancements have led to the evolution of numerous forms of
communication, such as radio, television, cable, and satellite." It is no longer
necessary to sign your "John Hancock" to represent yourself. One of the
newest forms of communication is the Internet, which is being combined
with other technologies to create a highly advanced system of
communication.' This new form of electronic communication is becoming
increasingly pervasive, influencing the everyday lives of all Americans.' The
use of the technology through computers and the Internet now means that an
individual can buy, sell, or trade, by clicking a mouse, pressing a key, or
typing a name. It has been suggested that we are in the midst of an
electronic commerce ("e-commerce") revolution that is bigger than the
industrial revolution and every other major economic shift that has preceded
it.7 America has both the fastest growing number of Internet users and the
largest proportion of e-commerce consumers in the world.8 By 2001-2002,
total e-commerce is predicted to reach $330 billion.9 The increasing trend
1. 13 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AMRICANA 757 (Int'l ed. 1995).
2. Id.
3. Amelia H. Boss, Searching for Security in the Law of Electronic Commerce, 23
NOVA L. REV. 585, 585-86 (1999).
4. United States Internet Council, State of the Internet: USIC's Report on Use &
Threats in 1999, at http://www.usic.orglpaperslstateoftheintemet99.htm (last visited Aug. 2,
2000).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Mark Grossman, The E-Commerce Revolution, CYBERdAW.NEWS (Becker &
Poliakoff, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Winter 2000, at 1; Anitesh Barua & Andrew B. Whinston,
The Internet Economy Indicators: Overview-The Big Picture, at http'//www.intemetindicators.
com/ overview --big- picture june_00.htrl (last visited Aug. 9, 2000).
8. Roper Starch Worldwide, America is Fastest-Growing Internet Market, As Teens
Lead the Way, at http:l/www.roper.comfnewslcontentlnewsl27.htm (last visited Aug. 2,2000).
9. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Growth of Electronic
Commerce: Present and Potential, at http://www.oecd.org/subjectle._commercelebooks/027-
054.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2000).
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towards using electronic transactions is based on the inefficiencies of paper-
based communications.10 Some advantages of conducting business through
e-commerce are that it is convenient, flexible, and efficient." Although
e-commerce has eliminated the need for slower, paper-based transactions, a
number of questions have been raised in the legal system as to what
constitutes a signature within an electronic transaction. In addition to these
questions, security concerns regarding electronic transactions have also been
raised. 3
The United States government discourages barriers to the increasing use
of e-commerce to conduct business,14 and recently passed legislation that
gives electronic signatures the same legally binding effect as handwritten
signatures.15 At the state level, a number of states, including Florida, have
adopted the 1999 Uniform Electronic Transactions Act ("UETA") to provide• 16
their own legal standard for e-commerce transactions. This article
considers the effect of Florida's Electronic Transaction Act on businesses,
consumers, and governmental entities in Florida, and the issues raised by
giving electronic signatures the same legally binding effect as handwritten
signatures. With the vast increase in computer use and electronic
transactions in conducting business, it is important that attorneys in all areas
of concentration, judges, and everyday consumers have a knowledge of the
ramifications of the new legislation that gives electronic signatures the same
legally binding effect as handwritten signatures and paper records.
10. Shea C. Meehan, Comment, Consumer Protection Law and the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act (UETA): Why States Should Adopt UETA as Drafted, 36 IDAHO L Rnv. 563,
564(2000).
11. Barua & Whinston, supra note 7.
12. Boss, supra note 3, at 587.
13. Boss, supra note 3, at 592.
14. The White House, A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, at
http:llwww.ecommerce.gov/fraimewrlhtm (July 1, 1997); U.S. Department of Commerce, The
Emerging Digital Economy, at www.doc.gov/ecommerce/EmergingDig.pdf (June 22, 1999); see
also U.S. Government Working Group on Electronic Commerce, First Annual Report, at
http//www.doc.gov/ecommerceIE-comm.pdf (Nov. 1998).
15. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (ESGNCA), Pub. L.
No. 106-229, 114 Stat. 464 (2000) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-7031).
16. UNiF. ELEc. TRANSACTIONS ACT (UETA) §§ 1-21, 7A U.L.A. 20-46 (West Supp.
2000); see also FLA. STAT. § 668.50 (2000).
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II. WHAT IS THE INTERNET AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE?
The Internet is a worldwide system of computer networks, 17 which
transport information from stored files from one computer to others having
the same Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol ("TCP/IP"). ' *
Through the Internet, computers can be used to send and receive electronic
mail ("e-mail"), 9 send and receive documents from other computers, and
view information on the World Wide Web.2°
As an application of the Internet, e-commerce transactions are
increasing at a rapid pace and will potentially account for a sizeable share of
overall commerce.21 Although the term e-commerce has no widely accepted
definition, it generally refers to doing business and selling goods and
services on the Internet. 22 These goods and services can be delivered both
on-line, through a computer, or offline, being mailed in a regular fashion
through the Postal Service. The emphasis on a geographic location suitable
for business, large amounts of capital, and retail stores are irrelevant in
17. The original purpose of the Internet was for the United States government to have a
decentralized system of computers to ensure that communication would still be possible even if
some were destroyed in an event such as a nuclear war. Sean Selin, Governing Cyberspace: The
Need for an International Solution, 32 GONz. L REV. 365, 367 (1997). This decentralization
then expanded beyond a military purpose into the commercial and educational context of
computers. Id. The unique structure of the Internet means that it is difficult to govern. Id. at
368. It is not a single entity, and is not controlled by any government, company, or individual. Id.
18. University of California, Berkeley, What is the Internet, the WWW, and Netscape?
An Introduction, at http://www.lib.berkeley.edulTeachingLib/Guides/Intemet/WhatIs.html (last
modified July 19, 2000).
19. Id. E-mail is a medium where electronic letters, pictures, sounds, and data files can
be instantly sent within a building or across the world. Paul Hoffman, Internet Electronic Mail,
at http:lwww.sciam.com/1998/0398issuel0398working.html (last visited Aug. 3, 2000). By
entering an Internet mail address, the sender of the message uses software, such as Microsoft
Outlook, to send the document to another person. Id. The message is sent by TCP software to a
mail submission server that converts the recipient's address into a numeric IP address. Id.
Routers through the Internet then relay the message to its destination on the most efficient
pathway, through data lines to the destination mail server. Id. This places the message in the
recipient's mail box, and the recipient can then use software to display the message. Id.
20. University of California, Berkeley, supra note 18.
21. JONATHAN COPPEL, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, E-COMMERCE: IMPACTS AND Pouc" CHALLENGES 3 (Econ. Dep't Working
Papers No. 252, 2000).
22. ld. at4.
23. Id.
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e-commerce transactions. 24 E-commerce transactions come in a number of
forms, for instance, business to business, between businesses and consumers,
or from consumer to consumer.25 By using e-commerce, thousands of
businesses and consumers now have ease of access for the opportunity to
generate and spend revenue.
26
III. TRADITIONAL CONTRACT LAW AND SIGNATURES
A. Writings
Some contracts require a writing to be held enforceable, and most of the
United States have adopted some modified form of the Statute of Frauds,
originally an English statute passed in 1677.27 The main provision of the
Statute of Frauds states that no law suit can be maintained on certain types of
contracts unless they are in writing and signed by the party involved, or by
an authorized agent.2 The types of contracts included under the Statute of
Frauds are those for the sale of goods over $500, contracts for the sale of
land, contracts which cannot be performed within one year, and contracts
that guaranty the debt of another.79 The formal requirements of the Statute
of Frauds have been incorporated by both the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC")30 and Florida's own version of the UCC.31
Although a writing requirement is not always needed to form a binding
contract, parties often formalize an agreement in writing after negotiating a
32transaction. Traditionally, writing requirements have been used to ensure
that terms of a document are fixed. If there are any ambiguities regarding
the parties' intent within a transaction, courts generally limit their
interpretation of the agreement to what is contained in the text of the
24. Global Information Infrastucture Commission, GIIC Recommendations for
Promoting the Use of Electronic Commerce, at http://www.giic.org/focus/ecommercetecrecs
.html (last visited Aug. 3,2000).
25. CoPPEL, supra note 21, at 4.
26. Kalama M. Lui-Kwan, Recent Developments in Digital Signature Legislation and
Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TZH. LJ. 463 (1999).
27. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 661 (6th ed. 1990).
28. Id. at 662.
29. Id.
30. U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1989).
31. FLA. STAT. § 672.201 (2000); see also 45 FA. JUR. 2D Sales and Exchanges of
Goods § 30 (1984).
32. JOHN D. CALAMAM & Josma M. PERLLO, TE LAW OF CONMCrS § 2.8 (4th ed.
1998).
33. Adam White Scoville, Clear Signatures, Obscure Signs, 17 CARDozo ARTS & ENT.
LJ. 345,356 (1999).
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document.34 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that a writing is
acceptable if it reasonably identifies the subject matter of a contract, is
sufficient to indicate that a contract has been made, and states the essential
terms of the promises contained in the contract with reasonable certainty.35
B. Signatures
In contrast to writings, signatures are attached to documents for the
purpose of authentication, and to demonstrate a signer's intent to be bound
36by what is written. A signature can be defined as any mark, sign, or
symbol on an instrument or document that signifies knowledge, approval, or
acceptance of an obligation,37 or something that an individual may use to
represent herself.38 In addition to handwritten signatures, it has also been
recognized, unless stated otherwise by a statute, that a genuine signature may
be one that is stamped, typewritten, engraved, or faxed.39 It is the signer's
intent rather than the form of a signature that determines whether a signature
is legal.40
Along with showing evidence of a person's intent, a secondary purpose
of a signature can be to identify the person signing a document or to show
the integrity of a document.41 As suggested by Smedinghoff and Hill-Bro,42
these secondary purposes become important in the electronic world, because
of the potential for electronic transactions to be altered.43 Potential damage
to the integrity of an electronic document may be inflicted by a computer
hacker, or someone attempting to commit fraud." Furthermore, the identity
of the sender and the integrity of the document hold great importance in
electronic transactions, because the transactions can be anonymous and
34. Id.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONTRACrS § 131 (1981).
36. 80 CJ.S. Signatures § l(a) (1953); see also Scoville, supra note 33, at 356.
37. 80 C.J.S. Signatures § 1(a) (1953).
38. Id.
39. Id. § 7; see also State v. Hickman, 189 So. 2d 254, 258 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1966).
40. William E. Wyrough, Jr. & Ron Klein, The Electronic Signature Act of 1996:
Breaking Down Barriers to Widespread Electronic Commerce in Florida, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
407,420 (1997).
41. Thomas J. Smedinghoff & Ruth Hill Bro, Moving With Change: Electronic
Signature Legislation As a Vehicle for Advancing E-Commerce, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
IfrO. L. 723, 731 (1999). The integrity of a document could be shown by initialing pages of a
document before it is signed to prevent pages being substituted. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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occur over thousands of miles without the parties ever meeting or
exchanging any papers.45 Although most handwritten signatures are used
merely to indicate a signer's intent, electronic signatures in an e-commerce
transaction can identify the sender of a document, indicate the sender's
intent to be bound by the contractual terms, and ensure the integrity of the
document that has been signed. 6 Based on traditional contract law and
signatures, a name typed at the end of an e-mail should qualify as a
signature, as long as the person signing the e-mail had an intent to contract.47
C. What Are Electronic Signatures?
With the development of e-commerce, traditional paper-based
signatures have been replaced by electronic signatures." As a result,
legislation has been directed toward the types of documents and signatures
that can be electronically created, communicated and stored.49 These
electronically generated signatures are referred to as either "electronic
signatures" or "digital signatures., 50 Although these terms are often used
interchangeably, each has its own distinct meaning.51  An electronic
signature is a broadly used, technology-neutral term which embraces all the
methods by5 which an individual can sign an electronic record or
transaction. An electronic record is a record that is "created, generated,
sent, communicated, received, or stored by electronic means. Electronic
signatures can take numerous forms, including a faxed writing,54 a name
typed in an e-mail message,55 a secret code, as used in a personal
identification number of an automated teller machine with a credit card,56 a
biometric identifier using physical characteristics such as face, finger prints,
and retinas,57 or digital signatures. 8
45. Smedinghoff & Hill Bro, supra note 41, at 732.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 737.
48. Wyrough, Jr. & Klein, supra note 40, at 421.
49. Smedinghoff& Hill Bro, supra note 41, at 729.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 730.
53. FLA. STAT. § 668.50(2)(g) (2000).
54. Wyrough, Jr. & Klein, supra note 40, at 421.
55. Smedinghoff& Hill Bro, supra note 41, at 730.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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In contrast, a digital signature is a specific term for one type of
electronic signature.59 It is a stamp that a signer places on documents or data
which is unique to that signer.6 0 For a digital signature to be produced and
used, a signer will have both a "public key" and a "private key."'" The
public and private keys are used in electronic documents to encrypt and
scramble information, leaving only the person with the appropriate key as
being able to unscramble the information to make it readable again.
62
Anyone can gain access to the signer's public key, but only the signer can
63use her private key. In conjunction with the appropriate software, a signer
can use her private key to encrypt and scramble information contained in a
document, thus attaching her digital signature. When the document with
the digital signature is passed to another person, the person who receives the
document can decrypt the signature by using the signer's public key.65 If the
unscrambling of the document is successful, it proves that the signer signed
the document, and if the message is the same as that which was created, the
recipient knows that the signed data has not been altered.6 If the original
message was forged or altered, and the private key did not correspond to the
public key used, the recipient would not be able to decrypt the message.
67
IV. THE NEED FOR A UNIFORM STANDARD FOR
ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS
A fundamental issue that e-commerce raises is whether the electronic
records and electronic signatures generated by transactions within
e-commerce "meet legal formalities such as the writing and signature
requirements imposed by a variety of statutes and regulations .... ,6 Under
traditional contract law, electronic transactions, such as those with a faxed
69
signature, should be legally binding. Statutes and regulations requiring
transactions to be in writing are considered barriers that need to be removed
to allow the development and increase of e-commerce transactions.70
59. Id.
60. David M. Nadler & Valerie M. Furman, House Passes Digital Signature Act,
CYBERSPACE LAw, Dec. 1999, at 17.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Nadler & Furman, supra note 60, at 17.
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. Smedinghoff & Hill Bro, supra note 41, at 733.
69. Id. at 735-36.
70. Id. at 734.
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However, because of a lack of specific statutory guidelines, coupled with a
lack of uniformity in court decisions among jurisdictions, the legality of
electronic signatures has been questioned.7'
A. Uniform Acts
1. The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act ("UCITA") has
been developed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws ("NCCUSL"). 72  This Act includes substantial provisions on
electronic signatures, and provides a comprehensive uniform law for
computer information licensing.73 The purpose of UCITA is to provide a set
of rules for creating and adopting electronic contracts by using the
traditional principles of contract law.74 Examples of computer information
that could be subject to UCITA include computerized databases,
computerized music, access contracts to sites on and off the Internet
containing computer information, and software such as diskettes and
compact discs, which may be used to hold computer information. 7  UCITA
is limited to commercial licensing.76  Similar to the common law
understanding of signatures, UCITA sees signatures as being a method to
show a signer's intent to authenticate a document.
77
71. Id. at737; see also Parma Tile Mosaic & Marble Co. v. Short, 663 N.E.2d 633, 634
(N.Y. 1996) (holding that a heading, including a name on a fax, does not constitute a signature
for the writing requirement under the Statute of Frauds).
72. Carol A. Kunze, The ETA Forum, at http'//www.webeom.com/legaled/ETAForunm
bkgd.html (last modified July 11, 1999). The NCCUSL began in 1892 as a conference attended
by commissioners from seven states and by 1912 every state had representation. Id. It is a
nonprofit, unincorporated association of over 300 commissioners on uniform laws that represent
all fifty states. Id. The commissioners are mostly judges, practicing attorneys, and professors of
law. Id. The main task of the NCCUSL is to determine which areas of the law would benefit
from a uniform standard for a law, and to write and recommend these uniform laws to provide
state legislatures with a model for enactment. Id.
73. Uniform Law Commissioners, A Few Facts About Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act, at http:/www.nccusl.orguniformact.factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucita.htm. (last
visited Aug. 4,2000).
74. Id.
75. Uniform Law Commissioners, Summary: Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act, at http://www.nccusl.orgtuniformact_summaries/uniformacts-s-ucita.htm (last
visited Aug. 4, 2000).
76. Scoville, supra note 33, at 356.
77. Id.
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2. The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
To help create certainty and uniformity in the field of electronic trans-
actions, the NCCUSL established a drafting committee to develop a uniform
act to establish a legal standard for the recognition of electronic records and
electronic signatures. The uniform law generated by this committee is
known as the Electronic Transactions Act, and was approved and
recommended for enactment in all the states in 1999.79 The Act attempts to
remove barriers to e-commerce,80 with limited purposes to ensure that
electronic records are given the same recognition as a piece of paper, and
that electronic signatures are given the same legal effect as manual
signatures.81 It does not attempt to provide a new standard of legislation
governing all electronic commerce, and it does not effect the substantive
rules of contracts.82 UETA applies only to electronic signatures and records
relating to a transaction, not to all writings and signatures, and not those
governed by most of the UCC.83  It is a procedural statute that does not
require electronic signatures or records to be used, but provides a standard
for governing these transactions." The commissioners also make it clear
that the Act is not a digital signature statute.85 Where a state has a statute
governing digital signatures, the Act is not designed to replace that
legislation, but to support and compliment that statute.
Both the Uniform Law commissioners and legal scholars have encou-
raged the states to adopt UETA. They have advanced a number of reasons
as to why UETA should be adopted in its entirety, including the fact that it
defines and validates electronic signatures, it removes the barriers to e-
commerce, it assures that people can choose between paper or electronic
based methods of transacting business, it does not affect consumer pro-
tection laws, and it encourages state governments to use electronic communi-
78. Kunze, supra note 72.
79. Id.
80. Uniform Law Commissioners, Why States Should Adopt the Unifonn Electronic
Transactions Act, at http://www.nccusl.orgluniformactwhy/uniformacts-why-ueta.htm. Oast
visited Aug. 4, 2000).
81. Uniform Law Commissioners, at http://www.nccusl.orgtuniformact_sumnaries/
uniformacts-s-veta.htm (last visited Aug. 4, 2000).
82. Uniform Law Commissioners, supra note 75.
83. Id. The reason that most contracts governed by the UCC are excluded is because
most articles of the UCC already deal with the use of electronic records. Meehan, supra note 10,
at 568.
84. Uniform Law Commissioners, supra note 75.
85. UETA, Prefatory Note, 7A U.L.A. 17-19 (West Supp. 2000).
86. Id.
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cations and records.Y UETA applies to both commercial and many non-
commercial signatures, and although UETA and UCITA are designed to
compliment each other, UETA has a wider scope and uses a broader
definition of an electronic signature. 8 In contrast to UCITA, UETA requires
a signature with intent to associate the person with a particular record.89"
So far, UETA has been adopted by a number of states, including
California, Florida, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Virginia, and introduced in a
number of others, such as Delaware, Michigan, and New Jersey. 90 With the
increasing use and concerns about electronic transactions, it seems likely
that other states will also adopt UETA in the near future. A further reason
advanced for adopting UETA in its entirety is that preemptive federal
regulations may be financially burdensome to the states if they adopt non-
uniform amendments. 91
B. Federal Legislation
1. The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act
In addition to the NCCUSL, the United States government also
recognizes that traditional laws and regulations can hinder the development
of e-commerce.9 As both a national and international marketplace, the
government states that the Internet needs to be governed by a legal
framework that is consistent and predictable at the state, national, and
international level, regardless of the jurisdiction in which a buyer or seller
makes the transaction. 93 After consideration of a number of bills, Congress
recently passed the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce
Act ("ESGNCA"), being signed into law by President Clinton on June 30,
2000.94 After signing the legislation, the President stated that by providing a
87. . Uniform Law Commissioners, supra note 81; Meehan, supra note 10, at 563.
88. Scoville, supra note 33, at 356.
89. Id.
90. Carol A. Kunze, What's happening, to UETA in the States, at
http'/www.uetaonline.com/hapstate.html (last modified July 9, 2000). According to UETA on-
line, the full list of states that have adopted the UETA to date are Arizona, California, Florida,
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, and Virginia. Id. The states that have introduced
UETA are Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Michigan,
New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Vermont, and West Virginia. Id.
91. Meehan, supra note 10, at 564.
92. Global Information Infrastructure Commission, supra note 24.
93. Id.
94. ESGNCA, Pub. L No. 106-229, § 101(a) 114 Stat. 464 (2000) (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 7001-7031).
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legal standard for electronic contracts and signatures, there will be new
frontiers of economic opportunity, while still protecting the rights of
American consumers in the largest economic expansion in history.95
As a member of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, Senator Spencer Abraham, introduced ESGNCA as Senate
Bill 76196 on March 5, 1999, to regulate interstate commerce by electronic
means by allowing and encouraging the increased use of e-commerce
through free market forces. 97 The Act states that a signature, contract, or
other record of a transaction cannot be denied legal effect, validity, or
enforceability, solely on the basis that it was formed by an electronic record
or electronic signature. 98 There is no requirement that any person has to
agree to use or receive electronic signatures or electronic records. 99 Also, it
does not affect statutes, regulations, or rules of law, other than to the extent
that they require contracts or records to be written or signed by non-
electronic means. °° In developing the Act, Congress intended to have the
marketplace, rather than governments, control the continued growth and
development of e-commerce.10
Where information relating to a transaction is required to be made
available to a consumer in writing, the use of an electronic record can be
used to meet this requirement.' 2 By providing consumers with the right not
to use electronic records or signatures to conduct transactions, the Act states
that an electronic record can only be used to satisfy the writing requirement
of a statute, regulation, or rule of law if a consumer consents to it, and does
not later withdraw that consent.1 3  Specifically, prior to consenting,
consumers must be given a clear and conspicuous statement that they can
withdraw their consent, and that they can have the record made available in a
non-electronic form.104 A statement of the hardware and software that will
be needed to access and retain electronic records is also required, along with
95. The White House, Signing of Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/html/electronic.signaturestext.html.
(last visited Aug. 4,2000).
96. In Senate Bill 761, the Act was called the "Millennium Digital Commerce Act." S.
761, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999).
97. Id.
98. ESGNCA, Pub. L No. 106-229, § 101(a), 114 Stat. 464,464 (2000) (to be codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-7031).
99. § 101(b).
100. Id.
101. COMM. ON COMMERCE, Sci., & TRANsP., MmLENNIM DIGrrAL COMMECE ACT, S.
REP. No. 106-131, at 5 (1999).
102. § 101(c).
103. Id.
104. Id.
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the procedures consumers need to follow to withdraw consent and receive a
non-electronic record.105 If consumers consent electronically, it must be
reasonably demonstrated that they will be able to access the information in
its electronic form.1°6 However, the failure to obtain electronic consent or
confirmation from a consumer cannot be the sole basis in denying the
validity of a contract.1 7 An electronic signature can also be used as
notarization for a transaction where a statute or other law requires this
authorization. 08
Although ESGNCA is intended to give electronic signatures and
records the same legally binding effect as handwritten signatures, there are
some specific exceptions.'0 The Act does not apply to contracts governed
by statutes or other laws regarding the creation and execution of wills,
codicils or testamentary trusts, divorce, adoption, or other matters of family
law, and a majority of sections of the UCC. 110 Furthermore, the Act can
preempt state electronic signature laws, but a state law will not be preempted
if it is an adoption of UETA,111 or the law is an alternative method for
achieving the same recognition of electronic records and signatures and
consistent with the principles contained in ESGNCA.1
12
2. The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act and the
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
The definitions of terms in ESGNCA, such as electronic record,
electronic signature, person, and transaction, are consistent with those
contained in UETA.' In regulating and encouraging a uniform standard for
electronic signatures and records, the government does not intend to preempt
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. § 101(c)(3), 114 StaL at466.
108. § 101(g), 114Stat.at467.
109. § 103, 114 Stat, at 468.
110. § 103(a). Further exceptions include court orders and official court documents, such
as briefs and pleadings, the cancellation or termination of utilities, repossession or default under
credit or rental agreements, the cancellation or termination of either health or life insurance
benefits, the recall of a product for health and safety reasons, and documentation regarding the
transportation or handling of toxic or dangerous materials. § 103(b)(1).
111. § 102(a)(1).
112. Id.; see Patricia Brumfield Fry, A Preliminary Analysis of Federal and State
Electronic Commerce Laws, at http.//www.uetaonline.comfdocspfry700.htnl (last visited Aug.
4,2000).
113. COMM. ON COMMERCF, ScffNCE, AND TRANSP., MmLearNtM DirrAL COMMERCE
ACT, S. REP. No. 106-131, at 5 (1999).
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or overrule state law enactments of UETA.' 14 The gradual enactment of
UETA by the states is similar to the situation that occurred when the
NCCUSL released the UCC, where the uniform act was not adopted in every
state simultaneously.1 5 There was a transition period with the status of
commercial law being somewhat unclear, while states debated and
considered the ramifications of the UCC before deciding to approve its
enactment.1 6 The Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
recognizes that effects of the transition period seen when the states were
considering and adopting the UCC will be the same for the enactment of
UETA. 1 7  In achieving the goal of a uniform standard for contracts
generated by electronic methods, the federal legislation provides uniformity,
even among those states that have either not yet adopted or chosen not to
adopt UETA. "'
V. FLORIDA'S ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE LEGISLATION AND THE
UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTION ACT
A. The Electronic Signature Act of 1996
In a step to encourage the development of e-commerce in Florida, the
legislature passed the Electronic Signature Act of 1996.19 Similar to UETA
and ESGNCA, this Act provides that an electronic signature may be used to
sign a writing and may be given the same force and effect as a written
signature.12° The intent of the legislature in adopting this Act was to
enhance public confidence in the use of electronic signatures, minimize
forged electronic signatures and fraud in e-commerce, encourage economic
development in the state, and allow government the opportunity to provide
its services by electronic communications.' 2' Differences between electronic
signatures and digital signatures are defined in this Act,122 and it gives both
forms of communication, including future forms of electronic signatures, the
same legal effect as written signatures.1 3 Many electronic signature statutes
incorrectly use technology-specific terminology in referring to a digital
114. S.REP.No. 106-131,at2.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. FLA. STAT. §§ 668.001-.006 (2000).
120. § 668.004.
121. § 668.002.
122. § 668.003.
123. Wyrough, Jr. & Klein, supra note 40, at 420.
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signature to refer to all the ways in which an electronic signature can be
generated.124 However, Florida correctly recognizes that a digital signature
is generated by an asymmetric cryptosystem where a public key can be used
to determine whether the document was created by the signer's private key,
and whether the original message has been altered in any way.12
B. Florida's Enactment of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
On May 26, 2000, Governor Jeb Bush signed Florida's adoption of
UETA into law, becoming effective on July 1, 2000.126 The Florida
Legislature followed the wording of UETA almost in its entirety, since the
Florida enactment has the same legislative intent as both UETA and
ESGNCA, which is to remove barriers to e-commerce1 27 As a consequence
of the Act, electronic signatures and records can now be used to satisfy a
provision of law that requires a signature or a record to be in writing. 2 In
the Electronic Signature Act of 1996, Florida already has a digital signature
law. 129 As UETA is not a digital signature law, Florida's adoption of UETA
both supports and compliments the Electronic Signature Act of 1996.130
The federal government recognizes UETA as valid legislation to
promote and develop e-commerce and as an exception to ESGNCA. 13  By
adopting UETA, Florida's legislation will not be preempted by the recently
passed federal Act.13 2 In regulating interstate commerce through ESGNCA,
the federal government has allowed states to retain some independence in
adopting their own standard for electronic transactions.1 It is possible that
some states may have, or may adopt, their own legislation concerning
standards for electronic transactions. However, when businesses and
consumers in Florida are involved in electronic transactions with parties
from other states, there should be no concern that the principles contained in
Florida's adoption of UETA will be undermined or invalidated by differing
state legislation. Based on the principles of the Supremacy Clause in the
124. Smedinghoff& Hill Bro, supra note 41, at 729-30.
125. § 282.72; see Smedinghoff& Hill Bro, supra note 41, at n.25.
126. Ch. 2000-164, § 42,2000 Fla. Laws 972, 1013.
127. See House OF REPRESENTATIVES CoMm. ON UTILS. & CoMm. ANALYSIS & EcoN.
IMPACT STATBUNT ON BaaL No. CS/HB 1891, at 2 (Comm. Print 2000) [hereinafter ANALYSIS
CS/HB 1891].
128. FLA. STAT. § 668.50(7) (2000).
129. §§ 282.70-.75.
130. ANALYSIS CS/HB 1891, supra note 127.
131. See ESGNCA, Pub. L No. 106-229, § 102, 114 Stat. 464 (2000) (to be codified at
15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-7031).
132. § 102, 114 Stat. at 467-68.
133. See § 103, 114 Stat. at 468.
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United States Constitution, 34 states having legislation that directly conflicts
with ESGNCA will be required to follow the federal law that requires a
uniform national standard for electronic transactions. By enacting UETA,
the Florida legislature has ensured that any disputes between businesses or
consumers in Florida and out-of-state parties, from a state which has
legislation that does not follow federal standards, will be governed by the
standards for electronic transactions contained in Florida's UETA.
1. Definitions and Applications of the Act
a. Electronic Transactions
While giving electronic transactions generated by electronic records
and electronic signatures the same effect as those written on paper, these
transactions are limited to those between two or more people in the context
of business, insurance, or governmental affairs. 135 As defined in UETA,
transactions may include recurring weekly or monthly orders between
companies that have agreed to methods and manners of their transactions,
individuals making purchases from an Internet site, and the closing of
business transactions by facsimile or e-mail.136 UETA does not apply to the
creation and execution of wills, codicils, or testamentary trusts. 1 7 The
reason for this is because electronic transactions in UETA must be between
two or more persons. 38 Wills, codicils, and testamentary trusts are unilateral
acts. 1 39 Also, the Act does not apply to UCITA, rules relating to judicial
procedure, or the UCC, with the exception of sections 671.107, 671.206 and
chapters 672 and 680 of the Florida Statutes.14° Although UETA does not
134. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
135. FLA. STAT. § 66 8.50(2)(p) (2000).
136. UETA § 2 cmt. 12, 7A U.L.A. 24 (West Supp. 2000).
137. FLA. STAT. § 668.50(3)(b) (2000).
138. § 3 cmt. 4.
139. Id.
140. FLA. STAT. § 668.50(3) (2000). Section 671.107 of the Florida Statutes states
that "[a]ny claim or right arising out of an alleged breach can be discharged... without
consideration by a written waiver or renunciation signed and delivered by the aggrieved
party." § 671.107.
Section 671.206 of the Florida Statutes provides that, except in the cases of a contract
for the sale of goods, securities, or security agreements, a contract for the sale of personal
property is not enforceable as an action or a defense if the value exceeds, or the remedy
sought, is in excess of $5000, unless there is a writing between the parties that there is a
contract, at a stated price, with the subject matter reasonably identified, and signed by the
party against whom enforcement is sought, or his or her authorized agent. §671.206.
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apply to UCITA, Florida has not formally enacted UCITA, and there does
not appear to be a comparable act in the laws of Florida.14
b. Electronic Signatures and Electronic Records
The U.S. government has expressed a desire that laws relating to
e-commerce should be technology-neutral, meaning that one particular
technology should not be required or favored over another. z This
encourages the development of new technology to transact business. 143
Given the constant changing nature of computer technology, future forms of
electronic communications will develop rapidly, and it is not possible to
accurately predict what communication forms will be used to transact
business in the future. 44 Therefore, having technology-neutral legislation
governing e-commerce also ensures laws will still be applicable when new
forms of communication are developed. 45  By being technology-neutral,
UETA fulfils the desire of the federal government.
46
In UETA, an electronic signature is defined as an "electronic sound,
symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with a record and
executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record.' 47
Therefore, a person's voice on an answering machine or typing a name in an
e-mail will be sufficient to meet the legal requirement of a signature, as long
as there is an intent to execute or adopt the sound, symbol, or process for the
purpose of signing a record.14 Furthermore, a computer program or other
automatic method of communication can be used to form a contract even if
the terms and conditions of the agreement were not reviewed.1 49  For
example, clicking "I agree" for the receipt of goods or services from an
Internet site will be legally enforceable, if this is coupled with an intent to
sign and the person was free to refuse the terms and conditions of the
agreement. A signature will be attributable to actions taken by a person,
or an authorized agent, based on factors such as a name on the letterhead of a
141. SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS & ECON. IMPACT STATEMENT ON BILL No. CS/SB 2416
(Comm. Print 2000) [hereinafter ANALYSIS CS/HB 2416].
142. See The White House, supra note 14.
143. See also Smedinghoff& Hill Bro, supra note 41, at 760-61.
144. Scoville, supra note 33, at 356.
145. Smedinghoff & Hill Bro, supra note 41, at 731. The integrity of a document could
be shown by initialing pages of a document before it is signed to prevent pages being substituted.
Id.
146. Id. at 739.
147. FLA. STAT. § 668.50(2)(h) (2000).
148. UETA § 2 cmL. 7, 7A U.L.A. 23 (West Supp. 2000)
149. FLA. STAT. § 668.50(14) (2000).
150. UETA § 14 cmt. 3, 7A U.L.A. 38 (West Supp. 2000).
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fax, a typed name in an e-mail, a coded PIN number, or a combination of
public and private keys.' 5 ' Once an electronic signature or record has been
attributed to a person, its effect will be determined from the context of the
surrounding circumstances at the time the record or signature was created,
adopted, or executed.
52
Electronic records can be computer equipment and programs, e-mail,
voice mail, fax transmissions, audio and video tape recordings, and
information stored on computer hard drives or diskettes. Under UETA, if
a law requires that a record be maintained, this requirement can be met by
retaining an electronic record of the information, as long as the record
accurately reflects the information as it was first generated and is accessible
for later reference. '4 Laws requiring a record to be maintained in an
original form may be satisfied by having an electronic record. 155 Written
records can now be converted to electronic records, including the retention
or production of original canceled checks.
156
Although it can be argued that information copied from the hard drive
of a computer to a floppy disk is not information in its original form, the
focus and concern of this section of the Act aims more towards the integrity
of the information.1' 7 In recognizing that information stored on floppy disks
is more prone to disintegration and generally less stable than information
stored on a hard drive, the accessibility of the information requirement in
UETA must always be satisfied to validate electronically stored
information.158 Electronic records can also be used to satisfy a law that
requires a person to retain records for evidentiary reasons, audits, or any
other purpose. 59 Their admissibility into evidence cannot be denied solely
on the basis that the record or signature is in an electronic form.1 °
As paper is a tangible form, it is difficult to create an electronic token
which embodies the intangible rights and obligations that paper negotiable
instruments can provide. However, UETA includes a section whereby
business parties can gain some of the benefits of negotiability in the
electronic world. 62 Section 16 of UETA provides a way to avoid the space
151. § 9 cmt. 4.
152. FLA. STAT. § 668.50(15)(a) (2000).
153. UETA § 2 cmt. 4, 7A U.L.A. 22 (West Supp. 2000).
154. FLA. STAT. § 668.50(12)(a) (2000).
155. UETA § 12(d), 7A U.LA. 36 (West Supp. 2000).
156. § 12 cmt. 6.
157. § 12 cmt. 1.
158. § 12cmt. 3.
159. FLA. STAT. § 668.50(12)(f) (2000).
160. UETA § 13, 7A U.LA. 37 (West Supp. 2000).
161. § 16cmt. 1.
162. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 668.50(16) (2000).
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requirements that are needed to store numerous paper notes and documents
and protect against the natural disasters that can destroy the types of
documents required to be kept by paper instruments for purposes of being
retained, retrieved, or delivered. r63 The meaning of a transferable record
under this section only refers to the creation of the equivalent of paper
promissory notes and documents, and those electronic records that would
qualify as negotiable promissory notes or documents if they were in
writing. 1  The issuer of an electronic record must expressly agree that it is a
transferable record.1 65 Conversion of a paper note to an electronic record is
not possible because the issuer would not be the issuer of the electronic
record.
16
If a law requires a signature or record to be notarized, electronic
signatures can be used to fulfill that requirement if the notarized signature is
attached with the signature or record.167  Furthermore, an electronic
notarization is legitimate without a rubber stamp or an impression type
seal. 16 Florida's enactment of UETA adds an additional requirement to the
uniform law in that first-time applicants for a notary commission must show
proof that they have completed at least three hours of instruction, including
instruction on electronic notarization, about the duties of a notary public.A
However, there is no similar requirement for those who are already notaries
to comply with this section upon their renewal or subsequent commission
because they have to reapply for appointment every four years.
70
c. Government Agencies
Under sections 17 and 18 of UETA, government agencies in Florida
have their own choice about whether they will use electronic records, and if
they choose to use them, the extent to which they will create, retain, or use
electronic signatures and electronic records or convert written materials into
an electronic form.171 This applies to interactions both internally, among
other government agencies, and externally, as a commercial party, when
dealing with the private sector.172 Although these sections do not require
163. UETA § 16 cmt 1, 7A U.L.A. 41 (West Supp. 2000).
164. Id.
165. FLA. STAT. § 668.50(16) (2000).
166. UETA § 16 cmL. 1, 7A U.LA. 41 (West Supp. 2000).
167. FLA. STAT. § 668.50(11)(a) (2000).
168. Id.
169. RLA. STAT. § 668.50(1 1)(b) (2000).
170. ANALYSIS CS/HB 2416, supra note 141.
171. FLA. STAT. § 668.50(17)-(18) (2000).
172. UETA § 19 cmL 1, 7A U.LA. 45 (West Supp. 2000).
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government agencies to use or accept electronic records or electronic
signatures, they must recofgnize electronic records for evidentiary, audit, and
other similar purposes. 17 If a government agency does choose to use
electronic records or electronic signatures, it may consult with state
technology offices to determine the details of use, such as the manner and
format in which electronic records must be created, sent, or stored, the type
of electronic signature required, and the types of control that will be used to
ensure the "integrity, security, confidentiality, and auditability of electronic
records."'174  In choosing whether to use these electronic forms of
communication, governmental agencies are required to be consistent, while
retaining flexibility and adaptability, because requiring one particular system
of communication may promote more barriers to e-commerce than those
already in existence.' 5 Showing its commitment to the development of
e-commerce, the Florida legislature chose to adopt these sections of UETA,
even though they are considered optional provisions to the Act. 76
2. E-commerce Concerns and Why Florida's Enactment of UETA will
Benefit Businesses, Consumers, and the State as a Whole
a. Security Issues
On a global scale, it has been suggested that the transition from paper-
based transactions to electronic communications has increased security
concerns regarding the authenticity and integrity of transacting business
electronically. 177 Some people, especially consumer rights advocates, are
skeptical about giving electronic records and signatures the same legally
binding effect as handwritten records and signatures, and of the increased
use of e-commerce to transact business. 78 However, there are a number of
reasons why Florida's enactment of UETA will benefit the state, businesses,
and consumers. It will encourage the use of technology and business in the
state, thus bringing more money and opportunities, while keeping the
substantive law relating to contracts the same in the electronic world as it is
for paper-based transactions. 
179
173. FLA. STAT. § 668.50(18) (2000).
174. Id.
175. UETA § 19 cm. 2, 7A U.LA. 45 (West Supp. 2000).
176. 'LA. STAT. § 668.50(17)-(19) (2000).
177. P.P. Kanthan, Legal Aspects of Electronic Commerce and the Scope for Appropriate
Legislation, CYBERSPACE LAW, Jan. 2000, at 24.
178. Meehan, supra note 10, at 564.
179. Uniform Law Commissioners, supra note 81.
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A fundamental issue raised by e-commerce is whether an individual can
rely on an electronic message that he or she receive to transact some form of
business and enter into binding contracts.18W This reliance and trust is
required to achieve the e-commerce goals of speed, efficiency, and
economy. 81 In electronic communications, the reliability usually associated
with paper-based transactions, such as receiving a document signed with ink
and delivered by the United States Postal Service, is not present.1 As e-
commerce transactions can occur without talking or seeing another
individual, making sure that a communication from a person is actually from
that particular person and not a fraudulent representation may be a
concern.183 It could be argued that a manually generated ink signature on
paper is an ideal method to ensure the integrity of a contract because it is
difficult to forW a signature and change text that is already printed on a
piece of paper. However, even the results of handwriting experts seeking
to determine the validity of a handwritten signature are not always
accurate. 8 5 Furthermore, people often already rely on other forms of
communication that do not use paper and handwritten ink signatures, such as
signing a digitized signature for United Parcel Service parcels, faxes, and
rubber-stamped signatures. 186 The security concerns regarding a lack of
handwritten signatures and paper in e-commerce is misplaced.
187
b. Consumer Transactions
One of the major advantages of consumers being able to conduct
transactions on-line will be convenience and cost savings.18 8 Since March,
customers of E*trade Securities have been able to use electronic signatures
to open accounts.' 8 9 Also, since July, two home loans in Broward County
have been originated, signed, and recorded completely on-line through
Mortgage.com, located in Sunrise, Florida.19° The president of the company
180. Smedinghoff& Hill Bra, supra note 41, at 731.
181. id.
182. Id. at 732-33.
183. See id. at 733.
184. Scoville, supra note 33, at 356.
185. D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational
Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification "Expertise", 137 U. PA. L REv. 731,
739.
186. Scoville, supra note 33, at 357.
187. See generally id.
188. Cindy Krisher Goodman, Today it's O.K. to Sign on the Electronic Line, MIAMI
HERALD, Oct. 1, 2000, at El.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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stated that customers can save between $750 and $1000 in the cost of
processing a home loan by using this form of electronic transaction. 191 The
reason for this is that the fees usually associated with paper-based
transactions are eliminated.' 92 With regard to the potential to conduct
mortgage transactions completely on-line, it is now possible to complete
these transactions in ten minutes, as opposed to ninety days.
193
Some consumer advocates have expressed concern that allowing
electronic signatures and records in consumer transactions will enable
businesses to avoid the requirements of consumer protection statutes and
exploit unwary consumers. 19 There may be a concern that a consumer can
be forced to conduct business electronically by a seller including hidden
notice or ambiguous terms in contracts.'95 However, UETA only applies to
transactions between parties who agree to conduct transactions by electronic
methods.196  The agreement is determined from the context of the
surrounding circumstances. 197 Parties to the transaction have the right to
refuse to conduct future transactions electronically, and this right cannot be
waived by an agreement. 98 Therefore, a consumer will be protected if a
company places a hidden term in an e-mail or a standard contract stating that
the consumer will receive all future notices, or conduct all future business
with that company electronically, because this will not be considered an
"agreement."' 99  Also, consumers who agree to transact business using
electronic contracts may evenspend more time reviewing the details of a
contract on a computer screen.2* They can review contractual terms at their
leisure without feeling pressured into signing the contract quickly in the
presence of a salesperson.2°1
Once agreeing to conduct a particular transaction electronically, it will
not be possible to revert to a paper-based method of communication.m This
provision would not further the intent of UETA to encourage e-commerce
transactions and enhance the speed and economy of business. 203 In
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Goodman, supra note 188.
194. Meehan, supra note 10, at 570.
195. See id. at 572.
196. FLA. STAT. § 668.50(15) (2000).
197. See id.
198. Id.
199. See Meehan, supra note 10, at 572; UETA § 16 cmt.
200. Kurt A. Wimmer, E-Litigation: Clicks and Contracts, NAT'L UJ., Sept. 27, 1999, at
B18.
201. Id.
202. Meehan, supra note 10, at 577.
203. Id.
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recognizing that companies who conduct their activities solely on-line also
need protection from consumers, this provision allows these companies to
conduct their business in electronic form without being forced to use and
keep paper records.20 When a consumer agrees to conduct a transaction and
receive notices or records electronically, the sender of that information
cannot inhibit the ability of the recipient to store or print that record if a
provision of law requires a person to provide, send, or deliver information in
writing to another person.2 5 If the sender does this, the electronic record
will not be enforceable against the recipient. 2 M This protection gives the
ability to weaker parties in a transaction, who will likely be consumers, to
record and prove the details of a transaction in court if any dispute arises.207
There should not be a concern that consumers may enter into transactions
where they agree to receive notices at a rarely checked e-mail address. 208 It
is not unreasonable to expect people to check e-mail regularly for these
notices, as they would check the regular mail for paper-based notices.W The
substantive laws relating to adhesion contracts and unconscionability are still
applicable under UETA.210 As consumers are able to keep records of their
electronic transactions and show these records in court, with the substantive
laws of contracts being unaffected by UETA, there will be no confusion or
areas of ambiguity for Florida courts when they are asked to apply and
enforce UETA in a lawsuit.
Any concerns that consumers may have regarding the reliability of
electronic records and transactions are also misplaced, because UETA
recognizes that electronic methods of communication sometimes experience
technical problems and may not be successful.211 If parties to an electronic
transaction agree to use a security procedure to detect changes or errors, and
one party conforms while the other does not, and the person who did not
conform would have been able to detect the change or error if he or she had
conformed, the conforming party can avoid the effect of the change or error
in the electronic record.21 2 This is a reasonable rule that protects those who
213follow the terms of an agreement. Additionally, consumers are protected
204. Id.
205. FLA. STAT. § 668.50(8) (2000).
206. § 668.50(8)(c).
207. Symposium, Responding to the Legal Obstacles to Electronic Commerce in Latin
America, 17 ARz. J. OF INT'L & CoMP. L 119, 128 (2000).
208. Meehan, supra note 10, at 572.
209. Id.
210. Id.; FLA. STAT. §§ 668.50(5), (6), (8) (2000).
211. Mark Grossman, E-commerce Game Finally Gets Set of Rules, BROWARD DAILY
Bus. REV., June 27,2000, at 2.
212. FLA. STAT. § 668.50(8) (2000); see also Grossman, supra note 211.
213. See Grossman, supra note 211.
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if they experience an error while conducting business through an automated
computer program.214  For example, if consumers buy a book from
Amazon.com advertised for $25.99 after entering their credit card details on
the site and agreeing to the sale, and the screen then provides a confirmation
stating that "your credit card has been charged $259.99," they will just have
to notify the seller of the error and state that they did not intend to be bound
by the electronic record received.215  Consumers will then have to take
reasonable steps to cooperate and correct the error or return the book.
216
Although consumer protection advocates have encouraged state
217legislatures to adopt non-uniform provisions of UETA, Florida has
correctly followed the uniform principles of UETA. In an example of
adopting non-uniform amendments of UETA, California included a list of
bills to be excluded from the Act.2 18  However, these non-uniform
amendments were predicted to have far-reaching, adverse consequences for
commercial transactions, increasing the harm to commercial and consumer
parties rather than following the government's principle that undue burdens
219
should not be placed upon electronic commerce. Other states have been
advised to ignore following California in adopting nonuniform
amendmentsYm
c. Business to Business Transactions
Substantively, UETA provides a balance between being technology-
neutral and being specific enough to avoid granting inappropriate
221t~ 
rpit
protections.  The world of business is adverse to uncertainty. Before
UETA, the benefits of conducting on-line business could not be maximized,
because of the uncertainty in conducting electronic transactions.2 3 More
Florida-based companies can now feel confident about conducting business
on-line as they do not need to have such a concern that people are using false
credit card information, checking account numbers, or mailing addresses.22
In addition to being substantively sound, UETA gives national,
214. FIA. STAT. § 668.50(10) (2000).
215. See Grossman, supra note 211.
216. Id.
217. Meehan, supra note 10, at 566.
218. Holly Towle, The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act: The California
Amendments, CYBERSPACE LAw, Dec. 1999, at 18-19.
219. Id. at 19.
220. Id. at 21.
221. Scoville, supra note 33, at 392.
222. See Grossman, supra note 211.
223. See id.
224. Lui-Kwan, supra note 26, at 463.
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multinational, and local businesses located in Florida a definite structure for
contracting on-line, and there is no longer a need to be concerned with the
legal effect of conducting business electronically. UETA is advantageous to
businesses using electronic transactions because it prserves the ideals of
freedom of contract while avoiding over-regulation. Many other states
have also adopted UETA,22 and even if states have not yet adopted it, with
ESGNCA as federal legislation, there is now definite jurisdiction over the
national information infrastructure.M
7
d. Attorneys and Governmental Entities
As governmental agencies are not required to implement and use
electronic signatures and records,7 Florida's enactment of UETA will not
place significant financial burdens on govermment.2 9 If these agencies do
choose to use electronic methods of communications, it will be beneficial for
governmental administration both at the local and the state level. Florida's
enactment of UETA is beneficial to attorneys because they now have a set of
rules governing on-line transactions, and they will no longer have to deal
with the inefficiencies of mailing hard copies of a contract to another client's
attorney for a signature, then waiting before receiving a signed contract back
in the mail.2 Attorneys should also not be concerned with the validity of
the Act, as it is not preempted by federal legislation231 and it is unlikely to
raise any state constitutional issues in Florida.z2 Similarly, Florida courts
also now have a standard for governing disputes regarding e-commerce
transactions, allowing predictability and an equitable administration of the
law. Even if a provision of the Act is found to be invalid, it will be severable
from the other sections, not affecting the provisions or applications of the
these sections.2 3 Although the use of e-commerce is dramatically increasing
in the United States, by adopting UETA, Florida courts are unlikely to be
burdened with a vast increase in litigation regarding e-commerce, electronic
transactions, and UETA. In contrast, it seems that Florida's adoption of
UETA will prevent lawsuits because Florida now has a defined set of legal
225. Grossman, supra note 211.
226. Kunze, supra note 90.
227. See Scoville, supra note 33, at 393.
228. FLA. STAT. § 668.50(17)-(18) (2000).
229. ANALYSIS CS/HB 1891, supra note 127.
230. See Grossman, supra note 211.
231. ESGNCA, Pub. L No. 106-229, § 102(a)(1), 114 Stat. 464, 468 (2000) (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-7031).
232. ANALYSIS CS/HB 1891, supra note 127.
233. FLA. STAT. § 668.50(20) (2000).
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rules as to the status of electronic records and how to transact business on-
line.
VI. CONCLUSION
By enacting UETA, consumers, businesses, and governments in Florida
can now conduct business without using paper and a traditional handwritten
"John Hancock." Removing some of the barriers to e-commerce, while
retaining consumer protections, will be beneficial to Florida, as it will be
able to avoid preemptive federal legislation, at the same time retaining some
control over electronic transactions in the state. With the increasing use of
the Internet and electronic forms of transacting business, there is also now a
clear standard for courts in Florida to adjudicate disputes regarding
e-commerce transactions. Florida will be recognized as a state that
encourages electronic transactions, thus attracting businesses and increasing
employment opportunities. Ultimately, there will be both an efficient
administration of government and increased state revenues.
Mark D. Earles
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On the eve of the U.S. Senate primary, Colbath & Co. and the
Fourth DCA--repeating a tactic they had used on the eve of the
1996 general election-again kidnapped petitioner on void and
bogus legal process and sought to hold him through the election.
On and on it goes, an unprecedented attempt to prevent a citizen
from seeking office and exposing local and judicial corruption.
1
I. INTRODUCTION
Sounds like a scene out of a conspiracy theory novel, right? Guess
again. This paragraph was excerpted from a petition filed in the Supreme
Court of Florida in 1998. Colbath is Chief Judge Walter N. Colbath, Jr.,
1. Petition For Writ of Mandamus/Prohibition at 2, Martin v. Colbath (No. 94012),
consolidated into Martin v. State, 747 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 2000) (Nos. 93573 & 94012)
[hereinafter Martin Petition 1].
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who oversees the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida for Palm Beach
County, and who has been the target of numerous personal attacks in the
voluminous court filings of pro Se2 litigant Anthony R. Martin 3 in the
Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, the
Supreme Court of Florida, and various federal courts. In the same petition in
which he leveled the above allegation,4 Martin went on to say about Palm
Beach County's Chief Judge: "Colbath is a pretty good politician, but not
much of a lawyer or judge. He should go back to law school."5 And in a
second petition filed in the Supreme Court of Florida that same year, Martin
directed insults at newly appointed Supreme Court Justice Barbara J.
Pariente, asserting that "Jewish judges are using their official positions to
pervert the law against petitioner," and that Jewish judges have retaliated
against him.
6
So what happened to Martin's petitions for relief?. In January 2000, the
Supreme Court of Florida denied them on the grounds that Martin's claims
were frivolous as well as abusive, and ordered that he could no longer file
anyyPro se petitions unless they were accompanied by the appropriate filing
fee. By reading Anthony Martin's numerous and repetitious petitions, one
learns that he is frustrated because he wins few of his cases, and that he
takes out his anger on all of those "who have unluckily crossed his path."s
2. When describing litigants, "pro se" litigant is defined as "[flor oneself; on one's
own behalf; without a lawyer." BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY 1236 (7th ed. 1999). One who
represents himself in court without counsel is a "pro se." Id. at 1237.
3. Anthony R. Martin is also known as Anthony R. Martin-Trigona. Martin v. State,
747 So. 2d 386, 387 (Fla. 2000).
4. The incident to which the petitioner Anthony Martin refers as his "kidnapping"
was actually an arrest in which the petitioner was denied bail. Response to Order to Show
Cause and Motion for Review by the Court En Bane at 3-4, Martin v. State, 747 So. 2d 386
(Fla. 2000) (Nos. 93573 & 94012) [hereinafter Martin Petition 2].
5. Martin Petition I at 6, (Nos. 93573 & 94012).
6. Verified Emergency Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 8, n.4, Martin v.
Beuttenmuller (No. 93573), consolidated into Martin v. State, 747 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 2000)
(Nos. 93573 & 94012) [hereinafter Martin Petition 3].
7. Martin, 747 So. 2d at 389-90, 392. Martin frequently files his petitions informa
pauperis so that he will not have to pay filing fees. Id. He is reportedly bankrupt. Id. at 387.
8. Id. at 391 (quoting In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1256 (2d Cir. 1984)). In
Martin-Trigona, the court described Martin as a person who considers himself to be the
victim of imaginary conspiracies. In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1257 (2d. Cir. 1984).
For example, the appendix to the opinion cites Martin's complaint in the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut, which levels accusations that the "entire
bankruptcy court system in the entire United States is manipulated and controlled by Jewish
judges and Jewish lawyers" who have conspired to steal his property and violate his civil
rights by interfering with his right of access to courts. Id. at 1265-66. This footnote cannot
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He is one of Florida's most vexatious 9 litigants, and his hijinks, albeit
extreme as an example of courtroom frivolity, represent a growing issue that
Florida courts face as the number of pro se litigants entering the courtroom
rises.
Pro se litigants, with their limited knowledge of the law and oversight
of court rules, create serious problems for Florida courts and impose a heavy
burden upon courts' administration of justice in today's litigious society.
Those problems multiply when litigants become vexatious. The State of
Florida passed new legislation in June 2000 that will bring relief from the
barrage of frivolous lawsuits filed in Florida courts by vexatious pro se
litigants. 10 This article discusses how it will work, why it will work, and
what opposition it will face.
Part I will set the stage. It will identify the pro se litigant, and describe
what effects he or she has on Florida courts. It will also detail the current
sanctions available to punish pro se litigants who file frivolous actions and
will explain the drawbacks of those sanctions. Part II will discuss the
Florida Vexatious Litigant Law ("FVLL") in detail, including the
legislature's rationale for its passage and the methods used for labeling a
person as a "vexatious litigant." It will also explain the prohibitions placed
upon a vexatious litigant's case once he or she has been so labeled. In Part
I, the FVLL will be compared to current case law, and the author will
assert that the legislature merely codified into statute what courts have
already been haphazardly enforcing and will explain why the statute will
create a more efficient process for disposing of frivolous lawsuits. It will
also compare the Florida statute to similar vexatious litigant laws enacted in
other states.'1 Part IV will address the pro se litigant's arguments that the
statute violates the right of access to courts guaranteed by the Florida
Constitution1 and will assert that those arguments ultimately fail because
sufficient safeguards exist within the statute to limit the frivolous activity of
such litigants without infringing upon their constitutional rights. Finally,
convey the full extent of Martin's offensive and anti-semitic slurs and attacks. For a better
picture of Martin's offensiveness, a reading of the entire opinion is encouraged.
9. "Vexatious" is defined as being "without reasonable ... cause or excuse;
harassing; annoying." BLACK'S LAW DiCrIONARY 1559 (7th ed. 1999). A vexatious suit is
one that is "instituted maliciously and without good cause." Id.
10. FLA. STAT. § 68.093 (2000).
11. California enacted a vexatious litigant law in 1963. See CAL. CIV. P. CODE § 391
(West 1998 & Supp. 2000). Texas created a similar statute in 1997. See Tax. Civ. PRAc. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 11.001-.004 (West Supp. 2000). Hawaii and Ohio have enacted vexatious
litigant statutes as well. See Orno Rnv. CODE ANN. § 2323.52 (Anderson 1998); see also
HAW. REv. STAT. § 634J (1999).
12. FL. CONST. art. I, § 21.
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this article will conclude with a recap of why this law will help to unburden
the Florida court system.
II. THE PRO SE LITIGANT'S ABILITY TO BRING THE WHEELS OF
JUSTICE TO A HALT
To understand the problems that pro se litigants create for the judicial
system, it is necessary to understand who sues and what they allege.
Statistics on pro se litigants are sparse, but recent studies have shown that
not all pro se litigants are indigent, as was once commonly thought.13 About
twenty percent of pro se litigants say they can afford a lawyer but simply do
not want one.' 4 Individuals with incomes less than $50,000 are more likely
to represent themselves.' 5 In state court, pro se litigants may represent
themselves in various types of actions: divorce or family law proceedings,
contract actions, tort suits, or probate matters, just to name a few. At least
sixty-five percent of marriage dissolution cases in Florida involve at least
16one pro se litigant at some point during the case. Statistics on the number
of pro se filings for each are unfortunately not compiled, but as the courts of
Florida begin to study further the pro se litigant's needs for self-help
services,17 such statistics should become available.
Even judges at the federal court level 8 must contend with an increasing
percentage of cases filed pro se, most commonly by both prisoners and
individuals bringing employment discrimination suits under federal
statutes.19  In federal courts, pro se cases have increased steadily-from
13. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, REPORT ON TRENDS IN TnE STATE COURTS, 1997-
1998 ED., at 47 [hereinafter TRENDS IN THE STATE COURTS]. The common misconception
about pro se litigants is that they cannot afford a lawyer, but in reality some just prefer to do it
themselves and may feel that they do not have any "resources or property to squabble about."
Jan Pudlow, Access to Justice Panel to Study Issue of Pro Se Litigants, FLA. BAR. NEWS, Jan.
1, 2000, at 11.
14. TRENDS IN THE STATE COURTS, supra note 13, at 47.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 50. See generally Jona Goldschmidt, How Are Courts Handling Pro Se
Litigants?, 82 JUDICATURE 13 (1998).
17. Pudlow, supra note 13, at 11.
18. Frivolous litigation in federal courts is an important issue as well, but because the
remedies for cure are different from those available in state courts, this note focuses only on
the effect of the FVLL on state courts. Including a detailed discussion on federal courts
would exceed the scope of this note.
19. Jerry Nagle, Pro Se Litigation and Its Impact on the Courts (Feb. 22, 1995), The
Information Service of the National Center for State Courts, available at
http:/www.ncsc.dni.us/is/MEMOS/S95-0724.htm.
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fifteen percent of total filings in 1991 to twenty-four percent in 1994.20 Most
cases filed by pro se prisoners are civil rights actions. Many pro se
litigants (especially prisoners) are illiterate and unschooled in the law, and a
good number are "frequent filers" who have more than twenty cases in court
at any given time.23
Pro se litigants increase case flow problems. Because courts are
aware that many pro se litigants are unfamiliar with both the legal system
and legal procedure, great consideration is given to them in terms of how
they are allowed to proceed with their cases. 24  Courts give them
considerable latitude in the tone and pace of the trial. Pro se litigants often
struggle with the completion of legal forms, as well as the process of filing
and serving court papers?2 In addition to the pro se litigant's frustration
with court rules, judges are also frustrated with having to continue cases or
deny motions without prejudice in order to give pro se litigants a fair day in
court.26 Judges are uncomfortable with the slow pace of pro se litigants'
cases in their courtrooms (which results from the litigants being untrained in
rules of evidence and procedure), as well as having to intervene to nudge
litigants along at times. 27 The court is faced with a difficult task when a
litigant represents him or herself, because the obligation to serve as an
impartial referee conflicts with the need to assist the pro se litigant in
procedural matters.?
A. Far Reaching Negative Effects of Frivolous Pro Se Litigation
One should not make the assumption that "every pro se litigant is
clueless."29 On the contrary, some pro se litigants are well versed in legal
20. Lurana S. Snow, Prisoners in the Federal Courts, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 295,296
(1997).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 301. The federal courts address the issue of frivolous and abusive lawsuits
under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11. There is no
requirement of overwhelming abuse, although courts do have the discretion to take into
account the circumstances of pro se litigants. Howard D. DuBosar & Ubaldo J. Perez, Jr.,
Comment, Ask Questions First and Shoot Later: Constraining Frivolity in Litigation Under
Rule 11, 40 U. MLANU L. REV. 1267, 1283 (1986).
23. TREDs iN THE STATE COURTS, supra note 13, at 49.
24. Nagle, supra note 19.
25. Jan Pudlow, Searching for Pro Se Solutions, FLA. BAR. NEws, June 15, 2000,
at1.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Goldschmidt, supra note 16, at 16.
29. Pudlow, supra note 25, at 1.
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terminology and capable of writing properly constructed motions.30 Many
pro se litigants make an honest effort to conduct themselves properly and
abide by the procedural rules.31 However, those few that use the judicial
system as a weapon to harass and intimidate others wreak havoc on the
32system and give the common pro se litigant a bad reputation.
A major problem with discussing the concept of frivolous pro se
litigation in detail is that it is difficult to define the extent of the problem.
Florida has recently addressed the needs of the pro se litigant in its
development of an Access to Justice Task Force,33 but no comprehensive
study on the extent of pro se litigation, or the level of frivolity caused by it,
has yet been completed.
Frivolous lawsuits by vexatious litigants cause delays in the legal
system, consume substantial amounts of scarce judicial resources, and
generate hours of work for court personnel because the litigants file
meaningless documents to provoke arguments with judges about previous
decisions.3 4 But the problem with frivolous lawsuits goes beyond the impact
on the court system. In one California case, a vexatious litigant's history of
filing frivolous suits with questionable merit actually depreciated the
property value of homes in her neighborhood because she was so fond of
suing her neighbors.3 5
Consequently, defendants named in frivolous actions are also impacted
by the increase in frivolous litigation. Defendants in frivolous suits have
36two options: defend the suit, or settle the case for a de minimis monetary
award.3 7 Both options are costly, since they require either that defendants
seek legal counsel to defend their rights, or that they settle and pay out
whatever sum will persuade the vexatious litigant to drop the lawsuit. Some
defendants prefer to settle in order to avoid the vexatious litigant's
harassment, but settling may actually create an incentive for a vexatious
litigant to file even more frivolous litigation.38
30. Id.
31. Biermann v. Cook, 619 So. 2d 1029, 1031 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
32. Lee W. Rawles, Note, The California Vexatious Litigant Statute: A Viable
Judicial Tool to Deny the Clever Obstructionists Access?, 72 S. CAL L. REV. 275, 278
(1998).
33. Pudlow, supra note 13, at 11.
34. Rawles, supra note 32, at 281.
35. Id. at 282.
36. "De minimis" means small or trifling. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 443 (7th ed.
1999).
37. Rawles, supra note 32, at 282.
38. Id. at 282-83.
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The overwhelming number of frivolous suits also contributes to the
public outrage at the judicial system in general. 39 Litigants with legitimate
legal matters are delayed or postponed while clerks and judges deal with the
frivolity and tying up of court resources by vexatious litigants. Vexatious
litigants manage to slow the judicial system as a whole and create discontent
and frustration for both the court administration and those litigants who
appear in the courtrooms.
B. Current Sanctions Available at the Court's Disposal
Courts currently use a variety of sanctions in their attempt to curb the
frivolous and harassing activity of vexatious pro se litigants. However, the
means of enforcing sanctions against litigants is not uniform, and different
courts at different points have been using different forms of punishment.
This lack of uniformity has created chaos in Florida courtrooms and clerks'
offices as personnel try to follow individualized decisions and orders for
each litigant.
For many pro se litigants, court proceedings begin with a4getition for
leave to file under indigent status, known as informa pauperis, by asking
the court to waive the costs of filing.4 1 By preparing an affidavit claiming
poverty and providing the details of one's financial condition, a pro se
litigant can have filing fees and court costs waived.42 This freedom to
litigate without concern for the costs means that pro se litigants have nothing
to lose (and everything to gain) by filing their lawsuits under indigent status.
Courts, however, have observed their vexatious litigation patterns and have
begun barring vexatious litigants from filing in forma pauperis (allowing
their lawsuits to be filed only if they provide the appropriate filing fees).43
39. Id. at 283.
40. "Informa pauperis" is defined as the manner in which an indigent is permitted to
disregard filing fees and court costs in litigation. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 783 (7th ed.
1999).
41. See FLA. STAT. § 57.081 (2000).
42. Id. Costs are waived only for the following services for persons filing in forma
pauperis: filing fees, service of process, certified copies of orders and final judgments, single
copies of court pleadings and documents, examining fees, mediation services, subpoena
services, collection charges, and costs of transcripts and exhibits for appeals. Id.
43. See, e.g., Martin v. State, 747 So. 2d 386 (2000). In Martin, the supreme court
criticized Anthony Martin, one of Florida's most vexatious litigants, who has filed over 30
petitions in the Supreme Court of Florida alone. Id. at 388. The supreme court issued an
order imposing sanctions that barred him from filing any future petitions in its court without
the proper filing fee. Id. at 387. In doing so, the court was using its authority to deny
indigent status (regardless of actual financial position) in situations when the litigant is
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A court can also sanction a vexatious litigant by prohibiting court
filings that do not contain the signature of a member of the state bar
association.44 Litigants have a guaranteed right of access to the courts,45 and
while courts have given much leeway in the pleadings and other motions
filed by pro se litigants, 46 they have also recognized that when litigants
abuse the court's latitude, sanctions requiring the assistance of counsel are
warranted.47 In Gladstone v. Smith,4 Florida's Fourth District Court of
Appeal affirmed an order that required a pro se litigant to appear through an
attorney if he wanted to refile his lawsuit after dismissal when the litigant
had amended one complaint ten times.49 The court held that a pro se litigant
should not be held to a lesser standard than that of a reasonably competent
attorney, applying the rationale that if the standards for pro se litigants are
lowered, increased frivolous litigation would result.5° In the interest of
preventing pro se litigants from endlessly tying up judicial resources with
frivolous matters, Florida courts frequently issue orders prohibiting
particularly vexatious litigants who refuse to obtain the assistance of counsel
from filing on their own if assistance is clearly warranted by the deficiencies
in the litigant's court pleadings.51
Courts can also strike or dismiss pleadings when they are patently
frivolous. 52  A common problem with pro se litigants is that they lack
sufficient legal knowledge of proper causes of action and often write
pleadings so deficient that the courts have no choice but to strike them
down. In Hammond v. A. Vetsburg Co.,53 the Supreme Court of Florida held
abusive and the sanction will prevent future frivolous petitions. Id.; see Martin v. Marko, 651
So. 2d 819 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
Similar sanctions are also available in the federal courts. See, e.g., In re McDonald, 489
U.S. 180 (1989) (holding that a petitioner who continually submitted frivolous requests for
writs was not allowed to file any further actions to the Court informa pauperis).
44. Attwood v. Eighth Cir. Ct., Union County, 667 So. 2d 356, 357 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1995).
45. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
46. See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (holding that allegations in pro
se complaints should be held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by counsel).
47. See, e.g., Atwood, 667 So. 2d at 356.
48. 729 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
49. i at 1003.
50. Id. at 1004.
51. See, e.g., Emery v. Clifford, 721 So. 2d 401, 402 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that an order requiring litigant to obtain counsel was proper given her vexatious
pleadings); Platel v. Maguire, Voorhis & Wells, P.A., 436 So. 2d 303, 304 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) (finding that a litigant who upsets the administration of justice to the point that it
interferes with others should be restrained by requiring an attorney's signature on pleadings).
52. 10 FLA. JuR. 2D Pleadings § 183 (1982).
53. 48 So. 419 (Fla. 1908).
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that when a plea is so plainly frivolous, even though it may conform to the
rules of pleading, it may be stricken by motion if the subject matter is
absolutely without merit. A "frivolous plea" was later defined in Rhea v.
Hackney5 as one which may be true in fact but sets up no defense (or by
extension, no cause of action).56
A different situation arises when the pleadings prepared by litigants are
clearly false in fact or based on incorrect details. When a plea is absolutely
false in fact, it is called a "sham plea" and can be stricken in the same
manner.5 7 In DiGiovanni v. All-Pro Golf, Inc.,58 Florida's Second District
Court of Appeal held that a motion to dismiss a pleading as sham was only
to be granted when there was an absence of issues of material fact and a
pleading sound on the surface but instituted in bad faith.5 9 For example,
Anthony Martin, discussed earlier, often misunderstands and misrepresents
the facts of the situations he contests in his petitions and files motions with
the clear intention to harass those with whom he deals in the court system.
His petitions would likely come close to being outright "shams" and should
be stricken or dismissed by the courts. However, this remedy is available
only after a complaint has been filed in the court system; thus courts are still
burdened with frivolous or sham lawsuits until the defendants in those
lawsuits move to strike pleadings.
Finally, the courts in Florida have the statutory authority to award
monetary sanctions for the costs of litigation to a prevailing party when there
is a finding that an action is based on a complete absence of "a justiciable
issue of either law or fact." The Second District Court of Appeal upheld a
sanction awarding attorneys' fees in Biermann v. Cook,61 where a litigant
representing himself filed numerous inappropriate and unorthodox pleadings
on appeal that had no justiciable issues of law or fact.62 The Biermann court
stated that "[n]o court is obligated to permit a litigant 'to take advantage of
the court as the forum to express his personal criticism and castigation not
54. Id. at 420.
55. 157 So. 190 (Fla. 1934).
56. Id. at 194.
57. Id.
58. 332 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
59. Id. at 93. The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provide a remedy for striking
"sham pleadings." FIA. R. Cv. P. 1.150(a). A party can dismiss all or part of a pleading that
is false in fact by verified motion at any time before trial. Id.; see Decker v. County of
Volusia, 698 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1997).
60. Biermarm v. Cook, 619 So. 2d 1029, 1030 (Fla. 2d Dist Ct. App. 1993)
(explaining FIA. STAT. § 57.105 (1999)).
61. Id. at 1029.
62. Id. at 1030.
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only of his adversary but of opposing counsel, court staff, and judiciary."' 63
Similarly, in Parker v. Parker,64 the Fourth District Court of Appeal held
that an award of sanctions prescribed by Florida statute was appropriate
where a litigant filed a frivolous motion asking the court to set aside a
supposedly fraudulent judgment issued years before.65
The problem with all of the above described sanctions is that they are
not applied universally by the different courts in Florida. A pro se litigant
can file his or her frivolous complaints under indigent status in a local circuit
court until the court issues an order barring his or her indigent status, at
which time the litigant simply moves on to the next higher court, or to a
neighboring circuit court, and does the same thing.66 When a vexatious
litigant fails to obtain indigent status in any Florida court but manages to
scrape together the appropriate filing fees, the litigant again has free reign to
wreak havoc on the court system with vexatious lawsuits. This pattern
continues until a court dismisses the suits as frivolous or shams, and issues
an order forcina the losing litigant to pay the defendants' court costs and
attorneys' fees. Waiting for either of these occurrences can mean that a
great deal of a court's time, as well as a defendant's time, is wasted. In fact,
it may be futile to pursue any award for attorneys' fees under section 57.105
of the Florida Statutes, since many pro se litigants are indigent and
judgment proof, being without the resources to pay any awards.-
For all of these reasons, a mechanism for more uniformly and com-
pletely limiting the intrusion of frivolous lawsuits into Florida courtrooms
was demanded. The Florida legislature responded with the FVLL.69
63. Id. (quoting Continental Nat'l Am. Group v. Majeske, 305 A.2d 291, 292 (D.
Conn. 1973)).
64. 585 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
65. Id. at 329.
66. Pro se litigants often possess the misconception that they are entitled to litigate
their claims in any Florida court regardless of the outcome at the initial trial court. Often they
file appeals to the district courts of appeal or to the Supreme Court of Florida and attempt to
frame previously litigated claims that should be procedurally barred (by the doctrine of res
judicata) as new ones. However, the Supreme Court of Florida determined that the district
courts now constitute the "courts of last resort" for most litigants. Rivera v. State, 728 So. 2d
1165, 1166 (Fla. 1998) (citing In re Amendments to Fla. R. App. P., 609 So. 2d 516, 526
(Fla. 1992)).
67. FLA. STAT. § 57.105 (2000).
68. See Kreager v. Glickman, 519 So. 2d 666, 667 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(discussing a vexatious pro se litigant who had a one and a half million dollar judgment
entered against him that utterly failed to deter him from his malicious court filings). The
implication here is that sanctions under section 57.105 of the Florida Statutes would not stop
a litigant from future filings when the litigant evidences neither any means nor any desire to
fulfill another court obligation.
69. FLA. STAT. § 68.093 (2000).
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III. THE LEGISLATURE'S SOLUTION TO FRIVOLOUS PRO SE LITIGATION
The legislature has long recognized a need to curb the number of
frivolous lawsuits being filed within state courts. As early as 1978, the
legislature enacted the statutory provision that awarded costs of litigation to
the prevailing party when the action was determined to have been devoid of
merit at commencement. 7° However, this statute has proven ineffective
against indigent pro se litigants for reasons previously discussed.
Recognizing that prisoners initiated a great number of frivolous pro se suits,
the legislature again tried to crack down on frivolous pro se litigation in
1996 when it passed legislation that sought to limit the ability of prisoners to
file numerous lawsuits under indigent status. 71 With strong conviction about
the issue, the legislature prefaced the statute with the following language:
"under current law frivolous inmate lawsuits are dismissible by the courts
only after considerable expenditure of precious taxpayer and judicial
resources. ' '72 In the introduction to the new statutes created by the bill, the
legislature said, in part, "state and local governments spend millions of
dollars each year processing, serving, and defending frivolous lawsuits filed
by self-represented indigent inmates, and... the overwhelming majority of
civil lawsuits filed by self-represented indigent inmates are frivolous and
malicious actions intended to embarrass or harass public officers and
employees. ' 73 The problem is that the legislation impacts only prisoner
litigants, so the impact from private citizens filing pro se is still staggering.
So while the legislature has taken at least two statutory steps to reduce
frivolous litigation, a renewed acknowledgment of the need for sanctions
again arose, pushing for action to curtail the number of frivolous lawsuits
filed by vexatious pro se litigants on a broad scope. The business law
section of the Florida Bar perceived the need for a device that would restrict
the frivolous activity of p4ro se litigants in Florida courts, and proposed the
FVLL to the legislature. The bill's sponsor in the Senate noted that the
law would not affect people who are trying to resolve legitimate disputes;
70. Ch. 78-275, § 1, 1978 Fla. Laws 791, 792 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 57.105
(2000)).
71. Ch. 96-106, § 1, 1996 Fla. Laws 92, 92-3 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 57.081,
.085, 92.351, 95.11, 944.279, & 944.28 (2000)). This legislation required greater proof of
poverty from inmates who were requesting indigent status in the courts, allowed the courts to
dismiss a prisoner's lawsuit when it appeared groundless, and allowed the forfeiture of gain
time as a penalty for filing frivolous actions. Id. at § 1(1), 1996 Fla. Laws at 93.
72. Id. at 93.
73. Id. at 92.
74. Audio tape: Florida Vexatious Litigant Law: Hearing on H. 0557 Before the
House of Representatives Comm. on Judiciary, 102d Legis., Interim Comm. Meeting, (Feb. 7,
2000) [hereinafter Audio Tape] (statement ofRep. J. Dudley Goadlette, sponsor).
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rather the law is aimed at those individuals with a propensity for filing
harassing civil actions.75
The first task the legislature faced in passing the FVLL was
determining at what point a pro se litigant was so bothersome as to be
labeled vexatious. There was much debate in the House of Representatives
Judiciary Committee over where to draw this line.76 The bill signed by
Governor Jeb Bush on June 19, 2000 defined a "vexatious litigant" as "[a]
person77... who, in the immediately preceding 5-year period, has
commenced, prosecuted, or maintained, pro se, five or more civil actions in
any court in this state.., which actions have been finally and adversely
determined against such person. 78  Once a person has been labeled a
vexatious litigant pursuant to the above definition, he or she retains the
classification indefinitely.79
A. Becoming a Vexatious Litigant
So how does a litigant become a vexatious litigant? The process used
to classify a litigant as vexatious depends on whether the litigant has an
action pending in court at the time. If an action is already pending, a
defendant can move for a hearing and ask the court to enter an order that the
pro se plaintiff furnish a security bond in the amount of the defendant's
reasonably anticipated court costs and attorneys' fees on the grounds that the
plaintiff is a vexatious litigant whose lawsuit is frivolous. The hearing
gives both parties the opportunity to present evidence relevant to the
75. Bill Would Limit Frivolous Suits, FLA. BAR. NEWS, Nov. 15, 1999, at 14.
76. Audio Tape, supra note 74 (statements of Rep. J. Dudley Goodlette and other
committee members).
77. A "person" under section 1.01(3) of the Florida Statutes includes, but is not
limited to, any individual, firm, association, partnership, estate, corporation, or group. FLA.
STAT. § 1.01(3) (2000). Thus, a pro se litigant suing in the name of his business or
corporation would still fall within the confines of the FVLL.
78. § 68.093(2)(d)(1). The terminology "finally and adversely determined against
such person" receives little explanation in the legislature's bill. See id. The statute defines an
action to be "finally and adversely determined" if no appeal in the action is pending.
§ 68.093(2)(d)(2). However, questions remain regarding what an adverse determination is
and it is unclear whether actions which are settled out of court, removed to a different court,
or dismissed voluntarily by the litigant are adverse determinations.
79. Id. The wording "[a]ny person or entity previously found to be a vexatious
litigant pursuant to this section," referring to section 68.093(2)(d)(1), leaves open the
possibility that even if a pro se litigant has not within the preceding five years received five
adverse judgments, if he or she has ever been deemed by Florida courts to be a vexatious
litigant, the restrictions would continue indefinitely. Id. The statute does not provide any
method for pro se litigants to be removed from the courts' registry of vexatious litigants.
80. FLA. STAT. § 68.093(3)(a)-(b) (2000).
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determination of the plaintiff's likelihood of succeeding with his or her
claim.81 In order to have the motion granted, the defendant can provide
documentation that the pro se plaintiff meets the statutory requirements in
having received five adverse judgments in five years, show that the plaintiff
is not likely to prevail on the merits of his or her case, and then ask the court
to classify the plaintiff as a vexatious litigant, requiring the litigant to
furnish a security bond for the anticipated court costs and attorneys' fees.
8 2
Additionally, even if a vexatious litigant does not currently have an
action pending, a court may, either on its own motion or on the motion of
any party, enter a prefiling order that bars the vexatious litigant from filing
any further pro se lawsuits in the courts of that circuit unless he obtains
leave from the administrative judge.83 If a pro se litigant makes a request,
the administrative judge may grant leave to file a meritorious action, if it is
determined at a hearing that the action is not filed for the purpose of
harassment or delay.84 The judge, if he or she chooses, can also still require
the posting of the security bond previously discussed as a condition to be
met before filing any such action.
B. The Effects of Being Labeled a Vexatious Litigant
Once a pro se plaintiff has been registered as vexatious, several things
happen. If there is a pending action in one of the applicable courts and the
judge determines that the plaintiff is not likely to win on the merits of his
case, that plaintiff must furnish a security bond for the defendant's court
86
costs and attorneys' fees. If the plaintiff fails to post this bond, the courtthen dismisses the action with prejudice.8 7
81. Id.
82. § 68.093(3)(b).
83. § 68.093(4).
84. Id.
85. FLA. STAT. § 68.093(4) (2000).
86. § 68.093(3)(a). According to the Florida House of Representatives Committee on
the Judiciary, the plaintiff would presumably post bond with the court as done with replevin
actions; however, the Committee noted that the statute as drafted required the plaintiff to
furnish the bond directly to the moving defendant rather than placing it in the court's trust,
and provided no means of return of the bond to the plaintiff should he prevail. STAFF OF
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF HB (FLORDA VEXATIOUS
LITIGANT LAw) 8 (Fla. 2000) 557 [hereinafter ANALYSIS OF HB 557]. An amendment to the
House Bill was proposed, but the changed language did not ultimately become part of the
final bill approved by Governor Bush because the House version of the bill died on the floor.
Compare House of Representatives Committee on Judiciary, Amendment No. 01 to H. 557,
(Feb. 8, 2000) available at http:lwww.leg.state.fl.uslcitizenldocumentslstatutesl1998/ with
Florida Vexatious Litigant Law, FLA. STAT. § 68.093(3)(b) (2000). This could prove
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If the court has issued a prefiling order that requires the pro se plaintiff
to obtain leave of the court to file an action, the clerk of the court is under
order not to file any actions from vexatious litigants absent that court's
permission. 88 If the vexatious litigant violates this order and attempts to file
an action anyway, his or her disobedience can be punished as contempt of
court.89 Furthermore, the relief provided by the FVLL is cumulative to ana
other relief currently provided by section 57.105 of the Florida Statutes.
Thus, even if a suit is dismissed for failure to post the required security
bond, monetary sanctions for filing a frivolous lawsuit and causing a
defendant to incur needless litigation expenses up to that point can still be
assessed against a vexatious pro se litigant. Finally, the clerk of the court
must maintain copies of all prefiling orders issued by the court, and must
also forward copies of all prefiling orders to the Supreme Court of Florida,
which will maintain a registry of vexatious litigants for central reference.92
IV. THE VEXATIOUS LITIGANT LAW AS A NOT-SO-NOVEL APPROACH
The FVLL simply codifies the sanctions that the courts have already
been using haphazardly. As previously discussed, courts have applied
sanctions such as denying indigent status, requiring counsel in order to file a
complaint, dismissing frivolous or sham pleadings, and awarding monetary
damages for pursuing frivolous causes of action for years. However, until
now there have been no guidelines that tell the courts when to enforce each
particular sanction. Decisions to sanction have been made individually by
each court. Consequently, the same litigant who is barred from filing in
problematic for courts until a method for handling the posting of a security bond is
established.
87. FLA. STAT. § 68.093(3)(b)-(c) (2000).
88. Article V of the Florida Constitution describes how the supreme court and the
district courts of appeal appoint a clerk, who is charged with "perform[ing] such duties as the
court directs." FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3, cl. c & § 4, cl. c. Thus, if a judge or justice orders a
clerk not to accept filings without the appropriate fees, a clerk must follow that order.
ANALYSiS oF HB 557, supra note 86.
If a court clerk files an action instigated by a registered vexatious litigant by mistake,
any party to the action can file a notice with the court stating that the plaintiff is a pro se
vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling order. FLA. STAT. § 68.093(5) (2000). This filed
notice stays the litigation process, and unless the pro se plaintiff moves for leave to file the
action, the judge can dismiss his action with prejudice 10 days after the notice is filed. Id.
89. § 68.093(4).
90. § 57.105.
91. § 68.093. However, as previously discussed, most pro se litigants are judgment
proof, so attempts to collect these monetary sanctions may prove to be fruitless.
92. § 68.093(6).
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forma pauperis in one court after filing five unsuccessful lawsuits can
sometimes still walk into another court and continue filing and harassing his
or her targets time and time again. The FVLL draws a line for the courts,
giving them a guide for when to say that a vexatious litigant has crossed the
line into being abusive of the judicial system.
A. Reducing Frivolous Litigation More Efficiently
The FVLL combines several of the currently used sanctions and simply
prescribes an efficient manner for enforcing them. This law sets at five the
number of cases in which a pro se litigant must receive an adverse judgment
and tells the court that a litigant is becoming abusive of the court system at
that point.93 In the past, litigants have sometimes been allowed to file up to
forty petitions before courts ended their abusive behavior by refusing to
allow further complaints to be filed.94 Thus, one of the ways that the FVLL
makes the process more effective is by allowing a judge to say that a
vexatious litigant has caused enough trouble at a much earlier point in his or
her dealings with the court.
A second advantage to this law is that it provides a mechanism whereby
a frivolous cause of action can be dismissed with prejudice9 s early in
litigation.96 If motions to strike frivolous and sham pleadings are granted, a
court still has the option of giving the party an oportunity to amend or
submit additional pleadings to correct the errors. Because the FVLL
requires an order of dismissal with prejudice if a party does not furnish the
required bond, it does not leave courts with the latitude to allow
amendments. 98 Thus, another benefit of the FVLL is that it allows a court to
enter a final judgment against frivolous claims early on in the litigation
93. § 68.093(2)(d)(1).
94. See generally Martin v. State, 747 So. 2d 386, 387-88 (Fla. 2000) (recognizing
that petitioner had filed 43 petitions to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, and 30 petitions to
the Supreme Court of Florida); Rivera v. State, 728 So. 2d 1165, 1165 (Fla. 1998) (noting that
petitioner had filed at least 20 petitions to its court alone); Attwood v. Eighth Cir. CL, Union
County, 667 So. 2d 356, 356 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that litigant had filed 17
appeals or petitions in its court, most of which received adverse judgments); Platel v.
Maguire, Voorhis, & Wells, P.A., 436 So. 2d 303, 304 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(commenting that petitioner had filed nine notices of appeal in 14 months).
95. A dismissal with prejudice means that a lawsuit cannot be amended and refiled.
BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY 482 (7th ed. 1999).
96. FLA. STAT. § 68.093(2)(d)(1) (2000).
97. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.150(a).
98. § 68.093(3)(c); see also Gladstone v. Smith, 729 So. 2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1999) (noting that petitioner had been allowed to amend his initial complaint 10
times before he was ordered to obtain counsel to proceed with the litigation).
2000]
357
: Nova Law Review 35, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2000
Nova Law Review
process, rather than having to allow repeated amendments that further tie up
court resources.
The FVLL does not outright require a litigant to obtain counsel in order
to continue filing complaints. However, the FVLL only applies to actions
filed pro se. This means that once litigants have been prohibited from
further pro se filings, if they present valid complaints and have attorneys
sign those complaints, they will not face barriers to getting those complaints
filed and starting the litigation process. The rationale behind having
attorneys sign the filings presented to the court is to ensure that filings are
legally sound and properly drafted. 99 The law is written only to prevent
those litigants from filing suits that no lawyer would sign their names to in
good conscience. Legitimate complaints which are recognized and accepted
by counsel, as well as those filed pro se that express legitimate claims, will
not be barred by this law.
The obvious advantage of the FVLL over the current monetary
sanctions under section 57.105 of the Florida Statutes is that costs of
litigation are addressed at earlier stages of litigation. Section 57.105
sanctions require that one party must prevail, meaning that in most cases
there has to be a final judgment.'0° At that point, a vexatious litigant has
possibly harassed and abused the defendants, witnesses, and judicial staff for
years. Additionally, the litigant likely will not possess the resources to pay
any judgment of attorneys' fees, and he or she is unlikely to have learned the
intended lesson that filing frivolous suits is wrong. Since the intent of
frivolous suits is to harass, once a litigant has seen a lawsuit through to
completion, even if it results in an adverse judgment, the objective has been
successfully completed. With pro se litigants, the monetary sanctions under
section 57.105 do not have the deterrent effect that was intended.
In contrast, the FVLL requires that a vexatious litigant post a bond in
order to proceed with his or her frivolous lawsuit.10' In forcing this action,
the courts are guaranteeing that a defendant who is hauled into court is
protected to some degree from bearing the costs of litigation. By raising the
issue of costs of litigation early in the process, the court forces the vexatious
pro se litigant to examine the claims made and to determine whether claims
are important enough to proceed. This law ensures that a defendant will not
waste countless days and precious monetary resources on litigation, only to
learn at the end of the road that he or she will not be reimbursed for his or
her troubles. For these reasons the FVLL will prove to be more effective
99. McAliley v. McAliley, 704 So. 2d 611, 614 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
(Farmer, J., concurring).
100. FLA. STAT. § 57.105(1) (2000). The award for attorneys' fees is ordered at the
end of litigation. See id.
101. § 68.093(3)(b).
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than sanctions currently in place, and the courts should expect to see a more
effective process for reducing the burden of frivolous lawsuits.
B. Following the Trend in Other States
Four other states have also introduced similar statutes into their
courts. 1°2 California's statute is the most similar to the FVLL. Indeed, the
California Vexatious Litigant Statute was the model upon which Florida's
law was based. 0 3 Most of the other states' laws use essentially the same
language, with the exception of the Ohio Vexatious Litigator Statute.04 All
except Ohio's specify a certain number of cases in which a litigant must
receive an adverse judgment in order to qualify for categorization as a
vexatious litigant.10 5 However, the statutory period differs from that chosen
by Florida's legislature. In California, Hawaii, and Texas, a litigant is
vexatious after he or she has received five or more adverse judgments in a
seven-year period, as opposed to afive-year period stated in Florida's law. 10 6
This means that Florida's law is slightly more restrictive than those of other
states.
A second distinction between the Florida law and others is that the
others (except Ohio's) define litigation as any civil action in either state or
federal court.1 7  Ohio's law applies only to state courts." Although
Florida's law is silent on whether it applies to federal courts, a plain reading
of the statute defining an "action" as one in a court governed by the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure (or the Florida Probate Rules) seems to imply that
federal courts in Florida do not benefit from the law's restrictions. One
possible effect of this omission is that vexatious litigants who have been
102. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. P. CODE § 391 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000); OHio REv. CODE
ANN. § 2323.52 (Anderson 1998); HAW. REV. STAT. § 634J (1999); Tax. Crv. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 11.001-.104 (West Supp. 2000).
103. Audio Tape, supra note 74.
104. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2323.52 (Anderson 1998).
105. CAL. Crv. P. CODE § 391(b)(1) (West 1998 & Supp. 2000); HAw. REv. STAT.
§ 634J-1(1) (1999); TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 11.054(1) (West Supp. 2000).
Ohio does not require a litigant to receive adverse judgments in a specific number of cases
within a chosen time frame. Instead, the state classifies a vexatious litigant as one who has
'"abitually, persistently, and without reasonable grounds engaged in vexatious conduct."
OrHO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.52(A)(3) (Anderson 1998).
106. CAL. CIV. P. CODE § 391(b)(1) (West 1998 & Supp. 2000); HAW. REv. STAT.
§ 634.-1(1) (1999); TEX Cirv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 11.054(1) (West Supp. 2000).
107. CAL. Civ. P. CODE § 391(a) (West 1998 & Supp. 2000); HAw. REv. STAT.
§ 634J-1 (1999); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 11.001(2) (West Supp. 2000).
108. OmOREv. CoDEANN. § 2323.52(A)(3) (Anderson 1998).
109. FLA. STAT.. § 68.093(2)(a) (2000).
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prohibited from filing in state courts might begin filing in federal courts,
thereby increasing the strain of frivolous litigation on the federal courts. One
way to correct this would be for the United States District Courts located in
Florida to issue a local rule stating that judges may refer to the FVLL for the
purpose of issuing sanctions against vexatious parties." 0
There are other minor differences between the FVLL and the vexatious
litigant laws in other states. For example, Texas' law gives a party just
ninety days from the date the answer was filed to make a motion for the
plaintiff to furnish a security bond."' Conversely, Florida's law is silent
regarding the timing of filing such a motion, but without such restrictions as
Texas places on bringing the motion, it seems a party has until the entry of
final judgment to ask for a bond to be furnished.1
Finally, the only other notable difference between the FVLL and other
states' vexatious litigant laws is the inclusion of additional definitions of a
"vexatious litigant" in California, Hawaii, and Texas. All three state statutes
include provisions that allow litigants to be termed vexatious if they allow
lawsuits to remain pending for at least two years with no trial date (in
addition to being termed vexatious because of adverse judgments).1 3 In all
three states, litigants can also earn the vexatious label by repeatedly
relitigating issues already finally determined in previous actions, and
repeatedly filing meritless motions, pleadings, or other papers to delay or
harass the other party." 4 In contrast, Florida's law does not provide such
mechanisms for terming parties to be vexatious; rather, Rarties only earn the
title if they receive five adverse judgments in five years.
Overall, in comparison to other vexatious litigant laws, the FVLL is
somewhat less broad. Florida frames the definition of a vexatious litigant
more narrowly and allows the statute to affect only certain courts within the
state. The FVLL applies only to actions governed by the Florida Rules of
110. See Rawles, supra note 32, at 288, n.80 (describing how California handled this
issue before the statute was amended to include federal courts in the state).
111. TEx. Crv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 11.051 (West Supp. 2000). California and
Hawaii allow such a motion until a final judgment has been entered. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE
§ 391.1 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000); HAW. REV. STAT. § 634-2 (1999). Ohio does not
provide a mechanism by which a party can move the court to order the plaintiff to furnish a
security bond. See Ofio REv. CODE ANN. § 2323.52(A)(3) (Anderson 1998).
112. See FLA. STAT. § 68.093(3)(a) (2000).
113. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 11.054(1)(B) (West Supp. 2000); CAL.
CIV. P. CODE § 391(b)(1)(ii) (West 1998 & Supp. 2000); HAw. REv. STAT. § 634J-1(1)(B)
(1999).
114. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REm. CODE ANN. § 11.054(2)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 2000);
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 391(b)(2) (West 1998 & Supp. 2000); HAw. REv. STAT. § 634J-
1(2)-(3) (1999).
115. FLA. STAT. § 68.093(2)(d) (2000).
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Civil Procedure and the Florida Probate Rules, as well as actions governed
by the Florida Small Claims Rules.'16 It specifically excludes any actions in
courts governed by the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure, meaning
that pro se actions for divorce, child custody, or other family law matters
would not be restrained.117 It likewise does not apply to criminal actions, or
to petitions for writs of habeas corpus.118 This is a departure from the
vexatious litigant laws enacted in the other states, in which actions in family
courts and writs of habeas corpus can apparently be subjected to the
restrictions of the vexatious litigant statutes.119 Florida's law declines to
encompass all of the definitions of a "vexatious litigant" that its counterparts
in other states do. Due to its narrower construction, the Florida law is likely
to affect only the most vexatious of litigants, and should draw less criticism
from pro se litigants claiming that it impinges on constitutional rights of
access to courts.
V. CLOSING THE COURTROOM DOORS TO FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION
Initial responses to the FVLL will consist of claims of constitutional
violations of a right of access to the courts. The Florida Constitution states,
116. § 68.093(2)(a), (3)(a).
117. Id.; STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 102D CONG., ANALYSIS AND
ECONOMIC IMPACr STATEMENT ON CSISB 154 (VEXATIous LXnGANTs) 4 (Fla. 2000); see also,
Audio Tape, supra note 74. The statute is also silent as to whether the law applies to federal
courts within the state. See § 68.093(2)(a), (3)(a). Obviously, Florida legislatures have no
authority over federal courts, so this may be the reason for the omission. However, the
inclusion of federal court adverse judgments against a pro se litigant was mentioned at the
House of Representatives Committee on Judiciary's Hearing, and the Committee seemed
favorable to including those decisions when tallying the five adverse judgments. Audio Tape,
supra note 74. This is an important point to note because many pro se litigants file federal
civil rights violations suits as a blanket basis for their alleged harms after they fail to gain
relief in state courts.
Adverse judgments for actions in courts governed by the Florida Small Claims Rules
are not tallied for the purposes of establishing the threshold number to meet the statute's
requirements for terming a party a vexatious litigant. So while a pro se litigant's adverse
judgment in a small claims court is not held against him for purposes of totaling up the
number of adverse judgments, if he otherwise meets the criteria, he can be restrained from
filing lawsuits in small claims court under the statute's language. § 68.093(2)(d)(1).
118. Audio Tape, supra note 74.
119. The vexatious litigant statutes in California, Hawaii, and Texas place no
restrictions on the courts in which a vexatious litigant's activities can be restricted. CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 391 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000); HAw. Ray. STAT. § 634J-1 (1999); TaX. Cirv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 11.001 (West Supp. 2000). Ohio's statute applies only to the
actions governed by the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. OHIo Rav. CODE ANN. § 2323.52(C)
(Anderson 1998).
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in pertinent part, that "[t]he courts shall be open to every person for redress
of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or
delay., 12 Traditionally, courts have liberally construed the right of access
to guarantee everyone the opportunity to have their day in court.121 However,
courts have a responsibility to see that limited resources are allocated in a
way that "promotes the interests of justice."' They recognize a need to
reserve the resources of the court system for genuine dispute resolutions.
123
When one person's vexatious and harassing activities upset normal court
procedure, it becomes necessary to invoke some sort of restraint.'2 Courts
have recognized a legislative right to restrict access in certain circumstances
if a reasonable alternative remedy is shown.125 If there is no alternative
remedy, there must be an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment
of the right of access.'2
A pro se litigant who feels that his or her rights have been abused may
assert arguments that the constitutional right of access to courts restricts the
placing of financial barriers to bringing claims or defenses to court. 27 In
Don's Sod Co. v. Department of Revenue, 128 the Fifth District Court of
Appeal held that "[n]o bond requirement... can be employed by the
Legislature to prevent a constitutional challenge to those very provisions."' 29
This statement is problematic because some pro se litigants will construe it
to mean that absolutely no bond requirement can be enacted by the
legislature. However, what the holding actually suggests is that if a litigant
wants to challenge a bond requirement (or other restriction) on his or her
right of access to courts, the litigant cannot be barred from doing so by the
bond requirement. It says nothing about the constitutionality of a bond itself.
Another likely argument is found in Psychiatric Associates v. Siegel,130
where the Supreme Court of Florida explained that a statute requiring that a
bond for attorneys' fees be posted as a condition for bringing an action
violates the right of access to courts guaranteed by the Florida
Constitution. As a blanket statement, this is simply not true.
120. FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 21.
121. Psychiatric Assocs. v. Siegel, 610 So. 2d 419, 424 (Fla. 1992).
122. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989).
123. Rivera v. State, 728 So. 2d 1165, 1166 (Fla. 1998).
124. Shotkdn v. Cohen, 163 So. 2d 330, 332 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
125. Siegel, 610 So. 2d at 424.
126. Id.
127. 10 FLA. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 316 (1997).
128. 661 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
129. Id. at 898.
130. 610So. 2d419 (FIa. 1992).
131. Id. at424-25.
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While access to courts must not be unreasonably burdened, requiring a
bond as a condition of bringing an action under some circumstances does not
violate the right of access to the courts.1 32 Courts recognize a public need to
impose a significant restraint on those who abuse the judicial system.133
However, courts must be careful that when limiting one's right of access to
the courts, they safeguard those rights to essential due process. 13 A restraint
on a right of access to courts should not amount to a total denial of access.
135
Issues of due process arise when the right of access to courts is
restricted as mandated by the FVLL. According to the Supreme Court of
Florida in Siegel, the test used to determine whether a statute violates the
due process clause is whether the statute "'bears a reasonable relation to a
permissible legislative objective and is not discriminatory, arbitrary or
oppressive.," 13  In Siegel, a bond requirement for bringing actions
challenging medical peer review board decisions was found to be
unconstitutional because it did not reasonably relate to the goal of reducing
frivolous suits by physicians, since the bond requirement was required of all
plaintiffs before filing, regardless of the merits of the case. 137 This statute
discriminated against those who could not afford to post a bond.138 A denial
of due process does not occur when a state restricts the right of access to
courts by means of a reasonable procedural requirement. 13  For example,
when courts afford a litigant a reasonable opportunity to be heard (i.e.,
evaluating the likelihood of the plaintiff's success) prior to requiring a
posting of a security bond, due process rights are not violated.
The California Vexatious Litigant Law was challenged in Taliaferro v.
Hoogs, 4° in which a pro se litigant disputed the constitutionality of the
statute that required him to post a security bond.14 1 His claim was
subsequently dismissed when he failed to do so.142 The California statute
was upheld, and the court held that the provisions of the statute were not
132. 10 FLA. JuR. 2D Constitutional Law § 318 (1997).
133. Martin v. State, 747 So. 2d 386,391-92 (Fla. 2000).
134. Martin v. Cir. Ct., Seventeenth Judicial Cir., 627 So. 2d 1298, 1300 (Fla. 4th
Dist. CL App. 1993).
135. Emery v. Clifford, 721 So. 2d 401, 402 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding
that a prohibition on filing pro se was not a complete denial of access).
136. Siegel, 610 So. 2d at 425 (citing Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 15
(Fla. 1974)).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Julie M. Bradlow, Comment, Procedural Due Process Rights of Pro Se Civil
Litigants, 55 U. C. L. REv. 659, 678 (1988).
140. 46 Cal. Rptr. 147 (Cal. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
141. Id. at 147.
142. Id. at 148.
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unreasonable, and that the statute did not discriminate against any roup of
persons unconstitutionally, or deny a litigant due process of law.r43 One
could expect a similar result if Florida's law should be so challenged.
Thus, the FVLL will not violate the constitutional rights of pro se
litigants who come before the court. The statute serves a legitimate
governmental interest in preventing the wheels of justice from becoming so
clogged with frivolous litigation that they cannot effectively provide judicial
remedy for other well-meaning litigants. It does not discriminate unfairly
against those who are without funds, since litigants with legitimate claims
will not be denied access to the courts. Further, alternative means exist,
such as posting the security bond, even if claims are deemed meritless. The
statute does not require the posting of such a bond before filing; it only
requires that a vexatious litigant either obtain leave by telling the judge that
he or she has a new and meritorious claim, or, if brought as a motion during
litigation, that the litigant show the judge at a hearing that his or her claim is
valid. Judicial consideration will be given prior to issuance of an order
requiring a bond. In this manner, the litigant enjoys an opportunity to be
heard, and his or her due process rights are not violated. The bond
requirement is not an absolute bar to litigation; rather, it is an impediment to
those who would otherwise take advantage of the judicial system. The
requirements of the FVLL are narrow enough to protect the courts from
frivolous litigation without infringing upon rights of litigants.
VI. CONCLUSION
The FVLL is a valuable new tool in the hands of Florida courts. It will
make the process of disposing of frivolous claims more efficient and will
ensure that the judicial process runs more smoothly. While there will be
vexatious litigants who challenge the new law and the restrictions it
imposes, the statute as it is currently framed should withstand the pressure. It
will be interesting to see how the FVLL affects vexatious litigants like
Anthony Martin. It may be too soon to tell, but perhaps it really will curtail
the courtroom capers that vexatious pro se litigants exhibit every day in
today's courtrooms.
Deborah L Neveils
143. Id. at 151-52.
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"If the manifest probability of harm is very great, and the harm
follows, we say that it is done maliciously or intentionally; if not so
great, but still considerable, we say that the harm is done
negligently; if there is no apparent danger, we call it mischance."'
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REv. 1, 1
(1894).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Workers' compensation is a form of strict liability.2 It is a system
where employers are responsible for their employees' injuries despite fault.
In return, the Florida Statutes preclude employees from suing3 their
employers for damages available under the common law tort system. The
exclusive remedy provision of the Florida Workers' Compensation Act
provides this preclusive effect and gives rise to the workers' compensation
immunity defense to tort actions.4 Certain situations exist, however, where
an employer may still be exposed to tort liability.5  The intentional tort
exception is such a situation.6
Recently, in Turner v. PCR, Inc.,7 the Supreme Court of Florida
recognized and reaffirmed the existence of an intentional tort exception!
Additionally, the court held that an objective standard may be used to judge
an employer's conduct. 9 Now, employers may be accountable under this
exception for conduct that a reasonable person, in the employer's position,
would understand as "substantially certain" to result in injury or death to an
employee. 10
This comment discusses the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in
Turner, as it addresses the intentional tort exception to workers'
compensation as an exclusive remedy. In addition, it considers the impact
the Turner decision may have on future litigation against employers. Part II
gives a brief overview of workers' compensation in Florida as it describes
benefits and disadvantages of the current system, and discusses case law
concerning this exception prior to Turner. Part III outlines the facts of
Turner, and Part IV summarizes the procedural posture of the case.
Next, Parts V and VI analyze the arguments presented by both sides of
this dispute as they pertain to the intentional tort exception and employer
conduct. Part VII describes in detail the Supreme Court of Florida's
decision. Part VIII reflects on the decision and discusses its impact,
particularly questioning what the court considers "substantial certainty," and
providing a possible interpretation. This section additionally discusses the
2. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 80, at 573
(5th ed. 1984).
3. FLA. STAT. § 440.11 (2000).
4. Id.
5. Robert L. Dietz & Robert E. Mansbach, Jr., Workers' Compensation Law: Dual
Challenges to Exclusive Employer Liability, 66 FLA. BAR J. 53, 55 (1992).
6. Id.
7. 754 So. 2d 683 (Fa. 2000).
8. Id. at 691.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 688.
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procedural aspect as it relates to surviving summary judgment in this type of
case. Part IX concludes that holding employers responsible for intentional
acts, as defined by this court's opinion, is appropriate. However, extending
an objective standard to employees' conduct may also help in creating a
system where both employers and employees are encouraged to behave
responsibly and promote workplace safety.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION
A. Benefits and Disadvantages
In Florida, the legislature enacted workers' compensation law to
provide benefits including medical care and lost wages to employees for
accidental injuries arising in the course and scope of employment." The
intent was to assure a "quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical
benefits" and facilitate the employee's return to work at a reasonable cost to
the employer.' 2 The legislature designed the workers' compensation system
to: replace uncertain remedies with certain ones; avoid the expenses of
litigation; and resolve employment injury disputes through a more efficient
and less costly system' 3
Generally, to receive benefits, employees need only to inform their
employer of an injury within thirty days.' Employers must pay benefits
despite who is at fault. 5 Additionally, certain occupational illnesses are
covered.16 Therefore, employees benefit from prompt guaranteed medical
care and disability benefits for lost wages. On the other hand, litigation
within the workers' compensation system is increasingly a disadvantage.
Originally intended to be the exception rather than the rule, litigation is
becoming more frequent as employees try to prove eligibility, injury
causation, and pursue washout settlements.' 7 Additionally, although medical
11. FlA. STAT. § 440.015 (2000).
12. Id.
13. Joan T.A. Gabel, Escalating Inefficiency in Workers' Compensation Systems: Is
Federal Reform the Answer?, 34 WAK FOREST L. REv. 1083, 1089 (1999).
14. § 440.185(t); see also JOHN J. DUBREUiL, FLORIDA WORKERS' COMPENSATION
HANDBOOK, § 2.02 (1999) (explaining employee reporting of injuries and occupational
illnesses in general).
15. DUBREUIL, supra note 14, §§ 1.0114], 1.0211]; KEETON, supra note 2, § 80, at
573.
16. DUBREUIL, supra note 14, § 8.01[1]-[8]; KEnTON, supra note 2, § 80, at 575.
17. DUBREUIL, supra note 14, § 1.0115].
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care is paid, if an employee loses time from work, he or she only receives a
percentage of his or her lost wages.'8
The benefits and disadvantages for employers are similar. Generally,
employers benefit because they are immune from tort liability if they
participate in the system. 19 Thus, employers for the most part escape the
expense of litigating employee injury claims. . Unfortunately, the system,
intended as an efficient and less expensive alternative, has still been costly
for employers. Medical care is not cheap and lost-time costs can be
considerable. For instance, nationally in 1984, employers spent an estimated
thirty billion dollars in annual workers' compensation costs. 1 In 1993, that
figure rose to seventy billion dollars. 22 However, due to reform measures
over the last few years, costs have slightly declined.23 Still, many criticize
the effectiveness of the system as a solution for injured employees or a
remedy for businesses faced with costly claims, demands for settlements,
and increasing insurance premiums.2A
B. Intentional Tort Exception
Although workers' compensation is generally an exclusive remedy for
employees, in 1986 the Supreme Court of Florida, in Fisher v. Shenandoah
General Construction Co., remarked that employers were not immune from
suit if they have engaged in intentional acts either designed to result in, or
substantially certain to, harm an employee.2 In Fisher, an employer ordered
an employee to clean the inside of an underground pipe with a high pressure
hose, resulting in the employee's death due to methane gas fumes. 27 The
employee's personal representatives sued his employer, alleging
Shenandoah's conduct constituted an intentional tort and therefore did not
fall within the scope of Florida workers' compensation law.2
The original question certified to the Supreme Court of Florida in
Fisher addressed whether Florida workers' compensation law precluded
actions by employees against their employers for intentional torts, if the
18. FLA. STAT. § 440.15 (2000).
19. See generally KEETON, supra note 2, § 84, at 601.
20. Id.
21. See Gabel, supra note 13, at 1089.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See Id.
25. 498 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1986).
26. See id. at 883.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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injuries occurred within the scope of their employment.29 ' However, the
court refrained from answering the question directly, because it held that the
facts in Fisher did not state an intentional tort cause of action.3° The
complaint alleged that the employer required the deceased employee to
engage in an activity that would "'in all probability' cause injury or death."31
Instead, the court restated the certified question and addressed whether an
employer commits an intentional tort when he orders his employee to engage
in an activity that the employer knows to be dangerous, and that will "in all
probability result in injury to the employee. 32
Expectedly, the court answered no; probable injury was insufficient to
prove an intentional tort.33 In doing so, however, it essentially addressed the
original question stating, "[in order for an employer's actions to amount to
an intentional tort, the employer must either exhibit a deliberate intent to
injure or engage in conduct which is substantially certain to result in injury
or death." What was missing in Fisher's complaint was the "substantial
certainty" element.35 Decided the same day, Lawton v. Alpine Engineered
Products, Inc. ,3 met the same fate. In Lawton, the court held that a willful
and wanton disregard for the safety of employees is different from
committing an intentional tort.37  Additionally, "[t]his [intentional tort]
standard requires more than a strong probability of injury. It requires virtual
certainty."3
Now, in Turner v. PCR, Inc., the Supreme Court of Florida recognizes
and reaffirms that "workers' compensation law does not protect an employer
from liability for an intentional tort against an employee. 39 This opinion
specifically addresses and explains the alternative bases for recovery under
this excep0ion and how it takes a step back from the requirement of virtual
certainty.
29. Id. at 882-83.
30. Fisher, 498 So. 2d at 883.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 883-84.
34. Id. at 883.
35. Fisher, 498 So. 2d at 884.
36. 498 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1986).
37. Id. at 880.
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. 754 So. 2d 683, 687 (Fla. 2000).
40. Id.
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IMI. THE FACTUAL SITUATION OF TURNER V. PCR, INC.
On November 22, 1991, an explosion occurred at a chemical plant in
Alachua County, Florida, killing Paul Turner and seriously injuring James
Creighton.41 At the time of the explosion, PCR, Inc. ("PCR"), employed
both Turner and Creighton as technicians. 42
E.I. DuPont Nemours & Co. hired PCR to develop a chemical
replacement compound for Freon 113.43 The creation of the replacement
compound (F-pentene-2) involved complicated chemical processes.
Initially, requiring a difficult and unstable three-ste? procedure, the process
resulted in several explosions and meltdowns. Subsequently, PCR
modified the process.46 Before the November 22 explosion, PCR made
thirty-six runs of the F-pentene-2 process.47 Thirty of those runs involved
quantities less than or equal to twenty gallons.48 Six involved two-hundred
gallon runs.49 The explosion at issue occurred during the seventh, two-
hundred gallon run.50 Appellants produced evidence showing "at least
three" other explosions involving the manufacture of F-pentene-2, although
the processes involved differed. 1 However, the November 22 explosion
resulted from mixing three chemicals required to produce F-pentene-2, in a
one hundred pound liquid fuel cylinder lacking any pressure relief device.
52
Turner and Creighton retained two chemical experts to investigate the
circumstances surrounding the incident.53 The experts provided affidavits
stating it was substantially certain an explosion would result from mixing
large quantities of the chemicals at issue, tetrafluoroethylene ('TFE"),
hexafluoropropene ("HFP"), and aluminum chloride, in a propane tank,
rather than in a reactor equipped with pressure release valves and other
safety features.M The experts stated that TFE in particular, was 'highly
41. Id. at 684.
42. Respondent's Answer Brief on Merits at 4, Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683
(Fla. 2000) (No. 94,468).
43. Turner, 754 So. 2d at 684.
44. Initial Brief of Appellants at 1, Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2000)
(No. 94,468).
45. Id. at2.
46. Id.
47. Turner, 754 So. 2d at 685.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Turner, 754 So. 2d at 685.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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reactive,' 'prone to spontaneous and violent decomposition when heated or
compressed,"' and required special equipment and precautions when
handled.55 Evidence was also presented that ICI, the manufacturer of TFE,
had notified PCR that it was discontinuing supplying TFE due to its
hazardous nature.
56
Both experts concluded that due to intense pressure placed on PCR and
the nearing phase-out date for the legal use and manufacture of Freon, PCR
intentionally changed the protocol for producing F-pentene-2 to
accommodate the existing reaction facility that was unsuited for that
purpose.57 Furthermore, evidence was presented that Turner voiced
concerns regarding the safety of the project and PCR never informed
Creighton regarding the hazards.5 8  Finally, PCR, knowing TFE was
dangerously unstable, allowed the practice of manually inverting the
chemical containers thus, making it substantially certain employees would be
harmed.59
IV. PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF TURNER V. PCR, INC.
Turner's estate, along with Creighton and his wife, sued PCR for
wrongful death and personal injuries arising out of alleged intentional torts
including: intentional exposure to injury, battery, fraudulent
misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.6 PCR
claimed immunity as Turner and Creighton's employer and alleged they
were only entitled to workers' compensation benefits. 61  The trial court
granted summary judgment for PCR based on workers' compensation
immunity pursuant to section 440.11(1) of the Florida Statutes.62
Additionally, the trial court held the experts' affidavits amounted to
conclusory statements rather than evidence of facts.63 The First District
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order but certified the following
question of "great public importance" to the Supreme Court of Florida:
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Turner, 754 So. 2d at 685.
58. Initial Brief of Appellants at 4, Turner (No. 94,468).
59. Turner, 754 So. 2d at 685.
60. Respondent's Answer Brief on Merits at 2, Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683
(Fla. 2000) (No. 94,468).
61. Id.
62. Turner, 754 So. 2d at 686.
63. Respondent's Answer Brief on Merits at 19-20, Turner (No. 94,468).
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IS AN EXPERT'S AFFIDAVIT, EXPRESSING THE OPINION
THAT AN EMPLOYER EXHIBITED A DELIBERATE INTENT
TO INJURE OR ENGAGED IN CONDUCT SUBSTANTIALLY
CERTAIN TO RESULT IN INJURY OR DEATH TO AN
EMPLOYEE, SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A FACTUAL
DISPUTE, THUS PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
THE ISSUE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION IMMUNITY?64
V. THE APPELLANTS URGE THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA TO ANSWER
THE CERTIFIED QUESTION IN THE AFFIRMATIVE
Turner and Creighton (Appellants) in their initial brief asked the
Supreme Court of Florida to answer the certified question in the affirmative
for two reasons.65 First, Appellants argued the experts' affidavits proffered
on their behalf must be considered before rendering summary judgment in
favor of PCR (Appellee).6 Second, Appellants argued the experts'
affidavits "present genuine issues of material fact precluding Appellee's
motion for summary judgment and the order of the district court should be
reversed." 67
Addressing their first argument, Appellants acknowledged that the
lower courts in this case questioned the applicability of experts' affidavits
and the weight they must be given in summary judgment proceedings.6 8
Defending the applicability, Appellants cited Buchman v. Seaboard Coast
Line Railroad,69 where the Supreme Court of Florida set forth the elements
for admissibility of expert testimony.70 The two elements required for
admitting expert testimony are: first, "the subject must be beyond the
common understanding of the average layman"; and second, the witness
must 7,ossess knowledge that will aid the trier of fact in determining the
truth. Likewise, Appellants argued the subject matter in this case was
"highly technical and well outside the common knowledge of the jury," and
additionally, the affidavits supporting a showing of material issues of fact.72
64. Turner, 754 So. 2d at 684.
65. Initial Brief of Appellants at 11, 16, Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla.
2000) (No. 94,468).
66. Id. at 11.
67. Id. at 16.
68. Id. at 11.
69. 381 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1980).
70. Id. at 230.
71. Id.
72. Initial Brief of Appellants at 14, Turner (No. 94,468).
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In particular, the experts' findings were. necessary to create, at a
minimum, a question of fact for the jury. Appellants claimed the issue was
whether Appellee knew or should have known its specific actions or
omissions, such as allowing highly volatile gases to be manually mixed in
containers without pressure relief valves, were substantially certain to result
in injury or death to an employee. 73 In further support of their argument,
Appellants cited several other cases where courts relied upon exlpert witness
affidavits in granting or denying motions for summary judgment.
74
For example, Appellants cited Roster v. Moulton, a Fourth District
Court of Appeal case addressing the significance of experts' affidavits in
summary judgment proceedings. 6 Roster involved a personal injury action
filed against a bar after a customer struck the plaintiff, a bicyclist, with his
vehicle while leaving.77 The trial court considered the affidavits of two
expert witnesses stating that the amount of alcohol the defendant consumed
over a short period, with no outward evidence of physical impairment, would
have put a reasonable server of alcoholic beverages on notice that the
defendant was "habitually addicted."78 These affidavits helped in creating
an issue of fact, whether bar employees knew the defendant was addicted to
alcohol.79
Additionally, Appellants cited Lugo v. Florida East Coast Railway
Co. In Lugo, a negligence and strict liability action brought under the
Federal Employer's Liability Act, the trial court excluded the plaintiff's
expert witness from testifying because he had not been listed as a witness,
violating the court's pretrial order.81 However, the Third District Court of
Appeal refused to affirm for other reasons but stated, "we must assume that
the trial court found the expert qualified to render an opinion, and his
affidavit testimony reasonably credible, as it was the only evidence it could
have relied upon in denying defendants' motions for summary judgment."
8 2
As these examples suggest, judges consider expert testimony in summary
judgment proceedings and use the affidavits as evidence to deny motions for
summary judgment.
Appellants not only claimed the court must consider their experts'
affidavits, but that the affidavits set forth evidence creating disputable issues
73. Id. at 26.
74. Id. at 12-14.
75. 602 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
76. Initial Brief of Appellants at 13-14, Turner (No. 94,468).
77. Roster, 602 So. 2d at 975.
78. Id. at 976 n.2.
79. See id. at 976.
80. 487 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
81. Id. at 323.
82. Id. at 324.
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83for trial . In favor of their second argument, Appellants cited the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure for granting summary judgment stating, summary
judgment will be rendered if the "pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."" Therefore, the
moving party has the burden of proving there is no genuine issue of material
fact for trial.1
5
Appellants used Holl v. Talcott 6 to illustrate this point. 7 Holl was a
medical malpractice action where the petitioner claimed she suffered
complications due to the negligence of her surgeons and others.88 Here, the
Supreme Court of Florida discussed experts' affidavits and the alleged
deficiencies of such when offered by respondents in support of summary
judgment.89 In fact, the court found the respondents' affidavits did not
demonstrate conclusively that the respondents were not npgligent and
therefore, they were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore,
the respondents, as movants, did not meet their burden and this being so, the
sufficiency of the petitioner's affidavit should never have been reached. 91
Using these arguments, Appellants clarified that they were not alleging
that Appellee's conduct was designed or actually intended to result in
serious bodily injury or death.92 Instead, they claimed that intentional acts
by Appellee, perhaps motivated by business concerns, were substantially
certain to cause harm, and the experts' testimony explains the conditions
that support this position. 93 Additionally, all inferences must be resolved in
favor of the non-moving party. 94 Thus, the affidavits illuminated material
issues of objective intent and substantial certainty that can only be resolved
at trial.95
83. Initial Brief of Appellants at 16, Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2000)
(No. 94,468).
84. Id. (citing FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.5 10).
85. Id. at 16-17.
86. 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1966).
87. Initial Brief of Appellants at 16, Turner (No. 94,468).
88. Holl, 191 So. 2d at 42.
89. Id. at 44-45.
90. Id. at 45.
91. Id.
92. Initial Brief of Appellants at 19, Turner (No. 94,468).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 20.
95. See id. at 27.
[Vol. 25:365
374
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss1/1
Fontana
VI. THE APPELLEE URGES THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA TO ANSWER
THE CERTIFIED QUESTION IN THE NEGATIVE
In response to the Appellants' arguments, PCR acknowledged
disagreement with much of the Appellants' statement of the facts and
claimed Appellants' version was not supported by the record.9 Appellee's
main arguments consisted of: first, an affidavit from a scientific expert does
not preclude summary judgment if the affidavit does not create a dispute as
to a material issue of fact; and second, a conclusory affidavit is insufficient
to create a factual issue as to an intentional tort.
97
Supporting the first argument, Appellee stated the affidavits opposing
summary judgment must demonstrate the existence of a material issue of
fact. 9s To determine this, it is necessa97 to judge the affidavits against the
standard forroving an intentional tort. This is not contrary to Appellants'
arguments.luo However, Appellee stated the issue was whether the employer
committed an intentional tort against its employees.10' Proving this required
evidence suggesting that the employer had actual subjective knowledge that
its conduct was substantially certain to cause injury or death.1°2 Therefore,
to create a material issue of fact, the experts' affidavits must provide
evidence that the employer subjectively knew this result was substantially
certain to occur and set forth facts supporting this claim.
0 3
Appellee admitted that the affidavits in question could be used to
establish that the employer knowingly created an unsafe workplace. 1' 4
However, Appellee claimed that, in order to defeat a motion for summary
judgment, the affidavit must show that the employer knew that his or her
conduct was substantially certain to result in injury or death. 05 Therefore,
because Appellants failed to show actual knowledge on the part of the
employer as to the consequences of its acts, the affidavits were insufficient
to defeat summary judgment. 106
96. Respondent's Answer Brief on Merits at 3, Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683
(Fla. 2000) (No. 94,468).
97. Id. at 9,15.
98. Id. at9.
99. Id. at 10.
100. See Initial Brief of Appellants at 18-21, Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla.
2000) (No. 94,468).
101. Respondent's Answer Brief on Merits at 7, Turner (No. 94,468).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 8.
105. Id. at 15.
106. Respondent's Answer Brief on Merits at 8, Turner (No. 94,468).
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Supporting its second argument, Appellee stated Florida courts have
held that conclusory affidavits are insufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact. 10 7  For example, Appellee cited Clark v. Gumby's Pizza
Systems, Inc.,108 where the plaintiff-employee alleged that the employer
knew with substantial certainty one of its employees would be assaulted
while delivering pizza to a particular college campus at night. 1' The First
District Court of Appeal in Clark stated, "conclusory allegations of
'substantial certainty' do not raise otherwise insufficient allegations of fact
to the level of [an] intentional tort."" Important in Clark is the court's
definition of substantial certainty. There, the court cited Fisher, equating
substantial certainty with virtual certainty."' Therefore, the affidavit in
Clark was ineffective because it did not provide facts supporting a level of
virtual certainty on the part of the employer. 1 2 Likewise, considering the
court's prior holding regarding substantial certainty as virtually sure,
Appellee argued the affidavits of Appellants' experts did not provide facts
supporting this claim.
113
Appellants replied, stating that Appellee misinterpreted the alternative
bases for showing an employer had the requisite intent to prove the
commission of an intentional tort and actual subjective knowledge was not
required under the substantial certainty test."14  As a result, the Supreme
Court of Florida decided a clarification of this issue was necessary; whether
actual subjective knowledge of the employer was required to find intent, and
refrained from addressing the certified question."
15
VII. THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA DECLINES TO ADDRESS THE
CERTIFIED QUESTION & ALTERNATIVELY DECIDES PROOF NEEDED FOR
INTENTIONAL TORT EXCEPTION
The Supreme Court of Florida declined to address the certified
question.1 6 Instead, the court clarified what a claimant-employee must showwhen attempting to prove the commission of an intentional tort, thereby
107. Id. at 15.
108. 674 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
109. Respondent's Answer Brief on Merits at 16, Turner (No. 94,468).
110. Clark, 674 So. 2d at 904.
Ili. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Respondent's Answer Brief on Merits at 23, Turner (No. 94,468).
114. Reply Brief of Appellants at 1, Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2000)
(No. 94,468).
115. Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683, 684 (Fla. 2000).
116. Id. at 684.
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disallowing an employer from invoking an otherwise valid workers'
compensation immunity defense. 1 7 Neither argument made by Appellants
nor Appellee claimed expert testimony should be completely disregarded in
summary judgment proceedings. 18 As previously noted, the Appellee
essentially addressed the underlying issue implying that if actual knowledge
requiring an inquiry into the subjective state of mind of the employer is
necessary to prove an intentional tort, an expert's opinion that does not
address the actual knowledge issue is of little use in creating a genuine issue
of material fact. 9 Noting this line of thought, the court cited previous
decisions setting forth two alternative bases for proving an intentional tort,
including one allowing an objective finding of intent based on a reasonable
person standard. 120
A. The Objective vs. Subjective Standard
The Supreme Court of Florida in Fisher set forth the disjunctive two
part test for proving an intentional tort.121 The court takes note that
Appellants do not claim that Appellee acted with deliberate malice toward
them. Therefore, the first part of the Fisher test is not at issue.'2 Instead,
Appellants claimed the conduct of Appellee fell under the second part of the
Fisher test- Appellee engaged in acts substantially certain to result in injury
or death.12 Thus, the court decided the issue was whether a subjective or
objective standard is appropriate for judging the conduct of an employer
under the second part of the Fisher test.'2
An objective standard requires an analysis of the facts of a case to
determine if the employer's conduct was substantially certain to result in
injury or death.' 26  The employer's actual intention to harm is not
determinative.127  The court pointed out that if subjective intent were
required under the second part of the Fisher test, there would be no
alternative basis for recovery against an employer.12 A consequence of this
117. Id.
118. See Initial Brief of Appellants at 11, Turner v. PCR, Inc. 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla.
2000) (No. 94,468); Respondent's Answer Brief on Merits at 7, Turner (No. 94,468).
119. Respondent's Answer Brief on Merits at 7-8, Turner (No. 94,468).
120. Turner, 754 So. 2d at 688.
121. Id. at 687; see supra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
122. Turner, 754 So. 2d at 688.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 688-89.
126. Id. at 688.
127. Turner, 754 So. 2d at 688.
128. Id.
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holding would be that an employee could only recover in those situations
where the employer actually intended to harm the employee.'2 9 In fact, in
many previous cases, Florida courts held the employer must subjectively
know that injury or death was virtually certain to rise to the level of an
intentional tort.
130
However, the Supreme Court of Florida in Turner attributed the second
part of the Fisher test to Spivey v. Battaglia,131 where it held if a reasonable
person would believe a particular result was substantially certain to follow,
the law finds he intended it.' 32 Therefore, intention may be imputed where
the facts indicate a reasonable person in the employer's position would
realize or should have realized certain acts were substantially certain to
cause injury.33  In other words, proving intent under the second part of
Fisher requires evidence showing conduct which a reasonable person in the
employer's position should know is substantially certain to result in injury or
death. '
B. Virtual vs. Substantial Certainty
The court recognized that in previous cases, particularly Fisher and
Lawton, it declined to answer explicitly whether an intentional tort was a
valid exception to workers' compensation immunity.13' As stated earlier,
this was due to the complainant's failure to allege a prima facie case of an
intentional tort.136 Specifically, both cases spoke of "probable injury" when
in fact, substantial certainty is required. 137 Presenting evidence in support of
an objective finding of intent requires an understanding of what "substantial
certainty" means. The court recedes from equating substantial certainty with
129. Id.
130. See Fisher v. Shenandoah Gen. Constr. Co., 498 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1986); Lawton
v. Alpine Eng'rd Prods., Inc., 498 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1986); Kenann & Sons Demolition, Inc. v.
Dipaolo, 653 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); UPS v. Welsh, 659 So. 2d 1234 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
131. 258 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1972).
132. Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683, 688 (Fla. 2000) (citing Spivey, 258 So. 2d at
817). The court cited and relied upon the Second Restatement of Torts when forming the basis
for its holding. Id.
133. Spivey, 258 So. 2d at 816-17.
134. See id.; Fisher v. Shenandoah Gen. Constr. Co., 498 So. 2d 882, 883 (Fla. 1986).
135. Turner, 754 So. 2d at 687; Fisher, 498 So. 2d at 883; Lawton v. Alpine Eng'rd
Prods., Inc., 498 So. 2d 879, 880 (Fla. 1986).
136. Turner, 754 So. 2d at 687.
137. Id.
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virtual certainty, and explains the concept as something greater than gross
negligence but less than being virtually sure. 
38
In Turner, the court hinted that substantial certainty may be something
closer to "culpable negligence." 139 Citing Eller v. Shova,'40 the Supreme
Court of Florida defined culpable negligence as "reckless indifference" or
"grossly careless disregard" of human life.141 The court considers culpable
negligence greater than gross negligencd, but it is clear the distinction
involves a matter of degree. 142 Some clues to the type of conduct or
circumstances supporting a finding of substantial certainty are provided by
two cases cited in this opinion.
In Connelly v. Arrow Air, Inc.,143 the Third District Court of Appeal
reversed summary judgment based on the workers' compensation immunity
defense for an employer airline.'" The court stated:
It is quite reasonable to conclude, as a matter of law, that a
passenger aircraft which is routinely overloaded and poorly
maintained, with known mechanical deficiencies including a
leaking hydraulic system, regular engine stalls, overheating, and
faulty thrust reversers, will--to a substantial certainty-eventually
succumb to the incessant forces of gravity causing serious injury to,
or the death of, those aboard.1
45
Furthermore, the facts of Connelly suggested that the airline withheld
knowledge of the defects and hazards from its employees so they were not
permitted to exercise an informed judgment of whether to perform their
assigned duties.14
Likewise, in Cunningham v. Anchor Hocking Corp.,'47 the First District
Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment for the employer. 14 The
allegations and supporting evidence in this case described a situation where
a glass manufacturer, the employer, diverted the smokestack of the plant's
exhaust system allowing toxic fumes to flow into, rather than out of the
working environment, and periodically turned off the ventilation system,
138. Id. at 687 n.4.
139. Id. at 687 n.3.
140. 630 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1993).
141. Turner, 754 So. 2d at 687 n.3.
142. See Eller, 630 So. 2d at 541 n.3.
143. 568 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
144. Id. at451.
145. Id.; see Turner, 754 So. 2d at 690-91.
146. Connelly, 568 So. 2d at 451; Turner, 754 So. 2d at 691.
147. 558 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1990).
148. Id. at 100.
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intensifying the employees' level of exposure. 149 Additionally, they removed
warning labels from chemical containers, misrepresented the nature of toxic
substances, and ignored the need for safety equipment. 50 Therefore, the
repeated and continuous exposure, intentionally increased and worsened by
the employer, supported the employees' contention that injury was
substantially certain to occur.' 51 Thus, these actions supported an intentional
tort cause of action.15z Of note, in both cases there was evidence that the
deliberate actions or omissions of the employer were done to increase profits
at the expense of employee safety.153
The facts of Turner are similar to Connelly and Cunningham. In
Turner, the court specifically stated the alleged conduct of PCR, if proven,
was at least as disturbing. 54 Appellants' experts claimed that serious danger
existed due to the known hazardous activity involved, based on personal
knowledge obtained through their investigation. 155 Additionally, the experts
offered evidence of at least three other explosions that occurred at the plant
in less than two years involving a chemical used in the fatal November 22
explosion. 56 Furthermore, the evidence suggested that PCR intentionally
stepped up production, intentionally disregarded the safety of its employees,
and failed to warn them of the highly explosive nature of TFE, in order to
meet an approaching deadline and increase profits. 57 Significantly, like
Connelly and Cunningham, this case "share[s] a common thread of evidence
that the employer tried to cover up the danger, affording the employees no
means to make a reasonable decision as to their actions." r
Once an act by an employer is considered actually or constructively
intentional and results in harm to an employee, the court stated such an event
should not be covered under workers' compensation immunity for the
following reasons. 59 First, under the statute, compensation is payable for
accidental disability or death arising out of and in the course of
employment. 6° Furthermore, an accident is defined as an unexpected or
149. Id. at 95-97; Turner, 754 So. 2d at 690.
150. Cunningham, 558 So. 2d at 96; Turner, 754 So. 2d at 690.
151. Cunningham, 558 So. 2d at 97.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 96; Connelly v. Arrow Air, Inc., 568 So. 2d 448, 449 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1990).
154. Turner, 754 So. 2d at 690.
155. See id.
156. Id. at 691.
157. See id. at 690-91.
158. Id. at 691.
159. Turner, 754 So. 2d at 689.
160. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 440.09(1) (2000).
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unusual happening or event, occurring suddenly. 61 Therefore, the court
pointed out that if an event is substantially certain to occur as the result of an
employer's act, then it is neither unexpected nor.unusual and thus, does not
meet the definition of an accident under the Workers' Compensation Act.1
62
Finally, the court stressed that workers' compensation is not intended to
shield employers from liability for intentional torts and is not to be construed
in favor of the employer or the employee.163 The existence of "workers'
compensation should not affect the pleading or proof of an intentional
tort." 16 In sum, the workers' compensation immunity defense is not
intended to block intentional tort suits at the summary judgment phase.' 65
VIII. OPINION
A. Surviving Summary Judgment
This decision by the Supreme Court of Florida is a logical and well-
reasoned summary of the alternative bases available to prove the commission
of an intentional tort resulting in injury to an employee. The court points out
that it makes good public policy to hold employers responsible for
intentional conduct resulting in injury. 166 The decision provides a road map
for plaintiffs' attorneys filing claims under this exception.
To get a claim to trial successfully, it is necessary to allege either the
employer committed intentional acts designed to harm the employee and/or
alternatively, committed intentional acts the employer should have known
were substantially certain to cause harm' 7  This case, unlike previous
cases, survived summary judgment because substantial certainty of harm was
alleged and sul ported with credible evidence thereby creating an issue of
material fact.
1
B. Defining Substantial Certainty
An understanding of what is meant by "intent" and "substantial
certainty" is important when pleading an intentional tort exception. An actor
161. § 440.02(1).
162. Turner, 754 So. 2d at 689.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See id.
167. See Turner, 754 So. 2d at 688-89.
168. Compare Fisher v. Shenandoah Gen. Constr. Co., 498 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1986),
with Lawton v. Alpine Eng'rd Prods., Inc., 498 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1986).
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manifests intent when he or she desires to cause the consequences of the
act. 169 However, if the actor knows, or should know, the consequences of his
or her actions are substantially certain to occur and still proceeds, the law
treats the actor as having intended to produce the result.
170
Proving substantial certainty may be difficult. Acquiring an
understanding of what substantial certainty means is important when setting
forth the facts of the case. No bright line rule currently exists defining
substantial certainty. However, the court provided a few excellent clues
regarding what sort of evidence may support a finding of substantial
certainty on the part of the employer. First, the court states it has retreated
from a requirement of virtual certainty." What is virtual certainty?
Perhaps the simplest interpretation is also the most common. In everyday
terms, the meaning of virtual is "almost entirely," "nearly," or "for all
practical purposes.' '173 Applying this plain or common meaning, one could
say he or she is virtually sure of something if for all practical purposes it is
inevitable. In essence, this probably means as close as one can come to
being completely certain about something in an uncertain world. Now, it
appears something less than this may do.177
In contrast, the court now states substantial certainty will suffice.
Again, looking to the common meaning of the word "substantial,"
interpretations include: "considerable in quantity," "significantly great," or
"largely but not wholly that which is specified." 76 Yet, what is large or
significant in terms of certainty? Most reasonably, this can only be
determined on a case by case basis, allowing flexibility in weighing the
various social policies involved.177 It is the quantum of evidence, provided
by the particular circumstances surrounding the event, that allows a finding
of substantial certainty. For instance, looking to cases surviving this issue, it
appears that evidence eliciting particular behavior is especially
condemning.1
78
169. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b (1965).
170. Id.
171. Turner, 754 So. 2d at 689-91.
172. Id. at 687-88 n.4.
173. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1320 (10th ed. 1993).
174. Turner, 754 So. 2d at 687-88 n.4.
175. Id.
176. MERRIAM-WEBSTER's COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 173, at 1174.
177. Shannan Clare Sweeney, The Intentional Act Exception to the Exclusivity of
Workers' Compensation, 44 LA. L. REv. 1507, 1516 (1984).
178. See Cunningham v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 558 So. 2d 93, 96-97 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1990); see also Connelly v. Arrow Air, Inc., 568 So. 2d 448, 451 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1990).
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The following circumstances may support a finding of an employer's
substantial certainty of inevitable harm. First, a hazardous work
environment existed at the time the harm occurred.'79 Second, prior to the
harmful incident, the employer engaged in intentional or deliberate acts or
omissions which created or increased the danger of harm to employees.180
Third, the employer willfully withheld facts from employees concerning the
hazards.'8 ' Fourth, the employer provided no reasonable defense for its
conduct. 182 Finallyr, the employer exhibited behavior placing profits before
employee safety.1 3 Therefore, the quantity and quality of the evidence
eliciting the employer's acts and motivations must present a set of
circumstances supporting a finding that a reasonable employer would know
its acts were substantially certain to cause harm.
C. Procedural Considerations
When an employee brings a tort action against his or her employer, the
employer must plead the workers' compensation statute as a defense.'8 In
other words, the employer must claim workers' compensation immunity. The
employer has the burden to prove: first, the employee was subject to the
workers' compensation act; and second, the act is the employee's exclusive
remedy. 15  However, an employer is relieved of this burden in three
situations. The employer does not need affirmative proof when: 1) the
employment relationship is apparent; 2) a worker admits the injury occurred
during employment; and 3) when the employee prosecutes a claim and
accepts compensation. 86
On the other hand, when the employee's complaint alleges facts
admitting coverage under workers' compensation, the complaint must also
allege facts showing an exception to the statute applies.187 For instance, if
the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to apply the intentional tort
exception, no civil action will lie and the complaint is subject to a general
demurrer. 88 This pleading requirement is jurisdictionally based."' The trial
court lacks jurisdiction if the complaint does not allege facts supporting a
179. Cunningham, 558 So. 2d at 95; Connelly, 568 So. 2d at 451.
180. Cunningham, 558 So. 2d at 96; Connelly, 568 So. 2d at 449-51.
181. Cunningham, 558 So. 2d at 96; Connelly, 568 So. 2d at 451.
182. See Cunningham, 558 So. 2d at 95-97; see also Connelly, 568 So. 2d at 449-51.
183. Cunningham, 558 So. 2d at 96; Connelly, 568 So. 2d at 449.
184. 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers' Compensation § 90 (1992).
185. Id.
186. Id.; DUBREUIL, supra note 14, § 3.01[b][iii].
187. 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers' Compensation § 90 (1992).
188. Id.
189. Id.
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civil action. 9' Therefore, the action must be dismissed and workers'
compensation law will apply. 91
Notice, Appellants argued that Appellee did not meet its burden of
proof.'92 Applying the above rule to sustain a motion to dismiss, Appellee
had the burden to prove the employee was subject to workers' compensation
law, and the intentional tort exception did not apply. Additionally,
Appellants had to state sufficient facts in their complaint to assert an
intentional tort exception. Appellants met their burden with the assistance of
expert opinions.193 On the other hand, Appellee failed to show conclusively
that the intentional tort exception did not apply. 194 Appellee's only hope was
that the Fisher test would be read narrowly, and the court would support an
"actual knowledge" theory or hold with the "virtual certainty" standard.
Unfortunately, for Appellee, the court did neither.195
Allowing an objective finding of intent based upon substantial certainty
of harm, if pled correctly and supported by evidence, may allow more claims
to get past the summary judgment phase. This may encourage more claims
as employees attempt to evade the exclusivity provision of workers'
compensation. Considering the costs of litigation, this is a significant
concern to employers. The hope is that employers will consider the potential
liability and reexamine their workplace practices. Ideally, the decision will
prevent or discourage employers from turning a blind eye toward workplace
safety.1
96
IX. CONCLUSION
Common sense tells us successfully creating and maintaining a safe
work environment requires both employers' and employees' participation. It
is clear employers have a recognized moral duty to refrain from conduct
placing employees in danger. Now employers are also legally accountable
for objectively intentional conduct resulting in harm.197 However, in many
cases employees are sometimes in the best position to recognize potential
hazards and determine what needs to be done to improve or prevent a
dangerous situation. Therefore, to remain true to the original intent of the
190. Id.
191. See id.
192. Initial Brief of Appellants at 22, Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2000)
(No. 94,468).
193. Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683, 691 (Fla. 2000).
194. See id. at 691.
195. See id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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Florida legislature, so as not to construe the law in favor of the employer or
employee, perhaps we should apply a similar standard to employees' conduct
that is substantially certain to cause harm to themselves and others.19s If
employees may sue their employer for imputed objective intentional harm,
then allowing an employer to withhold benefits or defend on the basis of an
employee's similar conduct may only be fair. Imposing responsibility into a
system immune from blame may be beneficial.
Theresa J. Fontana
198. FLA. STAT. § 440.015 (2000) (discussing the legislature's intent that the Workers'
Compensation Act is not to be construed in favor of the employer or employee).
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